TY - JOUR AU - Hosken, Daniel S. AU - Olson, Luke M. AU - Smith, Loren K. T1 - CAN ENTRY OR EXIT EVENT STUDIES INFORM HORIZONTAL MERGER ANALYSIS? EVIDENCE FROM GROCERY RETAILING. JO - Economic Inquiry JF - Economic Inquiry Y1 - 2016/01// VL - 54 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 342 EP - 360 PB - Wiley-Blackwell SN - 00952583 AB - This study estimates how prices change following the entry and exit of grocery retailers. We estimate the effects of entry (exit) by comparing affected markets to a set of unaffected markets using both a difference-in-difference estimator and a synthetic control estimator. We find that entry typically results in reduced prices. More surprisingly, we find that exit is frequently associated with falling prices. Our estimated effects of entry on grocery prices are similar in magnitude to estimates of merger price effects in the supermarket industry. This finding suggests that entry event studies may be a useful tool for horizontal merger analysis. ( JEL L11, L4, L81) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Economic Inquiry is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - GROCERY industry KW - RESEARCH KW - RETAIL industry -- Research KW - SUPERMARKETS KW - CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations KW - FOOD industry N1 - Accession Number: 111238766; Hosken, Daniel S. 1 Olson, Luke M. 1 Smith, Loren K. 2; Affiliation: 1: Bureau of Economics, U.S. Federal Trade Commission 2: Compass Lexecon; Source Info: Jan2016, Vol. 54 Issue 1, p342; Subject Term: GROCERY industry; Subject Term: RESEARCH; Subject Term: RETAIL industry -- Research; Subject Term: SUPERMARKETS; Subject Term: CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations; Subject Term: FOOD industry; NAICS/Industry Codes: 311991 Perishable Prepared Food Manufacturing; NAICS/Industry Codes: 311999 All Other Miscellaneous Food Manufacturing; NAICS/Industry Codes: 453999 All other miscellaneous store retailers (except beer and wine-making supplies stores); NAICS/Industry Codes: 452999 All other miscellaneous general merchandise stores; NAICS/Industry Codes: 453998 All Other Miscellaneous Store Retailers (except Tobacco Stores); NAICS/Industry Codes: 424490 Other Grocery and Related Products Merchant Wholesalers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 413110 General-line food merchant wholesalers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 445110 Supermarkets and Other Grocery (except Convenience) Stores; NAICS/Industry Codes: 424410 General Line Grocery Merchant Wholesalers; Number of Pages: 19p; Illustrations: 1 Diagram, 9 Charts, 2 Graphs; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1111/ecin.12208 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=111238766&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - aph ER - TY - JOUR AU - Sacher, Seth1, ssacher@ftc.gov AU - Sandford, Jeremy1, jsandford@ftc.gov T1 - THE ROLE OF CAPACITY IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS. JO - Journal of Competition Law & Economics JF - Journal of Competition Law & Economics J1 - Journal of Competition Law & Economics PY - 2016/12// Y1 - 2016/12// VL - 12 IS - 4 CP - 4 M3 - Article SP - 661 EP - 700 SN - 17446414 AB - Issues of productive capacity can play a role in nearly every aspect of competition analysis. This article provides an overview of the economic literature on capacity and the role that capacity has played in actual antitrust and competition law enforcement. The goal is to aid the analysis in matters where capacity issues potentially play a significant role. For the most part, the theoretical role of capacity in various aspects of competition analysis is ambiguous and the empirical literature is similarly inconclusive. Moreover, in many situations, measuring excess capacity may be quite difficult. Given the theoretical and empirical ambiguity regarding the role of excess capacity, or the lack thereof, the overall conclusion is that capacity issues should play a role in competition analysis only when there is strong case-specific evidence regarding their effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] KW - Antitrust law KW - Competition (Economics) KW - Law enforcement KW - Economics knowledge KW - Empirical research N1 - Accession Number: 120676351; Authors:Sacher, Seth 1 Email Address: ssacher@ftc.gov; Sandford, Jeremy 1 Email Address: jsandford@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: Economist, U.S. Federal Trade Commission; Subject: Antitrust law; Subject: Competition (Economics); Subject: Law enforcement; Subject: Empirical research; Subject: Economics knowledge; Number of Pages: 40p; Court Cases: Federal Trade Commission v. Owens Illinois; Blomkest Fertilizer Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan; Statute:Sherman Act; Jurisdiction:United States; Record Type: Article L3 - 10.1093/joclec/nhw029 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lft&AN=120676351&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - lft ER - TY - JOUR AU - Herman, Douglas A. AU - Ulrick, Shawn W. AU - Sacher, Seth B. T1 - Dominance Thresholds: A Cautionary Note. JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2014/12// VL - 59 IS - 4 M3 - Article SP - 855 EP - 893 PB - Sage Publications Inc. SN - 0003603X AB - As a threshold matter, high market shares are considered informative of potential underlying competitive dynamics, especially issues of market power and dominance. However, as is well known, high shares may not tell the entire story. Beyond issues related to market definition, entry, and efficiencies, this article notes an additional reason why caution may be warranted before drawing conclusions about dominance or market power from share evidence. Specifically, such conclusions can be statistically unsupportable in the presence of small sample issues. In markets with relatively few transactions (that is, “thinly” traded markets), the implications of observed high market shares are much less clear than in more thickly traded markets. It is entirely possible that situations that appear to implicate a dominant firm actually reflect pure random chance in a competitive process involving equally matched or nondominant firms. This article discusses theories and methods for distinguishing between outcomes that exhibit strong statistical evidence of dominance as opposed to those that merely reflect the random distribution of winnings among nondominant firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Antitrust Bulletin is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - MARKET power -- Law & legislation KW - INDUSTRIAL organization (Economic theory) KW - ANTITRUST law -- United States KW - STATISTICAL significance KW - MONOPOLISTIC competition KW - MARKET potential KW - antitrust KW - dominance KW - market structure KW - monopolization KW - small samples KW - statistical significance N1 - Accession Number: 101410522; Herman, Douglas A. 1 Ulrick, Shawn W. 2 Sacher, Seth B. 2; Affiliation: 1: Economist, Encino, CA 2: Economist, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC; Source Info: 2014, Vol. 59 Issue 4, p855; Subject Term: MARKET power -- Law & legislation; Subject Term: INDUSTRIAL organization (Economic theory); Subject Term: ANTITRUST law -- United States; Subject Term: STATISTICAL significance; Subject Term: MONOPOLISTIC competition; Subject Term: MARKET potential; Author-Supplied Keyword: antitrust; Author-Supplied Keyword: dominance; Author-Supplied Keyword: market structure; Author-Supplied Keyword: monopolization; Author-Supplied Keyword: small samples; Author-Supplied Keyword: statistical significance; Number of Pages: 39p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1177/0003603X1405900407 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=101410522&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - aph ER - TY - JOUR AU - Mongeon, Kevin AU - Ulrick, Shawn AU - Giannetto, Michael T1 - Explaining university course grade gaps. JO - Empirical Economics JF - Empirical Economics Y1 - 2017/02// VL - 52 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 411 EP - 446 SN - 03777332 AB - The article discusses a study that assessed college course grade gaps among Hispanic and Black students as compared to White students to determine contributing factors to such gaps. Topics include regression analysis of course grade data of Colorado State University (CSU)-Pueblo students in general education mathematics, chemistry and biology and scores in American College Testing (ACT). Results showed the adverse effect of college environment and student behavior on academic performance. KW - UNIVERSITIES & colleges KW - GRADING & marking (Students) KW - HISPANIC American college students KW - AFRICAN American college students KW - WHITE college students KW - ACT Assessment KW - Education KW - Grade gaps KW - I21 KW - I24 KW - J15 KW - Race KW - COLORADO State University N1 - Accession Number: 120928011; Mongeon, Kevin 1; Email Address: kmongeon@brocku.ca; Ulrick, Shawn 2; Email Address: sulrick@ftc.gov; Giannetto, Michael 3; Email Address: Michael.Giannetto@asu.edu; Affiliations: 1: Brock University , 500 Glenridge Ave. St Catharines L2S 3A1 Canada; 2: U.S. Federal Trade Commission , 600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington 20580 USA; 3: Arizona State University , Tempe 85287 USA; Issue Info: Feb2017, Vol. 52 Issue 1, p411; Thesaurus Term: UNIVERSITIES & colleges; Subject Term: GRADING & marking (Students); Subject Term: HISPANIC American college students; Subject Term: AFRICAN American college students; Subject Term: WHITE college students; Subject Term: ACT Assessment; Author-Supplied Keyword: Education; Author-Supplied Keyword: Grade gaps; Author-Supplied Keyword: I21; Author-Supplied Keyword: I24; Author-Supplied Keyword: J15; Author-Supplied Keyword: Race ; Company/Entity: COLORADO State University; NAICS/Industry Codes: 611310 Colleges, Universities, and Professional Schools; Number of Pages: 36p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1007/s00181-016-1078-4 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=120928011&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hanner, Dan AU - Jin, Ginger Zhe AU - Luppino, Marc AU - Rosenbaum, Ted AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission and U MD AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Economics at the FTC: Horizontal Mergers and Data Security JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2016/12// VL - 49 IS - 4 SP - 613 EP - 631 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 1615731; Keywords: Divestiture; Food; Merger; Tobacco; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201701 N2 - This article describes aspects of the economic analyses that were performed on three matters on which economists in the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission have worked during this past year. The first two matters were merger investigations: They (separately) involved tobacco manufacturers and food distributors. While these investigations shared some common attributes, such as the importance of the proposed divestitures, this essay demonstrates how our analysis must vary based on the types of information and the competitive concerns presented by specific transactions. The third section discusses a general economic approach to estimating consumer harm from data breaches, which is illustrated with an example of an application to a recent case. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco; Wine and Spirits L66 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1615731&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9548-6 UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Wilson, Nathan E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - For-Profit Status and Industry Evolution in Health Care Markets: Evidence from the Dialysis Industry JO - International Journal of Health Economics and Management JF - International Journal of Health Economics and Management Y1 - 2016/12// VL - 16 IS - 4 SP - 297 EP - 319 SN - 21999023 N1 - Accession Number: 1613393; Keywords: Health; Health Care; Market Structure; Non-Profit; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201701 N2 - This paper examines why for-profit dialysis providers have displaced non-profit providers over the last 25 years. Using detailed data on individual markets' evolutions, I find that for-profit facilities were quicker to enter growing markets and slower to exit declining ones than non-profit facilities. Moreover, for-profit providers' presence in a market had a larger impact on the exit and entry behavior of competitors. These results suggest that for-profit dialysis providers have an advantage in static competition relative to non-profit providers, and that this--rather than lower entry costs--explains their increasing prominence. Additional empirical analyses indicate that for-profits' advantage cannot solely be attributed to efficiencies related to membership in a large, multi-facility chain. This further suggests that managerial incentives have had an economically significant impact on long-run market structure in this industry. KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks L14 KW - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope L25 KW - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship L31 KW - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics L65 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/10754 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1613393&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10754-016-9192-6 UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/10754 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - McAdams, John M. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Effect of School Starting Age Policy on Crime: Evidence from U.S. Microdata JO - Economics of Education Review JF - Economics of Education Review Y1 - 2016/10// VL - 54 SP - 227 EP - 241 SN - 02727757 N1 - Accession Number: 1617398; Keywords: Crime; Incarceration; Law; Policy; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201702 N2 - Does school starting age policy have an impact on the propensity of individuals to commit crime as adults? Using microdata from the U.S. Census, we find that a higher school starting age cutoff leads to lower rates of incarceration among both those directly affected by the laws and those only indirectly affected. However, the reduction in incarceration among those directly affected is smaller in magnitude, implying that the delay itself was harmful with respect to crime outcomes. These findings provide further support for early childhood interventions influencing future criminal activity. KW - Analysis of Education I21 KW - Education: Government Policy I28 KW - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K42 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/02727757 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1617398&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2014.12.001 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/02727757 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ashenfelter, Orley C. AU - Hosken, Daniel S. AU - Weinberg, Matthew C. T1 - Efficiencies brewed: pricing and consolidation in the US beer industry. JO - RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) JF - RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Y1 - 2015///Summer2015 VL - 46 IS - 2 M3 - Article SP - 328 EP - 361 PB - Wiley-Blackwell SN - 07416261 AB - Merger efficiencies provide the primary justification for why mergers of competitors may benefit consumers. Surprisingly, there is little evidence that efficiencies can offset incentives to raise prices following mergers. We estimate the effects of increased concentration and efficiencies on pricing by using panel scanner data and geographic variation in how the merger of the brewers Miller and Coors was expected to increase concentration and reduce costs. All else equal, the average predicted increase in concentration led to price increases of 2%, but at the mean this was offset by a nearly equal and opposite efficiency effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - BEER industry KW - BEER -- Sales & prices KW - CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations KW - BUSINESS enterprises KW - RESEARCH KW - BREWING KW - UNITED States N1 - Accession Number: 102271685; Ashenfelter, Orley C. 1; Hosken, Daniel S. 2; Weinberg, Matthew C. 3; Affiliations: 1: Princeton University and NBER; 2: US Federal Trade Commission; 3: Drexel University; Issue Info: Summer2015, Vol. 46 Issue 2, p328; Thesaurus Term: BEER industry; Thesaurus Term: BEER -- Sales & prices; Thesaurus Term: CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations; Thesaurus Term: BUSINESS enterprises; Thesaurus Term: RESEARCH; Subject Term: BREWING; Subject Term: UNITED States; NAICS/Industry Codes: 413220 Alcoholic beverage merchant wholesalers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 445310 Beer, Wine, and Liquor Stores; NAICS/Industry Codes: 424810 Beer and Ale Merchant Wholesalers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 312120 Breweries; Number of Pages: 34p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1111/1756-2171.12092 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=102271685&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Adams, Christopher P. T1 - Finite mixture models with one exclusion restriction. JO - Econometrics Journal JF - Econometrics Journal Y1 - 2016/06// VL - 19 IS - 2 M3 - Article SP - 150 EP - 165 SN - 13684221 AB - This paper characterizes the identified set for finite mixture models with one exclusion restriction on the data-generating process. It provides necessary and sufficient conditions on the observed data for point identification and for when the identified set has measure zero. The results are illustrated in a simulation study and with data from a randomized controlled trial on chemotherapy for colon cancer as well as with data from an observational study used to estimate returns to schooling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Econometrics Journal is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - COLON cancer -- Treatment KW - CHEMOTHERAPY (Cancer) KW - COMPUTER simulation KW - RANDOMIZED controlled trials KW - FINITE mixture models (Statistics) KW - OBSERVATION (Scientific method) KW - Identification KW - Mixture models KW - Non-parametrics N1 - Accession Number: 118886597; Adams, Christopher P. 1; Affiliations: 1: United States Federal Trade Commission; Issue Info: Jun2016, Vol. 19 Issue 2, p150; Subject Term: COLON cancer -- Treatment; Subject Term: CHEMOTHERAPY (Cancer); Subject Term: COMPUTER simulation; Subject Term: RANDOMIZED controlled trials; Subject Term: FINITE mixture models (Statistics); Subject Term: OBSERVATION (Scientific method); Author-Supplied Keyword: Identification; Author-Supplied Keyword: Mixture models; Author-Supplied Keyword: Non-parametrics; Number of Pages: 16p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1111/ectj.12065 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=118886597&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - ULRICK, SHAWN W.1, sulrick@ftc.gov T1 - A PRIMER ON AIDS-BASED MODELS IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS. JO - European Competition Journal JF - European Competition Journal J1 - European Competition Journal PY - 2014/04// Y1 - 2014/04// VL - 10 IS - 1 CP - 1 M3 - Article SP - 123 EP - 153 SN - 17441056 AB - The article discusses the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)-based demand systems for the antitrust analysis. Topics discussed include basic properties of demand theory which can be satisfied imposing certain constraints on AIDS, simultaneous equations bias in demand estimation and econometric analysis. It further presents derivations to find uncompensated demand elasticities. KW - Antitrust law KW - Economic models KW - Demand (Economic theory) KW - Simultaneous equations KW - Econometric models N1 - Accession Number: 95657422; Authors:ULRICK, SHAWN W. 1 Email Address: sulrick@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: United States Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20580, USA; Subject: Economic models; Subject: Antitrust law; Subject: Demand (Economic theory); Subject: Simultaneous equations; Subject: Econometric models; Number of Pages: 31p; Record Type: Article L3 - 10.5235/17441056.10.1.123 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lft&AN=95657422&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - lft ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ederington, Josh AU - Sandford, Jeremy AD - U KY AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Employer Discrimination and Market Structure: Does More Concentration Mean More Discrimination? JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2016/09// VL - 48 SP - 1 EP - 33 SN - 01677187 N1 - Accession Number: 1603123; Keywords: Discrimination; Discriminatory; Entry; Firm; Firms; Market Structure; Production; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201611 N2 - We formalize Gary Becker's dynamic conjecture that competitive forces drive discriminating employers from the market in the long run, using a dynamic model of a monopolistically competitive industry characterized by sunk costs and sequential entry. An advantage of this formalization is that it demonstrates the importance of the structure of production costs, as well as market power, in explaining the long-run survival of discriminatory firms. In addition, we show that, despite decades of empirical research on this connection, there is no consistent theoretical relationship between the degree of market concentration within an industry and the degree of discrimination. However, we do find an indirect link in which market liberalization has a more pronounced effect in reducing discrimination in more concentrated markets. KW - Firm Behavior: Theory D21 KW - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D43 KW - Labor Demand J23 KW - Labor Discrimination J71 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions M51 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1603123&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.008 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hanner, Daniel AU - Hosken, Daniel AU - Olson, Luke M. AU - Smith, Loren K. T1 - Dynamics in a Mature Industry: Entry, Exit, and Growth of Big-Box Grocery Retailers. JO - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy JF - Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Y1 - 2015///Spring2015 VL - 24 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 22 EP - 46 PB - Wiley-Blackwell SN - 10586407 AB - This paper measures market dynamics within the U.S. grocery industry (defined as supermarket, supercenter, and club retailers). We find that despite being a mature industry, the grocery industry is remarkably dynamic. Each year retailers open or close roughly 7% of U.S. stores. We also find significant changes in the size of firms' operations within markets over time. These changes in relative size are largely the result of expansion or contraction by incumbents rather than the result of firm entry or exit. In fact, entry and exit are quite rare, except by small firms. Moreover, only in small markets do new entrants gain substantial market share. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Journal of Economics & Management Strategy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - GROCERY industry KW - RESEARCH KW - SMALL business KW - MARKET share KW - MARKET entry KW - RETAIL stores KW - UNITED States N1 - Accession Number: 100952447; Hanner, Daniel 1; Hosken, Daniel 1; Olson, Luke M. 1; Smith, Loren K. 2; Affiliations: 1: U.S. Federal Trade Commission 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,; 2: Compass Lexecon 1101 K Street NW,; Issue Info: Spring2015, Vol. 24 Issue 1, p22; Thesaurus Term: GROCERY industry; Thesaurus Term: RESEARCH; Thesaurus Term: SMALL business; Thesaurus Term: MARKET share; Thesaurus Term: MARKET entry; Thesaurus Term: RETAIL stores; Subject Term: UNITED States; NAICS/Industry Codes: 452999 All other miscellaneous general merchandise stores; NAICS/Industry Codes: 453999 All other miscellaneous store retailers (except beer and wine-making supplies stores); NAICS/Industry Codes: 236220 Commercial and Institutional Building Construction; NAICS/Industry Codes: 453998 All Other Miscellaneous Store Retailers (except Tobacco Stores); Number of Pages: 25p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1111/jems.12087 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=100952447&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ulrick, Shawn W.1, sulrick@ftc.gov AU - Sacher, Seth B.1, ssacher@ftc.gov T1 - INFERRING ANTICOMPETITIVE PRICE EFFECTS FROM DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ANALYSIS: ACAVEAT. JO - Journal of Competition Law & Economics JF - Journal of Competition Law & Economics J1 - Journal of Competition Law & Economics PY - 2015/12// Y1 - 2015/12// VL - 11 IS - 4 CP - 4 M3 - Article SP - 999 EP - 1012 SN - 17446414 AB - Difference-in-differences, or "D-in-D," is perhaps the most broadly applied econometric technique in retrospective analyses of competition matters.We discuss a possible pitfall regarding this procedure. We argue that a positive and significant event variable coefficient is not a sufficient condition for concluding that there have been anticompetitive price effects.We use simulations to demonstrate that even in cases where the alleged anticompetitive activity had no anticompetitive effect, the D-in-D procedure can still produce positive and significant event variables. This article does not take issue with D-in-D in principle but rather as it is often practiced. Our results imply that while D-in-D is an important tool, the researcher must conduct additional analyses to put the D-in-D result into context before concluding a significant event variable is indicative of anticompetitive effects. We suggest a specific approach. We note that our results may have important implications for the current state of the academic literature regarding retrospectives in antitrust as well as for practitioners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] KW - Price discrimination KW - Antitrust law KW - Procedure (Law) KW - Econometrics KW - Simulation methods & models N1 - Accession Number: 111523749; Authors:Ulrick, Shawn W. 1 Email Address: sulrick@ftc.gov; Sacher, Seth B. 1 Email Address: ssacher@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: Economist, U.S. Federal Trade Commission,Washington, DC 20580; Subject: Price discrimination; Subject: Antitrust law; Subject: Econometrics; Subject: Procedure (Law); Subject: Simulation methods & models; Number of Pages: 14p; Record Type: Article L3 - 10.1093/joclec/nhv032 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lft&AN=111523749&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - lft ER - TY - JOUR AU - Koch, Thomas AU - Birchenall, Javier AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - U CA, Santa Barbara T1 - Taking versus Taxing: An Analysis of Conscription in a Private Information Economy JO - Public Choice JF - Public Choice Y1 - 2016/06// VL - 167 IS - 3-4 SP - 177 EP - 199 SN - 00485829 N1 - Accession Number: 1584684; Keywords: Conscription; Draft; Information; Military; Tax; Taxation; Taxes; Volunteer Army; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201608 N2 - Most countries currently man their militaries through conscription (i.e., a draft). Conventional wisdom suggests that, by lowering the budgetary cost of the military, a draft reduces distortionary taxation, especially when military needs are large. We find that this intuition is misguided. When income taxes are set optimally, voluntary enlistments lead to less distortionary taxation than a draft, because the tax base left behind by a volunteer army tends to be more productive than that after a draft. For reasonable parameter values, drafts are more distortionary (and less socially desirable) when military needs are large. KW - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design D82 KW - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General H20 KW - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes H24 KW - National Security and War H56 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11127 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1584684&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0334-7 UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11127 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - GEN AU - Ashenfelter, Orley AU - Hosken, Daniel AU - Weinberg, Matthew T1 - Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers. JO - Journal of Law & Economics JF - Journal of Law & Economics Y1 - 2014/08/02/2014 Supplement VL - 57 M3 - Essay SP - S67 EP - S100 SN - 00222186 AB - In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork viewed most mergers as either competitively neutral or efficiency enhancing. In his view, only mergers creating a dominant firm or monopoly were likely to harm consumers. Bork was especially skeptical of oligopoly concerns resulting from mergers. In this paper, we provide a critique of Bork's views on merger policy from The Antitrust Paradox. Many of Bork's recommendations have been implemented over time and have improved merger analysis. Bork's proposed horizontal merger policy, however, was too permissive. In particular, the empirical record shows that mergers in oligopolistic markets can raise consumer prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Journal of Law & Economics is the property of University of Chicago Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations -- United States -- History KW - COMPETITION (Economics) -- United States -- History KW - CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations -- United States -- Charts, diagrams, etc. KW - INDUSTRIAL concentration -- United States -- History KW - ANTITRUST law -- United States -- History KW - BORK, Robert, 1927-2012 KW - ANTITRUST Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself, The (Book) N1 - Accession Number: 100397294; Ashenfelter, Orley 1; Hosken, Daniel 2; Weinberg, Matthew 3; Affiliations: 1 : Princeton University; 2 : U.S. Federal Trade Commission; 3 : Drexel University; Source Info: 2014 Supplement, Vol. 57, pS67; Historical Period: ca 1961 to ca 1980; Subject Term: CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations -- United States -- History; Subject Term: COMPETITION (Economics) -- United States -- History; Subject Term: CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations -- United States -- Charts, diagrams, etc.; Subject Term: INDUSTRIAL concentration -- United States -- History; Subject Term: ANTITRUST law -- United States -- History; Number of Pages: 34p; Document Type: Essay UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ahl&AN=100397294&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ahl ER - TY - CONF AU - Ohlhausen, Maureen K.1 T1 - Illuminating the Story of China's Anti-monopoly Law. JO - Antitrust Source JF - Antitrust Source J1 - Antitrust Source PY - 2013/10// Y1 - 2013/10// VL - 13 IS - 1 CP - 1 M3 - Proceeding SP - 1 EP - 8 AB - The article discusses the highlights of the China Competition Policy Forum - Competitition Policy in Transition held in Beijin, China on July 31 and August 1, 2013. Topics discussed include merger review and remedies and treatment of intellectual property (IP) rights and focus more on static competition factors instead of considering longer term effects on innovation and consumer welfare. Speakers included Shang Ming, Xu Kunlin and Ren Airong. KW - Competition (Economics) -- Government policy KW - Monopolies -- Law & legislation -- Congresses KW - Consolidation & merger of corporations -- China KW - Intellectual property -- China KW - Consumer protection -- China N1 - Accession Number: 96656736; Authors:Ohlhausen, Maureen K. 1; Affiliations: 1: Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission; Subject: Monopolies -- Law & legislation -- Congresses; Subject: Competition (Economics) -- Government policy; Subject: Consolidation & merger of corporations -- China; Subject: Intellectual property -- China; Subject: Consumer protection -- China; Number of Pages: 8p; Record Type: Proceeding; Full Text Word Count: 4401 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lft&AN=96656736&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - lft ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ulrick, Shawn W. T1 - The bias in measuring disparity in outcomes via a dummy variable: A note. JO - Journal of Economic & Social Measurement JF - Journal of Economic & Social Measurement Y1 - 2014/09// VL - 39 IS - 3 M3 - Article SP - 153 EP - 161 PB - IOS Press SN - 07479662 AB - Disparity in an outcome between two groups is often measured via the coefficient of a dummy variable in a regression that pools both groups. The dummy is interpreted as the disparity. A casual search of the literature in economics and other social sciences reviews far too many examples of this method to catalog. Unfortunately, if the impact of one (or more) of the control variables differs between the two groups, the measured disparity (i.e., the coefficient on the group dummy) will be biased. We illustrate and derive this bias. Given the bias, we believe that one is better running separate regressions for each group and then implementing decomposition methods or predicting adjusted gaps in outcome (i.e., predicting the but-for world that would exist if the two groups had identical characteristics). