TY - RPRT AN - 00040620 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - SPECIAL STUDY, TRAIN ACCIDENTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE 'NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES' PY - 1972/05/24 SP - 27 p. AB - The report identifies and ranks the leading causes of train accidents attributed to the negligence of employees for the period 1961-1970. Analyses of the leading accident causes are performed to explore contributory factors such as rules, rule enforcement procedures, equipment design or maintenance, and environment. The relationship between accidents attributed to employee negligence and employee training, railroad safety efforts, the financial condition of the industry, and organized labor's role in advancing safety is discussed. A recommendation is directed to the Federal Railroad Administration to analyze the identified leading accident causes and to take appropriate corrective action. Safety Board recommendations from previous accident reports and special studies are reiterated as applicable to the circumstances identified in the report. (Author) KW - Behavior KW - Crash investigation KW - Crashes KW - Employees KW - Negligence KW - Personnel KW - Railroad trains KW - Safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/7744 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00222052 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - TRAIN ACCIDENTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE "NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES" PY - 1972/05 AB - THE REPORT IDENTIFIES AND RANKS THE LEADING CAUSES OF TRAIN ACCIDENTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES FOR THE PERIOD 1961-1970. ANALYSES OF THE LEADING ACCIDENT CAUSES ARE PERFORMED TO EXPLORE CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS SUCH AS RULES, RULE ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES, EQUIPMENT DESIGN OR MAINTENANCE, AND ENVIRONMENT. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACCIDENTS ATTRIBUTED TO EMPLOYEE NEGLIGENCE AND EMPLOYEE TRAINING, RAILROAD SAFETY EFFORTS, THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE INDUSTRY, AND ORGANIZED LABOR'S ROLE IN ADVANCING SAFETY IS DISCUSSED. A RECOMMENDATION IS DIRECTED TO THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION TO ANALYZE THE IDENTIFIED LEADING ACCIDENT CAUSES AND TO TAKE APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION. SAFETY BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS FROM PREVIOUS ACCIDENT REPORTS AND SPECIAL STUDIES ARE REITERATED AS APPLICABLE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES IDENTIFIED IN THIS REPORT. KW - Crash causes KW - Human factors KW - Personnel KW - Railroad transportation KW - Regulations KW - Systems analysis UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/114242 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00224165 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO PIPELINE SAFETY-SPECIAL STUDY PY - 1972/05 SP - 13 p. AB - THE STUDY DISCUSSES THE NEED FOR AND THE BENEFITS TO BE OBTAINED BY USING SYSTEM SAFETY TECHNIQUES IN THE PIPELINE INDUSTRY. PAST PIPELINE ACCIDENTS ARE REVIEWED, AND IT IS POINTED OUT THAT ANALYSIS OF THE HAZARDS IN THE PIPELINE SYSTEMS PRIOR TO THE ACCIDENTS WOULD HAVE IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS WHICH EVENTUALLY RESULTED IN THE ACCIDENTS. THE APPROACH, WHICH WAS DEVELOPED FOR USE IN THE AEROSPACE AND AVIATION FIELDS, HAS PROVED TO BE EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE AND IS NOW BEING ADAPTED TO MANY OTHER AREAS. THE SURFACE MODES OF TRANSPORTATION HAVE THE GREATEST NEED FOR THESE TECHNIQUES. THE STUDY ALSO DESCRIBES SYSTEM SAFETY, AND HOW IT CAN BE IMPLEMENTED. KW - Crash investigation KW - Hazards KW - Pipelines KW - Safety KW - System safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/112418 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00039863 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT. BURLINGTON NORTHERN INCORPORATED, DERAILMENT OF EXTRA 5701 EAST AT SHERIDAN, WYOMING. MARCH 28, 1971 PY - 1972/04/26 SP - 31 p. AB - Burlington Northern Extra 5701 East, approaching Sheridan Yard, Sheridan, Wyoming, on the morning of March 28, 1971, called the Yard Office for a track on which to deliver the train. The main track was assigned, but as the approach was continued, cars were sighted standing on the main track. The cars were sighted too late. The train did not stop, and there was a collision. The engineer and fireman were killed, two brakemen were injured, and three diesel units and eleven cars were derailed. (Author) KW - BNSF Railway KW - Casualties KW - Crash investigation KW - Crashes KW - Derailments KW - Railroad trains KW - Sheridan (Wyoming) KW - U.S. National Transportation Safety Board KW - Wyoming UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/7413 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00221956 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORT - SCHOOLBUS/AUTOMOBILE COLLISION AND FIRE, NEAR RESTON VIRGINIA - FEBRUARY 29, 1972 PY - 1972/04/12 SP - 34 p. AB - ON FEBRUARY 29, 1972, A 1961 SEDAN RAN A STOP SIGN AT AN INTERSECTION IN FAIRFAX COUNTY, NEAR RESTON, VIRGINIA, AND COLLIDED WITH A FAIRFAX COUNTY SCHOOLBUS WITH FOUR CHILDREN ABOARD. THE HIGHWAY, ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS, AND VEHICLE CONDITION WERE NOT FACTORS IN THIS ACCIDENT. /NTIS/ KW - Crash investigation KW - Crashes KW - Intersections KW - Motor vehicle accidents KW - School buses KW - Traffic crashes UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/111720 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00224172 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - BICYCLE USE AS A HIGHWAY SAFETY PROBLEM. SPECIAL STUDY PY - 1972/04 SP - 21 p. AB - THE REPORT REVIEWS THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM, AND EMPHASIZES THAT THE MAJORITY OF LOSSES AND INJURIES ARE AMONG CHILDREN 5 TO 14 YEARS OLD. IN EACH OF THE PAST 3 YEARS, 800 OR MORE FATALITIES OCCURED IN COLLISIONS BETWEEN BICYCLES AND MOTOR CARS. THE STATUS OF KNOWLEDGE IS REVIEWED, AND THE MEAGERNESS OF THIS KNOWLEDGE IS POINTED UP. THE NEED FOR MUCH MORE STUDY IS PART OF THE PROBLEM. NO CLEARLY FEASIBLE AND EFFECTIVE COUNTERMEASURES ARE READILY AT HAND. THE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (NHTSA) ARE REVIEWED BRIEFLY, AND THE VERY LIMITED ACTIONS. THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE ARE REVIEWED BRIEFLY. RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE THAT NHTSA: (1) EXPLORE AND DEVELOP EFFECTIVE METHODS OF INTEGRATING TRAINING OF YOUNG PEOPLE FOR BICYCLE OPERATION AND AUTOMOBILE DRIVING; (2) IF (1) IS SUCCESSFUL, PROMULGATE A HIGHWAY SAFETY PROGRAM STANDARD TO IMPLEMENT IT; AND (3) COORDINATE ITS BICYCLE SAFETY EFFORTS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE (DHEW), PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO BICYCLE DESIGN. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT DHEW'S RESEARCH FOCUS ON INJURY POTENTIAL OF SPECIFIC DESIGN FEATURES AS WELL AS OPERATOR BEHAVIOR ASSOCIATED WITH SPECIFIC FEATURES. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION (FHWA) AND NHTSA BE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION'S EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE THE USE OF BICYCLES TO ASSURE THAT SAFETY IS GIVEN FULL CONSIDERATION. /AUTHOR/ KW - Age KW - Bicycles KW - Crashes KW - Fatalities KW - Injuries KW - Safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/112422 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00039862 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT. PENN CENTRAL COMPANY. ELECTROCUTION OF JUVENILE TRESPASSER ON PENN CENTRAL TRACKS AT WASHINGTON, D. C. MAY 14, 1971 PY - 1972/03/29 SP - 25 p. AB - On May 14, 1971, a male juvenile climbed on top of a draft of freight cars which had been left temporarily adjacent to the Penn Central Sixth Street Yard, Washington, D. C., and was electrocuted when he contacted the electrified catenary system. Within minutes thereafter, a police officer was seriously burned and knocked from the top of an adjacent car when he attempted to reach the stricken youth. The youth was apparently killed outright, but the police officer survived. There are few effective warning indicators in and around the accident area and no barriers that would discourage trespassers. Compounding the hazard in the area is a parking lot on which children congregate to play. There are no positive separation barriers between the railroad and the parking lot. Also prominent in causal factors to the injury of the policeman is the practice of Penn Central of immediately restoring an actuated circuit breaker when the cause of actuation is not known. (Author) KW - Adolescents KW - Crash investigation KW - Crashes KW - Electric current KW - Electrical shock KW - Electrocution KW - Fatalities KW - Railroad crashes KW - Railroad electrification KW - Railroad trains KW - U.S. National Transportation Safety Board UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/7412 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00034661 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - ANALYSIS OF THE SAFETY OF TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ON THE NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES PY - 1972/03/15 SP - 28 p. AB - The report analyzes the safety of transportation of bulk hazardous materials on the navigable waters of the United States. Typical hazardous materials (H.M.) accidents are analyzed to determine what countermeasures are necessary to prevent recurrence. Risks involved in the transportation of H.M. are analyzed, with priority given to prevention of catastrophic accidents. The ingredients necessary for the occurrence of a catastrophic H.M. incident are discussed, and the risk peaks leading to the casualty are analyzed. Federal regulatory authority over the transportation of H.M. by water is summarized. Projects of the future shipment of H.M., and trends in H.M. accidents are made. The report concludes with a summary of areas of control of H.M. needed to prevent major H.M. accidents, and recommendations made to implement these added controls. KW - Hazardous materials KW - Hazardous materials transportation KW - Inland waterways traffic KW - Marine transit KW - Prevention KW - Risk analysis KW - Safety KW - Transportation UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/4527 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00221951 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - AIRPORT POLICE CRUISER-AUTOMOBILE COLLISION ON DULLES AIRPORT ACCESS ROAD, EXIT NO. 1, NEAR CHANTILLY, VIRGINIA, APRIL 22, 1971 PY - 1972/03/15 SP - 30 p. AB - AN EASTBOUND DULLES AIRPORT POLICE CRUISER STOPPED ON THE EXIT RAMP IN RESPONSE TO A SIGNAL FROM THE DRIVER OF A TRUCK. AN EASTBOUND PASSENGER AUTOMOBILE WAS APPROACHING THE EXIT RAMP. THE DRIVER, DISTRACTED BY THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TRUCK, OBSERVED THE POLICE CRUISER, APPLIED THE BRAKES, AND STRUCK IT IN THE REAR. UPON IMPACT, THE FUEL TANK OF THE POLICE CAR DEVELOPED A LEAK RESULTING IN A FIRE. ALSO, AS A RESULT OF THE IMPACT, THE TWO POLICE OFFICERS WERE THROWN BACK AGAINST THE FRONT SEAT CAUSING THE ANCHORAGE SYSTEM TO FAIL AND SEAT BACK TO BEND REARWARD. THE POLICE CRUISER WAS TOTALLY DESTROYED BY THE FIRE. THE OCCUPANTS OF BOTH VEHICLES RECEIVED MINOR INJURIES. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DETERMINES THAT THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS COLLISION WAS THE COMBINATION OF THE UNNECESSARY STOPPING OF THE POLICE CRUISER ON THE TRAVELLED LANE OF THE EXIT RAMP AND THE DISTRACTION OF THE ATTENTION OF THE DRIVER OF THE AUTOMOBILE TO HER PRIMARY DRIVING TASK. /AUTHOR/ KW - Crash injury research KW - Crash investigation KW - Crashes KW - Motor vehicle accidents KW - Research KW - Traffic crashes UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/111716 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00037107 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT. DERAILMENT OF TOLEDO, PEORIA AND WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY'S TRAIN NO. 20 WITH RESULTANT FIRE AND TANK CAR RUPTURES, CRESCENT CITY, ILLINOIS, JUNE 21, 1970 PY - 1972/03/02 SP - 47 p. AB - Train No. 20, an eastbound freight train of the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railroad Company, consisting of a four-unit diesel-electric locomotive and 109 cars derailed the 20th to the 34th cars, inclusive, at the west switch of the siding in Crescent City, Illinois, at about 6:30 a.m. on June 21, 1970. Included in the 15 derailed cars were nine tank cars loaded with liquefied petroleum gas. During the derailment one of the tank cars was punctured, and the leaking propane was immediately ignited, engulfing the other tank cars in the fire. A series of explosions of the remaining tank cars occurred, beginning about 1 hour following the derailment, resulting in the injury of 66 persons and the destruction of a number of buildings within the town of Crescent City. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the breaking of the L-4 journal of CB and O 182544, the 20th car, due to excessive overheating, which permitted the truck side to drop to the track and derail the leading wheels of the car. The cause of the overheating could not be determined. (Author) KW - Crash causes KW - Crash investigation KW - Crash reports KW - Derailments KW - Explosions KW - Fires KW - Hazardous materials KW - Liquefied petroleum gas KW - Overheating KW - Railroad trains KW - Tank cars UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/5642 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00226308 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - SPECIAL STUDY-SIGNALS AND OPERATING RULES AS CASUAL FACTORS IN TRAIN ACCIDENTS PY - 1972/03 AB - RAILROAD SIGNAL SYSTEMS, EVEN THROUGH PERFORMING AS DESIGNED, DO NOT COMPENSATE FOR HUMAN FAILURE AND PREVENT ACCIDENTS. MANY COLLISIONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEES RESULT FROM LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATING RULES WHICH DO NOT RELATE COMPATIBLY WITH THE SIGNAL SYSTEMS. A RELATIONSHIP IS DEVELOPED BETWEEN SIGNAL SYSTEMS, OPERATING RULES, AND THE HUMAN ELEMENT THAT IS RESPONSIVE TO BOTH. SPECIFIC CASES ARE CITED IN WHICH THE DISCREPANCIES ARE EXPOSED AND EXAMINED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE FOREGOING. RECOMMENDATIONS ARE DIRECTED TO THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION THAT THEY TAKE STEPS UNDER THE INCREASED SCOPE OF AUTHORITY OF THE FEDERAL RAILROAD SAFETY ACT OF 1970, TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM FOR FUTURE REQUIREMENTS IN SIGNAL SYSTEMS AND OPEATING RULES THAT WILL REDUCE OR ELIMINATE THE PRESENT AMBIGUITIES AND LAX, ILL-DEFINED OPERATING RULES. /AUTHOR/ KW - Human factors KW - Negligence KW - Prevention KW - Railroad signals KW - Regulations KW - Safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/115141 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00044000 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - PROTECTION OF TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES AGAINST EARTHQUAKES PY - 1972/02/18 SP - 41 p. AB - This study is an examination of federal involvement in the earthquake field, specifically in the transportation field. The report discusses the need for reexamination of the criteria used in the design of transportation structures, stepped-up earthquake-related programs, and better coordination between federal agencies. It also discusses earthquake history in the United States, existing standards for earthquake-resistant design and construction of transportation systems, and possible modifications to existing transportation structures. KW - Bridges KW - Earthquakes KW - Safety KW - Structures KW - Tunnels UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/8581 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00209743 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - PROTECTION OF TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES AGAINST EARTHQUAKES PY - 1972/02/08 SP - 41 p. AB - THIS EXAMINATION OF FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE EARTHQUAKE FIELD, SPECIFICALLY IN RELATION TO TRANSPORTATION, ASSESSES THE CRITERIA USED IN THE DESIGN OF TRANSPORTATION STURCTUES, EARTHQUAKE-RELATED PROGRAMS, AND COORDINATION BETWEEN FEDERAL AGENCIES. IT ALSO DISCUSSES EARTHQUAKE HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES, EXISTING STANDARDS FOR EARTHQUAKE-RESISTANT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, AND POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING TRANSPORTATION STRUCTURES. KW - Construction KW - Construction safety KW - Construction specifications KW - Design KW - Design criteria KW - Earthquake resistant design KW - Earthquake resistant structures KW - Earthquakes KW - Federal government KW - Specifications KW - Transportation engineering KW - United States UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/94183 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00649683 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - SPECIAL STUDY OF COLLISIONS WITHIN THE NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE PREVENTIVE MEASURES PY - 1972/02/02 SP - 53 p. AB - The report evaluates the causes and the potential results of collisions in the navigable waters of the United States. The evaluation is based upon casualty reports of major collisions for which the National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause and casualty vessel and cargo statistics compiled by the U.S. Coast Guard, Lloyds Register of Shipping, American Bureau of Shipping, U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission, the Water Transport Association, et al. Methods of preventing collisions and minimizing the potential losses resulting from collisions are considered. Fundamental functions of a complete shore-based traffic control system and basic criteria for a shipboard collision avoidance system are proposed. Systems and methods for preventing collisions, which are currently in operation throughout the world, are discussed. In conclusion, the report makes recommendations which will facilitate determining and implementing the most suitable methods and systems for significantly reducing or preventing collisions, and their resultant losses, in the navigable waters of the United States. A selected bibliography is included. KW - Crash avoidance systems KW - Crash causes KW - Prevention KW - Radar KW - Recommendations KW - Shipboard systems KW - Traffic control KW - Water transportation crashes UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/388218 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00035629 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - SPECIAL STUDY OF COLLISIONS WITHIN THE NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES. CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE PREVENTIVE MEASURES, ADOPTED: FEBRUARY 2, 1972. PY - 1972/02/02 SP - 58 p. AB - The report evaluates the causes and the potential results of collisions in the navigable waters of the United States. The evaluation is based upon casualty reports of major collisions for which the National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause and casualty vessel and cargo statistics complied by the U. S. Coast Guard, Lloyds Register of Shipping, American Bureau of Shipping, U. S. Interstate Commerce Commission, the Water Transport Association, et al. Methods of preventing collisions and minimizing the potential losses resulting from collisions are considered. Fundamental functions of a complete shore-based traffic control system and basic criteria for a shipboard collision avoidance system are proposed. Systems and methods for preventing collisions, which are currently in operation throughout the world, are discussed. In conclusion, the report makes recommendations which will facilitate determining and implementing the most suitable methods and systems for significantly reducing or preventing collisions, and their resultant losses, in the navigable waters of the United States. A selected bibliography is included. KW - Collision statistics KW - Crash avoidance systems KW - Crashes KW - Navigational aids KW - Position finding KW - Position fixing KW - Radar KW - Shore based radar KW - Statistics KW - Traffic control UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/5502 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00034653 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - COLLISIONS WITHIN THE NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES--CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE PREVENTIVE MEASURES PY - 1972/02 SP - 58 p. AB - The report evaluates the causes and the potential results of collisions in the navigable waters of the United States. The evaluation is based upon casualty reports of major collisions for which the National Transportation Safety Board determined the probable cause and casualty vessel and cargo statistics compiled by the U.S. Coast Guard, Lloyds Register of Shipping, American Bureau of Shipping, U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission, the Water Transport Association, et al. Methods of preventing collisions and minimizing the potential losses resulting from collisions are considered. Fundamental functions of a complete shore-based traffic control system and basic criteria for a shipboard collision avoidance system are proposed. Systems and methods for preventing collisions, which are currently in operation throughout the world, are discussed. In conclusion, the report makes recommendations which will facilitate determining and implementing the most suitable methods and systems for significantly reducing or preventing collisions, and their resultant losses, in the navigable waters of the United States. A selected bibliography is included. KW - Communication systems KW - Crash avoidance systems KW - Harbor advisory radar KW - Harbors KW - Navigation radar KW - Radar KW - Traffic control KW - Very high frequency KW - Vessel traffic control KW - Vhf communications UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/4520 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00911639 AU - National Transportation Safety Board AU - CANADAIR LTD TI - SAFETY RECOMMENDATION A-72-219 THRU 223: ADOPTED BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD AT ITS OFFICE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. ON THE 13TH DAY OF DECEMBER 1972. PY - 1972 AB - No abstract provided. KW - Air transportation crashes KW - California KW - Crash investigation KW - Sacramento (California) KW - Studies UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/585384 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00041296 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - 1971 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS PY - 1972 SP - 64 p. AB - This 64-page document is the fifth annual report of the Federal body charged with a constant review of safety and accidents involving all modes of transportation. The independent agency made 246 separate recommendations on accident prevention involving railroads, aviation, marine transportation, highways and pipelines. During the year NTSB involved itself in five railroad accidents on which it is issuing final reports. KW - Crash records KW - Crash reports KW - Crashes KW - Prevention KW - Safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/7985 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00056178 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - SPECIAL STUDY. A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO PIPELINE SAFETY. ADOPTED: MAY 25, 1972 PY - 1972 SP - 17 p. AB - Recommendations to the pipeline industry and to the U.S. Department of Transportation concern the use of an approach developed for the aerospace and aviation fields for analysis of system safety to prevent accidents. There are essentially three basic techniques: (1) hazard analysis (addressing the total system from the standpoint of energy sources that can be out of control), (2) logic tree or fault tree analysis (selecting one or more events that cannot be allowed to occur as the undesired event, then further analyzing these events to determine the subevent that could cause the postulated accident), and (3) failure mode and effect analysis (examining each component of the system to determine how it could fail and the impact of that failure upon the system). A review of past pipeline accidents indicates that analysis of the hazards in the pipeline systems prior to the accidents would have identified problems that eventually caused accidents. KW - Environmental impacts KW - Pipeline safety KW - Pollution control KW - Safety engineering UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/16621 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00226666 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD/HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORT ATCHISON TOPEKA AND SANTA FE PASSENGER TRAIN NO 212 COLLISION WITH STILLWATER MILLING COMPANY MOTOR TRUCK AT 116TH STREET NORTH GRADE CROSSING NEAR COLLINSVILLE, OKLAHOMA, APRIL 5, 1971 PY - 1972 SP - 44 p. AB - THE TRUCK STRUCK THE SECOND DIESEL UNIT. THE FIRST CHAIR CAR AND THE REMAINING CARS OF THE PASSENGER TRAIN WERE DERAILED; ONE RAIL CAR OVERTURNED. RAILROAD EMPLOYEES AND PASSENGERS IN THE TRAIN WERE INJURED. TWO PASSENGERS ON THE TRAIN WERE KILLED, AS WAS THE DRIVER OF THE TRUCK, AND 21 PASSENGERS WERE INJURED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT WAS THE FAILURE OF THE DRIVER TO STOP HIS TRUCK PRIOR TO IMPACT WITH THE PASSENGER TRAIN, WHILE CROSSING WARNING SIGNALS WERE INDICATING THE APPROACH OF THE