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Journal of Economic & Social Measurement is the property of IOS Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - REGRESSION analysis KW - ECONOMICS KW - DUMMY variables KW - REGIONAL disparities KW - SOCIOMETRY KW - measuring disparity KW - Pooling bias N1 - Accession Number: 100639601; Ulrick, Shawn W. 1; Affiliations: 1: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20580, USA. Tel.: +1 202 326 2327; Fax: +1 202 326 3443; E-mail: sulrick@ftc.gov; Issue Info: 2014, Vol. 39 Issue 3, p153; Thesaurus Term: REGRESSION analysis; Thesaurus Term: ECONOMICS; Subject Term: DUMMY variables; Subject Term: REGIONAL disparities; Subject Term: SOCIOMETRY; Author-Supplied Keyword: measuring disparity; Author-Supplied Keyword: Pooling bias; Number of Pages: 9p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.3233/JEM-140390 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=100639601&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ohlhausen, Maureen K. T1 - 100 IS THE NEW 30: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FTC'S NEXT 100 YEARS. JO - George Mason Law Review JF - George Mason Law Review Y1 - 2014/08//2014 Symposium Issue VL - 21 IS - 5 M3 - Article SP - 1131 EP - 1143 SN - 10683801 AB - In this article, the author who had participated in the 17th Annual Antitrust Symposium presented his views on efficiency of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) on the completion of its 100 years. Topics discussed include the efficient role of the FTC in consumer protection and antitrust policies, its role in providing proper business and consumer education, and the role of the FTC in analyzing the impact of the patent assertion entity (PAE) on competition and innovation. KW - ANTITRUST law KW - CONSUMER protection KW - COMPETITION (Economics) KW - BUSINESS education KW - CONSUMER education KW - UNITED States. Federal Trade Commission N1 - Accession Number: 99150429; Ohlhausen, Maureen K. 1; Affiliation: 1: Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission; Source Info: 2014 Symposium Issue, Vol. 21 Issue 5, p1131; Subject Term: ANTITRUST law; Subject Term: CONSUMER protection; Subject Term: COMPETITION (Economics); Subject Term: BUSINESS education; Subject Term: CONSUMER education; Company/Entity: UNITED States. Federal Trade Commission; NAICS/Industry Codes: 611310 Colleges, Universities, and Professional Schools; NAICS/Industry Codes: 611410 Business and Secretarial Schools; NAICS/Industry Codes: 922190 Other Justice, Public Order, and Safety Activities; NAICS/Industry Codes: 926110 Administration of General Economic Programs; Number of Pages: 13p; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=99150429&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - aph ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm AU - Ulrick, Shawn T1 - Unilateral Effects Analysis in Differentiated Product Markets: Guidelines, Policy, and Change. JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2016/02// VL - 48 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 45 EP - 68 SN - 0889938X AB - The Merger Guidelines highlight unilateral effects analysis as the primary anticompetitive theory in differentiated product markets. This study evaluates the Federal Trade Commission's historical record to determine what considerations drive the internal review process, if these considerations depend on the type of competition within the differentiated market under review, and if policy has changed much over the 20 years since the 1992 Merger Guidelines were issued. The results identify the importance of price-based competition to the analysis, as markets that are characterized by price competition tend to generate significantly higher estimates for the probability of a unilateral effects finding, all else equal, especially when repositioning is difficult. Moreover, a little fluctuation is detected in policy, but no real evidence of change over the 20-year period of the study exists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Review of Industrial Organization is the property of Springer Science & Business Media B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - COMPETITION (Economics) KW - MARKETING strategy KW - INDUSTRIAL policy KW - Diversion analysis KW - Federal Trade Commission KW - Merger policy KW - Unilateral effects KW - HISTORICAL Records Survey (U.S.) KW - UNITED States. Federal Trade Commission N1 - Accession Number: 112232837; Coate, Malcolm 1; Email Address: mcoate@ftc.gov; Ulrick, Shawn 1; Email Address: sulrick@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Ave, NW Washington 20580 USA; Issue Info: Feb2016, Vol. 48 Issue 1, p45; Thesaurus Term: COMPETITION (Economics); Thesaurus Term: MARKETING strategy; Thesaurus Term: INDUSTRIAL policy; Author-Supplied Keyword: Diversion analysis; Author-Supplied Keyword: Federal Trade Commission; Author-Supplied Keyword: Merger policy; Author-Supplied Keyword: Unilateral effects ; Company/Entity: HISTORICAL Records Survey (U.S.) ; Company/Entity: UNITED States. Federal Trade Commission; NAICS/Industry Codes: 926110 Administration of General Economic Programs; Number of Pages: 24p; Illustrations: 6 Charts; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1007/s11151-015-9478-8 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=112232837&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Wilson, Nathan E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Market Structure as a Determinant of Patient Care Quality JO - American Journal of Health Economics JF - American Journal of Health Economics Y1 - 2016///Spring VL - 2 IS - 2 SP - 241 EP - 271 SN - 23323493 N1 - Accession Number: 1570791; Keywords: Health; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201606 N2 - Understanding how market structure affects health outcomes is difficult because of the nonrandom nature of where patients receive care. I develop a control function approach that is robust not just to selection on unobservable differences in patients' condition severity, but also to selection on unobservable variation in how patients respond to different treatments. I apply the approach to data from 2004 to 2008 for all hemodialysis patients in Atlanta, Georgia. The results indicate that a one-facility acquisition by the average provider in the average market would lead the average patient to spend 28 percent more days in the ICU/CCU. Estimates that do not control for the role of idiosyncratic matching would predict smaller, though still economically and statistically significant, effects on the affected patients. I interpret the results as indicating the importance of idiosyncratic matching in this market, which multifacility firms address by differentiating their operations. KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health I18 L3 - http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/ajhe UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1570791&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/ajhe DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Chesnes, Matthew AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Asymmetric Pass-Through in U.S. Gasoline Prices JO - Energy Journal JF - Energy Journal Y1 - 2016/01// VL - 37 IS - 1 SP - 153 EP - 180 SN - 01956574 N1 - Accession Number: 1565538; Keywords: Concentration; Crude Oil; Oil; Prices; Retail; Wholesale; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201605 N2 - This paper presents new evidence of asymmetric pass-through, the notion that upward cost shocks are passed through faster than downward cost shocks, in U.S. gasoline prices. Much of the extant literature comes to seemingly contradictory conclusions about the existence and causes of asymmetry, though the differences may be due to different aggregation (both over time and geographic markets) and the use of different price series including crude oil, wholesale, and retail gasoline prices. I utilize a large and detailed dataset to determine where evidence of a pass-through asymmetry exists, and how it depends on the aggregation and price series chosen by the researcher. Using the error correction model, I find evidence of pass-through asymmetry based on spot, rack and retail prices, though the largest effect is found in the rack to retail relationship. I find more asymmetry in branded prices compared with unbranded prices, consistent with a consumer search explanation for asymmetry. However, I also find evidence consistent with explanations based on market power as the magnitude of asymmetry is positively associated with retail concentration. On average, retail prices rise three to four times as fast as they fall. KW - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing; option pricing G13 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 KW - Advertising M37 KW - Hydrocarbon Resources Q35 KW - Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices Q41 L3 - http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/journal.aspx UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1565538&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/journal.aspx DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - O'Brien, Daniel P. T1 - The welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets: the case of bargaining. JO - RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) JF - RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Y1 - 2014///Spring2014 VL - 45 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 92 EP - 115 PB - Wiley-Blackwell SN - 07416261 AB - This article examines the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination by a monopolist selling to downstream firms with bargaining power. One of the downstream firms (the 'chain store') can integrate backward at lower cost than rivals. Bargaining powers also depend on disagreement profits, bargaining weights, and concession costs. If the chain's integration threat is not credible, price discrimination reduces the input price charged symmetric downstream firms and often reduces the average input price charged asymmetric downstream firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - BARGAINING power KW - PRICE discrimination KW - CHAIN stores KW - PROFIT KW - MONOPOLISTIC competition KW - CONCESSION bargaining N1 - Accession Number: 95094653; O'Brien, Daniel P. 1; Affiliations: 1: US Federal Trade Commission; Issue Info: Spring2014, Vol. 45 Issue 1, p92; Thesaurus Term: BARGAINING power; Thesaurus Term: PRICE discrimination; Thesaurus Term: CHAIN stores; Thesaurus Term: PROFIT; Thesaurus Term: MONOPOLISTIC competition; Subject Term: CONCESSION bargaining; NAICS/Industry Codes: 452999 All other miscellaneous general merchandise stores; NAICS/Industry Codes: 453999 All other miscellaneous store retailers (except beer and wine-making supplies stores); NAICS/Industry Codes: 453998 All Other Miscellaneous Store Retailers (except Tobacco Stores); Number of Pages: 24p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1111/1756-2171.12043 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=95094653&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zimmerman, Paul R1, pzimmerman@ftc.gov T1 - EVALUATING THE RELATIVE PERFORMANCE OF UPWARD PRICING PRESSURE SCREENS WITH SHARE- BASED DIVERSION RATIOS. JO - European Competition Journal JF - European Competition Journal J1 - European Competition Journal PY - 2011/12// Y1 - 2011/12// VL - 7 IS - 3 CP - 3 M3 - Article SP - 407 EP - 420 SN - 17441056 AB - The article presents information on the upward pricing pressure and its performance and correlation with diversion ratios that are based on the market shares of Europe. The concentration ratio and the Herfindahl Hirschman Index are included in the structural merger screens that have a history in the antitrust economics. The relative price changes and leads to the shift in the behavior of the customer that are estimated by the market shares of the firms. Information on the reliance of the market shares for estimating diversion with reference to the antitrust authorities and the upward pricing pressure is also presented. KW - Market share KW - Antitrust law KW - Pricing KW - Consolidation & merger of corporations KW - Actions & defenses (Law) KW - International law KW - Law & economics KW - Economic models N1 - Accession Number: 75373458; Authors:Zimmerman, Paul R 1 Email Address: pzimmerman@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: Economist, US Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Antitrust I, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, M-8059, Washington, DC, 20580; Subject: Market share; Subject: Antitrust law; Subject: Pricing; Subject: Consolidation & merger of corporations; Subject: Economic models; Subject: Actions & defenses (Law); Subject: International law; Subject: Law & economics; Subject: Europe; Number of Pages: 14p; Record Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lft&AN=75373458&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - lft ER - TY - GEN AU - Brill, Julie1 T1 - THE INTERNET OF THINGS: BUILDING TRUST AND MAXIMIZING BENEFITS THROUGH CONSUMER CONTROL. JO - Fordham Law Review JF - Fordham Law Review J1 - Fordham Law Review PY - 2014/10// Y1 - 2014/10// VL - 83 IS - 1 CP - 1 M3 - Essay SP - 205 EP - 217 SN - 0015704X AB - The Internet of Things is one of the fastest growing facets of a world that is becoming more data intensive. Connecting cars, appliances, and even clothing to the internet promises to deliver convenience, safety, and, through analysis of the torrent of additional data generated, potential solutions to some of our most intractable problems. But turning on this data flood also creates privacy and security risks for consumers, challenging us to consider how to apply basic privacy principles to the Internet of Things. A wide range of stakeholders--technologists, lawyers, industry leaders, and others--has a role to play in meeting this challenge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] KW - Data security KW - Internet & privacy -- Law & legislation KW - Internet of things KW - Trust KW - Consumers -- United States -- Legal status, laws, etc. KW - Big data -- Security measures KW - Right of privacy -- United States KW - United States. Federal Trade Commission N1 - Accession Number: 99034198; Authors:Brill, Julie 1; Affiliations: 1: Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission; Subject: Internet of things; Subject: Trust; Subject: Consumers -- United States -- Legal status, laws, etc.; Subject: Data security; Subject: Internet & privacy -- Law & legislation; Subject: Big data -- Security measures; Subject: Right of privacy -- United States; Subject: United States. Federal Trade Commission; Number of Pages: 13p; Record Type: Essay UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lft&AN=99034198&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - lft ER - TY - JOUR AU - Balan, David J. AU - DeGraba, Patrick AU - Lafontaine, Francine AU - McAlvanah, Patrick AU - Raval, Devesh AU - Schmidt, David AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission and U MI AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Economics at the FTC: Fraud, Mergers and Exclusion JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2015/12// VL - 47 IS - 4 SP - 371 EP - 398 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 1536712; Keywords: Anti Competitive; Anticompetitive; Competition; Consumer; Consumer Protection; Firm; Firms; Fraud; Merger; Protection; Software; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201512 N2 - Economists at the Federal Trade Commission engage in economic analysis of a diverse set of behaviors, practices, and policies in support of the agency's consumer protection and competition missions as demonstrated by the four projects that are the focus of this article. Consumer protection economists provided economic analysis in the first two projects discussed, which both involve fraud. However, one of the projects was an enforcement action, and the other was a pure research project. The final two projects are antitrust matters: a proposed merger of software firms; and a case that was brought to stop anticompetitive exclusionary conduct. KW - Consumer Protection D18 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K42 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 KW - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software L86 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1536712&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-015-9488-6 UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kovacic, William E. T1 - An integrated competition policy to deter and defeat cartels. JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2006///Winter2006 VL - 51 IS - 4 M3 - Article SP - 813 EP - 835 PB - Sage Publications Inc. SN - 0003603X AB - The article presents a policy to prevent and overcome cartels in the U.S. Cartel is a group of independent producers with goals to increase profits by price fixing, limiting supply or other restrictive practices. Collusion has a vital role in cartel because parties tend to cooperate for mutual benefit. One way to deter cartel is the prosecution of collusive practices. The cartel law is covered in the Article 81 of Treaty of European Community. KW - CARTELS KW - ANTITRUST law KW - PRICE fixing KW - PRODUCERS' associations KW - COMPETITION KW - UNITED States N1 - Accession Number: 25532567; Kovacic, William E. 1; Affiliation: 1: Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission; Source Info: Winter2006, Vol. 51 Issue 4, p813; Subject Term: CARTELS; Subject Term: ANTITRUST law; Subject Term: PRICE fixing; Subject Term: PRODUCERS' associations; Subject Term: COMPETITION; Subject Term: UNITED States; NAICS/Industry Codes: 813910 Business Associations; Number of Pages: 23p; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=25532567&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - aph ER - TY - JOUR AU - DeGraba, Patrick AU - Rosston, Gregory AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Stanford U T1 - Reviewing Wireless Mergers: Providing Clarity on How to Evaluate Competition, Efficiency, and the 'Public Interest' JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2015/09// VL - 60 IS - 3 SP - 250 EP - 267 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 1544264; Keywords: Competition; Merger; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201602 N2 - The Federal Communications Commission can improve the transparency of its decision process by establishing a set of guidelines for its review of mergers. Its current process is opaque, and parties cannot discern the weights that it places on "public interest" goals in some areas and how those balance against harms in other areas. The antitrust agencies' Merger Guidelines provide an example of how the Commission could signal more clearly its analytical process and push for more efficient remedies and lessen political pressure to undertake inefficient trade-offs such as requiring build out to areas unaffected by changes in competition due to a merger. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G38 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Telecommunications L96 KW - Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy L98 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1544264&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Feinstein, Deborah L. AU - Kuhlmann, Patrick AU - Mucchetti, Peter J. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Department of Justice AD - US Department of Justice T1 - Accountable Care Organizations and Antitrust Enforcement: Promoting Competition and Innovation JO - Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law JF - Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law Y1 - 2015/08// VL - 40 IS - 4 SP - 875 EP - 886 SN - 03616878 N1 - Accession Number: 1609687; Keywords: Anti Competitive; Anticompetitive; Antitrust Law; Competition; Health; Health Care; Law; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201612 N2 - The antitrust laws stand to protect consumers of health care services from conduct that would raise prices, lower quality, and decrease innovation by lessening competition. Importantly, though, vigorous antitrust enforcement does not impede accountable care organizations (ACOs) and similar collaborations that advance these same goals of better and more efficient care; in fact, by fostering competitive markets, the antitrust laws encourage such initiatives. This article summarizes the legal framework that the federal antitrust agencies--the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice--use to analyze ACOs and other collaborations among health care providers. It outlines the guidance provided by the federal antitrust agencies concerning when ACOs and other provider collaborations likely would harm competition and consumers. In addition, it reviews common antitrust issues that can arise with ACOs and provides examples of enforcement actions that have prevented health care providers from taking or continuing anticompetitive actions. KW - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies G22 KW - National Government Expenditures and Health H51 KW - State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions H75 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Health Insurance, Public and Private I13 KW - Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health I18 KW - Antitrust Law K21 L3 - http://jhppl.dukejournals.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1609687&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://jhppl.dukejournals.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kreisle, Nicholas AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Merger Policy at the Margin: Western Refining's Acquisition of Giant Industries JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2015/08// VL - 47 IS - 1 SP - 71 EP - 89 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 1514380; Keywords: Acquisition; Merger; Policy; Refining; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201508 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G38 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts L42 KW - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels L71 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1514380&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-015-9463-2 UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Wilson, Nathan E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Can the Timing of Negotiations Impact the Consequences of Mergers? JO - Managerial and Decision Economics JF - Managerial and Decision Economics Y1 - 2015/07// VL - 36 IS - 5 SP - 336 EP - 344 SN - 01436570 N1 - Accession Number: 1526162; Keywords: Firm; Firms; Merger; Negotiation; Prices; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201510 N2 - This paper uses a theoretical model to examine whether variation in the timing of negotiations between buyers and sellers can alter the effects of mergers between sellers. The model shows that mergers between horizontally overlapping firms lead to price increases regardless of how negotiations take place. In contrast, mergers between firms in different markets can only lead to higher compensation for the combined firm when negotiations occur sequentially. However, any price effects from out-of-market mergers stem from a mechanical redistribution of existing market power and not from a loss in competition. KW - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies C41 KW - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory C78 KW - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory D85 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Firm Organization and Market Structure L22 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291099-1468/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1526162&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291099-1468/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Chesnes, Matthew AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Impact of Outages on Prices and Investment in the U.S. Oil Refining Industry JO - Energy Economics JF - Energy Economics Y1 - 2015/07// VL - 50 SP - 324 EP - 336 SN - 01409883 N1 - Accession Number: 1511085; Keywords: Crude Oil; Gasoline; Oil; Oil Price; Petroleum; Refinery; Refining; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201508 N2 - This paper considers the effects of refinery outages (due to planned turn-arounds or unplanned events) on current petroleum product prices and future refinery investment. Empirical evidence on these relationships is mixed and highly dependent on the size and duration of the outage, the geographic area considered, the level of inventories available at the time of the outage, and the tightness of the market as measured by the capacity utilization rate. Using a detailed database of plant-level refinery outages for both upstream and downstream refining units, I estimate the effects of outages on product prices controlling for the crude oil price and the ability of operating plants to respond to the outage. I also consider the effect of current market profitability on the likelihood of planned refinery outages and the effects of high utilization rates and planned maintenance on the prospects for unplanned outages. I then use plant-level capacity data to analyze the effects of outages, profitability, and utilization rates on future investment decisions of the refinery. Results based on probit and hazard models show that planned outages tend to occur during the spring and fall and during times of relatively low margins as measured by the crack spread, while unplanned outages are negatively associated with the capacity utilization rate. Price regressions show that atmospheric distillation and catalytic cracking outages are positively associated with gasoline prices and the association is stronger the higher is the utilization rate at the time of the outage. The relationship between both upstream and downstream investment and outages is mixed though refiners tend to invest less when nearby plants have made investments in the prior year. While causal relationships between outages, prices, and investment are difficult to estimate due to simultaneity and unobserved variables, these descriptive results show that outages are an important factor affecting refined product prices and future refinery investment. KW - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope L25 KW - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels L71 KW - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply; Prices Q31 KW - Hydrocarbon Resources Q35 KW - Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices Q41 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01409883 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1511085&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2015.05.008 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01409883 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Herman, Douglas A. AU - Ulrick, Shawn W. T1 - Measuring price dynamics: A guide to understanding payer-physician claims data. JO - Journal of Economic & Social Measurement JF - Journal of Economic & Social Measurement Y1 - 2012/09// VL - 37 IS - 3 M3 - Article SP - 197 EP - 224 PB - IOS Press SN - 07479662 AB - This paper provides a guide to understanding physician claims data. Physician claims data reflect the prices and quantity of procedures provided by physicians and billed to insurers. These data are often used by policy analysts, legal professionals, and academics to analyze price dynamics in markets for physician specialties. Given recent legislation, such data will become ever more common and accessible in the near future. The data are very complex, and there is little in terms of publically available sources to explain how they convey prices. Our goal is to aid the reader new to these data by providing a substantive overview of them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Journal of Economic & Social Measurement is the property of IOS Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - ELECTRONIC health records KW - INSURANCE companies KW - PHYSICIANS KW - MEDICAL care costs KW - MEDICAL records KW - Claims data KW - electronic medical/health records KW - health care costs KW - measuring health care price changes N1 - Accession Number: 84341704; Herman, Douglas A. 1; Ulrick, Shawn W. 2; Affiliations: 1: Nathan Associates, Irvine, CA, USA; 2: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, NW, Washington, DC, USA; Issue Info: 2012, Vol. 37 Issue 3, p197; Thesaurus Term: ELECTRONIC health records; Thesaurus Term: INSURANCE companies; Thesaurus Term: PHYSICIANS; Subject Term: MEDICAL care costs; Subject Term: MEDICAL records; Author-Supplied Keyword: Claims data; Author-Supplied Keyword: electronic medical/health records; Author-Supplied Keyword: health care costs; Author-Supplied Keyword: measuring health care price changes; NAICS/Industry Codes: 524210 Insurance Agencies and Brokerages; NAICS/Industry Codes: 524112 Direct group life, health and medical insurance carriers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 524114 Direct Health and Medical Insurance Carriers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 524128 Other Direct Insurance (except Life, Health, and Medical) Carriers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 621111 Offices of Physicians (except Mental Health Specialists); NAICS/Industry Codes: 621110 Offices of physicians; Number of Pages: 28p; Illustrations: 3 Charts; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=84341704&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zimmerman, Paul R.1, paul.r.zimmerman@gmail.com T1 - The deterrence of crime through private security efforts: Theory and evidence. JO - International Review of Law & Economics JF - International Review of Law & Economics J1 - International Review of Law & Economics PY - 2014/03// Y1 - 2014/03// VL - 37 M3 - Article SP - 66 EP - 75 SN - 01448188 AB - Highlights: [•] This study estimates the impacts of various private security efforts on crime rates using both structural and dynamic-GMM estimation techniques. [•] The impact of most private security efforts appears to vary both within and across violent and property offense categories. [•] Property offenses are negatively correlated with the employment rates of security system installers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] KW - Private security services KW - Criminal statistics KW - Generalized method of moments KW - Employment statistics KW - Economic impact KW - Economics -- Research N1 - Accession Number: 94795442; Authors:Zimmerman, Paul R. 1 Email Address: paul.r.zimmerman@gmail.com; Affiliations: 1: US Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Antitrust I, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20580, United States; Subject: Private security services; Subject: Criminal statistics; Subject: Generalized method of moments; Subject: Employment statistics; Subject: Economic impact; Subject: Economics -- Research; Author-Supplied Keyword: Crime; Author-Supplied Keyword: Deterrence; Author-Supplied Keyword: Market model; Author-Supplied Keyword: Private Security; Author-Supplied Keyword: Self-protection; Number of Pages: 10p; Record Type: Article L3 - 10.1016/j.irle.2013.06.003 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=lft&AN=94795442&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - lft ER - TY - JOUR AU - Munck, Suzanne Drennon T1 - Patent dispute resolution under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act. JO - Journal of Generic Medicines JF - Journal of Generic Medicines Y1 - 2012/09// VL - 9 IS - 3 M3 - Article SP - 118 EP - 122 SN - 17411343 AB - The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA) creates a pathway for expedited FDA approval of follow-on biologic drugs. As part of this pathway, the BPCIA includes special procedures to resolve patent disputes between the brand, or reference product sponsor, and the follow-on drug manufacturer. This article outlines the basics of the BPCIA and details procedures that reference product sponsors and follow-on applicants will follow to resolve patent issues under the Act. Finally, the article notes that the BPCIA patent dispute mechanism may lead to several unintended consequences: (1) it may be unlikely to provide patent certainty to the parties because it may not address the full portfolio of patents covering a biologic product; (2) it may also be unlikely to raise and resolve all pertinent patent issues prior to FDA approval; and (3) it is unclear whether there is a manner in which parties can enforce the rules of the patent dispute mechanism. At this time, no drug has been approved under the BPCIA, and no litigation has begun under the BPCIA's patent resolution procedures. While this article identifies potential outcomes, it will be important to monitor real-world experiences over the next several years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Journal of Generic Medicines is the property of Sage Publications Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - DRUG patents KW - DISPUTE resolution (Law) KW - DRUG approval -- Law & legislation KW - DRUG factories KW - ACTIONS & defenses (Law) KW - UNITED States KW - BPCIA KW - Follow-on biologics KW - patents KW - UNITED States. Food & Drug Administration N1 - Accession Number: 82378828; Munck, Suzanne Drennon 1; Affiliation: 1: munck@ftc.gov; Source Info: Sep2012, Vol. 9 Issue 3, p118; Subject Term: DRUG patents; Subject Term: DISPUTE resolution (Law); Subject Term: DRUG approval -- Law & legislation; Subject Term: DRUG factories; Subject Term: ACTIONS & defenses (Law); Subject Term: UNITED States; Author-Supplied Keyword: BPCIA; Author-Supplied Keyword: Follow-on biologics; Author-Supplied Keyword: patents; Company/Entity: UNITED States. Food & Drug Administration; NAICS/Industry Codes: 236210 Industrial Building Construction; NAICS/Industry Codes: 325410 Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing; Number of Pages: 5p; Document Type: Article; Full Text Word Count: 3415 L3 - 10.1177/1741134312454258 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=82378828&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - aph ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AU - Fischer, Jeffrey H. T1 - Daubert, Science, and Modern Game Theory: Implications for Merger Analysis. JO - Supreme Court Economic Review JF - Supreme Court Economic Review Y1 - 2012/07// VL - 20 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 125 EP - 182 SN - 07369921 AB - To be admissible in federal court under the Daubert standard, expert economic testimony must (1) be based on scientific analysis and (2) aid the dispute resolution process. Expert evidence should be considered scientific when (1) it meets Karl Popper's falsification standard and (2) some evidence compatible with the scientific proposition is provided. Standard competitive and monopoly models are well supported in the literature and therefore would generally meet this standard, while structuralism clearly fails the test. Modern game-theoretic analysis focuses on either collusion (coordinated interaction) or unilateral effects but only raises the possibility of a merger-related competitive problem and thus must be supported with case-specific evidence to be considered scientific. Economic evidence underpinning game-theoretic analysis can involve either a "systematic" study of competition in a market or a narrow "shock" analysis of a specific economic event. When both parties to a merger dispute provide evidence admissible under the Daubert standard, the court must resolve the scientific dispute in the decision on the merits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Supreme Court Economic Review is the property of University of Chicago Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - FEDERAL courts KW - TESTIMONY (Law) KW - COLLUSION KW - EVIDENCE (Law) KW - DISPUTE resolution (Law) KW - EXPERT evidence KW - COMPETITION (Economics) KW - FALSIFICATION KW - ANTITRUST law KW - GAME theory KW - DAUBERT v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Supreme Court case) N1 - Accession Number: 85269743; Coate, Malcolm B. 1; Email Address: mcoate@ftc.gov Fischer, Jeffrey H. 1; Email Address: jflscher@ftc.gov; Affiliation: 1: U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Washington, DC 20580; Source Info: 2012, Vol. 20 Issue 1, p125; Subject Term: FEDERAL courts; Subject Term: TESTIMONY (Law); Subject Term: COLLUSION; Subject Term: EVIDENCE (Law); Subject Term: DISPUTE resolution (Law); Subject Term: EXPERT evidence; Subject Term: COMPETITION (Economics); Subject Term: FALSIFICATION; Subject Term: ANTITRUST law; Subject Term: GAME theory; Subject Term: DAUBERT v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Supreme Court case); NAICS/Industry Codes: 911210 Federal courts of law; Number of Pages: 58p; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=85269743&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - aph ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kovacic, William E. T1 - Achieving better practices in the design of competition policy institutions. JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2005///Fall2005 VL - 50 IS - 3 M3 - Article SP - 511 EP - 517 PB - Sage Publications Inc. SN - 0003603X AB - The article reports on promoting convergence among the world's competition policy systems. The experimentation that is integral in the decentralization of competition policy authority across jurisdictions supplies a useful way to test different procedures, substantive commands, and analytical techniques. Decentralization will not fulfill its promise as source of useful policy innovation without a felt process to identify and adopt superior ideas. Best practices may recommend the existence of fixed objectives that, once attained, mark the end of the task. KW - CONVERGENCE (Economics) KW - COMMERCIAL law KW - PRICES KW - COMMERCE KW - PLANNING KW - COMPETITION N1 - Accession Number: 19359600; Kovacic, William E. 1; Affiliation: 1: General Counsel, U.S. Federal Trade Commission.; Source Info: Fall2005, Vol. 50 Issue 3, p511; Subject Term: CONVERGENCE (Economics); Subject Term: COMMERCIAL law; Subject Term: PRICES; Subject Term: COMMERCE; Subject Term: PLANNING; Subject Term: COMPETITION; Number of Pages: 7p; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=19359600&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - aph ER - TY - JOUR AU - Luppino, Marc AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Peer Turnover and Student Achievement: Implications for Classroom Assignment Policy JO - Economics of Education Review JF - Economics of Education Review Y1 - 2015/06// VL - 46 SP - 98 EP - 111 SN - 02727757 N1 - Accession Number: 1545443; Keywords: Social Networks; Teacher; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201602 N2 - This paper examines the effect of peer turnover on academic achievement using random variation in classroom composition induced by Tennessee's Student Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR) experiment. In central city school districts, I find that first graders benefit from greater peer turnover. Conversely, turnover is found to have a negative effect on young students in schools outside of central city districts. These results are consistent with a model of classroom learning in which the educational returns to having a stronger social network depend on neighborhood context. They suggest that a richer understanding of peer continuity effects is essential for designing optimal classroom assignment policies. KW - Analysis of Education I21 KW - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth J13 KW - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes R11 KW - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics: Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population; Neighborhood Characteristics R23 KW - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification Z13 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/02727757 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1545443&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/02727757 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Dafny, Leemore AU - Hendel, Igal AU - Wilson, Nathan AD - Northwestern U AD - Northwestern U AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Narrow Networks on the Health Insurance Exchanges: What Do They Look Like and How Do They Affect Pricing? A Case Study of Texas JO - American Economic Review JF - American Economic Review Y1 - 2015/05// VL - 105 IS - 5 SP - 110 EP - 114 SN - 00028282 N1 - Accession Number: 1488550; Keywords: Health; Health Insurance; Insurance; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201504 N2 - The Affordable Care Act has engendered significant changes in the design of health insurance products. We examine the "narrowness" of hospital networks affiliated with plans offered in the first year of the marketplaces. Using data from Texas, we find limited evidence of a tight link between pricing and a simple measure of network breadth, or a more complex measure of network value derived from a logit model of hospital choice. The state's largest insurer priced its narrow networks at a fairly constant discount relative to its broad networks, notwithstanding significant variation in its broad-narrow gap across geographic markets in Texas. KW - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies G22 KW - National Government Expenditures and Health H51 KW - State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions H75 KW - Health Insurance, Public and Private I13 L3 - http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1488550&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.105.5.110 UR - http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Wilson, Nathan E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Vertical Separation Increases Gasoline Prices JO - Economic Inquiry JF - Economic Inquiry Y1 - 2015/04// VL - 53 IS - 2 SP - 1380 EP - 1391 SN - 00952583 N1 - Accession Number: 1559754; Keywords: Consumer; Gasoline; Prices; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201604 N2 - I examine the relationship between vertical separation and gasoline stations' prices and sales. The endogeneity of stations' organizational forms is addressed using both panel methods and an instrumental variables strategy. Controlling for the endogeneity of form, I find that vertical separation raises margins by 25%-45% but does not have a statistically significant impact on output. I interpret these results as suggesting that vertical separation induces local agents to exert effort in ways that increase consumers' demand. KW - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D12 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Firm Organization and Market Structure L22 KW - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope L25 KW - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels L71 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 KW - Hydrocarbon Resources Q35 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291465-7295/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1559754&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291465-7295/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Cox, Caleb A. AU - Jones, Matthew T. AU - Pflum, Kevin E. AU - Healy, Paul J. AD - Durham U AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - U AL AD - OH State U T1 - Revealed Reputations in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma JO - Economic Theory JF - Economic Theory Y1 - 2015/04// VL - 58 IS - 3 SP - 441 EP - 484 SN - 09382259 N1 - Accession Number: 1489269; Keywords: Cooperation; Games; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201504 N2 - In a sequential-move, finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game (FRPD), cooperation can be sustained if the first-mover believes her opponent might be a behavioral type who plays a tit-for-tat strategy in every period. We test this theory by revealing second-mover histories from an earlier FRPD experiment to their current opponent. Despite eliminating the possibility of reputation-building, aggregate cooperation actually increases when histories are revealed. Cooperative histories lead to increased trust, but negative histories do not cause decreased trust. We develop a behavioral model to explain these findings. KW - Cooperative Games C71 KW - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games C73 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/199 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1489269&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0863-1 UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/199 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Herman, Douglas A. AU - Sacher, Seth B. AD - Unlisted AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - An Economic Analysis of Twombly/Iqbal with Applications to Antitrust JO - Journal of Competition Law and Economics JF - Journal of Competition Law and Economics Y1 - 2015/03// VL - 11 IS - 1 SP - 107 EP - 144 SN - 17446414 N1 - Accession Number: 1520758; Keywords: Courts; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201509 N2 - The Bell Atlantic v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal Supreme Court opinions refined the threshold for motions to dismiss claims. In elaborating on these thresholds, the Court discussed the legal interplay of "possibility," "plausibility," and "probability." The Court emphasized that claims must go beyond a recitation of theories or legal standards and rely on some level of factual allegations. Since the Iqbal decision, numerous lower courts have applied the newly articulated Twombly/Iqbal standards. Legal practitioners have argued that there are inconsistencies between courts when evaluating the scope and application of these standards. In order to help resolve this murkiness, this paper suggests a structured methodology that can be employed when arguing a motion to dismiss. A number of tools for evaluating the Twombly/Iqbal standard are proposed. We posit "strong" and "weak" conditions for satisfying these standards. The "strong" conditions for surviving a motion to dismiss are satisfied if well articulated conditions that meet the logical concept of sufficiency along with supporting facts are presented. Under the weak criteria, the claims are more likely to meet the standards the closer they are to the logical concept of sufficiency. In other words, the more "unlikely" are the claims (and supporting facts) to exist in the absence of a violation, the better able are the claims to meet the standard. The proposed methodology is applied to a broad range of antitrust categories. KW - Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law) K10 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General K40 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1520758&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Klick, Jonathan AU - Wright, Joshua D. AD - U PA and Erasmus U Rotterdam AD - George Mason U and US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Effect of Any Willing Provider and Freedom of Choice Laws on Prescription Drug Expenditures JO - American Law and Economics Review JF - American Law and Economics Review Y1 - 2015///Spring VL - 17 IS - 1 SP - 192 EP - 213 SN - 14657252 N1 - Accession Number: 1518553; Keywords: Competition; Drug; Drugs; Law; Prescription; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201509 N2 - Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) potentially lower costs associated with prescription drugs through increased bargaining power with manufacturers. PBMs engage in selective contracting with pharmacies which has the potential to reduce retail competition, leading to increased prices. Proponents of "Any Willing Provider (AWP)" and "Freedom of Choice (FOC)" laws limiting this selective contracting claim increased retail competition will lower prescription drug spending. Examining the passage of such laws over the period 1991-2009, we find that AWP laws increase spending on prescription drugs by around 5% beyond any pre-existing trends in spending while FOC laws have no significant effect. KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health I18 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts L42 KW - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology L65 L3 - http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1518553&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Birchenall, Javier A. AU - Koch, Thomas G. AD - U CA, Santa Barbara AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - 'Gallantry in Action': Evidence of Advantageous Selection in a Voluntary Army JO - Journal of Law and Economics JF - Journal of Law and Economics Y1 - 2015/02// VL - 58 IS - 1 SP - 111 EP - 138 SN - 00222186 N1 - Accession Number: 1535993; Keywords: Adverse Selection; Soldiers; War; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201512 N2 - A voluntary army's quality exceeds or falls below a drafted army's average quality depending on whether selection is advantageous or adverse. Using a collection of data sets that cover the majority of the US Army soldiers during World War II, we test for adverse selection into the army. Rather, we find advantageous selection: volunteers and drafted men showed no significant difference in fatalities, but volunteers earned distinguished awards at a higher rate than drafted men, particularly after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Analyses at the level of units concur with our findings based on enlistment records. KW - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design D82 KW - National Security and War H56 KW - Public Sector Labor Markets J45 KW - Economic History: Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy: U.S.; Canada: 1913- N32 KW - Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: U.S.; Canada: 1913- N42 L3 - http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=jlaweconomics UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1535993&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=jlaweconomics DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Wilson, Nathan E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Local Market Structure and Strategic Organizational Form Choices: Evidence from Gasoline Stations JO - International Journal of the Economics of Business JF - International Journal of the Economics of Business Y1 - 2015/02// VL - 22 IS - 1 SP - 119 EP - 140 SN - 13571516 N1 - Accession Number: 1512434; Keywords: Gasoline; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201508 KW - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights D23 KW - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design D82 KW - Firm Organization and Market Structure L22 KW - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels L71 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 L3 - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1512434&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Courtemanche, Charles AU - Heutel, Garth AU - McAlvanah, Patrick AD - GA State U AD - U NC, Greensboro AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Impatience, Incentives and Obesity JO - Economic Journal JF - Economic Journal Y1 - 2015/02// VL - 125 IS - 582 SP - 1 EP - 31 SN - 00130133 N1 - Accession Number: 1500569; Keywords: Discounting; Individual; Obesity; Preference; Prices; Time Preference; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201506 N2 - This article explores the relationship between time preferences, economic incentives and body mass index (BMI). We provide evidence of an interaction effect between time preference and food prices, with cheaper food leading to the largest weight gains among those exhibiting the most impatience. The interaction of changing economic incentives with heterogeneous discounting may help explain why increases in BMI have been concentrated amongst the distribution's right tail. We also model time-inconsistent preferences by computing individuals' quasi-hyperbolic discounting parameters. Both long-run patience and present-bias predict BMI, suggesting obesity is partly attributable to both rational intertemporal tradeoffs and time inconsistency. KW - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D12 KW - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving D91 KW - Health Behavior I12 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291468-0297/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1500569&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291468-0297/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Barbos, Andrei AU - Deng, Yi AD - U South FL AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Impact of a Public Option in the U.S. Health Insurance Market JO - Economic Inquiry JF - Economic Inquiry Y1 - 2015/01// VL - 53 IS - 1 SP - 508 EP - 521 SN - 00952583 N1 - Accession Number: 1497490; Keywords: Health; Health Insurance; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201505 N2 - We develop a game-theoretical framework to examine the implications of the introduction of a nonprofit "public option" in the U.S. health insurance market. In this model, heterogeneous consumers have to choose between two competing insurance plans. One plan is offered by a profit-maximizing private insurer; the other by social-welfare-maximizing public option. In equilibrium, the distinct objectives of the two insurers induce adverse selection in consumer choice: the public option covers the less healthy consumers, yielding the more profitable segment of market to the private insurer. However, our empirical results suggest that both insurers will capture significant parts of the health insurance market. KW - National Government Expenditures and Health H51 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Health Insurance, Public and Private I13 KW - Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health I18 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope L25 KW - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises L32 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291465-7295/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1497490&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291465-7295/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - SU, HENRY C. T1 - Thinking, Fast, Free, And Fashionable[1]: Competition and Consumer Protection In a Mobile Internet World. JO - Antitrust Magazine JF - Antitrust Magazine Y1 - 2012///Fall2012 VL - 27 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 82 EP - 86 SN - 01627996 AB - The article discusses behavioral economics (BE), under which the impact of environmental factors on the rationality of consumers is studied. The author refers to consumer markets, that has now become dominated by mobile devices and internet. According to psychologist Daniel Kahneman, consumer behaviour is very much dependent on their intuitive thinking. KW - BEHAVIORAL economics KW - CONSUMER behavior KW - CONSUMERS KW - ONLINE shopping KW - KAHNEMAN, Daniel, 1934- N1 - Accession Number: 90296797; SU, HENRY C. 1; Affiliation: 1: Attorney Advisor for Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission; Source Info: Fall2012, Vol. 27 Issue 1, p82; Subject Term: BEHAVIORAL economics; Subject Term: CONSUMER behavior; Subject Term: CONSUMERS; Subject Term: ONLINE shopping; NAICS/Industry Codes: 454110 Electronic shopping and mail-order houses; NAICS/Industry Codes: 454111 Electronic Shopping; NAICS/Industry Codes: 454113 Mail-Order Houses; People: KAHNEMAN, Daniel, 1934-; Number of Pages: 5p; Document Type: Article; Full Text Word Count: 4590 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=90296797&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - aph ER - TY - JOUR AU - Brand, Keith AU - Gaynor, Martin AU - McAlvanah, Patrick AU - Schmidt, David AU - Schneirov, Elizabeth AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission and Carnegie Mellon U AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Economics at the FTC: Office Supply Retailers Redux, Healthcare Quality Efficiencies Analysis, and Litigation of an Alleged Get-Rich-Quick Scheme JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2014/12// VL - 45 IS - 4 SP - 325 EP - 344 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 1475087; Keywords: Acquisition; Economics; Economists; Health; Health Care; Healthcare; Merger; Physician; Retailers; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201501 N2 - We discuss in this essay three of the matters on which economists in the Bureau of Economics (BE) at the Federal Trade Commission have worked this past year. BE revisited familiar ground in the first matter, a proposed merger of office supply retailers. The second part of the essay considers efficiency claims in health care mergers, with focus on the acquisition of a physician group by a health care system in Idaho. The final part of the essay discusses empirical work that was undertaken by the Bureau to investigate claims made by marketers of an alleged get-rich-quick scheme. KW - Role of Economics; Role of Economists; Market for Economists A11 KW - Consumer Protection D18 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1475087&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-014-9444-x UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Koch, Thomas G. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Bankruptcy, Medical Insurance, and a Law with Unintended Consequences JO - Health Economics JF - Health Economics Y1 - 2014/11// VL - 23 IS - 11 SP - 1326 EP - 1339 SN - 10579230 N1 - Accession Number: 1483670; Keywords: Bankruptcy; Law; Medical Care; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201503 N2 - Congress passed the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) in 1986, guaranteeing a standard of medical care to anyone who entered an emergency room. This guarantee made default a more reliable substitute for medical insurance. I construct a tractable structural model of the medical insurance market and find that repealing EMTALA would increase the fraction of the population with insurance while decreasing its price. KW - Household Saving; Personal Finance D14 KW - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design D82 KW - National Government Expenditures and Health H51 KW - Health Insurance, Public and Private I13 KW - Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health I18 KW - Personal Bankruptcy Law K35 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291099-1050/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1483670&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291099-1050/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Jones, Matthew T. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Strategic Complexity and Cooperation: An Experimental Study JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Y1 - 2014/10// VL - 106 SP - 352 EP - 366 SN - 01672681 N1 - Accession Number: 1469214; Keywords: Cooperation; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201412 N2 - This study investigates whether cooperation in an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma is sensitive to the complexity of cooperative strategies. An experimental design which allows manipulations of the complexity of these strategies by making either the cooperate action or the defect action state-dependent is used. Subjects are found to be less likely to use a cooperative strategy and more likely to use a simpler selfish strategy when the complexity of cooperative strategies is increased. The robustness of this effect is supported by the finding that cooperation falls even when the defect action is made state-dependent, which increases the complexity of punishment-enforced cooperative strategies. A link between subjects' standardized test scores and the likelihood of cooperating is found, indicating that greater cognitive ability makes subjects more likely to use complex strategies. KW - Cooperative Games C71 KW - Altruism; Philanthropy D64 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01672681 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1469214&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.005 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01672681 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Haas-Wilson, Deborah AU - Vita, Michael T1 - Mergers between Competing Hospitals: Lessons from Retrospective Analyses. JO - International Journal of the Economics of Business JF - International Journal of the Economics of Business Y1 - 2011/02// VL - 18 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 1 EP - 4 PB - Routledge SN - 13571516 AB - In April 2002, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced the Hospital Merger Retrospective Project to study consummated hospital mergers. This project was precipitated by a long string of unsuccessful hospital merger challenges by the FTC, the US Department of Justice, and the state of California. Accordingly, a principal goal of the retrospective study included 'studying consummated hospital mergers to determine whether particular hospital mergers have led to higher prices'. The studies presented here represent the output of this project. Collectively, these studies provide important empirical insights into a variety of issues relevant to hospital antitrust analysis, including the scope of relevant geographic markets in hospital merger analysis, the relevance of not-for-profit status on post-merger pricing behavior, and the impact of hospital mergers on clinical quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of International Journal of the Economics of Business is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - HOSPITAL mergers KW - HEALTH facilities KW - ANTITRUST law KW - MARKET share KW - EMPIRICAL research KW - CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations KW - RETROSPECTIVE studies KW - Antitrust Policy KW - Competition in Markets for Hospital Services KW - Hospital Mergers N1 - Accession Number: 58528632; Haas-Wilson, Deborah 1; Vita, Michael 2; Affiliations: 1: Department of Economics, Smith College, Northampton, MA; 2: Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC; Issue Info: Feb2011, Vol. 18 Issue 1, p1; Thesaurus Term: HOSPITAL mergers; Thesaurus Term: HEALTH facilities; Thesaurus Term: ANTITRUST law; Thesaurus Term: MARKET share; Thesaurus Term: EMPIRICAL research; Thesaurus Term: CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations; Subject Term: RETROSPECTIVE studies; Author-Supplied Keyword: Antitrust Policy; Author-Supplied Keyword: Competition in Markets for Hospital Services; Author-Supplied Keyword: Hospital Mergers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 621498 All Other Outpatient Care Centers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 622110 General Medical and Surgical Hospitals; NAICS/Industry Codes: 622111 General (except paediatric) hospitals; Number of Pages: 4p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1080/13571516.2011.542947 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=58528632&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ashenfelter, Orley AU - Hosken, Daniel AU - Vita, Michael AU - Weinberg, Matthew T1 - Retrospective Analysis of Hospital Mergers. JO - International Journal of the Economics of Business JF - International Journal of the Economics of Business Y1 - 2011/02// VL - 18 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 5 EP - 16 PB - Routledge SN - 13571516 AB - Retrospective analyses of hospital mergers may be uniquely valuable because they speak directly to two important issues - the methods used for delineating relevant geographic markets in hospital merger analysis, and the implications of not-for-profit status on post-merger hospital pricing - that have been systematically misunderstood by the courts and other policy analysts, and which likely have led to systematically biased judicial decisions. By identifying these systematic analytical errors and their implications for judicial decision making, retrospective studies of consummated hospital mergers have the capacity to greatly improve the quality of future antitrust policy making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of International Journal of the Economics of Business is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - HOSPITAL mergers KW - ANTITRUST law KW - GOVERNMENT policy KW - CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations -- Law & legislation KW - MARKET share KW - MEDICAL care KW - HEALTH facilities KW - Anticompetitive Practice KW - Concentration KW - Horizontal Integration N1 - Accession Number: 58528631; Ashenfelter, Orley 1; Hosken, Daniel 2; Vita, Michael 3; Weinberg, Matthew 4; Affiliations: 1: Joseph Douglas 1895 Professor of Economics, Industrial Relations Section, Firestone Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ; 2: Deputy Assistant Director for Applied Research and Outreach, US Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC; 3: Assistant Director for Antitrust, US Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC; 4: Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, PA; Issue Info: Feb2011, Vol. 18 Issue 1, p5; Thesaurus Term: HOSPITAL mergers; Thesaurus Term: ANTITRUST law; Thesaurus Term: GOVERNMENT policy; Thesaurus Term: CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations -- Law & legislation; Thesaurus Term: MARKET share; Thesaurus Term: MEDICAL care; Thesaurus Term: HEALTH facilities; Author-Supplied Keyword: Anticompetitive Practice; Author-Supplied Keyword: Concentration; Author-Supplied Keyword: Horizontal Integration; NAICS/Industry Codes: 621498 All Other Outpatient Care Centers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 622110 General Medical and Surgical Hospitals; NAICS/Industry Codes: 622111 General (except paediatric) hospitals; Number of Pages: 12p; Illustrations: 1 Chart; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1080/13571516.2011.542951 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=58528631&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Simpson, John AU - Robertson, J. Robert AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Hogan Lovells, Washington, DC T1 - Markets and Market Power in Battery Separators: In Re Polypore JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2014/09// VL - 59 IS - 3 SP - 643 EP - 666 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 1544233; Keywords: Acquisition; Anti Competitive; Anticompetitive; Competition; Entry; Merger; Prices; Shares; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201602 N2 - The FTC's lawsuit against Polypore International, Inc. mainly focused on Polypore's consummated acquisition of Microporous L.P., its only rival in the sale of two types of battery separators and one of its two rivals in the sale of a third type of battery separator. Because this was a consummated acquisition, three types of evidence were available to define markets and analyze competitive effects: 1) structural evidence showing a high market share in an appropriately defined market where there were barriers to entry; 2) pre-acquisition direct evidence of head-to-head competition; and 3) post-acquisition evidence of higher prices or reduced output. This article notes that while all three types of evidence indicated that the merger was anticompetitive, the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition evidence of direct effects was particularly informative in understanding the acquisition's effect on competition. KW - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General D40 KW - Multinational Firms; International Business F23 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 KW - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment L63 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1544233&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Market Definition in Differentiated Goods When the Final Consumer Buys the Good: Insights from the H&R Block Case JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2014/09// VL - 59 IS - 3 SP - 619 EP - 641 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 1544232; Keywords: Competition; Entry; Merger; Price Discrimination; Prices; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201602 N2 - This article addresses the development of market definition analysis in three recent merger cases: Staples, Whole Foods, and H&R Block. The discussion traces the evolution of the market concept from the naive Brown Shoe criteria to the price discrimination analysis implicit in Staples to the current application of diversion theory in the H&R Block case. By replacing fact with theory, the diversion approach to market definition runs the risk of returning to the world of Brown Shoe. Additional discussion of H&R Block suggests that price discrimination remains relevant and could have been developed through further factual study. Moreover, even if theory is used to define a narrow market, the analyst must address a range of entry issues before concluding that the merger is likely to substantially lessen competition. KW - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General D40 KW - Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors G23 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1544232&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Wendling, Brett W. AU - Wilson, Nathan E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Importance of Substitution in Assessing Health Care Provider Mergers JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2014/09// VL - 59 IS - 3 SP - 515 EP - 525 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 1544226; Keywords: Health; Health Care; Healthcare; Merger; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201602 N2 - As the number of challenged health care mergers has risen, so too has interest in the tools used to assess market power in health care markets. Some have expressed concern about the differences between the analytical methodology used in healthcare markets and the methods commonly used in other industries. We argue that, whatever the market, antitrust analysis's underlying goal should be to understand substitution patterns between the merging parties. The methods used to address the unique institutional features of healthcare markets should wax (or wane) with their ability to address that fundamental issue. Although the suite of tools used by enforcers to assess the consequences of health care mergers remains a work in progress, at present, analyses that employ diversion ratios and willingness-to-pay capture substitution patterns better than alternatives and represent the state of the art. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G38 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health I18 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1544226&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AU - Bernard, Kent AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Fordham U T1 - A Symposium on the Implications of Recent Merger Litigation for Market Definition JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2014/09// VL - 59 IS - 3 SP - 431 EP - 442 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 1544222; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201602 N2 - This article provides an overview of the papers in the Antitrust Bulletin's Market Definition symposium. Four styles of market analysis, each represented by a different merger decision are presented, with two articles on each topic, one in general agreement with the court case and the other providing alternative perspectives for the decision. Simple models of competition suffice for the straightforward investigations; however, careful institutional analysis is necessary to determine if the standard models implicit in the Merger Guidelines can be directly applied in complicated cases. As different economists often interpret data in different ways, antitrust regulators must expect a range of perspectives to be presented in any given case. KW - Introductory Material Y20 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1544222&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Unilateral Effects Analysis in Merger Review: Limits and Opportunities JO - European Competition Journal JF - European Competition Journal Y1 - 2014/08// VL - 10 IS - 2 SP - 231 EP - 252 SN - 17441056 N1 - Accession Number: 1463132; Keywords: Bertrand Model; Competition; Entry; Firm; Firms; Merger; Monopoly; Standard; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201411 N2 - Many economists believe that unilateral effects analysis should dominate the merger review process for differentiated products. However, it is far from clear if these theoretical models are broadly applicable, as they impose monopoly-style entry assumptions that constrain the competitive process. By abstracting from market complexities, the standard unilateral effects analysis gives rise to tractable mathematical equilibriums. Of course, the equilibriums may not offer insights if the key assumptions are not valid. This paper explores the limits to and opportunities for unilateral effects analysis, using the Landes-Posner model of a dominant firm as an initial example, before expanding the discussion to Nash-Bertrand models of competition. These Lerner-based modelling structures are problematic, especially when the entry-related assumptions are not credible. Because economic models may remain applicable even when their assumptions are not valid, the discussion addresses various types of effects evidence that could confirm the predictions of a specific unilateral effects model. Court precedent is reviewed, with an emphasis on a current understanding of the structural presumption, along with the applicability of effects evidence to litigation. By focusing the analysis on facts, unilateral effects analysis serves to aid the merger review process. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G38 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 L3 - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/ecj UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1463132&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/ecj DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Koch, Thomas G. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - One Pool to Insure Them All? Age, Risk and the Price(s) of Medical Insurance JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2014/07// VL - 35 SP - 1 EP - 11 SN - 01677187 N1 - Accession Number: 1459199; Keywords: Adverse Selection; Asymmetric Information; Information; Insurance; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201410 N2 - Asymmetric information can lead to adverse selection and market failure. In a dynamic setting, asymmetric information also limits reclassification risk. This certainty offsets the costs of adverse selection. Using a dynamic model of endogenous insurance choice and price calibrated to the U.S. medical insurance market, I find that asymmetric information is Pareto improving when information is fully asymmetric. However, when insurers can discriminate by age group, but not within age groups, the young benefit by paying less for insurance. The insurance market for the near elderly collapses because it is no longer implicitly subsidized by the participation of the young. KW - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design D82 KW - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies G22 KW - Health Insurance, Public and Private I13 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1459199&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2014.05.001 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ulrick, Shawn W. T1 - AGGREGATION IN DEMAND. JO - European Competition Journal JF - European Competition Journal Y1 - 2010/04// VL - 6 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 197 EP - 210 SN - 17441056 AB - The article focuses on the concept of aggregate demand, the sum of potentially heterogeneous individual's demands. It discusses the relationship between aggregated values of price and of the relevant values that can be obtained using the aggregated and disaggregated data. It introduces the concepts developed by Henri Theil, macro-parameter and micro-parameter, to understand fully the meaning of aggregate demand. The relationship of the two concepts is tackled including their functions. Furthermore, the relationship between the parameters of a macro-regression and those from the micro ones are examined. KW - AGGREGATE demand (Economics) KW - DEMAND (Economic theory) KW - CONSUMPTION (Economics) KW - PARAMETER estimation KW - REGRESSION analysis KW - MICROECONOMICS -- Study & teaching KW - MACROECONOMICS KW - ESTIMATION theory KW - THEIL, Henri N1 - Accession Number: 52364670; Ulrick, Shawn W. 1; Affiliation: 1: US Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20580; Source Info: 2010, Vol. 6 Issue 1, p197; Subject Term: AGGREGATE demand (Economics); Subject Term: DEMAND (Economic theory); Subject Term: CONSUMPTION (Economics); Subject Term: PARAMETER estimation; Subject Term: REGRESSION analysis; Subject Term: MICROECONOMICS -- Study & teaching; Subject Term: MACROECONOMICS; Subject Term: ESTIMATION theory; People: THEIL, Henri; Number of Pages: 14p; Illustrations: 2 Charts; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=52364670&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - aph ER - TY - JOUR AU - Borgers, Tilman AU - Smith, Doug AD - U MI AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules JO - Theoretical Economics JF - Theoretical Economics Y1 - 2014/05// VL - 9 IS - 2 SP - 339 EP - 360 SN - 15557561 N1 - Accession Number: 1452348; Keywords: Belief; Dictatorship; Equilibria; Rules; Voter; Voting; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201408 N2 - We develop an analysis of voting rules that is robust in the sense that we do not make any assumption regarding voters' knowledge about each other. In dominant strategy voting rules, voters' behavior can be predicted uniquely without making any such assumption. However, on full domains, the only dominant strategy voting rules are random dictatorships. We show that the designer of a voting rule can achieve Pareto improvements over random dictatorship by choosing rules in which voters' behavior can depend on their beliefs. The Pareto improvement is achieved for all possible beliefs. The mechanism that we use to demonstrate this result is simple and intuitive, and the Pareto improvement result extends to all equilibria of the mechanism that satisfy a mild refinement. We also show that the result only holds for voters' interim expected utilities, not for their ex post expected utilities. KW - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D71 KW - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D72 KW - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design D82 L3 - http://www.econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/issue/archive UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1452348&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/te/issue/archive DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Tenn, Steven AU - Wendling, Brett W. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Entry Threats and Pricing in the Generic Drug Industry JO - Review of Economics and Statistics JF - Review of Economics and Statistics Y1 - 2014/05// VL - 96 IS - 2 SP - 214 EP - 228 SN - 00346535 N1 - Accession Number: 1448786; Keywords: Drug; Drugs; Entry; Marketing; Pharmaceutical; Prices; Pricing; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201407 N2 - We use the unique regulatory environment of the pharmaceutical industry to examine how potential competition affects generic drug pricing. Our identification strategy exploits a provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act that awards 180 days of marketing exclusivity to the first valid generic drug applicant against the holder of a branded drug patent. In smaller drug markets, we find that price falls in response to an increase in potential competition. We also find that few manufacturers enter these markets, indicating this price reduction is an effective deterrent. In contrast, we find that generic incumbents accommodate entry in larger drug markets. KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Economics of Regulation L51 KW - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology L65 KW - Marketing M31 L3 - http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/rest UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1448786&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/rest DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR ID - 104078024 T1 - Employer-provided health insurance and hospital mergers. AU - Garmon, Christopher Y1 - 2013/07// N1 - Accession Number: 104078024. Language: English. Entry Date: 20140307. Revision Date: 20150710. Publication Type: Journal Article. Journal Subset: Biomedical; Europe; Health Services Administration; UK & Ireland. NLM UID: 101247224. KW - Economic Competition KW - Economics KW - Health Benefit Plans, Employee -- Economics KW - Health Facility Merger KW - Hospitals KW - Health Services Accessibility KW - United States SP - 365 EP - 384 JO - Health Economics, Policy & Law JF - Health Economics, Policy & Law JA - HEALTH ECON POLICY LAW VL - 8 IS - 3 PB - Cambridge University Press SN - 1744-1331 AD - Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC 20001, USA. cgarmon@ftc.gov U2 - PMID: 23347566. DO - 10.1017/S1744133112000357 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=rzh&AN=104078024&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - rzh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Tenn, Steven T1 - Demand estimation under limited product availability. JO - Applied Economics Letters JF - Applied Economics Letters Y1 - 2009/03/20/ VL - 16 IS - 5 M3 - Article SP - 465 EP - 468 PB - Routledge SN - 13504851 AB - Consumer purchases are determined, in part, by the assortment of products available at retailers. Despite this, commonly employed aggregate demand models fail to control for the fraction of stores that carry a given item. We detail the conditions under which aggregate demand is consistently estimated when heterogeneity in product assortment is ignored. The required assumptions are quite strict and likely violated in many empirical applications. Even when they hold, however, a problem of inference arises. One cannot tell whether a lack of interaction between two products is due to limited substitution in those stores where both are available or because many stores do not carry both products. This is a significant shortcoming since in many situations it is important to distinguish between these two possibilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Applied Economics Letters is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - CONSUMPTION (Economics) KW - PURCHASING KW - RETAIL industry KW - ECONOMICS KW - CONSUMERS KW - CONSUMER confidence N1 - Accession Number: 36649271; Tenn, Steven 1; Email Address: stenn@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: Bureau of Economics, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, USA; Issue Info: 3/20/2009, Vol. 16 Issue 5, p465; Thesaurus Term: CONSUMPTION (Economics); Thesaurus Term: PURCHASING; Thesaurus Term: RETAIL industry; Thesaurus Term: ECONOMICS; Thesaurus Term: CONSUMERS; Thesaurus Term: CONSUMER confidence; NAICS/Industry Codes: 453999 All other miscellaneous store retailers (except beer and wine-making supplies stores); NAICS/Industry Codes: 453998 All Other Miscellaneous Store Retailers (except Tobacco Stores); NAICS/Industry Codes: 452999 All other miscellaneous general merchandise stores; Number of Pages: 4p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1080/13504850601018650 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=36649271&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Greenfield, Daniel AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Competition and Service Quality: New