TRAIN. THE DRIVER MISPERCEIVED THE HAZARD PRESENTED BY THE APPROACHING TRAIN. THE CAUSES OF THE FATILITIES AND THE INJURIES ARE ATTRIBUTED TO SPEED OF THE VEHICLES AT IMPACT, SEPARATION AND EXCURSION OF THE TRAIN FROM THE RIGHT- OF-WAY, OVERTURN OF THE RAIL PASSENGER CAR, AND INADEQUATE CRASHWORTHINESS OF THE RAIL PASSENGER COACH AND THE TRUCK. THE REPORT SUGGESTS IMPROVEMENTS IN GRADE CROSSING CONTROLS, EQUIPMENT DESIGN, AND EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES. /HSL/ KW - Crash causes KW - Crash investigation KW - Crashes KW - Crashworthiness KW - Drivers KW - Fatalities KW - Hazard perception KW - Hazards KW - Railroad grade crossings KW - Warning systems UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/112999 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00222057 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - NONOPERATING MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STUDY PY - 1972 SP - 15 p. AB - THE BACKGROUND OF NONOPERATING MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY IS REVIEWED AND THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM IS DISCUSSED. THE STUDY: (1) NOTES THE DIFFICULTY IN IDENTIFYING NONOPERATING HAZARDS BY HARD STATISTICS; (2) SHOWS THE MINUSCULE QUANITY OF DATA AVAILABLE IN USABLE FORM; (3) DISCUSSES NONOPERATING HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS WHICH EXIST IN SOME CONTEMPORARY VEHICLE MODELS; (4) EXAMINES THE STATUTORY ROLE OF THE NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (NHTSA) IN NONOPERATING SAFETY EFFORTS; AND (5) DISCUSSES THE EXPERIMENTAL SAFETY PROGRAM IN RELATION TO NONOPERATING SAFETY FEATURES. THE REPORT CONCLUDES THAT A CONSIDERABLE REDUCTION IN NONOPERATING ACCIDENTS AND INJURIES MIGHT BE ACHIEVED WITH A RELATIVELY SIMPLE ENGINEERING EFFORT. SUCH A POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE BETTER PURSUED BY VOLUNTARY METHODS RATHER THAN MANDATORY STANDARDS, SINCE REDUCING INJURIES HAS LOWER PRIROITY THAN PREVENTING THE LARGE NUMBERS OF FATALITIES WHICH ARE OCCURRING ON THE HIGHWAYS. RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE TO PROVIDE CONSUMER INFORMATION ON NONOPERATING HAZARDS, AND TO ENCOURAGE NONOPERATING SAFETY FEATURES IN EXPERIMENTAL SAFETY VEHICLES. KW - Automobiles KW - Crashes KW - Hazards KW - Safety KW - Safety equipment KW - Safety features KW - Vehicle characteristics UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/111808 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00071755 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION COMPANY FREIGHT TRAIN DERAILMENT PASSENGER TRAIN COLLISION WITH HAZARDOUS MATERIAL CAR, SOUND VIEW, CONNECTICUT, OCTOBER 8, 1970 PY - 1971/12/22 SP - 49 p. AB - At 8:50 p.m., October 8, 1970, Penn Central Transportation Company's freight train derailed near Sound View, Connecticut. Freight cars obstructed track in the path of Penn Central passenger train. The passenger train struck the freight cars, puncturing an LPG tank car designated as "empty." The derailed units of the passenger train passed through ignited gases from the punctured tank car and crossed a railroad bridge. Train crewmembers and passengers were injured. The Safety Board has determined that the probable cause of the derailment of the freight train was the breakage of a truck side of a car on the freight train which followed a progressive fatigue crack failure. The breakage of the truck side resulted in damage to a turnout, which caused derailment of the following cars. The cause of the collision to the passenger train was the obstruction of track No. 2 by cars of the freight train. The Board concluded industry controls to prevent application of improper car components are inadequate, empty tank cars may be hazardous, and suggested that the industry should incorporate crashworthy concepts, improve communication and equipment design, and controls over maintenance, retirement, and testing of equipment components. The Board requested that bridge standards and joint corridor usage be reviewed. KW - Crash investigation KW - Crash reports KW - Crashes KW - Derailments KW - Fires KW - Hazardous materials KW - Tank cars UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/17795 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00039856 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - SIGNALS AND OPERATING RULES AS CASUAL FACTORS IN TRAIN ACCIDENTS PY - 1971/12/02 SP - 16 p. AB - Railroad signal systems, even though performing as designed, do not compensate for human failure and prevent accidents. Many collisions attributable to negligence of employees result from lack of compliance with operating rules which do not relate compatibly with the signal systems. A relationship is developed between signal systems, operating rules, and the human element that is responsive to both. Specific cases are cited in which the discrepancies are exposed and examined within the context of the foregoing. Recommendations are directed to the Federal Railroad Administration that they take steps under the increased scope of authority of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, to develop a comprehensive program for future requirements in signal systems and operating rules that will reduce or eliminate the present ambiguities and lax, ill-defined operating rules. KW - Behavior KW - Correlation analysis KW - Crash investigation KW - Crashes KW - Factor analysis KW - Railroad signals KW - Railroad trains KW - Recommendations KW - Regulations KW - Safety KW - Signaling KW - U.S. National Transportation Safety Board UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/7409 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00071746 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY AND INDIANA HARBOR BELT RAILROAD COMPANY COLLISION BETWEEN YARD TRAINS AT RIVERDALE, ILLINOIS ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1970 PY - 1971/11/24 SP - 38 p. AB - At 11:08 p.m. September 8, 1970, a collision occurred between Illinois Central (IC) Train 1218 and Indiana Harbor Belt (IHB) Train 8717 at Riverdale, Illinois. The collision of the two yard trains resulted in two fatalities and two serious injuries. Five cars and the caboose of the IC train were derailed and the locomotive cab of the IHB train was demolished. The IHB train was crossing over from an interchange track to an IC main track when the locomotive was struck by the unlighted caboose of the IC train. The IC locomotive was shoving 22 cars, and the caboose had passed a signal indicating "Restricted Proceed" 715 feet prior to impact. The safety Board determined that the accident resulted from the failure of the IC crewmembers to operate IC Train 1218 at a speed so as to be able to avoid the collision. Additional contributing factors included: (a) the failure of IC crewmembers to display a light and occupy a conspicuous position when shoving cars as required by rule; (b) the failure of the IC to provide additional protection when track changes initiated a permanent display of "Restricted Proceed" for the involved signal in 1969; and, (c) inadequacies in operating rules, practices, and personnel training. Contributing to the accident severity was the lack of crash protection provided the occupants of the IHB locomotive. KW - Crash investigation KW - Crash reports KW - Crashes KW - Crashworthiness KW - Fatalities KW - Operating rules KW - Signals KW - Vandalism UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/17787 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00223684 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORT. TRUCK AUTOMOBILE UNDERRIDE COLLISION ON INTERSTATE I-495 NEW CARROLLTON, MARYLAND JUNE 19, 1970 PY - 1971/09/16 AB - A REAR-END UNDERRIDE COLLISION INVOLVING A TRUCK AND AN AUTOMOBILE IS REPORTED AND ANALYZED. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS REAR-END UNDERRIDE COLLISION WAS THE STOPPING OF A TRUCK IN A HIGH-SPEED TRAFFIC LANE BY AN UNTRAINED DRIVER OPERATING AN UNSAFE TRUCK WITH A MAKESHIFT HOOD FASTENER THAT FAILED, ALLOWING THE HOOD TO OBSTRUCT THE DRIVER'S FORWARD VIEW. THE DRIVER OF A FOLLOWING AUTOMOBILE WAS NOT WARNED BY THE TRUCK'S EMERGENCY FLASHER LIGHTS DUE TO A FAULTY LIGHT SWITCH, AND THE DRIVER'S ATTEMPT TO STOP WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. TWO CONTRIBUTING FACTORS ARE EMPHASIZED: (1) THE NEED FOR RULEMAKING RELATING TO REAR-END UNDERRIDE PROTECTION DEVICES ON TRUCKS, TRAILERS, AND SEMITRAILERS; (2) THE ALMOST TOTAL LACK OF COMPLIANCE BY THE PRIVATE CARRIER WITH APPLICABLE MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY REGULATIONS. KW - Blood alcohol levels KW - Crash causes KW - Crash investigation KW - Laws KW - Motor vehicle laws & regulation KW - Motor vehicles KW - Rear end crashes KW - Taillamps KW - Trucks KW - Underride guards KW - Underride override crashes UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/114650 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00222029 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - CHARTERED BUS CRASH ON U. S. ROUTE 22 (INTERSTATE 78), NEAR NEW SMITHFIELD, PENNSYLVANIA, JULY 15, 1970 PY - 1971/09/08 SP - 68 p. AB - ON JULY 15, 1970, A CHARTERED TOUR BUS CARRYING 53 SCHOOL AGE CHILDREN AND THEIR COUNSELORS ON A SIGHT- SEEING TRIP INTO PENNSYLVANIA WAS WESTBOUND ON U.S. 22 (I-78) DURING A RAINSTORM. WHILE TRAVELING ABOUT 55 MILES PER HOUR ON A SLIGHT CURVE TO THE RIGHT, THE BUS TRAVERSED A SECTON OF HIGHWAY WHERE EXCESSIVE WATER FLOW WAS CROSSING THE HIGHWAY, PRODUCING 'HYDROPLANING' AND LOSS OF CONTROL. THE BUS SKIDDED CLOCKWISE 180 DEGREES AND INTO THE CABLE-TYPE GUARDRAIL, WHICH FAILED TO HOLD THE BUS, PERMITTING IT TO ROLL (OR VAULT) DOWN A STEEP EMBANKMENT WITH A 30-FOOT DROP. IN THE CRASH, 18 OCCUPANTS WERE EJECTED, RESULTING IN DEATH TO SEVEN STUDENTS AND VARYING INJURIES TO SOME 47 OTHER OCCUPANTS. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DETERMINED THAT THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT WAS EITHER DYNAMIC OR VISCOUS HYDROPLANING OF THE FRONT WHEELS OF THE BUS. /AUTHOR/ KW - Hydroplaning KW - School buses KW - Skid resistance KW - Traffic crashes UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/111783 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00071614 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - SPECIAL STUDY OF PROPOSED TRACK SAFETY STANDARDS PY - 1971/08/26 SP - 28 p. AB - The report reviews the initial track safety standards proposed by the Federal Railroad Administration in response to the mandate of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970. The report discusses the risks involved in promulgating nonobjective, incompatible, or nonadaptable standards and suggests alternate approaches that may promote effective and enforceable track safety standards. The report recommends that standards not be advanced unless they are objective, compatible with the system, and adaptable to circumstances, including changes in technology. Additional recommendations are directed at methods of strengthening the standards including such items as definitions, and the inclusion of standards for the promotion of safety at grade crossings and reducing the incidence of rail failure. KW - Federal railroad safety act of 1970 KW - Railroad safety KW - Railroad tracks KW - Safety KW - Standards KW - Track safety standards KW - U.S. Federal Railroad Administration UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/17708 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00221495 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - FATALITY RATES FOR SURFACE FREIGHT TRANSPORTATION, 1963-1968 PY - 1971/08/18 SP - 13 p. AB - The report identifies the need for an index of safety for freight transportation, suggests that the appropriate index might be fatalities per billion ton-miles, and then calculates these statistics for the surface modes of transportation. A technical appendix discusses data limitations. /NTSB/ KW - Commodities KW - Fatalities KW - Freight traffic KW - Freight transportation KW - Ground transportation KW - Indexes (Information management) KW - Intermodal transportation KW - Mode S KW - Safety KW - Safety and security KW - Ton miles KW - Transportation safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/111493 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00071612 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD/HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORT: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY TRAIN NO. 1 COLLISION WITH GASOLINE TANK TRUCK AT SOUTH SECOND STREET GRADE CROSSING, LODA, ILLINOIS, JANUARY 24, 1970 PY - 1971/07/08 SP - 28 p. AB - About 9:55 a.m., on January 24, 1970, Illinois Central Railroad southbound passenger train No. 1, moving at a speed of 79 miles per hour on track No. 1, struck a motortruck loaded with gasoline on the South Second street crossing in Loda, Illinois. The tank of the truck was split open, spilling the gasoline which exploded and caught fire. The burning gasoline covered the exterior of the locomotive unit and entered the control compartment through the nose door, damaged nose, and other openings. Three employees of the railroad, who were occupying the control compartment of the lead locomotive unit at the time of the accident, and the driver of the motortruck received fatal injuries from the burning gasoline. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was that the operator drove the gasoline-laden truck, without stopping, onto the tracks immediately in front of the approaching train, while the crossing warning device was indicating the train's approach. KW - Crash investigation KW - Derailments KW - Explosions KW - Fires KW - Grade crossing accidents KW - Railroad grade crossings KW - Tank trucks KW - Traffic crashes KW - Train truck collisions KW - Warning systems UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/17707 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00221438 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - SPECIAL STUDY - YOUTH AND TRAFFIC SAFETY EDUCATION PY - 1971/07 AB - THE STATUS OF KNOWLEDGE IS REVIEWED AND POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE HIGH DEATH RATE DISCUSSED; THE HIGH INVOLVEMENT OF ALCOHOL IS SHOWN. THE PRESENTLY UNKNOWN SAFETY VALUE OF CURRENT PROGRAMS OF INSTRUCTION IS NOTED. THE NEED FOR INSTRUCTION OF YOUTH AND FOR ADULT SUPERVISION AND MONITORING OF NEW YOUNG DRIVERS FOR EXTENDED PERIODS AFTER LICENSING IS DISCUSSED. THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE DRIVER LICENSING FUNCTION AND THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF DRIVER IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS ARE EXAMINED. THE RELEVANT ACTIVITIES OF NHTSA ARE REVIEWED AND THE NEED FOR INTEGRATED EFFORTS FOCUSED ON YOUNG DRIVERS EMPHASIZED. SEVEN RECOMMENDATIONS ARE DIRECTED TO NHTSA, FOCUSING ON (1) A DIAGNOSTIC APPROACH TO DRIVER PREPARATION, TO DRIVER LICENSING, AND TO DRIVER IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMS; (2) EFFORTS IN THE ALCOHOL SAFETY EDUCATION PROGRAMS; (3) POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO EVALUATION OF DRIVER EDUCATION PROGRAMS; (4) EXTENSION AND IMPROVEMENT OF CURRENT EXAMINATONS FOR LICENSING; AND (5) INTEGRATION OF EFFORTS OF STATE AGENCIES. AN EIGHTH RECOMMENDATION IS MADE TO THE YOUTHS GROUP AND ASKS THAT GROUP TO FIND WAYS TO DEVELOP AN INDIVIDUAL APPRECIATION OF THEIR HIGHWAY LOSSES AS THE MAJOR THREAT TO SURVIVAL INTO ADULTHOOD. /AUTHOR/ KW - Age KW - Crashes KW - Death rate KW - Driver improvement effort KW - Driver improvement programs KW - Driver licensing KW - Driver training KW - Drunk driving KW - Fatalities KW - Traffic safety education UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/114121 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00046996 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - SPECIAL STUDY OF RAIL RAPID TRANSIT SAFETY PY - 1971/06/16 SP - 31 p. AB - The report explores the status of safety of rail rapid transit systems, identifies areas of risk, and recommends means for improving safety in new and existing systems. The report is based on the experiences, and practices of new and old transit systems located in the Chicago, New York and Philadelphia metropolitan areas. The subjects covered include accident reporting, accident experience, emergency preparedness, transit car design, signal systems, vehicular excursion, joint corridor usage, fixed plant design, maintenance procedures, safety efforts, operating rules, employee training, research, and the exchange of data. The report also explores the role of the Urban Mass Transportation Administration in the development of safe transit systems and urges the use of System Safety techniques for the development of safe rail rapid transit systems. The report recommends that system safety plans submitted by applicants be one basic requirement for obtaining funding assistance through the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act. KW - Commuter service KW - Passenger security KW - Passenger service KW - Rapid transit KW - Safety KW - Vandalism UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/9468 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00221439 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - SPECIAL STUDY OF RAIL RAPID TRANSIT SAFETY PY - 1971/06 AB - THE REPORT EXPLORES THE STATUS OF SAFETY OF RAIL RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEMS, IDENTIFIES AREAS OF RISK, AND RECOMMENDS MEANS FOR IMPROVING SAFETY IN NEW AND EXISTING SYSTEMS. THE REPORT IS BASED ON THE EXPERIENCES, AND PRACTICES OF NEW AND OLD TRANSIT SYSTEMS LOCATED IN THE CHICAGO, NEW YORK AND PHILADELPHIA METROPOLITAN AREAS. THE SUBJECTS COVERED INCLUDE ACCIDENT REPORTING, ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, TRANSIT CAR DESIGN, SIGNAL SYSTEMS, VEHICULAR EXCURSION, JOINT CORRIDOR USAGE, FIXED PLANT DESIGN, MAINTENANCE PROCEDURESS , SAFETY EFFORTS, OPERATING RULES, EMPLOYEE TRAINING, RESEARCH, AND THE EXCHANGE OF DATA. THE ROLE OF THE URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ADMINISTRATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAFE TRANSIT SYSTEMS IS EXPLORED, AND THE USE OF SYSTEM SAFETY TECHNIQUES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAFE RAIL RAPID TRANSIT SYSTEMS IS URGED. SYSTEM SAFETY PLANS SUBMITTED BY APPLICANTS SHOULD BE ONE BASIC REQUIREMENT FOR OBTAINING FUNDING ASSISTANCE THROUGH THE URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ASSISTANCE ACT. /AUTHOR/ KW - Crash investigation KW - Design standards KW - Maintenance practices KW - Operation and maintenance KW - Public transit KW - Railroad transportation KW - Rapid transit KW - Recommendations KW - Safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/114122 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00221797 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT-PENN CENTRAL COMPANY ELECTROCUTION OF JUVENILE TRESPASSER ON PENN CENTRAL TRACKS AT WASHINGTON, D.C. - MAY 14, 1971 PY - 1971/05 SP - 26 p. AB - DETAILS OF THE ACCIDENT ARE GIVEN; IT WAS FOUND THAT THERE ARE FEW EFFECTIVE WARNING INDICATORS IN AND AROUND THE ACCIDENT AREA AND NO BARRIERS THAT WOULD DISCOURAGE TRESPASSERS. COMPOUNDING THE HAZARD IN THE AREA IS A PARKING LOT ON WHICH CHILDREN CONGREGATE TO PLAY. THERE ARE NO POSITIVE SEPARATION BARRIERS BETWEEN THE RAILROAD AND THE PARKING LOT. ALSO PROMINENT IN CAUSAL FACTORS TO THE INJURY OF THE POLICEMAN IS THE PRACTICE OF PENN CENTRAL OF IMMEDIATELY RESTORING AN ACTUATED CIRCUIT BREAKER WHEN THE CAUSE OF ACTUATION IS NOT KNOWN. RECOMMENDATIONS EVOLVING FROM THE INVESTIGATION ARE FOR MORE AND BETTER SIGNS, FENCING, AND A GENERAL IMPROVED WAY OF KEEPING TRESPASSERS OFF RAILROAD PROPERTY. THERE IS ALSO RECOMMENDED ACTION TO CHANGE THE MANNER OF POWER RESTORAL IN CASES OF OUTAGES AND EXPEDITE THE REMOVAL OF SIDE-END LADDERS TO KEEP PEOPLE OFF THE TOP OF BOX CARS. KW - Crash causes KW - Electric shock KW - Electrical equipment KW - Prevention KW - Railroad cars KW - Safety KW - Signs UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/111596 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00223549 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - THE STATUS OF PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC SAFETY EFFORTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PY - 1971/05 AB - THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PEDESTRIAN SAFETY PROBLEM AND ITS SALIENT CHARACTERISTICS ARE REVIEWED. PEDESTRIAN FATALITIES COMPOSE ABOUT 18% OF ALL HIGHWAY FATALITIES; IN METROPOLITAN AREAS, MORE THAN HALF THE HIGHWAY FATALITIES ARE PEDESTRIANS. THE NUMBER, CURRENTLY ABOUT 9,800 ANNUALLY, HAS BEEN INCREASING SINCE 1962. TRENDS IN POPULATION GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION ACCENTUATE THE PROBLEM. TWO AGE GROUPS ACCOUNT FOR OVER HALF THE FATALITIES: THOSE BELOW 15 AND THOSE ABOVE 64. ALOCHOL IS HEAVILY IMPLICATED IN ADULT PEDESTRIAN FATALITIES. ILLUMINATION/VISIBILITY APPEARS TO BE A FACTOR, AND ALSO PEDESTRIANS' UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE DRIVERS' TASK; MANY ADULT VICTIMS ARE NOT LICENSED DRIVERS. PEDESTRIAN SAFETY EFFORTS ARE REVIEWED. THE CONCLUSION IS REACHED THAT THE TOTAL PEDESTRIAN SAFETY EFFORT OF DOT IS FAR BELOW WHAT IS WARRANTED BY THE PROPORTION OF HIGHWAY LOSSES IN THIS CATEGORY: NEARLY A FIFTH OF THE ANNUAL 55,000 FATALITIES. RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE FOR INCREASED EFFORTS ON THE PART OF DOT AND FOR COORDINATION OF THE EFFORTS OF DIFFERENT AGENCIES OF DOT. /NTSB/ KW - Alcohols KW - Fatalities KW - Lighting KW - Pedestrian-vehicle crashes KW - Pedestrians KW - Safety education KW - Traffic crashes KW - Visibility UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/114594 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00221794 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT-BURLINGTON NORTHERN INC.-DERAILMENT OF EXTRA 5701 EAST AT SHERIDAN, WYOMING - MARCH 28, 1971 PY - 1971/03 SP - 30 p. AB - A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT IS GIVEN; RECOMMENDATIONS ARE DIRECTED AT CORRECTING THOSE DISCREPANCIES REVEALED DURING THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION. THIS INCLUDES STILL ANOTHER CASE WHERE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE IS GIVEN TO ENABLE THE FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION TO GO FORWARD WITH DISPATCH TO CORRECT THE SAFETY HAZARDS IN LOCOMOTIVE CABS. KW - Crash causes KW - Crash investigation KW - Railroad trains UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/111594 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00071747 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: CHICAGO, BURLINGTON AND QUINCY RAILROAD COMPANY TRAIN 64 AND TRAIN 824 DERAILMENT AND COLLISION WITH TANK CAR EXPLOSION CRETE, NEBRASKA, FEBRUARY 18, 1969 PY - 1971/02/24 SP - 79 p. AB - At about 6:30 a.m., on February 18, 1969, Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Train No. 64 derailed the 72nd to the 90th cars, inclusive, at a turnout located on the spiral of a 2 degree curve as the train was entering Crete, Nebraska, at a speed of about 52 miles per hour. The derailed cars struck standing cars on a siding south of the main track and the cars of train 824 standing on a track north of the main track. A tank car in train 824 was completely fractured on impact with the derailed cars which released the lading of 29,200 gallons of anhydrous ammonia into the atmosphere. A gas cloud was formed which blanketed the surrounding area for a considerable time due to the weather conditions. Three trespassers riding on train 64 were killed as a result of the derailment and six people were killed and 53 were injured as a result of exposure to the cloud of ammonia. The Safety Board determined that the derailment was caused by the movement of a rail of the turnout due to lateral forces produced by the locomotive as it moved over track alignment and surface deficiencies of the track. The complete fracture of the tank car on impact was contributed to by the brittleness of the steel of the car caused by the low ambient temperature. KW - Ammonia KW - Anhydrous ammonia KW - Crash investigation KW - Crash reports KW - Defects KW - Derailments KW - Explosions KW - Fatalities KW - Fracture mechanics KW - Hazardous materials KW - Railroad tracks KW - Tank cars KW - Track irregularities UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/17788 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00071754 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: RICHMOND, FREDERICKSBURG AND POTOMAC RAILROAD COMPANY TRAIN NO. 10/76 DERAILMENT WITH THREE FATALITIES AND NUMEROUS PERSONAL INJURIES, FRANCONIA, VIRGINIA, JANUARY 27, 1970 PY - 1971/02/03 SP - 57 p. AB - Train No. 10/76 derailed on Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac (RF&P) 1970. The train consisted of one express car, one postal car, two baggage cars, four coaches, two sleeping cars, and three diesel-electric locomotive units. The train proceeded northbound on No. 2 track and at Possum Point, 80 miles north of Richmond, crossed over to No. 3 track to avoid conflict with a local freight. On approaching Franconia, speed was reduced from 80 miles per hour to 70 miles per hour; at Franconia, speed was further reduced to 65 miles per hour, and as the train traversed the north end of a curve, the locomotive lurched severely to the left. Immediately thereafter, the derailment occurred. The accident resulted in the derailment of the eight rear cars of the train. The third, fourth, and fifth cars remained upright and coupled to the head end of the train. A separation occurred between the fifth and sixth cars, and between each of the following cars. The sixth through 10th car veered to the left down a bank, and either partially or completely overturned. Of the 101 passengers in the 10 cars, three were killed, five incurred injuries requiring hospitalization and 45 persons were treated for less serious injuries. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the derailment was the lateral movement of the track immediately ahead of the locomotive, due to conditions resulting from inadequate track maintenance procedures. KW - Crash investigation KW - Crash reports KW - Derailments KW - Fatalities KW - Maintenance of way KW - Maintenance practices KW - Railroad tracks KW - Stability (Mechanics) KW - Track stability UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/17794 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00649424 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - MARINE ACCIDENT REPORT: STRUCTURAL FAILURE AND SINKING OF THE TEXACO-OKLAHOMA OFF CAPE HATTERAS ON 27 MARCH 1971, WITH THE LOSS OF 31 LIVES PY - 1971 SP - 46 p. AB - At 0330, March 27, 1971, the tankship SS TEXACO-OKLAHOMA, fully loaded with a cargo of black oil, broke in two, about 120 miles northeast of Cape Hatteras, North Carolina. The ship was en route from Port Arthur, Texas, to Boston, Massachusetts, and was proceeding at very slow speed in a severe storm when the casualty occurred. The ship split in the vicinity of No.5 tanks and submerged all of the crew asleep in the forward deckhouse. The forward section then reversed direction and drifted down on the stern section, destroying the starboard lifeboat before the stern section was backed safely away. None of the 13 crew members on the forward section survived. The crew members on the stern section attempted to attract passing ships by firing flares, blinking white and red lights, and sounding the ship's whistle. One ship responded to the light signals, but no distress signals were identified and she departed. The crew also operated the portable lifeboat radio transmitter for at least 12 hours without knowing that distress signals were not being received. The stern section sank at about 0600 Sunday, March 28, which was th time the ship was scheduled to arrive in Boston and 27 hours after the ship broke in two. The crew members abandoned the stern, using one 15-person inflatable raft and two rafts improvised from empty oil drums. About 10 hours later, a merchant vessel discovered the raft, rescued 11 survivors, and initiated an extensive rescue effort. Subsequently, two more crew members who had been in the water for about 32 hours were rescued. Thirty-one of the 44 crew members perished in this casualty. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the TEXACO-OKLAHOMA hull fracture was the high stresses produced by heavy seas and other forces on the relatively lightly constructed, fully loaded ship. The design, maintenance, and operating standards inherently contained risk levels which were excessive for vessels of this type, transiting the seas off Cape Hatteras in winter storms. KW - Cape Hatteras (North Carolina) KW - Crash investigation KW - Failure KW - Marine safety KW - Reports KW - Shipwrecks KW - Structural failures KW - Structural mechanics KW - Tankers KW - Texaco-oklahoma (Vessel) KW - Water transportation crashes UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/388024 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00226667 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD/HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORT ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY TRAIN NO. 1 COLLISION WITH GASOLINE TANK TRUCK AT SOUTH SECOND STREET GRADE CROSSING, LODA, ILLINOIS, JANUARY 24, 1970 PY - 1971 SP - 34 p. AB - THE TANK OF THE TRUCK WAS SPLIT OPEN, SPILLING THE GASOLINE WHICH EXPLODED AND CAUGHT FIRE. THE BURNING GASOLINE COVERED THE EXTERIOR OF THE LOCOMOTIVE UNIT AND ENTERED THE CONTROL COMPARTMENT THROUGH THE NOSE DOOR, DAMAGED NOSE, AND OTHER OPENINGS. THREE EMPLOYEES OF THE RAILROAD AND THE THE DRIVER OF THE TRUCK RECEIVED FATAL INJURIES FROM THE BURNING GASOLINE. THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT WAS THAT THE OPERATOR DROVE THE GASOLINE-LADEN TRUCK, WITHOUT STOPPING ONTO THE TRACKS IMMEDIATELY IN FRONT OF THE APPROACHING TRAIN, WHILE THE CROSSING WARNING DEVICE WAS INDICATING THE TRAINS'S APPROACH. /HSL/ KW - Crash causes KW - Crash investigation KW - Crashes KW - Drivers KW - Fatalities KW - Hazard perception KW - Hazards KW - Railroad grade crossings KW - Warning systems UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/113000 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00226418 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RISK CONCEPTS IN DANGEROUS GOODS TRANSPORTATION REGULATIONS- SPECIAL STUDY PY - 1971 SP - 41 p. AB - THERE IS NO UNIFORM FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE PROBLEMS OF DANGEROUS GOODS TRANSPORTATION, AND THE PRESENT REGULATIONS FOCUS ON THE INHERENT NATURE OF THE COMMODITIES RATHER THAN THE RISKS CREATED BY THEIR MOVEMENT. THIS STUDY EXAMINES THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXISTING REGULATIONS AND DISCUSSES THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH. A FRAMEWORK WHICH MIGHT BE EMPLOYED FOR GUIDING RISK IDENTIFICATION, EVALUATION, AND REDUCTION IS SUGGESTED. ADOPTION OF A RISK- BASED FRAMEWORK FOR DANGEROUS GOODS REGULATIONS IS NECESSARY, DESIRABLE, AND FEASIBLE. /HSL/ KW - Crash causes KW - Freight transportation KW - Hazardous materials KW - Regulation KW - Transportation UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/112892 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00223829 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - THE STATUS OF PEDESTRIAN SAFETY EFFORTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PY - 1971 AB - PEDESTRIAN FATALITIES COMPRISE ABOUT 18% OF ALL HIGHWAY FATALITIES; IN METROPOLITAN AREAS, MORE THAN HALF THE HIGHWAY FATALITIES ARE PEDESTRIANS. THE NUMBER, CURRENTLY ABOUT 9,800 ANNUALLY, HAS BEEN INCREASING SINCE 1962. TWO AGE GROUPS ACCOUNT FOR OVER HALF THE FATALITIES: THOSE BELOW 15 AND THOSE ABOVE 64. ALCOHOL IS HEAVILY IMPLICATED IN ADULT PEDESTRIAN FATALITIES. ILLUMINATION/VISIBILITY APPEARS TO BE A FACTOR, AND ALSO PEDESTRIANS' UNFAMILIARITY WITH THE DRIVER'S TASK; MANY ADULT VICTIMS ARE NOT LICENSED DRIVERS. PEDESTRIAN SAFETY EFFORT OF DOT IS FAR BELOW WHAT IS WARRANTED BY THE PROPORTION OF HIGHWAY LOSSES IN THIS CATEGORY: NEARLY A FIFTH OF THE ANNUAL 55,000 FATALITIES. RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE FOR INCREASED EFFORTS ON THE PART OF DOT AND FOR COORDINATION OF THE EFFORTS OF DIFFERENT AGENCIES OF DOT. /HSL/ KW - Age KW - Alcohols KW - Crash causes KW - Fatalities KW - Highway safety KW - Pedestrian-vehicle crashes KW - Pedestrians KW - Safety KW - Urban areas KW - Visibility UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/114681 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00209451 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORT: COLLAPSE OF U.S. 35 HIGHWAY BRIDGE, POINT PLEASANT, WEST VIRGINIA DECEMBER 15, 1967 PY - 1970/12 AB - WHEN THE U. S. 35 HIGHWAY BRIDGE CONNECTING POINT PLEASANT, WEST VIRGINIA, WITH KANAUGA, OHIO, COLLAPSED IN DECEMBER 1967, FORTY-SIX PERSONS DIED IN THE ACCIDENT, NINE WERE INJURED, AND 31 OF THE 37 VEHICLES ON THE BRIDGE FELL WITH THE BRIDGE. THE SAFETY BOARD FINDS THAT THE CAUSE OF THE COLLAPSE WAS THE CLEAVAGE FRACTURE IN THE LOWER LIMB OF THE EYE OF EYEBAR 330 AT JOINT C13N OF THE NORTH EYEBAR SUSPENSION CHAIN IN THE OHIO SIDE SPAN. THE FRACTURE WAS CAUSED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CRITICAL SIZE FLAW OVER THE 40-YEAR LIFE OF THE STRUCTURE AS THE RESULT OF THE JOINT ACTION OF STRESS CORROSION AND CORROSION FATIGUE. OTHER CONTRIBUTING CAUSES FOUND ARE: (1) IN 1927, WHEN THE BRIDGE WAS DESIGNED, THE PHENOMENA OF STRESS CORROSION AND CORROSION FATIGUE WERE NOT KNOWN TO OCCUR IN THE CLASSES OF BRIDGE MATERIAL USED UNDER CONDITIONS OF EXPOSURE NORMALLY ENCOUNTERED IN RURAL AREAS. (2) FLAW LOCATION WAS INACESSIBLE TO VISUAL INSPECTION, AND (3) THE FLAW COULD NOT BE DETECTED BY AN INSPECTION METHOD KNOWN IN THE STATE OF THE ART TODAY WITHOUT DISASSEMBLY OF THE EYEBAR JOINT. /AUTHOR/ KW - Bridges KW - Causes KW - Cleavage KW - Cleavage fracture KW - Collapse KW - Corrosion KW - Defects KW - Fatigue (Mechanics) KW - Fracture KW - Fracture mechanics KW - Inspection KW - Location KW - Stress corrosion KW - Vision UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/97544 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00072461 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: PENN CENTRAL COMPANY COLLISION OF TRAINS N-48 AND N-49 AT DARIEN, CONNECTICUT, AUGUST 20, 1969 PY - 1970/10/14 SP - 65 p. AB - About 8:20 P.M. on August 20, 1969, Penn Central commuter trains N-48 and N-49 collided head-on just north of the Hoyt Street crossing on the New Canaan Branch, near Darien, Connecticut. The two trains involved in the accident consisted of self-propelled electrically-operated commuter type passenger cars. Train N-48, going from Stamford to New Canaan, had a three-man crew and about 60 to 80 passengers. The first car in train N-48 had been closed to revenue passengers before it left Stamford. Train N-49, a dead-head equipment train from New Canaan to Stamford, had a three-man crew and was carrying a car inspector and an electrician. A passenger, who was riding without authorization in the head car of N-48, and the engineer were killed. The conductor, flagman and about 40 passengers were injured. The conductor and flagman on train N-49 were killed and the engineer was seriously injured. The head cars of both trains were almost completely destroyed; other cars were less severely damaged. The Safety Board determined that the collision was caused by the operation of train N-48 beyond its meeting point in violation of properly issued train orders. Contributing to the cause of serious injuries and fatalities of the employees and the one passenger were: the design and location of the engineer's control compartment, the inability of the leading cars to withstand the force of the impact, and the location of the victims at the time of the collision in the forward area of the cars. Factors contributing to a great extent to the passengers' injuries were: the lack of restraining devices to hold the passengers in their seat, and the failure and movement of the seat backs. KW - Commuter cars KW - Crash investigation KW - Crashes KW - Fatalities KW - Train meets UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/20705 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00071942 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - STUDY OF WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY'S SAFETY PROCEDURES FOR THE PROPOSED METRO SYSTEM PY - 1970/10 SP - 17 p. AB - Some of the identifiable high-risk areas of Metro that could benefit from a system safety review of the proposed system are outlined. The Safety Board recommends that WMATA develop the capability within its organization for system safety engineering and apply system safety principles to all aspects of the proposed Metro System to identify, assess, and correct those deficiencies identified by the analysis. KW - Safety KW - Safety engineering KW - System safety KW - Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/20512 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00071759 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY TRAIN SECOND 76 DERAILMENT AT GLENDORA, MISSISSIPPI, SEPTEMBER 11, 1969 PY - 1970/08/19 SP - 24 p. AB - About 2:35 p.m., September 11, 1969, an Illinois Central freight train struck a pedestrian near the Glendora, Mississippi, station. When the engineer applied the brakes in full emergency in an attempt to avoid striking the pedestrian, the 149-car train buckled at the 108th car. The resulting derailment involved 15 cars, including eight tank cars loaded with vinyl chloride. The cars separated in the derailment and the coupler of one of the cars punctured one of the tank cars, spilling its contents on the ground. Initially, the breeze dispersed the vapor; however, about 8:30 p.m. the vapor accumulated in low places and was ignited by an unknown source. The ignition was followed by several explosions. Upon advice from a State chemist, an estimated 17,000 to 21,000 persons were evacuated because of an alleged danger from phosgene. The following morning a fire-impinged tank car of vinyl chloride exploded violently, seriously damaging the surrounding area. Four tenant houses, several auxiliary buildings, automobiles, and equipment were destroyed and damaged by fire. The pedestrian was seriously injured and a power company employee was burned. Both recovered. The Safety Board determines that the derailment was caused by the buckling of the underframe of the 108th car when the engineer made a full emergency brake application in an attempt to avoid striking a pedestrian who was walking in the track. The car buckled because of excessive and uncontrollable compression in the train which developed when the full emergency brake application created greater braking force on the head of the train than on the rear. The fire and explosions resulted from the rupture of a tank car of vinyl chloride by the coupler of one of the derailed cars. The absence of underlocking couplers and other means of preventing separation and jacknifing allowed the cars to jam up together. The pileup resulted in additional mechanical damage to the tanks and allowed the fire from the leaking tank to impinge on the others. KW - Crash investigation KW - Crash reports KW - Derailments KW - Explosions KW - Fires KW - Hazardous materials KW - Tank cars UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/17799 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00223338 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - SPECIAL STUDY: INADEQUATE STRUCTURAL ASSEMBLY OF SCHOOLBUS BODIES--THE ACCIDENTS AT DECATUR AND HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA PY - 1970/07 AB - SCHOOL BUS ACCIDENTS THAT INVOLVED A COLLISION BETWEEN A TRAIN AND A SCHOOL BUS INDICATED THAT THE STRUCTURAL ASSEMBLY OF SCHOOL BUS BODIES MIGHT BE INADEQUATE. THE EXAMPLES OF INJURIES IN THESE ACCIDENTS ARE REVIEWED AND IT IS EXPLAINED HOW THE DESIGN OF JOINTS AND FASTENINGS WAS INVOLVED IN THE INJURIES AND IN THE STRUCTURAL STRENGTH OF SCHOOL BUSES. SCHOOL BUS CONSTRUCTION IS COMPARED WITH CONSTRUCTION OF OTHER TYPES OF BUSES WHICH EMPLOY MORE EFFICIENT AND COMPLETE FASTENINGS. THE STUDY RELATES ENTIRELY TO THE TYPE OF SCHOOL BUS WHICH IS MANUFACTURED BY ATTACHING A SCHOOL BUS BODY TO A TRUCK CHASSIS. NO REVIEW IS MADE OF THE INTEGRAL-BODY-AND-CHASSIS TYPE OF SCHOOL BUS WHICH CONSTITUTES LESS THAN 10% OF TOTAL PRODUCTION. THE FACTORS ARE ALSO DISCUSSED OF COST, SAFETY BENEFITS, AND JUSTICE FACTORS IN THE PROTECTION OF THE CHILD PASSENGERS INVOLVED. THE ANALYSIS SHOWED THAT INTERIOR PANELS PRESENT EXPOSED SHARP EDGES BECAUSE THE WIDELY SPACED AND INADEQUATE FASTENINGS AT JOINTS FAIL OR ALLOW EDGES TO BE RAISED BETWEEN FASTENERS IN SCHOOL BUS CRASHES. THE JOINTS EMPLOYED TO JOIN STRUCTURAL MEMBERS AND POTENTIAL LOAD CARRYING PANELS IN SCHOOL BUSES OFTEN ARE INADEQUATE BECAUSE THEY EMPLOY RELATIVELY FEW FASTENERS AND DO NOT DEVELOP MORE THAN A SMALL FRACTION OF STRUCTURAL STRENGTH WHICH IS POTENTIALLY AVAILABLE. OTHER TYPES OF BUSES, SUCH AS INTERCITY BUSES AND CITY TRANSIT BUSES, EXHIBIT MUCH MORE ADEQUATE JOINING OF STRUCTURAL LOAD CARRYING PANELS THAN DO SCHOOL BUSES. IT IS FELT UNDERSIRABLE TO ALLOW THIS SOURCE OF INJURY TO CONTINUE IN THE SCHOOL BUS FIELD, WHEN IT IS VOLUNTARILY CONTROLLED IN THE INTERCITY AND TRANSIT BUSES. KW - Bus transit KW - Bus transportation KW - Bus transportation (Intracity) KW - Buses KW - Chassis KW - Construction KW - Crashes KW - Fasteners KW - Injuries KW - Intercity bus lines KW - Joint KW - Joints (Engineering) KW - Motor vehicle accidents KW - School buses KW - Structural members KW - Traffic crashes UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/114512 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00072593 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: PENN CENTRAL COMPANY TRAIN SECOND 115 (SILVER STAR) DERAILMENT AT GLENN DALE, MARYLAND, JUNE 28, 1969 PY - 1970/06/10 SP - 43 p. AB - The "Silver Star" operating as Penn Central Train 2nd 115, derailed on Penn Central tracks at Glenn Dale, Md. about 1:23 p.m. June 28, 1969. Among the 541 passengers in the 18 cars, 144 persons were transported to area hospitals, 12 of whom were admitted. Total estimated damage, excluding personal injuries, were in excess of $300,000. The derailment was caused by lateral movement of the track under the train. The lateral movement was caused by buckling of the track because of high compressive forces caused by heat expansion and the tendency of rail to creep in the direction of the predominant flow of traffic and descending grade. A number of injuries to passengers were caused by their being thrown from the seats and striking interior parts of the cars, and by luggage being thrown about inside the cars. KW - Buckling KW - Crash investigation KW - Crashes KW - Creep KW - Derailments KW - Injuries KW - Passenger injuries KW - Passengers KW - Rail (Railroads) KW - Rail creep KW - Railroad tracks UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/20762 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00222048 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORT. TRUCK-AUTOMIBILE COLLISION INVOLVING SPILLED METHYL BROMIDE ON U.S. 90 NEAR GRETNA, FLORIDA, AUGUST 8, 1971 PY - 1970/06/01 SP - 59 p. AB - A PASSENGER AUTOMOBILE MAKING A LEFT TURN AT AN INTERSECTION NEAR GRETNA, FLORIDA, WAS STRUCK BY A TRACTOR-VAN TYPE SEMITRAILER COMBINATION WHICH WAS ATTEMPTING TO OVERTAKE AND PASS THE AUTOMOBILE. BOTH VEHICLES ENTERED A ROADSIDE DITCH AFTER THE COLLISION. SEVERAL UNSECURED LARGE STEEL CYLINDERS, CONTAINING A MIXTURE OF METHYL BROMIDE AND CHLORPICRIN PRESSURIZED WITH AIR, BROKE OUT OF THE TRAILER AND SUSTAINED DAMAGES WHICH RESULTED IN LEAKAGE OF THE CONTENTS. FOUR OF THE OCCUPANTS OF THE AUTOMOBILE WERE EXPOSED TO THE RESULTANT CONTAMINATED ATMOSPHERE AND DID NOT SURVIVE. THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DETERMINES THAT THE CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT WAS THE PASSING MANEUVER OF THE TRUCKDRIVER WHO APPROACHED A RECOGNIZABLE INTERSECTION ON THE WRONG SIDE OF A SOLID YELLOW CENTER LINE AND THE EXECUTION WITHOUT SIGNALING OF A LEFT TURN BY THE AUTOMOBILE DRIVER INTO THE PATH OF THE OVERTAKING TRUCK. /AUTHOR/ KW - Crash causes KW - Crash investigation KW - Crashes KW - Hazardous materials KW - Motor vehicle accidents KW - Traffic crashes UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/111800 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00221795 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT - DERAILMENT OF TOLEDO, PEORIA, AND WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY'S TRAIN NO 20 WITH RESULTANT FIRE AND TANK CAR RUPTURES - CRESCENT CITY, ILLINOIS - JUNE 21, 1970 PY - 1970/06 SP - 47 p. AB - DETAILS OF THE ACCIDENT ARE GIVEN; THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD DETERMINED THAT THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT WAS THE BREAKING OF THE L-4 JOURNAL OF CB&Q 182544, THE 20TH CAR, DUE TO EXCESSIVE OVERHEATING, WHICH PERMITTED THE TRUCK SIDE TO DROP TO THE TRACK AND DERAIL THE LEADING WHEELS OF THE CAR. THE CAUSE OF THE OVERHEATING COULD NOT BE DETERMINED. THE CAUSE OF THE INITIAL FIRE WAS THE PUNCTURING OF ONE TANK DURING THE DERAILMENT, JUMBLING OF THE DERAILED CARS, AND THE LARGE VOLUME OF PROPANE RELEASED WHICH IMMEDIATELY IGNITED AND SUBJECTED THE OTHER TANKS TO IMPINGEMENT OF FIRES. KW - Crash causes KW - Fires KW - Flammable liquids KW - Overheating KW - Railroad cars KW - Railroad trains UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/111595 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00220987 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, 1969 PY - 1970/04/15 AB - THE BOARD'S MISSION IN ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATION IS OUTLINED. THE YEAR'S ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS INCLUDED AIRCRAFT, HIGHWAY, TURNPIKE, MARINE, RAILROAD, AND PIPELINE ACCIDENTS. LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRANSPORTATION SAFETY AND ACCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ARE EVALUATED. /HSL/ KW - Aircraft KW - Crash investigation KW - Pipelines KW - Prevention KW - Railroad transportation KW - Safety KW - Traffic crashes KW - Water transportation UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/109220 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00223236 AU - Reed, J H AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - PREVENTION OF ACCIDENTS IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PY - 1970 AB - AFTER TOUCHING UPON THE PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THIS AUTONOMOUS BOARD, EXAMPLES OF TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS INVOLVING HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ARE CITED. INCREASING NUMBERS OF SUCH ACCIDENTS INVOLVE RAILROAD, TRUCK AND PIPELINE TRANSPORT. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RANGE FROM PROPANE FUEL USED IN A CAMPER TO SHIPMENTS OF LIQUEFIED PETROLEUM GAS, ACETONE CYANOHYDRIN, VINYL CHLORIDE, MAGNESIUM BORINGS, ANHYDROUS AMMONIA. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE BOARD ARE OUTLINED AND SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS ARE OFFERED CONCERNING THE ROLE OF THE COMPRESSED GAS ASSOCIATION IN THE PREVENTION OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ACCIDENTS. /HSL/ KW - Freight transportation KW - Hazardous materials KW - Highway safety KW - Highway transportation KW - Prevention KW - Railroad transportation KW - Safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/114478 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00221342 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - MULTIPLE-VEHICLE COLLISIONS UNDER FOG CONDITIONS, FOLLOWED BY FIRES, NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE, NORTH OF GATE 2 NOVEMBER 29, 1969 PY - 1969/11 SP - 90 p. AB - IN NOVEMBER 1969, A CAR TRAVELLING AT 45 MPH ENTERED SUDDEN DENSE FOG ON THE NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE, ABOUR 1 1/2 MILES NORTH OF EXIT 2. ALTHOUGH THE DRIVER SLOWED TO 30 MPH, HE WAS RAPIDLY OVERRUN BY A TRACTOR AND A TANK-SEMITRAILER WHICH OVERTURNED AND BLOCKED BOTH LANES AND SHOULDER. IN RAPID SUCCESSION WHEN OTHER VEHICLES ENTERED THE AREA, MULTIPLE COLLISIONS OCCURRED, RESULTING IN 6 FATALITIES, 3 SERIOUS AND 15 LESS SERIOUS INJURIES. 29 VEHICLES WERE INVOLVED IN THIS MULTIPLE-VEHICLE ACCIDENT. THE SAFETY BOARD DETERMINED THAT THE CAUSE WAS DUE TO VEHICLE PENETRATION INTO A DENSE FOG AREA WHERE VISIBILITY WAS 20 TO 50 FT., TOGETHER WITH THE VARYING RATES OF SPEED WHICH PREVENTED APPROPRIATE EVASIVE ACTION. OTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE THE ABSENCE OF OBJECTIVE INDICATORS OF FOG DENSITY, AND INADEQUACY OF THE NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE SPEED CONTROL SYSTEM IN THAT IT FAILED TO PROVIDE TIMELY ACTIVATION OF SPEED REDUCTION WARNING SIGNS. /NTSB/ KW - Crashes KW - Fatalities KW - Fog KW - Injuries KW - Multiple vehicle crashes KW - Reduction KW - Reduction (Chemistry) KW - Speed KW - Speed control KW - Vehicles KW - Visibility KW - Warning signs KW - Warning systems UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/111481 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00034654 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - STUDY OF TOWING VESSEL SAFETY AND ACCIDENT PREVENTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS PY - 1969/08 SP - 35 p. AB - The Coast Guard notifies the Safety Board of major marine casualties, and during the past 2 years a number of collisions were reported on the inland waterways of the United States. These collisions involved towing vessels and their tows of tankbarges carrying bulk flammable and hazardous cargoes, and seagoing vessels. Two of these collisions resulted in major loss of life due to resultant fires and explosions. The Safety Board noted the potential for more severe loss of life and property damage in a number of these cases. The purpose of this study is to supplement the information introduced at the Congressional hearings in 1965 and printed in the House Report 89-16. Based on an analysis of Coast Guard statistical data on towing vessel casualties investigations, the preventive measures necessary to improve safety are considered. KW - Casualties KW - Casualty data KW - Hazardous materials KW - Hazardous materials transportation KW - Inland waterways traffic KW - Prevention KW - Safety KW - Safety standards KW - Standards KW - Towboats KW - Transportation UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/4521 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00220702 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - STUDY OF COMPATIBILITY OF STANDARDS FOR DRIVERS, VEHICLES, AND HIGHWAYS PY - 1969/06/11 AB - THE PROBLEMS OF EVERYDAY TRAFFIC SITUATIONS ARE CONSIDERED IN WHICH THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS OF ALL ELEMENTS OF THE TRAFFIC SAFETY SYSTEM--DRIVERS, VEHICLES, AND THE HIGHWAY ENVIRONMENT--ARE NOT ADEQUATELY DESCRIBED BY EXISTING STANDARDS. THREE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION REFLECT: THE NEED FOR HAVING ALL NEW STANDARDS COMPATIBLE IN ALL ASPECTS, THE NEED FOR LEADERSHIP AMONG STANDARDIZING ORGANIZATIONS, AND THE NEED FOR DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNICAL DEFINITIONS OF AN INTERIM TRANSITIONAL NATURE. EXAMPLES DISCUSSED ARE WINDSHIELD VISIBILITY AND TRAFFIC SIGNS; DRIVER VISION, REARVIEW MIRROR VISIBILITY AND HIGHWAY DESIGN; VEHICLE DESIGN AND HIGHWAY DESIGN. /HSL/ KW - Driver performance KW - Driver vision KW - Drivers KW - Highway design KW - Mirrors KW - Personnel performance KW - Rear view KW - Rearview mirrors KW - Standardization KW - Traffic safety KW - Traffic signs KW - Vehicle characteristics KW - Visibility KW - Vision KW - Windshields UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/109077 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00201999 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - A STUDY OF SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE UTILIZATION OF AIRSPACE OVER AND UNDER FEDERALLY AIDED HIGHWAYS PY - 1969/05 AB - ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL DANGERS TO STRUCTURES OCCUPYING HIGHWAY AIRSPACE ARE DISCUSSED, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ARE MADE AS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REGULATIONS FOR SHIPMENT OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS IN THE VICINITY OF SUCH STRUCTURES, DETERMINATION OF OTHER DANGERS PECULIAR TO THEM AND OF MEANS FOR COMBATTING THEM, AND RESTRICTION OF THE USES TO WHICH SUCH STRUCTURES CAN BE PUT (PARTICULARLY, EXCLUSION OF HIGH-DENSITY CONGREGATIONS OF PEOPLE). KW - Constrictions KW - Hazardous materials KW - Hazards KW - Multiple use KW - Regulations UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/91267 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00765887 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - A STUDY OF UNIFORM REPORTING SYSTEM FOR ALL MODES OF TRANSPORTATION IN REPORTING INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE SHIPMENT OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PY - 1969/03/21 SP - 18 p. AB - The reporting requirements and procedures for hazardous materials accidents and incidents are reviewed for each of the modal administrations and the Coast Guard. They illustrate the problems of setting up a centralized and unified hazardous materials accident and incident reporting system within the present regulatory framework. Recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board are then presented. KW - Air transportation KW - Crashes KW - Hazardous materials KW - Highway transportation KW - Incidents KW - Railroad transportation KW - Recommendations KW - Regulatory constraints KW - Reporting requirements KW - U.S. Federal Aviation Administration KW - U.S. Federal Highway Administration KW - U.S. Federal Railroad Administration KW - U.S. National Transportation Safety Board KW - United States Coast Guard KW - Water transportation UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/502351 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00080102 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY TRAIN 154 DERAILMENT WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION LAUREL, MISSISSIPPI JANUARY 25, 1969 PY - 1969 SP - 74 p. AB - Southern Railway train 154 was wrecked at Laurel, Mississippi on January 25, 1969 at about 4:15 a.m., when 15 tank cars of liquefied petroleum gas derailed. The train, with four diesel-electric locomotive units, 139 cars and caboose was moving northward at about 30 mph when the west wheel on the lead truck of the 62nd car in the train broke. The wheel which broke as it was passing over the crossing of the Gulf, Mobile, and Ohio Railroad, derailed about 256 feet north of the crossing, and the train continued northward for about 2,146 feet before the 62nd car and 14 loaded tank cars behind it were derailed. Most of the tanks were mechanically damaged by the derailment resulting in an immediate violent eruption of fire and explosion. Two fatalities resulted from injuries caused by the fires and explosions after the wreck, 33 persons were hospitalized. Property damage in the town was extensive and total damage to Southern Railway track, equipment and lading was estimated at about $3,000,000. KW - Crash investigation KW - Crash reports KW - Derailments KW - Explosions KW - Failure KW - Fatalities KW - Fires KW - Fracture mechanics KW - Hazardous materials KW - Liquefied petroleum gas KW - Tank cars KW - Wheel failure KW - Wheels UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/21105 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00072592 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD TRAIN PR-11A, EXTRA 2210 WEST AND TRAIN SW-6, EXTRA 2217 EAST DERAILMENT AND COLLISION DUNREITH, INDIANA, JANUARY 1, 1968 PY - 1968/12/18 SP - 73 p. AB - About 9:30 p.m., January 1, 1968, Pennsylvania Westbound freight train PR-11A, consisting of 98 cars and five-unit diesel-electric locomotive, was passing Dunreith, Indiana, at 42 miles per hour when the trailing wheels of the 88th car, an empty tank car, AESX 850, derailed at a broken rail near the eastern edge of the town. At the same time, eastbound freight train SW-6 consisting of a five-unit diesel-electric locomotive and 106 cars, was moving eastward at 32 miles per hour on the adjacent track. The derailed car in train PR-11A continued westward until it became disengaged from its trailing truck when it struck the crossing board at a grade crossing about 723 feet west of the point of original derailment. One or more cars collided with cars of hazardous materials moving in the opposite direction in SW-6's train, causing a general derailment and puncturing several tank cars of flammable materials. A large-scale fire ensued, followed by a violent explosion of a tank car of ethylene oxide forty-five minutes later. Immediately after the derailment and outbreak of fire the population of Dunreith was evacuated without injury. A cannery and several residences and businesses were destroyed. Three firemen and two police- men were slightly injured in the fire and explosion. The probable cause of the initial derailment in train PR-11A was the broken rail within the compromise joint where two different sizes of rail were joined. A contributing causal factor was the inadequate track maintenance which left the joint unsupported and allowed the development of the break in the rail. This initial derailment and the design of the lift-off type of center-pin connection between the truck and body of AESX car 850 which allowed the truck to separate from the car under impacts of a simple derailment, led to the secondary collision and general derailment. KW - Broken rails KW - Crash investigation KW - Crashes KW - Derailments KW - Explosions KW - Failure KW - Fires KW - Hazardous materials KW - Maintenance of way KW - Rail (Railroads) KW - Tank cars UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/20761 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00071839 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - HIGHWAY-RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: WATERLOO, NEBRASKA, PUBLIC SCHOOL BUS UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY FREIGHT TRAIN ACCIDENT WATERLOO, NEBRASKA OCTOBER 2, 1967 PY - 1968/09 SP - 51 p. AB - At 8:10 A.M. on October 2, 1967, a school bus carrying 13 children to school, traveling east on County Road 29, near Waterloo, Nebraska, was driven across an unprotected highway grade crossing and was struck by a westbound Union Pacific Railroad freight train traveling at 56 m.p.h. The locomotive struck and held the right rear quarter of the bus dragging it backward, and then deflected it into a communications pole. The rear of the bus body was disintegrated. Four of the children on the bus were killed and the other nine injured. There were no other fatalities or injuries in the accident. The probable cause of the accident was the failure of the school bus driver to ascertain that there was a train approaching the grade crossing and to hold his vehicle until the way was safe for passage. KW - Crash investigation KW - Crash reports KW - Fatalities KW - Grade crossing accidents KW - Railroad grade crossings KW - Traffic crashes UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/20443 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00071749 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD/HIGHWAY ACCIDENT REPORT: BOSTON AND MAINE CORPORATION SINGLE DIESEL-POWERED PASSENGER CAR 563 COLLISION WITH OXBOW TRANSPORT COMPANY TANK TRUCK AT SECOND STREET RAILROAD-HIGHWAY GRADE CROSSING EVERETT, MASSACHUSETTS, DECEMBER 28, 1966 PY - 1968/02/29 SP - 56 p. AB - At 12:10 AM, on December 28, 1966, eastbound firstclass passenger train No. 563, consisting of a single car diesel-powered passenger unit operated by the Boston and Maine Corporation collided with a northbound motor tank truck owned and operated by the Oxbow Transport Corporation stopped across the Second Street grade crossing at Everett, Mass. The collision resulted in the death of 11 of a total of 28 passengers and 2 of the 3 train crew members and other injuries and damage to property. The semi-trailer of the tank truck containing 8,200 gallons of fuel oil ruptured on impact, covering the forward end of the passenger car with the oil. A spread of flames immediately covered the forward section of the car. The fatalities were due to thermal burns and smoke inhalation. There was a lack of emergency exits in the car, in addition to an inward opening rear door which became jammed in a closed position while people were attempting to escape. The truck driver had left the vehicle prior to impact and was not injured. The probable cause of the accident was the loss of air pressure in the brake systems of the tractor-trailer which resulted in an automatic application of the brakes that could not be released from the cab of the tractor and therefore held the tractor-trailer directly across the Boston and Maine track at the collision point. KW - Crash investigation KW - Crash reports KW - Crashes KW - Fatalities KW - Fires KW - Grade crossing accidents KW - Railroad grade crossings KW - Tank cars KW - Traffic crashes UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/17789 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00071838 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY TRAIN 1/NY-4 EXTRA 2020 EAST AND TRAIN ND-5 EXTRA 5305 WEST HEAD-ON COLLISION NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK MAY 22, 1967 PY - 1968/01/24 SP - 37 p. AB - The accident occurred on the West 30th Street branch of the New York Central Railroad at approximately 147th Street, New York, New York, at about 9:55 A.M. on May 22, 1967. The collision occurred on Track No. 1, which was being used that morning for train movement in both directions due to repairs which were being conducted on main Track No. 2. Six train service employees were killed, and three train service employees were injured. Six locomotives and 11 cars were destroyed, one locomotive extensively damaged and five cars were also damaged. The probable cause of this accident was the failure of the operator at the 72nd Street Station (DO) to restrict train ND-5. KW - Crash investigation KW - Crash reports KW - Crashes KW - Operating rules KW - Signaling UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/20442 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00071750 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT: SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY FRUITRIDGE ROAD GRADE CROSSING SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, FEBRUARY 22, 1067 PY - 1968/01/15 SP - 31 p. AB - On February 22, 1967 at 12:05 PM, a station wagon traveling east on Fruitridge Road in Sacramento, California collided with a Southern Pacific Company freight train traveling north at the intersections of the Southern Pacific railroad tracks and Fruitridge road. Immediately prior to and after the collision, the flashing lights and bells of the automatic railroad crossing warning devices were functioning properly. In addition, the engineer was sounding the locomotive's horn and bell in the prescribed manner, and the locomotive's regular and oscillating headlights were functioning. The station wagon was destroyed and the nine occupants killed. The train was not derailed nor was the train crew harmed and the lead locomotive suffered only minor damage. The probable cause of the accident was failure of the driver of the station wagon to stop his vehicle short of the grade crossing and to remain clear of the track as required by California State law. KW - Crash investigation KW - Crash reports KW - Crashes KW - Fatalities KW - Grade crossing accidents KW - Grade crossing protection systems KW - Railroad grade crossings KW - Traffic crashes KW - Warning systems UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/17790 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00911640 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - A COMPARISON OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA INVOLVING U.S. AIR CARRIER OPERATIONS: FIVE-YEAR PERIOD, 1962-1966. PY - 1968 AB - No abstract provided. KW - Air transportation crashes KW - United States UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/585385 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00320705 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - NTSB ACCIDENT REPORT PY - SP - n.p. AB - This series of accident reports contains briefs of selected accidents which present the circumstances, basic facts, conditions, and probable cause(s) in each instance. Additional statistical information is tabulated by types of accidents, and casualties related to types of accidents, carriers involved, and causal factors. The series include the following: Aircraft Accident Report; Reports of Proceedings/Special Studies; Briefs of Accidents Involving...; A Preliminary Statistical Analysis of...; Aircraft Accident Data-U.S. Civil Aviation; Annual Review of Aircraft Accident Data; U.S. Air Carrier Operations; Aircraft Accident Reports-Brief Format; Highway Accident Reports; Highway Special Studies; Pipeline Special Studies, Railway Accidents Report. (TSC) KW - Aircraft KW - Crash investigation KW - Crash reports KW - Intermodal transportation KW - Railroad transportation KW - Safety and security KW - Traffic crashes KW - Transportation safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/158736 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00320636 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - TRANSPORTATION SAFETY RECORDS PY - SP - n.p. AB - This system is designed to collect accident data modes of transportation and determine probable cause and recommendations to prevent future similar accidents. Investigations of all civil aviation accidents and selected major catastrophic accidents in other transportation modes are included in the system. Specific informaiton consists of facts, circumstances, and probable cause of accidents. Investigations are conducted in all of the United States. Investigators are dispatched immediately following accident notification. Geocoding is date, type of vehicle (aircraft, truck, etc.), operator, and registration number. Output is the investigators factual report on the accident investigation, charts, and photographs. Query capability state, date, and place of accident. Primary sources of information are NTSB investigators or investigations conducted by other DOT Administrations, i.e. Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Highway Administration and U.S. Coast Guard. Input data come from findings of investigators. KW - Aviation KW - Crash investigation KW - Crash reports KW - Data analysis KW - Data collection KW - Data systems KW - Information systems KW - Intermodal transportation KW - Mathematical analysis KW - Motor vehicle accidents KW - Safety and security KW - Traffic crashes KW - Traffic safety KW - Transportation safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/158708 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00321413 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - TRANSPORTATION INITIAL DECISIONS AND ORDERS AND BOARD OPINIONS AND ORDERS ADOPTED AND ISSUED DURING THE MONTH PY - AB - The document contains the Judge's initial decisions and Board opinions and orders in safety enforcement. KW - Safety and security KW - Transportation safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/158992 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00320642 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT FATALITIES, PRELIMINARY STATISTICS PY - AB - Annual pamphlet presenting preliminary estimates of accident fatalities by transportation mode, 1975. Consists of brief narrative with text statistics on changes from the previous year, and a pie chart showing number of accidents for each transportation mode. KW - Intermodal transportation KW - Safety and security KW - Transportation safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/158709 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00321347 AU - University of South Dakota, Vermillion TI - STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION OF FATAL CRASH DRIVERS PY - AB - The degree to which alcohol represents a causative factor motor vehicle crashes is studied by a comparison of baseline and 1972 data on blood alcohol concentrations (BAC's) of fatally injured drivers, statistical description of all drivers involved in fatal motor vehicle crashes during 1972, and profiles of 1972 fatally injured drivers in crashes. Data currently available do not provide A reliable basis for the assessment of the impact of the South Dakota Alcohol Safety Action Proj. (SD: ASAP). About 85% of the fatal crash drivers were men, and 55.5% were under 30 years of age. Crashes involving drinking drivers tended to occur between 8 p.m. And 4 a.m., and on weekends. They intended to be fatal to the drinking driver more often than to others involved. Those involved in crashes not related to alcohol had proportionally fewer previous crashes. No statistically significant differences were observed in frequency of previous convictions for driving while intoxicated among crash-involved drivers in the following three groups: those who had been drinking, those who had not been drinking but another driver in the crash situation had been drinking, and those who had not been drinking and no other driver in the crash situation had been drinking. KW - Highways KW - Safety and security KW - Transportation safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/158945 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00320114 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - AVIATION SPECIAL STUDIES PY - AB - Continuing series of irregularly issued reports presenting narrative and tabular information on various aspects of aviation accidents and safety. Report subjects include fatalities and injuries sustained, and cause factors for various types of accidents; operators, operations groups, aircraft types, safety problem and hazards encountered. For example, 1976 reports include: chemically generated supplemental oxygen systems in DC-10 and L-1011 aircraft; U.S. general aviation takeoff accidents; the role of preflight preparation; nonfatal, weather-involved Ga accidents; Ga accidents involving aerobatics. KW - Air KW - Safety and security KW - Transportation safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/158479 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00320099 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - AUTOMATED AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INFORMATION SYSTEM (1964- ) PY - AB - The records are 1600 unpacked bytes in length, consist of 284 data fields such as date, location, aircraft, damage, injuries, pilot qualifications and experience, type of accident, phase of operation, causal factors, etc. Major publications: 1) Aircraft Accident Report. Brief format, U.S. Civil aviation (NTIS, 5/year) 2) Annual Review of Aircraft Accident Data, U.S. Air Carrier Operations, 3) Annual review of Aircraft Accident Data, U.S. General Aviation 4) Briefs of Accidents, selected categories/kinds of flying and special safety studies, such as: Listing of Aircraft Accidents/Incidents by Make and Model--U.S. Civil Aviation, 1973- ; Briefs of Accidents Involving (Various) Aircraft (1964- ), Annual; Briefs of Accidents Involving Aerial Applications Operations (1964- ); Briefs of Accident Involving Air Taxi Operations, U.S. General Aviation (1974- ); List of Accidents Involving Turbulence as a type of Accident: U.S. Carriers (1962- ); Briefs of Accidents Involving Alcohol as a Cause/Factor, U.S. General Aviation (1967- ); Briefs of Accidents Involving Amateur Build Aircraft, U.S. General Aviation (1967- ); Brief of Accidents Involving Corporate/Executive Aircraft, U.S. General Aviation (1967- ); Brief of Accidents Involving Mid-Air Collisions, U.S. Civil Aviation (1968- ); Brief of Accidents Involving Missing Aircraft, U.S. General Aviation (1967- ); Brief of Accidents Involving Mode Name Aircraft (1964- ); Brief of Accidents Involving Rotorcraft, U.S. Geneal Aviation (1967- ); Brief of Accidents Involving Turbine Powered Aircraft, U.S. General Aviation (1971- ); Brief of Accident Involving Weather as a Cause/Factor: U.S. General Aviation, (1966- ). Data are derived from NTSB Form 6120.12-aircraft accident analysis sheet, completed by NTSB air safety investigators. KW - Air KW - Safety and security KW - Transportation safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/158471 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00320115 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - PRELIMINARY STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT DATA, U.S. CIVIL AVIATION, (1967-PRESENT) PY - AB - Report presents the record of aircraft accidents which occurred in U.S. civil aviation operations during the calendar year. It includes a statistical recapitulation of all accidents and a brief of each air carrier accident containing the essential items of information. KW - Air KW - Mathematical models KW - Safety and security KW - Transportation KW - Transportation models and systems KW - Transportation safety UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/158480 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00195704 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS--NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD PY - SP - n.p. AB - Annual publication of NTSB containing summaries of accidents and statistics for all modes subject to investigation. First issued in 1967. KW - Casualties KW - Competition KW - Crash data KW - Crash investigation KW - Crashes KW - Derailments KW - Grade crossing accidents KW - Railroad grade crossings KW - Safety KW - Statistics KW - Traffic crashes KW - Transportation modes UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/85010 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00187100 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (ANALYSIS) PY - SP - n.p. AB - The Board generally delegates accident cause investigation to the U.S. Coast Guard subject to review by the Board. The Annual Report contains data on the marine investigations conducted by the Board during the year, which usually number less than 10, and summary statistics on marine casualties for the year, including those investigated by the USCG. KW - Casualties KW - Casualty data KW - Crash causes KW - Crash data KW - Crash investigation KW - Crashes KW - Fatalities KW - Loss and damage KW - Personnel casualties KW - Ship casualties KW - Ship losses KW - Ships KW - Statistics KW - Water transportation crashes UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/78826 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 00187101 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - SAFETY INFORMATION. ANNUAL REPORT PY - SP - n.p. AB - This annual report, published in newsletter form, contains a summary of marine transport fatalities, both commercial and recreational, for the relevant year and comparative statistics for preceding years. KW - Casualties KW - Casualty data KW - Crash data KW - Crashes KW - Fatalities KW - Occupational safety KW - Personnel casualties KW - Personnel safety KW - Ship casualties KW - Statistics KW - Water transportation crashes UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/78827 ER - TY - RPRT AN - 01342388 AU - National Transportation Safety Board TI - Aircraft Accident Report: Crash During Approach to Landing, Empire Airlines Flight 8284, Avions de Transport Regional Aerospatiale Alenia ATR 42-320, N902FX, Lubbock, Texas, January 27, 2009 PY - 110/42/06 SP - 128p AB - This accident report discusses the January 27, 2009, accident involving Empire Airlines flight 8284, an Avions de Transport Régional Aerospatiale Alenia ATR 42-320, N902FX, which crashed short of the runway at Lubbock Preston Smith International Airport, Lubbock, Texas. The captain sustained serious injuries, and the first officer sustained minor injuries. The airplane was substantially damaged. The airplane was registered to FedEx Corporation and operated by Empire Airlines, Inc., as a 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 supplemental cargo flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The safety issues discussed in this report include the flight crew’s actions in response to the flap anomaly, the continuation of the unstabilized approach, the dispatch of the flight into freezing drizzle conditions, the efficiency of the emergency response, and simulator-based training for pilots who fly in icing conditions. Nine safety recommendations are addressed to the Federal Aviation Administration. KW - Air pilots KW - Air transportation crashes KW - Approach KW - Cargo aircraft KW - Crash injuries KW - FedEx Corporation KW - Flaps (Aircraft) KW - Flight crews KW - Freezing rain KW - Instrument landing systems KW - Instrument meteorological conditions KW - Landing KW - Lubbock Preston Smith International Airport KW - Pilot training KW - Recommendations KW - Weather conditions UR - http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1102.pdf UR - https://trid.trb.org/view/1104750 ER -