Evidence from the Airline Industry JO - Economics of Transportation JF - Economics of Transportation Y1 - 2014/03// VL - 3 IS - 1 SP - 80 EP - 89 SN - 22120122 N1 - Accession Number: 1446820; Keywords: Airline; Airport; Market Structure; Quality; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201407 N2 - Previous studies examine the relationship between competition and airline service quality by regressing on-time performance on market structure. These studies implicitly assume that market structure is exogenously determined with respect to service quality. To address the likely endogeneity of market structure I employ two distinct instrumental variables. The first is lagged market structure. The second exploits a global airline merger that induced differential variations in market structure across hundreds of airport-pair markets. I find that the effect of competition on airline delays is three times stronger than previous studies suggest. KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility L15 KW - Air Transportation L93 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/22120122 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1446820&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecotra.2013.12.005 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/22120122 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Balan, David J. AU - Deltas, George AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - U IL A2 - Peitz, Martin A2 - Spiegel, Yossi T1 - Better Product at Same Cost: Leader Innovation vs. Generic Product Improvement T2 - The Analysis of Competition Policy and Sectoral Regulation PB - World Scientific-Now Publishers Series in Business, vol. 4. Hackensack, NJ and London: World Scientific; Hanover, MA: Now Y1 - 2014/// SP - 93 EP - 113 N1 - Accession Number: 1592583; Reviewed Book ISBN: 978-981-4616-35-5 (cloth); Keywords: Innovation; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 201609 KW - Consumer Economics: Theory D11 KW - Firm Behavior: Theory D21 KW - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D43 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility L15 KW - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope L25 KW - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives O31 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1592583&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Pautler, Paul A. AD - US Federal Trade Commission A2 - Payson, Steven T1 - Interpreting and Enforcing the Antitrust Laws T2 - Public Economics in the United States: How the Federal Government Analyzes and Influences the Economy. Volume 2. Economic Analysis of Legislation, Regulation, and Taxation PB - Santa Barbara, Calif. and Oxford: ABC-CLIO, Praeger Y1 - 2014/// SP - 551 EP - 580 N1 - Accession Number: 1576585; Reviewed Book ISBN: 9780-313-39633-5 (cloth); 978-0-313-396-34-2 (e-book); Keywords: Antitrust Law; Law; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 201607 KW - Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G38 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations L44 KW - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels L71 KW - Air Transportation L93 KW - Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: U.S.; Canada: 1913- N42 KW - Micro-Business History: U.S.; Canada: 1913- N82 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1576585&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Sandler, Danielle H. AU - Sandler, Ryan AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Center for Economic Studies, US Census Bureau T1 - Multiple Event Studies in Public Finance and Labor Economics: A Simulation Study with Applications JO - Journal of Economic and Social Measurement JF - Journal of Economic and Social Measurement Y1 - 2014/// VL - 39 IS - 1-2 SP - 31 EP - 57 SN - 07479662 N1 - Accession Number: 1473504; Keywords: Microeconomics; Public Finance; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201501 N2 - Event study is a powerful tool for analyzing the dynamic effects of policy and other shocks in microeconomics. However, there is little understanding of how to apply this method when individuals or locations experience multiple events in close succession. We explore methods of estimating a multiple event study with Monte Carlo simulations. Allowing multiple event-time dummies to be turned on at once generally produces unbiased estimates, while ignoring subsequent events or duplicating observations to have one observation per individual-event-time create trends in the outcome variable before and after an event that can be misleading to the researcher. We present empirical applications which show that the choice of method can make important differences in practice. KW - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation, Implementation, and Evaluation D04 KW - Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT) H25 KW - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials J31 KW - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public Policy J38 KW - Production Analysis and Firm Location: Government Policy R38 KW - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise R41 L3 - http://iospress.metapress.com/content/0747-9662/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1473504&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://iospress.metapress.com/content/0747-9662/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR ID - 104275262 T1 - Using RD design to understand heterogeneity in health insurance crowd-out. AU - Koch, Thomas G Y1 - 2013/05// N1 - Accession Number: 104275262. Language: English. Entry Date: 20130823. Revision Date: 20150711. Publication Type: Journal Article; research. Journal Subset: Biomedical; Continental Europe; Europe; Health Services Administration; Peer Reviewed. NLM UID: 8410622. KW - Eligibility Determination -- Statistics and Numerical Data KW - Insurance, Health -- Statistics and Numerical Data KW - Private Sector KW - Public Sector KW - Adolescence KW - Child KW - Child, Preschool KW - Female KW - Health Care Costs -- Statistics and Numerical Data KW - Human KW - Income KW - Infant KW - Insurance, Health -- Economics KW - Insurance, Health -- Utilization KW - Male KW - Models, Statistical KW - Private Sector -- Economics KW - Private Sector -- Utilization KW - Public Sector -- Economics KW - Public Sector -- Utilization KW - Regression KW - Reimbursement Mechanisms KW - United States SP - 599 EP - 611 JO - Journal of Health Economics JF - Journal of Health Economics JA - J HEALTH ECON VL - 32 IS - 3 PB - Elsevier Science SN - 0167-6296 AD - Federal Trade Commission, BE, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20580, USA. tkoch@ftc.gov U2 - PMID: 23579024. DO - 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.03.002 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=rzh&AN=104275262&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - rzh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Givens, David T1 - Defining governance matters: A factor analytic assessment of governance institutions. JO - Journal of Comparative Economics JF - Journal of Comparative Economics Y1 - 2013/11// VL - 41 IS - 4 M3 - Article SP - 1026 EP - 1053 SN - 01475967 AB - Abstract: This paper produces a new set of governance indices that enable estimation of the marginal economic benefits of particular categories of governance. The indices are constructed using a factor model, estimated on forty perceptions-based governance variables from eleven data sources. In contrast to previous research, a unified statistical framework is used to determine the number of governance indices to create, the conceptual content of each index, and the relative importance each has in accounting for the observable data. The four indices are labeled market infrastructure, downside governance risk, order, and civil liberties. Confidence intervals are calculated for each country, for each index to aid in the comparison of scores. As an application, the indices are used as explanatory variables in cross-country income regressions. Instrumental variables estimates show that market infrastructure and civil liberties both exert statistically and economically significant effects on per capita income, controlling for geography (malaria risk) and international trade. [Copyright &y& Elsevier] AB - Copyright of Journal of Comparative Economics is the property of Academic Press Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - DATA analysis KW - PER capita KW - INCOME KW - INTERNATIONAL trade KW - FACTOR analysis KW - PUBLIC institutions KW - CIVIL rights KW - Civil liberties KW - Factor model KW - Governance KW - O17 KW - Property rights N1 - Accession Number: 91694160; Givens, David 1,2; Email Address: davidmgivens@gmail.com; Affiliations: 1: University of Maryland, College Park, MD, United States; 2: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, United States; Issue Info: Nov2013, Vol. 41 Issue 4, p1026; Thesaurus Term: DATA analysis; Thesaurus Term: PER capita; Thesaurus Term: INCOME; Thesaurus Term: INTERNATIONAL trade; Subject Term: FACTOR analysis; Subject Term: PUBLIC institutions; Subject Term: CIVIL rights; Author-Supplied Keyword: Civil liberties; Author-Supplied Keyword: Factor model; Author-Supplied Keyword: Governance; Author-Supplied Keyword: O17; Author-Supplied Keyword: Property rights; NAICS/Industry Codes: 522293 International Trade Financing; Number of Pages: 28p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1016/j.jce.2012.09.005 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=91694160&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Carlson, Julie A. AU - Dafny, Leemore S. AU - Freeborn, Beth A. AU - Ippolito, Pauline M. AU - Wendling, Brett W. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Northwestern U AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Economics at the FTC: Physician Acquisitions, Standard Essential Patents, and Accuracy of Credit Reporting JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2013/12// VL - 43 IS - 4 SP - 303 EP - 326 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 1423890; Keywords: Consumer; Consumer Credit; Consumer Protection; Credit; Physician; Protection; Standard; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201403 N2 - Economists at the Federal Trade Commission pursue the agency's competition and consumer protection missions. In this year's essay, with respect to antitrust we discuss the analysis that is used in two areas where the Commission has recently been active: physician combinations and standard essential patents. In consumer protection, we discuss the FTC's recently released national study of the accuracy of consumer credit reports. KW - Consumer Protection D18 KW - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages G21 KW - Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation G28 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing J44 KW - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital O34 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1423890&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-013-9411-y UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Weinberg, Matthew C. AU - Hosken, Daniel AD - Drexel U AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Evidence on the Accuracy of Merger Simulations JO - Review of Economics and Statistics JF - Review of Economics and Statistics Y1 - 2013/12// VL - 95 IS - 5 SP - 1584 EP - 1600 SN - 00346535 N1 - Accession Number: 1418595; Keywords: Bertrand Model; Merger; Oligopoly; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201402 N2 - This paper evaluates the efficacy of a structural model of oligopoly used for merger review. Using premerger data, we estimate several demand systems and use a static Bertrand model to simulate the price effects of two mergers. Using pre- and postmerger data, we directly estimate the price effects. The direct estimates imply that one merger resulted in moderate price increases, while the second left prices essentially unchanged. While some simulations are similar to the directly estimated price effects, overall simulations overstate the price effects in one case and understate them in the other. Explanations for the discrepancies are explored. KW - Market Structure and Pricing: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D43 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco; Wine and Spirits L66 KW - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels L71 L3 - http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/rest UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1418595&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.mitpressjournals.org/loi/rest DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Shupp, Robert AU - Sheremeta, Roman M. AU - Schmidt, David AU - Walker, James AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Case Western Reserve U AD - MI State U AD - IN U T1 - Resource Allocation Contests: Experimental Evidence JO - Journal of Economic Psychology JF - Journal of Economic Psychology Y1 - 2013/12// VL - 39 SP - 257 EP - 267 SN - 01674870 N1 - Accession Number: 1412435; Keywords: Expenditure; Experiment; Experimental; Experiments; Individual; Preference; Risk; Risk Neutrality; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201401 N2 - Many resource allocation contests have the property that individuals undertake costly actions to appropriate a potentially divisible resource. We design an experiment to compare individuals' decisions across three resource allocation contests which are isomorphic under risk-neutrality. The results indicate that in aggregate the single-prize contest generates lower expenditures than either the proportional-prize or the multi-prize contest. Interestingly, while the aggregate results indicate similar behavior in the proportional-prize and multi-prize contests, individual level analysis indicates that the behavior in the single-prize contest is more similar to the behavior in the multi-prize contest than in the proportional-prize contest. We also elicit preferences toward risk, ambiguity, and losses, and find that while such preferences cannot explain individual behavior in the proportional-prize contest, preferences with regard to losses are predictive of behavior in both the single-prize and multiple-prize contests. Therefore, it appears that loss aversion is correlated with behavior in the single-prize and multi-prize contests where losses are likely to occur, but not in the proportional-prize contest where losses are unlikely. KW - Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual C910 KW - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D120 KW - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty D810 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01674870 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1412435&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2013.09.001 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01674870 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Garmon, Christopher AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Major League Baseball's First Year Player Draft: A Natural Laboratory for the Study of Bargaining JO - Journal of Sports Economics JF - Journal of Sports Economics Y1 - 2013/10// VL - 14 IS - 5 SP - 451 EP - 478 SN - 15270025 N1 - Accession Number: 1492079; Keywords: Bargaining; Compensation; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201504 N2 - Major League Baseball's (MLB) Draft is a natural laboratory for the study of bargaining: There are no bonus restrictions, draft picks cannot be traded, and there are no commitment issues (i.e., players "declaring" for the draft). This article tests the implications of bargaining theory using data from the 2003-2010 MLB drafts. In 2007, new draft rules were introduced, but not uniformly across the draft, making it possible to estimate the effect of each change. Although the rule changes were designed to lower bonuses, they had the opposite effect. The rule changes led to $178 million in extra compensation to drafted players. KW - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory C78 KW - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials J31 KW - Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing J44 KW - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation; Collective Bargaining J52 KW - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism L83 L3 - http://jse.sagepub.com/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1492079&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://jse.sagepub.com/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ulrick, Shawn W. T1 - Using semi-parametric methods in an analysis of earnings mobility. JO - Econometrics Journal JF - Econometrics Journal Y1 - 2008/12// VL - 11 IS - 3 M3 - Article SP - 478 EP - 498 PB - Wiley-Blackwell SN - 13684221 AB - This paper describes a dynamic random effects econometric model from which inferences on earnings mobility may be made. It answers questions such as, given some initial level of observed earnings, what is the probability that an agent with certain characteristics will remain below a specified level of earnings (for example the poverty level) for a specified number of time periods? Existing research assumes that the distributions of the unobserved permanent and transitory shocks in the model are known up to finitely many parameters. However, predictions of earnings mobility are highly sensitive to assumptions about these distributions. The present paper estimates the distributions of the random effects non-parametrically. The results are used to predict the probabilities of remaining in a low state of earnings. The results from the non-parametric distributions are contrasted to those obtained under a normality assumption. Using the non-parametrically estimated distributions gives estimated probabilities that are smaller than those obtained under the normality assumption. Through a Monte Carlo experiment and by examining unconditional predicted earnings distributions, it is demonstrated that the non-parametric method is likely to be considerably more accurate, and that assuming normality may give quite misleading results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Econometrics Journal is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - ECONOMETRICS KW - WAGES -- Accounting KW - WAGE theory (Economics) KW - INCOME KW - MONTE Carlo method KW - PANEL analysis KW - Deconvolution KW - Earnings mobility KW - Panel data with serial correlation KW - Semi-parametric estimation N1 - Accession Number: 35035317; Ulrick, Shawn W. 1; Email Address: sulrick@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20580; Issue Info: Dec2008, Vol. 11 Issue 3, p478; Thesaurus Term: ECONOMETRICS; Thesaurus Term: WAGES -- Accounting; Thesaurus Term: WAGE theory (Economics); Thesaurus Term: INCOME; Thesaurus Term: MONTE Carlo method; Subject Term: PANEL analysis; Author-Supplied Keyword: Deconvolution; Author-Supplied Keyword: Earnings mobility; Author-Supplied Keyword: Panel data with serial correlation; Author-Supplied Keyword: Semi-parametric estimation; Number of Pages: 21p; Illustrations: 7 Charts, 6 Graphs; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1111/j.1368-423X.2008.00248.x UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=35035317&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zimmerman, Paul AU - Yun, John AU - Taylor, Christopher T1 - Edgeworth Price Cycles in Gasoline: Evidence from the United States. JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2013/05// VL - 42 IS - 3 M3 - Article SP - 297 EP - 320 SN - 0889938X AB - Studies of gasoline prices in multiple countries have found sequences of a sharp price increase followed by gradual decreases. This pattern is linked to Maskin and Tirole (Econometrica 56:571-599, ) duopoly pricing game and labeled Edgeworth price cycles. We examine data on average daily MSA-level retail gasoline prices for 350 MSAs in the US from 1996-2010. We confirm the finding of others and show that a relatively small number of US MSAs in contiguous upper Midwestern states evidence price cycling. However, our lengthy data set allows us to see that these MSAs began cycling in 2000. Thus, we can examine prices in cycling and non-cycling MSAs before and after cycling and find that prices are lower in MSAs that began cycling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Review of Industrial Organization is the property of Springer Science & Business Media B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - PRICE increases KW - PETROLEUM industry KW - CONSUMERS KW - GAS prices KW - UNITED States KW - D4 KW - Dynamic oligopoly KW - Edgeworth price cycles KW - Gasoline KW - L44 KW - L81 KW - Petroleum industry N1 - Accession Number: 86449795; Zimmerman, Paul 1; Email Address: PZimmerman@ftc.gov; Yun, John 1; Email Address: JYun@ftc.gov; Taylor, Christopher 1; Email Address: ctaylor@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington 20580 USA; Issue Info: May2013, Vol. 42 Issue 3, p297; Thesaurus Term: PRICE increases; Thesaurus Term: PETROLEUM industry; Thesaurus Term: CONSUMERS; Subject Term: GAS prices; Subject: UNITED States; Author-Supplied Keyword: D4; Author-Supplied Keyword: Dynamic oligopoly; Author-Supplied Keyword: Edgeworth price cycles; Author-Supplied Keyword: Gasoline; Author-Supplied Keyword: L44; Author-Supplied Keyword: L81; Author-Supplied Keyword: Petroleum industry; NAICS/Industry Codes: 424720 Petroleum and Petroleum Products Merchant Wholesalers (except Bulk Stations and Terminals); NAICS/Industry Codes: 424710 Petroleum Bulk Stations and Terminals; NAICS/Industry Codes: 454311 Heating oil dealers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 412110 Petroleum and petroleum products merchant wholesalers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 486110 Pipeline Transportation of Crude Oil; NAICS/Industry Codes: 324199 All Other Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing; NAICS/Industry Codes: 211111 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Extraction; NAICS/Industry Codes: 324191 Petroleum Lubricating Oil and Grease Manufacturing; NAICS/Industry Codes: 213112 Support Activities for Oil and Gas Operations; NAICS/Industry Codes: 211113 Conventional oil and gas extraction; Number of Pages: 24p; Illustrations: 4 Charts, 2 Graphs; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1007/s11151-012-9372-6 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=86449795&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Smith, L. Douglas AU - Staten, Michael AU - Eyssell, Thomas AU - Karig, Maureen AU - Freeborn, Beth A. AU - Golden, Andrea AD - U MO, St Louis AD - U AZ AD - U MO, St Louis AD - U MO, St Louis AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Fair Isaac Corporation T1 - Accuracy of Information Maintained by US Credit Bureaus: Frequency of Errors and Effects on Consumers' Credit Scores JO - Journal of Consumer Affairs JF - Journal of Consumer Affairs Y1 - 2013///Fall VL - 47 IS - 3 SP - 588 EP - 601 SN - 00220078 N1 - Accession Number: 1417550; Keywords: Consumer; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201402 N2 - A representative sample of 1,000 US consumers reviewed their credit reports from the three major US credit bureaus with help from university research associates. Twenty-six percent of study participants claimed to find at least one potentially material error and filed formal disputes with the relevant bureau(s). For 78% of the 263 consumers who filed disputes (20% of participants overall) at least one bureau altered the credit report accordingly. Thirty-three percent of disputants (8.7% of participants) experienced a resulting increase of 10+ points in one or more of their FICO scores; 21% of disputants (5.5% of study participants) had one or more scores cross a threshold that would typically result in more favorable terms of credit. Our findings suggest that credit-bureau data are accurate enough to facilitate efficient lending and creditors' management of accounts, but individual consumers need to be vigilant to protect themselves against potentially costly errors in their files. KW - Household Saving; Personal Finance D14 KW - Consumer Protection D18 KW - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software L86 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291745-6606/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1417550&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291745-6606/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - DeGraba, Patrick AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Naked Exclusion by a Dominant Input Supplier: Exclusive Contracting and Loyalty Discounts JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2013/09// VL - 31 IS - 5 SP - 516 EP - 526 SN - 01677187 N1 - Accession Number: 1416857; Keywords: Contracts; Discounts; Firm; Firms; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201402 N2 - Recent literature has shown that an incumbent can use exclusive contracts to maintain supra-competitive prices when buyers of the good are also competitors. Most of the models require the incumbent to completely prevent a more efficient potential entrant from entering, and assume that the entrant is exogenously prevented from making exclusive offers. Such models cannot explain how exclusive arrangements can lower welfare when they do not completely foreclose a small rival, when the rival can make exclusive offers, nor can they identify rudimentary relationships such as how a dominant supplier's size affects his incentive and ability to exclude and lower welfare. I extend the intuition of the literature by formally modeling competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival selling to competing downstream firms. I show that a dominant supplier can pay downstream firms for exclusivity, allowing him to maintain supra-competitive input prices, even when a small rival that is more efficient at serving some portion of the market can make exclusive offers. I also show that exclusives need not completely exclude the small rival to cause competitive harm. The payment the dominant supplier makes for exclusivity equals the incremental rents that the rival's input could generate if exactly one downstream firm sold final goods using it. KW - Economics of Contract: Theory D86 KW - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks L14 KW - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope L25 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1416857&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.09.001 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Unilateral Effects in Merger Analysis: Models, Merits, and Merger Policy JO - International Journal of the Economics of Business JF - International Journal of the Economics of Business Y1 - 2013/07// VL - 20 IS - 2 SP - 145 EP - 162 SN - 13571516 N1 - Accession Number: 1393222; Keywords: Competition; Firm; Merger; Policy; Shares; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201309 N2 - This paper models the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) unilateral effects merger policy using a sample of 192 investigations undertaken between 1993 and 2010. Statistical analysis shows that the number of significant rivals represents a reasonable structural proxy for the FTC's merger challenge decision, although other variables, such as impediments to entry, fringe share, clear evidence of head-to-head competition between the merging firms, competitive effects' evidence, and efficiency-related proxies, also affect the decision to challenge a merger. Some of these variables suggest that the innovations in the 2010 Merger Guidelines had already been applied in FTC merger analysis. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G38 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1393222&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Garmon, Christopher AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Employer-Provided Health Insurance and Hospital Mergers JO - Health Economics, Policy and Law JF - Health Economics, Policy and Law Y1 - 2013/07// VL - 8 IS - 3 SP - 365 EP - 384 SN - 17441331 N1 - Accession Number: 1388627; Keywords: Acquisition; Firm; Health; Health Care; Health Insurance; Healthcare; Hospital; Hospitals; Merger; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201308 N2 - This paper explores the impact of employer-provided health insurance on hospital competition and hospital mergers. Under employer-provided health insurance, employer executives act as agents for their employees in selecting health insurance options for their firm. The paper investigates whether a merger of hospitals favored by executives will result in a larger price increase than a merger of competing hospitals elsewhere. This is found to be the case even when the executive has the same opportunity cost of travel as her employees and even when the executive is the sole owner of the firm, retaining all profits. This is consistent with the Federal Trade Commission's findings in its challenge of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare's acquisition of Highland Park Hospital. Implications of the model are further tested with executive location data and hospital data from Florida and Texas. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Health Insurance, Public and Private I13 KW - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions J32 L3 - http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayBackIssues?jid=HEP UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1388627&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayBackIssues?jid=HEP DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Balan, David J. AU - Deltas, George AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - U IL T1 - Better Product at Same Cost, Lower Sales and Lower Welfare JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2013/07// VL - 31 IS - 4 SP - 322 EP - 330 SN - 01677187 N1 - Accession Number: 1380858; Keywords: Cost; Firm; Firms; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201307 N2 - We consider a high-quality dominant firm facing a low-quality competitive fringe. We show that the dominant firm's quantity is (weakly) increasing in its quality if and only if its marginal cost (weakly) exceeds that of the fringe; otherwise it is strictly decreasing in quality. This result is driven by the fact that a quality increase causes the marginal revenue curve to rotate clockwise, rather than shift outwards, and at a height equal to the fringe firms' marginal cost. This fact, combined with the dominant firm's MR = MC condition, determines the result. For closely related reasons, the effect of a quality increase on consumer welfare also depends on the relationship between the costs. It is possible that all consumers are (weakly) better off, that some are better off and some worse off, or that all are (weakly) worse off. We also consider several extensions and variations of the model. KW - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity D24 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1380858&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.04.004 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Tedeschi, Gwendolyn A. AU - Carlson, Julie A. AD - Manhattan College AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Beyond the Subsidy: Coyotes, Credit and Fair Trade Coffee JO - Journal of International Development JF - Journal of International Development Y1 - 2013/05// VL - 25 IS - 4 SP - 456 EP - 473 SN - 09541748 N1 - Accession Number: 1382137; Keywords: International Trade; Trade; Trade Models; Welfare; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201307 N2 - International trade economists have largely avoided undertaking analysis of the fair trade movement because of the fact that fair trade is generally viewed as a price subsidy. Standard international trade models show this type of trade policy to be inefficient, as it would cause oversupply and further depress world prices. The problem with applying a standard international trade model to fair trade in coffee is that the input markets associated with coffee production are not perfectly competitive. Since perfect competition is an assumption common to many models of international trade, the conclusions of these models are not applicable in this setting. In this paper, we examine three models of coffee production. In the first model, the problem for coffee farmers is examined as if all markets were perfectly competitive; in the second model, we examine coffee production with an inefficient credit market in the absence of fair trade; and in the third model, we examine coffee production with an inefficient credit market but with the possibility of fair trade. Farmer welfare is improved with fair trade at the expense of local middlemen, but total welfare is lower than what could be achieved with perfect competition. KW - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation F12 KW - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q12 KW - Agriculture in International Trade Q17 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291099-1328/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1382137&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291099-1328/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Koch, Thomas G. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Using RD Design to Understand Heterogeneity in Health Insurance Crowd-Out JO - Journal of Health Economics JF - Journal of Health Economics Y1 - 2013/05// VL - 32 IS - 3 SP - 599 EP - 611 SN - 01676296 N1 - Accession Number: 1375096; Keywords: Health; Health Insurance; Insurance; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201306 N2 - Crowd-out, the switching from private to public insurance, is often found, but estimates are rarely consistent with prior measurements. Cutler and Gruber (1996) found crowd-out in up to half of the newly eligible children, while Card and Shore-Sheppard (2004) found almost none. This paper exploits many regression discontinuity (RD) designs to estimate heterogeneous effects of public insurance eligibility. Crowd-out and its impact on spending and utilization is documented across the income spectrum, but effects are smaller at higher income levels. These differences vary by state and correspond to changes in the reimbursement rates of public insurance plans. KW - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies G22 KW - Health Insurance, Public and Private I13 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01676296 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1375096&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2013.03.002 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01676296 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ulrick, Shawn W. T1 - Measuring the returns to education nonparametrically. JO - Applied Economics Letters JF - Applied Economics Letters Y1 - 2007/10/20/ VL - 14 IS - 13 M3 - Article SP - 1005 EP - 1011 PB - Routledge SN - 13504851 AB - This article uses a nonparametric model of earnings to measure the returns to education. Under very general smoothness conditions, a nonparametric estimator reveals the true shape of the earnings profiles up to random sampling error. Thus, the nonparametric model should provide better predictions than its parametric counterpart. We find that the nonparametric model predicts very different estimated returns than standard Mincer formulations. Depending on the experience and education level, returns measured in log earnings estimated from nonparametric model can be nearly twice those obtained from the Mincer model. Finally, this article examines what structural features parametric models should include. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Applied Economics Letters is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - FORECASTING KW - WAGES KW - NONPARAMETRIC statistics KW - OLDER people -- Employment KW - YOUNG workers KW - EARNINGS forecasting KW - EDUCATION KW - EDUCATIONAL attainment KW - ACADEMIC degrees N1 - Accession Number: 27216762; Ulrick, Shawn W. 1; Email Address: sulrick@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: US Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC 20580, USA; Issue Info: 10/20/2007, Vol. 14 Issue 13, p1005; Thesaurus Term: FORECASTING; Thesaurus Term: WAGES; Thesaurus Term: NONPARAMETRIC statistics; Thesaurus Term: OLDER people -- Employment; Thesaurus Term: YOUNG workers; Thesaurus Term: EARNINGS forecasting; Subject Term: EDUCATION; Subject Term: EDUCATIONAL attainment; Subject Term: ACADEMIC degrees; NAICS/Industry Codes: 923110 Administration of Education Programs; NAICS/Industry Codes: 611699 All Other Miscellaneous Schools and Instruction; NAICS/Industry Codes: 611710 Educational Support Services; Number of Pages: 7p; Illustrations: 1 Chart, 3 Graphs; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1080/13504850600706198 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=27216762&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Simpson, John AU - Wickelgren, Abraham L T1 - Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition. JO - American Economic Review JF - American Economic Review Y1 - 2007/09// VL - 97 IS - 4 M3 - Article SP - 1305 EP - 1320 PB - American Economic Association SN - 00028282 AB - Previous papers by Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer, and John S. Wiley, Jr. (1991) and Ilya R. Segal and Michael D. Whinston (2000) argue that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry in the presence of scale economies and multiple buyers. We first show that these results no longer hold when buyers are final consumers who can breach these contracts and pay expectation damages. We then show, however, that exclusive contracts can inefficiently deter entry if buyers are downstream competitors, even in the absence of scale economies and even if breach is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of American Economic Review is the property of American Economic Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - ECONOMICS KW - COMMERCE KW - IMPERFECT competition KW - EXCLUSIVE contracts KW - MONOPOLIES KW - RAMSEYER, J. Mark KW - RASMUSEN, Eric B. KW - WHINSTON, Michael D. N1 - Accession Number: 26592443; Simpson, John 1; Wickelgren, Abraham L 2; Affiliations: 1: Bureau of Economics, United States Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Washington, DC 20580.; 2: School of Law, Northwestern University, 357 E. Chicago Ave., Chicago, IL 60611.; Issue Info: Sep2007, Vol. 97 Issue 4, p1305; Thesaurus Term: ECONOMICS; Thesaurus Term: COMMERCE; Thesaurus Term: IMPERFECT competition; Thesaurus Term: EXCLUSIVE contracts; Thesaurus Term: MONOPOLIES; People: RAMSEYER, J. Mark; People: RASMUSEN, Eric B.; People: WHINSTON, Michael D.; Number of Pages: 16p; Illustrations: 1 Chart; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1257/aer.97.4.1305 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=26592443&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hosken, Daniel AU - Wendling, Brett AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Informing the Uninformed: How Drug Advertising Affects Check-Up Visits JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2013/03// VL - 31 IS - 2 SP - 181 EP - 194 SN - 01677187 N1 - Accession Number: 1369661; Keywords: Consumer; Drug; Drugs; Expenditure; Individual; Marketing; Medical Care; Physician; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201305 N2 - Direct-to-consumer drug advertising has recently become an important and controversial component of drug marketing. In this paper, we examine one of the claimed benefits of drug advertising: encouraging the undiagnosed to seek out medical treatment. We measure how advertising affects an undiagnosed individual's decision to visit a physician for a check-up using detailed person-level panel data on more than 30,000 individuals from the Medical Care Expenditure Panel Survey. We find drug advertising is an important determinant of an individual's decision to get a check-up and that this effect of drug advertising appears to differ by demographic group. While the differences between demographic groups are not statistically different, our point estimates suggest that Blacks and the highly educated are the most responsive to drug advertising. KW - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D12 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology L65 KW - Marketing M31 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1369661&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.11.006 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Silvia, Louis AU - Taylor, Christopher T. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Petroleum Mergers and Competition in the Northeast United States JO - International Journal of the Economics of Business JF - International Journal of the Economics of Business Y1 - 2013/02// VL - 20 IS - 1 SP - 97 EP - 124 SN - 13571516 N1 - Accession Number: 1361592; Keywords: Acquisition; Competition; Gasoline; Merger; Petroleum; Refinery; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201304 N2 - Sunoco's 2004 acquisition of El Paso's, New Jersey refinery and Valero's 2005 acquisition of Premcor's Delaware refinery significantly consolidated refinery control in the US Northeast. The Federal Trade Commission investigated both transactions but challenged neither. We examine the FTC's enforcement rationale and test whether these mergers were associated with post-merger price increases in either gasoline or diesel at retail and wholesale. Our findings indicate that the transactions were largely competitively neutral. There was some indication that some unbranded rack prices may have increased after the mergers, but this result was not robust across controls or assumptions. In some other instances, prices in merger-affected areas may have fallen relative to prices elsewhere. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels L71 L3 - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1361592&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Cohen, Andrew AU - Freeborn, Beth AU - McManus, Brian AD - Federal Reserve Board AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - U NC T1 - Competition and Crowding Out in the Market for Outpatient Substance Abuse Treatment JO - International Economic Review JF - International Economic Review Y1 - 2013/02// VL - 54 IS - 1 SP - 159 EP - 184 SN - 00206598 N1 - Accession Number: 1361464; Keywords: Outpatient; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201304 N2 - U.S. markets for outpatient substance abuse treatment (OSAT) include for-profit, nonprofit, and public clinics. We study OSAT provision using new methods on equilibrium market structure in differentiated product markets. This allows us to describe clinics as heterogeneous in their objectives, their responses to exogenous market characteristics, and their responses to one another. Consistent with crowding out of private treatment, we find that markets with public clinics are less likely to have private clinics. In markets with low insurance coverage, low incomes, or high shares of nonwhite addicts, however, public clinics are relatively likely to be the sole willing providers of OSAT. KW - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets H44 KW - National Government Expenditures and Health H51 KW - State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions H75 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health I18 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291468-2354/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1361464&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291468-2354/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gale, Ian AU - O'Brien, Daniel P. AD - Georgetown U AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Welfare Effects of Use-or-Lose Provisions in Markets with Dominant Firms JO - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics JF - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Y1 - 2013/02// VL - 5 IS - 1 SP - 175 EP - 193 SN - 19457669 N1 - Accession Number: 1341287; Keywords: Airline; Firm; Firms; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201301 N2 - A use-or-lose provision requires that firms employ a certain minimum fraction of their productive capacity. Variants have been used by regulators in the airline and wireless communications industries, among others. A typical stated objective is to limit capacity hoarding, thereby increasing aggregate output and welfare. When the dominant firm is more efficient than fringe firms, we find that imposing a use-or-lose provision induces the dominant firm to acquire capacity from the fringe, which causes aggregate output to fall. When the dominant firm is less efficient than the fringe, aggregate output rises. In both cases, total surplus may rise or fall. KW - Market Structure and Pricing: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D43 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Air Transportation L93 L3 - http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-micro/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1341287&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.1.175 UR - http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-micro/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ashenfelter, Orley C. AU - Hosken, Daniel S. AU - Weinberg, Matthew C. AD - Princeton U AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Drexel U T1 - The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool JO - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy JF - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy Y1 - 2013/02// VL - 5 IS - 1 SP - 239 EP - 261 SN - 19457731 N1 - Accession Number: 1341278; Keywords: Acquisition; Appliance; Concentration; Firm; Firms; Merger; Prices; Shares; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201301 N2 - Many experts speculate that US antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers has been too lenient. We estimate the price effects of Whirlpool's acquisition of Maytag to provide new evidence on this debate. We compare price changes in appliance markets most affected by the merger to markets where concentration changed much less or not at all. We estimate price increases for dishwashers and relatively large price increases for clothes dryers, but no price effects for refrigerators or clothes washers. The combined firm's market share fell across all four affected categories, and the number of distinct appliance products offered for sale fell. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Appliances; Furniture; Other Consumer Durables L68 L3 - http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-policy/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1341278&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.5.1.239 UR - http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-policy/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zimmerman, Paul R. T1 - Recent developments in US wireline telecommunications JO - Telecommunications Policy JF - Telecommunications Policy Y1 - 2007/07// VL - 31 IS - 6/7 M3 - Article SP - 419 EP - 437 SN - 03085961 AB - Abstract: This article presents a selective survey of several recent developments in the US market for wireline telecommunications services spanning the 2003–2005 period. Specifically, the article discusses the recent decline in overall telephone penetration rates, the substitution between wireline and wireless telephony, intermodal competition issues raised in the context of the FCCs review of the Cingular/AT&T Wireless merger, and the potentially anticompetitive effects of incumbent local exchange carrier tying of voice and DSL service. The article identifies several areas for future research motivated by each one of these developments. [Copyright &y& Elsevier] AB - Copyright of Telecommunications Policy is the property of Pergamon Press - An Imprint of Elsevier Science and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - SURVEYS KW - TELECOMMUNICATION systems KW - WIRELESS communication systems KW - CORDLESS telephones KW - Bundling KW - Intermodal competition KW - Telephone penetration KW - Tying KW - Wireless substitution N1 - Accession Number: 25841841; Zimmerman, Paul R. 1; Email Address: pzimmerman@ftc.gov; Affiliation: 1: Bureau of Economics, Antitrust I, US Federal Trade Commission, 601 New Jersey Avenue NW, Rm. 8103, Washington, DC 20580, USA; Source Info: Jul2007, Vol. 31 Issue 6/7, p419; Subject Term: SURVEYS; Subject Term: TELECOMMUNICATION systems; Subject Term: WIRELESS communication systems; Subject Term: CORDLESS telephones; Author-Supplied Keyword: Bundling; Author-Supplied Keyword: Intermodal competition; Author-Supplied Keyword: Telephone penetration; Author-Supplied Keyword: Tying; Author-Supplied Keyword: Wireless substitution; NAICS/Industry Codes: 517410 Satellite Telecommunications; NAICS/Industry Codes: 334220 Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless Communications Equipment Manufacturing; NAICS/Industry Codes: 517210 Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite); Number of Pages: 19p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1016/j.telpol.2007.04.002 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=25841841&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - aph ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AU - Simons, Joseph J. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP T1 - Louis Kaplow's Why (Ever) Define Markets? A Comment JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2012///Winter VL - 57 IS - 4 SP - 953 EP - 956 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 1368120; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201305 KW - Market Structure and Pricing: General D40 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General L10 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1368120&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AU - Simons, Joseph J. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP T1 - In Defense of Market Definition JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2012///Winter VL - 57 IS - 4 SP - 667 EP - 717 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 1368115; Keywords: Monopolists; Monopoly; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201305 N2 - Market definition, a concept that has long served to structure competitive analysis, is under assault from theoreticians who object to the inability of the standard analysis to define a market compatible with their models of unilateral effects. Although these unilateral models have not been shown to reliably predict competitive behavior in the real world, our article raises other concerns associated with substituting a unilateral effects models for market definition. We suggest that the criticisms of market definition are misplaced, because the theoretical analyses lack the benchmarks necessary to establish findings of monopoly power. Moreover, market analysis serves to build the foundation for a case-specific competitive analysis that reaches well beyond the confines of any one particular economic model. Market definition, structured by the hypothetical monopolist test and implemented with critical loss analysis, remains a valuable tool for antitrust analysis. Examples are provided for market definitions in homogeneous goods, static differentiated goods, and dynamic differentiated goods structures. KW - Market Structure and Pricing: General D40 KW - Market Structure and Pricing: Monopoly D42 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General L10 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1368115&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Lyon, Thomas P. AU - Wilson, Nathan AD - U MI AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Capture or Contract? The Early Years of Electric Utility Regulation JO - Journal of Regulatory Economics JF - Journal of Regulatory Economics Y1 - 2012/12// VL - 42 IS - 3 SP - 225 EP - 241 SN - 0922680X N1 - Accession Number: 1333745; Keywords: Electric Utilities; Electricity; Regulation; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201211 N2 - Jarrell (J Law Econ 21:269-295, 1978) found that electricity prices fell more slowly in states that adopted state regulation before 1917, suggesting that regulators were "captured" by the interests of the regulated electric utilities. An alternative explanation is that state regulation more credibly protected specialized utility assets from regulatory opportunism than did the municipal franchise contracting that preceded it. We test this alternative hypothesis using a panel of data from the U.S. Electrical Censuses of 1902-1937. We find that the shift from municipal franchise contracting to state regulation was associated with a substantial decrease in investment propensity, an outcome supporting the capture hypothesis. KW - Economics of Regulation L51 KW - Electric Utilities L94 KW - Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy L98 KW - Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: U.S.; Canada: 1913- N42 KW - Economic History: Transport, Trade, Energy, Technology, and Other Services: U.S.; Canada: 1913- N72 KW - Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices Q41 KW - Energy: Government Policy Q48 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11149 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1333745&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11149-012-9200-9 UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11149 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Sandler, Ryan AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Clunkers or Junkers? Adverse Selection in a Vehicle Retirement Program JO - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy JF - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy Y1 - 2012/11// VL - 4 IS - 4 SP - 253 EP - 281 SN - 19457731 N1 - Accession Number: 1324612; Keywords: Adverse Selection; Pollution; Vehicles; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201210 N2 - Vehicle retirement programs have become popular tools of public policy for reducing pollution. The efficacy of these programs is difficult to measure, as it is difficult to tell how much a vehicle would have polluted otherwise. I estimate that counterfactual using data from a long-running local program in California. I utilize the universe of emissions inspections from the California Smog Check Program to construct vehicle usage histories of retired cars and similar vehicles which did not retire early. I find that the program's cost-effectiveness steadily declined over time because of the depreciation of the vehicle fleet, while adverse selection remained a problem throughout. KW - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design D82 KW - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling Q53 KW - Environmental Economics: Government Policy Q58 KW - Transportation Economics: Government Pricing and Policy R48 L3 - http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-policy/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1324612&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.4.4.253 UR - http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-policy/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Pappalardo, Janis K. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Are Unintended Effects of Marketing Regulations Unexpected? Comment JO - Marketing Science JF - Marketing Science Y1 - 2012/09//September-October 2012 VL - 31 IS - 5 SP - 739 EP - 744 SN - 07322399 N1 - Accession Number: 1344548; Keywords: Brand; Labeling; Marketing; Nutrition; Regulation; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201301 N2 - This comment on the impact the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 has had on brand nutritional quality and taste as raised in Moorman et al. [Moorman C,, Ferraro R,, Huber, J. (2012) Unintended nutrition consequences: Firm responses to the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act. Marketing Sci. 31(5):717-737]. KW - Consumer Protection D18 KW - Health Production I12 KW - Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health I18 KW - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law K32 KW - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco; Wine and Spirits L66 KW - Marketing M31 L3 - http://mktsci.journal.informs.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1344548&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://mktsci.journal.informs.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zimmerman, Paul R. AU - Carlson, Julie A. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Critical Import Supply Elasticities and the 'Imports-as-Market-Discipline' Hypothesis JO - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization JF - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Y1 - 2012/09// VL - 84 IS - 1 SP - 345 EP - 354 SN - 01672681 N1 - Accession Number: 1343771; Keywords: Firm; Firms; Import; Merger; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201301 N2 - This paper formally examines the factors underlying how responsive imports must be to domestic prices (the 'import supply elasticity') in order to thwart an anticompetitive domestic price increase stemming from a merger--an issue that frequently arises in many antitrust reviews. Domestic firms face a fringe comprised of foreign firms who import their products into the domestic market. In the eyes of domestic consumers, these imports are viewed as imperfect substitutes in demand to the output produced by the domestic firms. The model is solved in terms of the 'critical' import supply elasticity that can then be used evaluate the ability of imports to constrain an anticompetitive price increase post-merger. Numerical simulations are conducted to consider the magnitude of perturbations in the model's exogenous parameters. Potential empirical extensions of the model are also considered. KW - Empirical Studies of Trade F14 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01672681 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1343771&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2012.04.004 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01672681 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Simons, Joseph J. AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AD - Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - A Comment on Choosing among Tools for Assessing Unilateral Effects Analysis JO - European Competition Journal JF - European Competition Journal Y1 - 2012/08// VL - 8 IS - 2 SP - 429 EP - 438 SN - 17441056 N1 - Accession Number: 1326190; Keywords: Competition; Merger; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201210 N2 - In a recent paper in this journal, Gregory Werden and Luke Froeb present a general discussion of unilateral effects analysis with a particular focus on the Upward Pressure on Price (UPP) model. Their work follows our paper on a similar topic that showed the application of an UPP model in the broad manner suggested by Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro would tend to dramatically expand the universe of mergers subject to challenge. Werden and Froeb propose to limit the application of UPP screen to situations of Bertrand competition and impose an Antitrust Logit Model (ALM) to link the values of the diversion ratio and the margin; as a result, they question our conclusion that the application of UPP analysis would lead to more aggressive merger enforcement. Moreover, they posit that merger simulation is generally preferable to UPP simulation. We disagree with these observations. First, their conclusion that our simulations overstate the potential for UPP analysis to increase enforcement is generated by their restrictive ALM structure. We show that the ALM assumption leads to an UPP analysis that reduces the level of enforcement below current levels. We also stress the importance of verifying the predictions of a theoretical model (whether UPP or other merger simulation) on a case by case basis, but note that UPP is easier to work with and test. Finally, we agree with Werden and Froeb that economic tools should be customized for the issue at hand (screening, enforcement, or litigation), but stress that under the US Daubert standard, economic experts must move beyond a theory that is generally accepted in their fields and present the court with evidence to show that the theory fits the facts at issue and is reliably predictive. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/ecj UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1326190&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/ecj DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Balan, David J. AU - Knack, Stephen AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - World Bank T1 - The Correlation between Human Capital and Morality and Its Effect on Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence JO - Journal of Comparative Economics JF - Journal of Comparative Economics Y1 - 2012/08// VL - 40 IS - 3 SP - 457 EP - 475 SN - 01475967 N1 - Accession Number: 1316043; Keywords: Human Capital; Geographic Descriptors: Selected Countries; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201208 N2 - In this paper, we analyze the relationship between the correlation between morality and human capital ("ability") on the one hand and aggregate economic performance on the other. Morality is defined as an aversion to consuming goods obtained through appropriative rather than productive activities. In our empirical analysis, we adapt the well-known regression framework of Rodrik et al. (2004), using the World Values Survey as a source of proxies for morality. Using our preferred proxy, we find evidence that higher within-country correlation between morality and ability, holding constant the levels of morality and ability, increases per-capita income levels. Under our preferred specification, a one-standard-deviation increase in the correlation between morality and ability raises the log of per-capita income by about one-fourth of a standard deviation, equal to approximately $3,600 for the median income country in our sample. Results are robust to correcting for endogeneity and to changes in sample and specification. Results are mixed when we use alternative morality proxies, but the coefficient on the morality-ability correlation is still usually positive and statistically significant. We also develop a simple static general equilibrium model to serve as a possible framework for understanding the empirical results. KW - Macroeconomics: Production E23 KW - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital E24 KW - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity J24 KW - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development O11 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01475967 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1316043&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2011.12.005 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01475967 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Borgers, Tilman AU - Smith, Doug AD - U MI AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Robustly Ranking Mechanisms JO - American Economic Review JF - American Economic Review Y1 - 2012/05// VL - 102 IS - 3 SP - 325 EP - 329 SN - 00028282 N1 - Accession Number: 1294810; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201205 KW - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design D82 L3 - http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1294810&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.3.325 UR - http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Luppino, Marc AU - Sander, Richard AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - UCLA T1 - College Major Peer Effects and Attrition from the Sciences JO - IZA Journal of Labor Economics JF - IZA Journal of Labor Economics Y1 - 2015/// VL - 4 SN - 21938997 N1 - Accession Number: 1490918; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201504 N2 - This paper examines how peer quality within distinct college majors affects graduation rates and major persistence. To mitigate the selection problem, we control for school-specific fixed effects, as well as very flexible application-admissions pattern fixed effects. Non-science peer quality appears to have a positive effect on both the likelihood that a student chooses a science major and on his or her cumulative GPA. Conversely, students who attend campuses with stronger peers in the sciences are less likely to graduate with a science degree. Weaker, non-minority students typically react to stronger peers in the sciences by shifting majors. Under-represented minorities tend to persist in the sciences regardless of peer quality, but in more competitive programs they suffer--often substantially--in terms of college grades and the likelihood of graduating. KW - Analysis of Education I21 KW - Higher Education; Research Institutions I23 L3 - http://www.izajole.com/content UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1490918&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s40172-014-0019-8 UR - http://www.izajole.com/content DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zimmer, David M. T1 - ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF MARITAL SEPARATION ON HEALTH INSURANCE AMONG MEN AND WOMEN. JO - Contemporary Economic Policy JF - Contemporary Economic Policy Y1 - 2007/01// VL - 25 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 92 EP - 106 PB - Wiley-Blackwell SN - 10743529 AB - Despite widespread interest among policy researchers in the effect of job displacement on insurance loss, there is little focus in the literature on the insurance implications of a married person losing his or her spouse. Using a large household survey, this article finds that despite legislation aimed at protecting separating spouses, individuals remain at risk of losing health insurance in the event of marital disruption. This is especially true for wives who are enrolled ht their husbands' plans prior to marital termination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Contemporary Economic Policy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - INSURANCE policies KW - HEALTH insurance KW - MEDICAL care KW - WIDOW'S allowance KW - WIDOWERS KW - HOUSEHOLD surveys KW - Women's Health KW - Women's Issues N1 - Accession Number: 25910834; Zimmer, David M. 1; Email Address: dzimmer@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: Economist, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20580; Issue Info: Jan2007, Vol. 25 Issue 1, p92; Thesaurus Term: INSURANCE policies; Thesaurus Term: HEALTH insurance; Thesaurus Term: MEDICAL care; Subject Term: WIDOW'S allowance; Subject Term: WIDOWERS; Subject Term: HOUSEHOLD surveys; Author-Supplied Keyword: Women's Health; Author-Supplied Keyword: Women's Issues; NAICS/Industry Codes: 524111 Direct individual life, health and medical insurance carriers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 524112 Direct group life, health and medical insurance carriers; Number of Pages: 15p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2006 00032.x UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=25910834&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ulrick, Shawn W. T1 - A nonparametric analysis of the black/white wage gap. JO - Applied Economics Letters JF - Applied Economics Letters Y1 - 2005/10/20/ VL - 12 IS - 13 M3 - Article SP - 811 EP - 815 PB - Routledge SN - 13504851 AB - This article estimates a nonparametric model of earnings to examine the black/white wage gap. This article extends the Oaxaca decomposition and adjusted wage ratios to a nonlinear form, to allow the use of this nonparametric approach. It finds that the results obtained nonparametrically are very similar to those obtained with variants of the (misspecified) Mincer model, suggesting that the parametric models may be appropriate in situations where the nonparametric estimator could not be applied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Applied Economics Letters is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - NONPARAMETRIC statistics KW - WAGES KW - INCOME KW - LABOR costs KW - RECURSIVE partitioning KW - HYPOTHESIS N1 - Accession Number: 18945717; Ulrick, Shawn W. 1; Email Address: sulrick@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: US Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20013, USA; Issue Info: 10/20/2005, Vol. 12 Issue 13, p811; Thesaurus Term: NONPARAMETRIC statistics; Thesaurus Term: WAGES; Thesaurus Term: INCOME; Thesaurus Term: LABOR costs; Subject Term: RECURSIVE partitioning; Subject Term: HYPOTHESIS; Number of Pages: 5p; Illustrations: 3 Charts; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1080/13504850500193166 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=18945717&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hosken, Daniel AU - Reiffen, David T1 - Patterns of retail variation. JO - RAND Journal of Economics (RAND Journal of Economics) JF - RAND Journal of Economics (RAND Journal of Economics) Y1 - 2004///Spring2004 VL - 35 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 128 EP - 146 PB - RAND Journal of Economics SN - 07416261 AB - We examine retail price variation across a range of goods and regions of the United States. We find that the typical grocery product has a regular price and stays at that price at least 50% of the time, and that most deviations from that regular price are downward. Temporary discounts or sales, while infrequent, account for 20% to 50% of the annual variation in retail prices for most product categories. Although existing models of retail sales yield predictions consistent with some aspects of the retail pricing distributions, all of these models fail to explain other important aspects of retail pricing identified here. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of RAND Journal of Economics (RAND Journal of Economics) is the property of RAND Journal of Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - PRICES KW - RETAIL industry KW - UNITED States N1 - Accession Number: 13490619; Hosken, Daniel 1; Email Address: dhosken@ftc.gov; Reiffen, David 2; Email Address: dreiffen@cftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: U.S. Federal Trade Commission; 2: U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission; Issue Info: Spring2004, Vol. 35 Issue 1, p128; Thesaurus Term: PRICES; Thesaurus Term: RETAIL industry; Subject: UNITED States; NAICS/Industry Codes: 452999 All other miscellaneous general merchandise stores; NAICS/Industry Codes: 453998 All Other Miscellaneous Store Retailers (except Tobacco Stores); NAICS/Industry Codes: 453999 All other miscellaneous store retailers (except beer and wine-making supplies stores); Number of Pages: 19p; Illustrations: 8 Charts, 5 Graphs; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=13490619&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Gale, Ian AU - O'Brien, Daniel P. T1 - THE ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS OF CAPACITY REALLOCATION BY A DOMINANT FIRM. JO - Journal of Industrial Economics JF - Journal of Industrial Economics Y1 - 2001/06// VL - 49 IS - 2 M3 - Article SP - 137 PB - Wiley-Blackwell SN - 00221821 AB - When a firm acquires rival firms in one market, and moves their capacity to another market, should antitrust authorities be concerned? We address this question by studying a multi-stage game. A dominant firm has the opportunity to acquire fringe firms that operate in the same market. Then, the dominant firm has the opportunity to move capacity from that market to a second market. The model is motivated by a series of acquisitions in the Specialized Mobile Radio industry aimed at establishing a new cellular carrier. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the dominant firm to acquire too little capacity relative to the social optimum. The results shed light on the Consent Decree negotiated in US v. Motorola Inc. and Nextel Communications Inc., 1994. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Journal of Industrial Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - INDUSTRIAL capacity KW - CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations KW - ANTITRUST law KW - COMMERCIAL crimes KW - CONSENT decrees KW - MOBILE radio stations KW - NEXTEL Communications Inc. KW - MOTOROLA Inc. N1 - Accession Number: 5326800; Gale, Ian 1; Email Address: galei@georgetown.edu; O'Brien, Daniel P. 2; Email Address: dobrien@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: Georgetown University, Department of Economics, Washington, D.C. 20057.; 2: Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C. 20580.; Issue Info: Jun2001, Vol. 49 Issue 2, p137; Thesaurus Term: INDUSTRIAL capacity; Thesaurus Term: CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations; Thesaurus Term: ANTITRUST law; Thesaurus Term: COMMERCIAL crimes; Subject Term: CONSENT decrees; Subject Term: MOBILE radio stations ; Company/Entity: NEXTEL Communications Inc. DUNS Number: 178219796 Ticker: NXTL ; Company/Entity: MOTOROLA Inc. DUNS Number: 001325463 Ticker: MOT; NAICS/Industry Codes: 515112 Radio Stations; Number of Pages: 24p; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=5326800&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Vita, Michael G. AU - Sacher, Seth T1 - THE COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITAL MERGERS: A CASE STUDY. JO - Journal of Industrial Economics JF - Journal of Industrial Economics Y1 - 2001/03// VL - 49 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 63 PB - Wiley-Blackwell SN - 00221821 AB - Applying conventional horizontal merger enforcement rules to nonprofit hospitals is controversial. Critics contend that the different objective function of not-for-profits entities should mitigate competitive concerns about mergers involving nonprofit hospitals. We analyze a merger that reduced the number of competitors (both nonprofit) in the alleged relevant market from three to two. We find that the transaction was followed by significant price increases; we reject the hypothesis that these price increases reflect higher post-merger quality. This study should help policymakers assess the validity of current merger enforcement rules, especially as they apply to not-for-profit enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Journal of Industrial Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - HOSPITAL mergers KW - HOSPITALS KW - HOSPITAL administration KW - MARKETS KW - COMPLIANCE KW - VOLUNTARY hospitals KW - DOMINICAN Hospital (Santa Cruz, Calif.) KW - CASE studies KW - COMPETITION KW - STUDY & teaching KW - CALIFORNIA KW - SANTA Cruz (Calif.) KW - UNITED States N1 - Accession Number: 4849637; Vita, Michael G. 1; Email Address: mvita@itc.gov; Sacher, Seth 2; Email Address: sbs@crdt.com; Affiliations: 1: US Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW., Washington, DC 20580, USA.; 2: Charles River Associates, 600 13th St., NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20005, USA.; Issue Info: Mar2001, Vol. 49 Issue 1, p63; Thesaurus Term: HOSPITAL mergers; Thesaurus Term: HOSPITALS; Thesaurus Term: HOSPITAL administration; Thesaurus Term: MARKETS; Thesaurus Term: COMPLIANCE; Subject Term: VOLUNTARY hospitals; Subject Term: DOMINICAN Hospital (Santa Cruz, Calif.); Subject Term: CASE studies; Subject Term: COMPETITION; Subject Term: STUDY & teaching; Subject: CALIFORNIA; Subject: SANTA Cruz (Calif.); Subject: UNITED States; NAICS/Industry Codes: 622111 General (except paediatric) hospitals; NAICS/Industry Codes: 622110 General Medical and Surgical Hospitals; Number of Pages: 22p; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=4849637&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Benvignati, Anita M. T1 - INDUSTRY DETERMINANTS AND 'DIFFERENCES' IN U.S. INTRAFIRM AND ARMS-LENGTH EXPORTS. JO - Review of Economics & Statistics JF - Review of Economics & Statistics Y1 - 1990/08// VL - 72 IS - 3 M3 - Article SP - 481 PB - MIT Press SN - 00346535 AB - "Internalization theory" has been held high in the literature on foreign direct investment and intrafirm trade. This paper empirically examines the strength of this theory in distinguishing U.S. intrafirm exports from its arms-length counterpart. Using dummy variable specifications, it estimates "differences" in the relationship between traditional trade variables and the two different types of export trade across 249 manufacturing industries. It has the advantage of using confidential Line-of-Business data from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission data bank. At the industry level, results suggest weak support for "internalization theory" as an effective discriminating model of intrafirm exports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Review of Economics & Statistics is the property of MIT Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - INTERNATIONAL trade KW - INTRA-firm trade KW - EXPORT duties KW - EXPORTS KW - MANUFACTURES KW - MANUFACTURING industries KW - ECONOMETRICS KW - TRADE regulation KW - VARIABLES (Mathematics) KW - UNITED States N1 - Accession Number: 4648116; Benvignati, Anita M. 1; Affiliations: 1: Consultant, U.S. Federal trade Commission.; Issue Info: Aug90, Vol. 72 Issue 3, p481; Thesaurus Term: INTERNATIONAL trade; Thesaurus Term: INTRA-firm trade; Thesaurus Term: EXPORT duties; Thesaurus Term: EXPORTS; Thesaurus Term: MANUFACTURES; Thesaurus Term: MANUFACTURING industries; Thesaurus Term: ECONOMETRICS; Thesaurus Term: TRADE regulation; Subject Term: VARIABLES (Mathematics); Subject: UNITED States; NAICS/Industry Codes: 522293 International Trade Financing; NAICS/Industry Codes: 339999 All Other Miscellaneous Manufacturing; NAICS/Industry Codes: 339990 All other miscellaneous manufacturing; Number of Pages: 8p; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=4648116&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Scott, John T. AU - Pascoe, George T1 - PURPOSIVE DIVERSIFICATION OF R & D IN MANUFACTURING. JO - Journal of Industrial Economics JF - Journal of Industrial Economics Y1 - 1987/12// VL - 36 IS - 2 M3 - Article SP - 193 EP - 205 PB - Wiley-Blackwell SN - 00221821 AB - The R&D diversification in manufacturing of large US firms is found to be purposive, exploiting complementarities of various research activities and forming groups of related industry categories. Purposively diversified firms are seen to behave differently than randomly diversified or undiversified firms. Further, the behavioral differences between purposively diversified firms and others result because the former allocate relatively more R&D funds to industry categories where appropriability conditions are good and relatively fewer funds to those categories where appropriation of the returns from R&D is difficult. Finally, R&D expenditure and productivity are more closely linked at the group level than at the industry-category level, suggesting knowledge spills across industry categories are important. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Journal of Industrial Economics is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - BIG business KW - RESEARCH & development KW - BUSINESS enterprises KW - RATE of return KW - CAPITAL investments KW - INDUSTRIAL productivity KW - INDUSTRIAL efficiency KW - UNITED States N1 - Accession Number: 5169990; Scott, John T. 1; Pascoe, George 2; Affiliations: 1: Department of Economics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755, USA; 2: Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, USA; Issue Info: Dec87, Vol. 36 Issue 2, p193; Thesaurus Term: BIG business; Thesaurus Term: RESEARCH & development; Thesaurus Term: BUSINESS enterprises; Thesaurus Term: RATE of return; Thesaurus Term: CAPITAL investments; Thesaurus Term: INDUSTRIAL productivity; Thesaurus Term: INDUSTRIAL efficiency; Subject: UNITED States; NAICS/Industry Codes: 541711 Research and Development in Biotechnology; NAICS/Industry Codes: 541712 Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences (except Biotechnology); Number of Pages: 13p; Illustrations: 5 Charts; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=5169990&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zimmerman, Paul R. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Competitive Impact of Hypermarket Retailers on Gasoline Prices JO - Journal of Law and Economics JF - Journal of Law and Economics Y1 - 2012/02// VL - 55 IS - 1 SP - 27 EP - 41 SN - 00222186 N1 - Accession Number: 1340023; Keywords: Gasoline; Grocery; Prices; Retail; Retailers; Wholesale; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201212 N2 - Hypermarkets are large retail suppliers of general merchandise or grocery items that also sell gasoline, often at very low margins. This paper estimates the impact of hypermarkets on average state-level retail gasoline prices and margins. The empirical results indicate an economically and statistically significant price-decreasing effect of increased hypermarket competition. The estimations also suggest that refiners lower the delivered wholesale prices charged to their affiliated lessee-dealer and open-dealer stations in response to increased hypermarket competition, which in turn translates to lower retail (street) prices. The adoption of sales-below-cost laws may lessen the price-reducing effects from hypermarket competition. KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels L71 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 L3 - http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=jlaweconomics UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1340023&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=jlaweconomics DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Smith, Loren K. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Dynamics and Equilibrium in a Structural Model of Wide-Body Commercial Aircraft Markets JO - Journal of Applied Econometrics JF - Journal of Applied Econometrics Y1 - 2012/01//January-February 2012 VL - 27 IS - 1 SP - 1 EP - 33 SN - 08837252 N1 - Accession Number: 1297055; Keywords: Aircraft; Airline; Modeling; Prices; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201205 N2 - This paper develops and estimates a dynamic equilibrium model of the market for new and used commercial aircraft. The model is estimated by maximum simulated likelihood using data on wide-body aircraft owners and prices for transactions occurring 1978-1997. The importance of explicitly modeling dynamics and equilibrium in new and used markets for durable goods is illustrated in two counterfactual experiments. Estimates of the structural model are used to show that implementing an investment tax credit not only increases demand for new wide-body aircraft by the airlines that receive the tax credit, but also increases the number of new wide-body aircraft owned by airlines not directly affected by the policy. Further, the model indicates that a policy which improves the efficiency of secondary markets for used wide-body aircraft will also stimulate demand for new wide-body aircraft. KW - Model Construction and Estimation C51 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Automobiles; Other Transportation Equipment L62 KW - Air Transportation L93 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291099-1255/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1297055&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291099-1255/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Wilson, Nathan E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Uncertain Regulatory Timing and Market Dynamics JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2012/01// VL - 30 IS - 1 SP - 102 EP - 115 SN - 01677187 N1 - Accession Number: 1277527; Keywords: Tax; Uncertainty; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201201 N2 - Using a dynamic model of capacity accumulation, I examine the relationship between uncertainty about the timing of a new Pigouvian tax and oligopolistic competition. I find that for some market structures uncertainty about the timing of the regulatory change leads firms to increase investment. These results stem from the nature of the uncertainty and its interaction with firms' strategic incentive to engage in capacity races. They dramatize the importance of accounting for initial conditions when forecasting firms' reactions to anticipated regulatory changes. In addition, I find that more protracted uncertainty leads to greater welfare costs. KW - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty D81 KW - Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation H21 KW - Economics of Regulation L51 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1277527&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2011.07.001 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ulrick, Shawn W. T1 - The Oaxaca decomposition generalized to a continuous group variable JO - Economics Letters JF - Economics Letters Y1 - 2012/04// VL - 115 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 35 EP - 37 SN - 01651765 AB - Abstract: Almost universally, the decomposition is used to compare the outcomes between two discrete groups, e.g., black and white. In many applications, however, groups are not readily divided into discrete bins. The purpose of this paper is to extend the Oaxaca decomposition to examine differences amongst groups that are most naturally modeled as at points in a continuum. The gap can vary by values of the group variable. [Copyright &y& Elsevier] AB - Copyright of Economics Letters is the property of Elsevier Science and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - MATHEMATICAL models KW - DECOMPOSITION (Mathematics) KW - GENERALIZATION KW - CONTINUOUS groups KW - VARIABLES (Mathematics) KW - DISCRETE groups KW - CONTINUUM (Mathematics) KW - Education attainment KW - Oaxaca decomposition KW - Wage gap N1 - Accession Number: 73276786; Ulrick, Shawn W. 1; Email Address: sulrick@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC 20580, United States; Issue Info: Apr2012, Vol. 115 Issue 1, p35; Thesaurus Term: MATHEMATICAL models; Subject Term: DECOMPOSITION (Mathematics); Subject Term: GENERALIZATION; Subject Term: CONTINUOUS groups; Subject Term: VARIABLES (Mathematics); Subject Term: DISCRETE groups; Subject Term: CONTINUUM (Mathematics); Author-Supplied Keyword: Education attainment; Author-Supplied Keyword: Oaxaca decomposition; Author-Supplied Keyword: Wage gap; Number of Pages: 3p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.037 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=73276786&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Enhanced Upward Pressure on Price Screen: Merging Markets into the Methodology JO - World Competition: Law and Economics Review JF - World Competition: Law and Economics Review Y1 - 2011/12// VL - 34 IS - 4 SP - 675 EP - 692 SN - 10114548 N1 - Accession Number: 1376605; Keywords: Merger; Shares; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201306 N2 - Farrell and Shapiro's Upward Pressure on Price (UPP) structure is advanced as a technique to screen mergers in differentiated product markets. Lacking an ability to benchmark their analysis with experiences from relevant markets, Farrell and Shapiro propose to assume substantial efficiencies, and conclude that any positive upward pressure on price is sufficient to trigger potential concerns. This structure creates problems: the refusal to tolerate any positive UPP leads the screen to find concerns with a broad collection of mergers and an assumption of high efficiencies means the screen is unable to identify concerns for certain mergers in low price-cost margin businesses. If minor changes are made in the UPP formula and the UPP effect is adjusted for market share, it is possible to define revised UPP-based models. One of the models can be shown to be compatible with historical Federal Trade Commission (FTC) experience, given an assumed tolerance of 2%-3% upward pressure on price. Further research could improve the parameterization of a UPP-related screen and generate an even more reliable index. In some form, UPP analysis may succeed at defining the structural index for certain classes of unilateral effects mergers. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G38 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 L3 - http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/worldcompetition UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1376605&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/worldcompetition DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Benchmarking the Upward Pricing Pressure Model with Federal Trade Commission Evidence JO - Journal of Competition Law and Economics JF - Journal of Competition Law and Economics Y1 - 2011/12// VL - 7 IS - 4 SP - 825 EP - 846 SN - 17446414 N1 - Accession Number: 1293521; Keywords: Merger; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201204 N2 - The upward pricing pressure (UPP) model was introduced in the 2010 revision of the Merger Guidelines, although little insight was offered for how to operationalize an UPP screen. Abstracting from the potential for efficiencies, this article defines an UPP-related benchmark of 15 percent using data from a review of Federal Trade Commission merger challenge decisions. While the historical record highlights the importance of diversion ratios, the other key input into the UPP index, the margin, appears to play little role in the review process. A supplemental analysis of the case-specific evidence associated with unilateral merger review serves to confirm the benchmark results. Moreover, a detailed case study of unilateral-effects analyses identifies a number of application issues that may negate the finding of an UPP-based competitive concern. Thus, careful study should be undertaken before (1) using an UPP index as a merger screen with a benchmark well below 15 percent (diversions well below 30 percent), (2) customizing the UPP calculation for either high or low values of the margin, or (3) using an UPP index to impose a strong presumption of a competitive concern. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G38 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1293521&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Farrell, Joseph AU - Balan, David J. AU - Brand, Keith AU - Wendling, Brett W. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Economics at the FTC: Hospital Mergers, Authorized Generic Drugs, and Consumer Credit Markets JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2011/12// VL - 39 IS - 4 SP - 271 EP - 296 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 1283496; Keywords: Consumer Credit; Credit; Drug; Drugs; Hospital; Hospitals; Merger; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201202 N2 - Economists at the Federal Trade Commission pursue the agency's competition and consumer protection missions. In this year's essay, in antitrust, we discuss various aspects of our hospital merger analyses as well as the effects of authorized generic drugs on consumers and competition. In consumer protection, we describe two ongoing studies on the use of credit-based insurance scores to price homeowners insurance, and the accuracy of consumers' credit reports that are provided by credit bureaus. KW - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages G21 KW - Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation G28 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G38 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health I18 KW - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology L65 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1283496&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-011-9320-x UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Galasso, Emanuela AU - Umapathi, Nithin AU - Yau, Jeffrey AD - World Bank AD - World Bank AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Nutritional Gains from Extended Exposure to a Large-Scale Nutrition Programme JO - Journal of African Economies JF - Journal of African Economies Y1 - 2011/11// VL - 20 IS - 5 SP - 673 EP - 703 SN - 09638024 N1 - Accession Number: 1282483; Keywords: Malnutrition; Nutrition; Geographic Descriptors: Madagascar; Geographic Region: Africa; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201202 N2 - This paper estimates the returns to differential programme exposure in the context of a large-scale nutritional programme. It addresses this question using information available only on programme participants. To that end, the authors develop a methodology that circumvents this data hurdle and estimate returns to differential lengths of exposure using administrative data. Such data are generally collected as a by-product of the monitoring process of programme implementation but are rarely exploited to assess the effectiveness of the programme. The analysis finds that the returns to exposure are positive: communities exposed for an additional 1 (or 2) years of display on average lower malnutrition rates of around 7-9 percentage points. Moreover, the differential returns are decreasing over time, although they do not dissipate to zero. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the returns to the programme reflect learning effects from the intervention. KW - Health Production I12 KW - Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health I18 KW - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration O15 L3 - http://jae.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1282483&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://jae.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu AU - Pinto, Santiago M. AU - Wheeler, Christopher H. AD - Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and IZA, Bonn AD - WV U AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Urban Crime and Labor Mobility JO - Journal of Public Economic Theory JF - Journal of Public Economic Theory Y1 - 2011/06// VL - 13 IS - 3 SP - 443 EP - 462 SN - 10973923 N1 - Accession Number: 1240055; Keywords: Crime; Immobility; Labor Mobility; Law; Law Enforcement; Mobility; Municipalities; Municipality; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201106 N2 - Two municipalities within a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) determine the level of local law enforcement. Enforcement reduces and diverts crime. The former confers a spillover benefit; the latter a spillover cost. When labor is mobile, welfare necessarily declines: if enforcement is too high (low) under labor immobility, it is raised (reduced) further under mobility. If municipalities have different enforcement costs, mobility reduces welfare for the high-cost municipality and for the MSA, but the effect is ambiguous on the low-cost municipality. Finally, when residents choose between productive and criminal activities, enforcement is more likely to be overprovided. KW - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects H73 KW - State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories H76 KW - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers J61 KW - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K42 KW - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics: Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population; Neighborhood Characteristics R23 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-9779/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1240055&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-9779/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kovacic, William E. AU - Hollman, Hugh M. AU - Grant, Patricia AD - US Federal Trade Commission and George Washington U AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Northwestern U T1 - How Does Your Competition Agency Measure Up? JO - European Competition Journal JF - European Competition Journal Y1 - 2011/04// VL - 7 IS - 1 SP - 25 EP - 45 SN - 17441056 N1 - Accession Number: 1238053; Keywords: Competition; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201106 N2 - In our article, we identify the institutional and performance characteristics of effective competition agencies and suggest methodologies for evaluating agency performance. We hope this will allow agencies to strengthen their ability to implement competition policies that improve economic performance. We believe that competition agencies can use their participation in organisations such as the International Competition Network (ICN) to devise widely accepted standards and practices related to agency effectiveness. Worldwide adoption of these measures would enhance the performance of individual agencies and facilitate benchmarking across jurisdictions. By committing themselves to this endeavour, competition agencies will set themselves on a trajectory of continuous improvement--an attribute of successful public and private institutions alike. KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 L3 - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/ecj UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1238053&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/ecj DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Vita, Michael G. T1 - Regulatory restrictions on selective contracting: an empirical analysis of "any-willing-provider" regulations. JO - Journal of Health Economics JF - Journal of Health Economics Y1 - 2001/11// VL - 20 IS - 6 M3 - Article SP - 955 EP - 966 SN - 01676296 AB - "Any-willing-provider" (AWP) laws compel managed care plans to accept any provider willing to accept the plan's terms and conditions, potentially undermining managed care's ability to constrain spending. However. AWP laws potentially respond to inefficient risk-selection by providers of managed care. With risk selection, observed reductions in expenditures in the managed care sector may be offset by increases in the fee-for-service (FFS) sector, with no net decrease. This paper uses panel data on state expenditures to compare per capita spending levels in stales with and without AWP laws. The results indicate that expenditures are higher when AWP laws are enacted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Journal of Health Economics is the property of Elsevier Science and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - MANAGED care plans (Medical care) KW - DELEGATED legislation KW - USER charges KW - PUBLIC spending KW - MEDICAL care KW - PUBLIC health KW - Fee-for-service. KW - Managed care KW - Regulation N1 - Accession Number: 11879691; Vita, Michael G. 1; Email Address: mvita@ftc.gov; Affiliation: 1: Bureau of Economics, United States Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20580, USA.; Source Info: Nov2001, Vol. 20 Issue 6, p955; Subject Term: MANAGED care plans (Medical care); Subject Term: DELEGATED legislation; Subject Term: USER charges; Subject Term: PUBLIC spending; Subject Term: MEDICAL care; Subject Term: PUBLIC health; Author-Supplied Keyword: Fee-for-service.; Author-Supplied Keyword: Managed care; Author-Supplied Keyword: Regulation; NAICS/Industry Codes: 921130 Public Finance Activities; NAICS/Industry Codes: 525120 Health and Welfare Funds; Number of Pages: 12p; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=11879691&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - aph ER - TY - JOUR AU - Bush, C. Anthony AU - Zimmerman, Paul R. T1 - Media Mergers with Preference Externalities and Their Implications for Content Diversity, Consumer Welfare, and Policy. JO - Journal of Industry, Competition & Trade JF - Journal of Industry, Competition & Trade Y1 - 2010/06// VL - 10 IS - 2 M3 - Article SP - 105 EP - 133 SN - 15661679 AB - One of the primary concerns regarding media mergers involves their potential adverse effect on content/viewpoint diversity. This paper presents a formal treatment of the influence that within-group consumer preference externalities over media content have on a media outlet’s incentive to engage in product repositioning both before and after merging with another media outlet. We first present a model of consumer behavior under preference externalities and derive aggregate consumer expenditure functions for media output. It is shown that even assuming the merged entity sets a uniform price and content mix across market areas, the relative access to some minority (majority) group subscribers will increase (decrease) post-merger (and vice versa). We derive sufficient conditions under which the merged entity will in fact have an incentive to homogenize its post-merger price/content mix. And while the post-merger repositioning effects arguably suggest the consumer welfare implications of such mergers are ambiguous a priori, it is posited that the observed idiosyncratic preferences for media content among demographic groups may translate into significant losses to consumer welfare in some instances and may also adversely affect some individuals’ participation in civil affairs, such as voting. Finally, the relation of the model to previous empirical work on media mergers and diversity, and the potential for non-traditional policy interventions to offset the competitive harms of such transactions, are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Journal of Industry, Competition & Trade is the property of Springer Science & Business Media B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations KW - CONSUMERS' preferences KW - CONSUMER behavior KW - CONSUMERS -- Attitudes KW - MARKETING strategy KW - diversity KW - K23 KW - L41 KW - L82 KW - media ownership KW - merger policy KW - preference externalities KW - product repositioning KW - welfare N1 - Accession Number: 50133008; Bush, C. Anthony 1; Email Address: anthony.bush@starpower.net; Zimmerman, Paul R. 2; Email Address: pzimmerman@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: Office of Inspector General, U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20554, USA.; 2: Bureau of Economics, Antitrust I, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 601 New Jersey Avenue NW, Rm. 8103, Washington, DC 20580, USA.; Issue Info: Jun2010, Vol. 10 Issue 2, p105; Thesaurus Term: CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations; Thesaurus Term: CONSUMERS' preferences; Thesaurus Term: CONSUMER behavior; Thesaurus Term: CONSUMERS -- Attitudes; Thesaurus Term: MARKETING strategy; Author-Supplied Keyword: diversity; Author-Supplied Keyword: K23; Author-Supplied Keyword: L41; Author-Supplied Keyword: L82; Author-Supplied Keyword: media ownership; Author-Supplied Keyword: merger policy; Author-Supplied Keyword: preference externalities; Author-Supplied Keyword: product repositioning; Author-Supplied Keyword: welfare; Number of Pages: 29p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1007/s10842-009-0057-2 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=50133008&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - GEN AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AU - Fischer, Jeffrey H. T1 - Antitrust Regulators and the Chicago School. JO - Regulation JF - Regulation Y1 - 2012///Spring2012 VL - 35 IS - 1 M3 - Letter SP - 2 EP - 3 PB - Cato Institute SN - 01470590 AB - A letter to the editor is presented in response to the article "The Case of Duopoly," by Erwin Blackstone and Larry Darby in the Winter 2011-2012 issue. KW - DUOPOLIES KW - LETTERS to the editor N1 - Accession Number: 75154524; Coate, Malcolm B. 1; Fischer, Jeffrey H. 1; Affiliations: 1: U.S. Federal Trade Commission; Issue Info: Spring2012, Vol. 35 Issue 1, p2; Thesaurus Term: DUOPOLIES; Subject Term: LETTERS to the editor; Number of Pages: 2p; Document Type: Letter UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=75154524&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR ID - 2014-49294-016 AN - 2014-49294-016 AU - Pappalardo, Janis K. T1 - Contributions by Federal Trade Commission economists to consumer protection: Research, policy, and law enforcement. JF - Journal of Public Policy & Marketing JO - Journal of Public Policy & Marketing Y1 - 2014///Fal 2014 VL - 33 IS - 2 SP - 244 EP - 255 CY - US PB - American Marketing Association SN - 0743-9156 SN - 1547-7207 N1 - Accession Number: 2014-49294-016. Partial author list: First Author & Affiliation: Pappalardo, Janis K.; Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, DC, US. Release Date: 20150928. Publication Type: Journal (0100), Peer Reviewed Journal (0110). Format Covered: Print. Document Type: Journal Article. Language: English. Major Descriptor: Consumer Protection; Economics; Law Enforcement; Policy Making. Minor Descriptor: Government Agencies. Classification: Industrial & Organizational Psychology (3600); Marketing & Advertising (3940). Population: Human (10). Location: US. Age Group: Adulthood (18 yrs & older) (300). References Available: Y. Page Count: 12. Issue Publication Date: Fal 2014. Copyright Statement: American Marketing Association. 2014. AB - This essay reflects the author's experience working in the Division of Consumer Protection (DCP) at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for almost three decades, primarily as a staff economist and more recently as Assistant Director of the division. The author recognizes that others may have different views; therefore, he has endeavored to provide sufficient detail about the background and source materials to enable others to investigate, understand, build on, and challenge the conclusions. Theoretical and empirical economic models of consumer choice often become even richer and more powerful through collaboration with marketing researchers who have expertise studying the nuance of information and information remedies on consumer knowledge and behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) KW - consumer protection KW - consumer policy KW - law enforcement KW - economics KW - Federal Trade Commission KW - 2014 KW - Consumer Protection KW - Economics KW - Law Enforcement KW - Policy Making KW - Government Agencies KW - 2014 DO - 10.1509/jppm.14.FTC.013 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2014-49294-016&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - jpappalardo@ftc.gov DP - EBSCOhost DB - psyh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Abbott, Alden F. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - A Tale of Two Cities: Brussels, Washington, and the Assessment of Unilateral Conduct JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2011///Spring VL - 56 IS - 1 SP - 103 EP - 138 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 1271432; Keywords: Competition; Law; Geographic Descriptors: EU; U.S.; Geographic Region: Europe; Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201112 N2 - Achieving convergence between American and European competition law approaches to the assessment of single firm conduct (SFC) would reduce costly business uncertainty and promote beneficial commercial activity. In 2009, the European Commission issued formal guidance on its analysis of SFC; a 2008 Justice Department Report on SFC was critiqued by the Federal Trade Commission and withdrawn in 2009. Although withdrawal of the Justice Department Report may have narrowed the perceived gap between American and European SFC policy (and reduced potential tensions between Justice Department and FTC approaches), it has not fully eliminated it. Steps that might be taken to bridge this gap include framing bilateral discussion in commonly accepted economic terms; working toward a common understanding of balancing tests; seeking to establish consensus approaches to particular practices; analyzing the centrality to the competitive process of conduct under scrutiny; taking into account the most recent findings from economic research; and cooperating in investigations. Although not a panacea, these and similar approaches should lead to greater consistency between U.S. and European enforcement policy and thereby promote welfare. KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1271432&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Shelanski, Howard A. AD - US Federal Trade Commission and Georgetown U T1 - The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation JO - Michigan Law Review JF - Michigan Law Review Y1 - 2011/03// VL - 109 IS - 5 SP - 683 EP - 732 SN - 00262234 N1 - Accession Number: 1159004; Keywords: Antitrust Law; Law; Regulated Industries; Regulation; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201103 N2 - The Supreme Court's decisions in Verizon v. Trinko and Credit Suisse v. Billing reduced the reach of antitrust law in regulated industries; they did so even where Congress expressly preserved antitrust enforcement, and even though the Court itself had long declined to block antitrust suits against regulated firms except in unusual circumstances. This article analyzes the reasoning and potential consequences of Trinko and Credit Suisse. It provides a critique of the Supreme Court's redrawing of the relationship between antitrust and regulation and explains how Trinko and Credit Suisse could saddle regulators with a choice between inefficiently strong and overly weak regulation as economic conditions change in regulated industries. The Article concludes that consumers and industry would benefit from a rebalancing of antitrust and regulation and discusses several possible means to that end. KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 KW - Economics of Regulation L51 L3 - http://www.michiganlawreview.org/information/archive/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1159004&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.michiganlawreview.org/information/archive/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Thompson, Aileen AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Effect of Hospital Mergers on Inpatient Prices: A Case Study of the New Hanover-Cape Fear Transaction JO - International Journal of the Economics of Business JF - International Journal of the Economics of Business Y1 - 2011/02// VL - 18 IS - 1 SP - 91 EP - 101 SN - 13571516 N1 - Accession Number: 1162528; Keywords: Hospital; Hospitals; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201104 N2 - The Federal Trade Commission initiated a Hospital Merger Retrospective Project in 2002 to analyze the effects of consummated mergers. One of the mergers studied was the 1998 acquisition by New Hanover Regional Medical Center ("New Hanover") of Columbia Cape Fear Memorial Hospital ("Cape Fear") in Wilmington, North Carolina. In this paper, we employ patient-level claims data from four different insurers to estimate the effects of this merger on inpatient prices. Our results provide mixed evidence. Two of the insurers experienced substantial post-merger price increases relative to the control group of hospitals. The post-merger price changes for another insurer, however, were comparable to those for the control group, while the fourth insurer actually experienced a significant price decrease following the merger. Thus it is difficult to draw conclusions about the impact of this merger on inpatient pricing. KW - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis D22 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations L44 L3 - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1162528&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Tenn, Steven AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Price Effects of Hospital Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction JO - International Journal of the Economics of Business JF - International Journal of the Economics of Business Y1 - 2011/02// VL - 18 IS - 1 SP - 65 EP - 82 SN - 13571516 N1 - Accession Number: 1162526; Keywords: Anti Competitive; Anticompetitive; Health; Hospital; Hospitals; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201104 N2 - We conduct a retrospective study of the Sutter-Summit hospital merger to assess whether antitrust enforcement in this matter was appropriate. This consummated merger combined two hospitals located close together in the Oakland-Berkeley region of the San Francisco Bay Area. The greater metropolitan area contained many other hospitals that offered a similar range of services, but which were located farther away. A central issue raised by the Sutter-Summit transaction was whether travel costs were low enough such that these hospitals were a sufficient constraint on the merging parties to prevent an anticompetitive price increase. We use detailed claims data from three large health insurers to compare the post-merger price change for the merging parties to the price change for a set of control-group hospitals. Our results show that Summit's price increase was among the largest of any comparable hospital in California, indicating this transaction may have been anticompetitive. KW - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis D22 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations L44 L3 - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1162526&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Romano, Patrick S. AU - Balan, David J. AD - U CA, Davis AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - A Retrospective Analysis of the Clinical Quality Effects of the Acquisition of Highland Park Hospital by Evanston Northwestern Healthcare JO - International Journal of the Economics of Business JF - International Journal of the Economics of Business Y1 - 2011/02// VL - 18 IS - 1 SP - 45 EP - 64 SN - 13571516 N1 - Accession Number: 1162525; Keywords: Health Care; Healthcare; Hospital; Hospitals; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201104 N2 - In 2004, the Federal Trade Commission brought a legal action retrospectively challenging the 2000 acquisition of Highland Park Hospital by Evanston Northwestern Healthcare in Evanston, Illinois. A major issue in that case was whether the merger had resulted in improved clinical quality at Highland Park. In this paper, we describe the conceptual framework that guided our analysis of that issue and we report our findings. Specifically, we examine numerous quantitative measures of clinical quality. We find little evidence that the merger improved quality. We also discuss the applicability of our framework to the prospective analysis of unconsummated hospital mergers. KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Health Production I12 KW - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations L44 L3 - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1162525&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Garmon, Christopher AU - Haas-Wilson, Deborah AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Smith College T1 - The Use of Multiple Control Groups and Data Sources as Validation in Retrospective Studies of Hospital Mergers JO - International Journal of the Economics of Business JF - International Journal of the Economics of Business Y1 - 2011/02// VL - 18 IS - 1 SP - 41 EP - 44 SN - 13571516 N1 - Accession Number: 1162524; Keywords: Hospital; Hospitals; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201104 KW - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis D22 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations L44 L3 - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1162524&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Haas-Wilson, Deborah AU - Garmon, Christopher AD - Smith College AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Hospital Mergers and Competitive Effects: Two Retrospective Analyses JO - International Journal of the Economics of Business JF - International Journal of the Economics of Business Y1 - 2011/02// VL - 18 IS - 1 SP - 17 EP - 32 SN - 13571516 N1 - Accession Number: 1162522; Keywords: Anti Competitive; Anticompetitive; Health; Health Insurance; Hospital; Hospitals; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201104 N2 - We present empirical analyses of the effects of two hospital mergers - both occurring in the northern suburbs of Chicago in 2000 - on the pre- and post-merger prices negotiated with commercial health insurers. Using difference-in-differences methodology and data on actual transaction prices, specifically the prices paid by private health insurance companies and patients for inpatient care, we find one of the mergers was anticompetitive. Relative to price increases at other hospitals, the merger between Evanston Northwestern and Highland Park Hospitals led to large and statistically significant post-merger price increases. Our results are robust across data sources, control groups, and case-mix adjustment methods. KW - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis D22 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations L44 L3 - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1162522&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Ippolito, Pauline M. AD - US Federal Trade Commission A2 - Cawley, John T1 - Regulation of Food Advertising T2 - The Oxford Handbook of the Social Science of Obesity PB - Oxford Handbooks series. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press Y1 - 2011/// SP - 741 EP - 751 N1 - Accession Number: 1337206; Reviewed Book ISBN: 978-0-19-973636-2; Keywords: Advertising; Food; Regulation; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 201212 KW - Consumer Protection D18 KW - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth J13 KW - Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law) K10 KW - Economics of Regulation L51 KW - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco; Wine and Spirits L66 KW - Advertising M37 KW - Marketing and Advertising: Government Policy and Regulation M38 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1337206&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Kovacic, William E. AD - George Washington U and US Federal Trade Commission A2 - Drexl, Josef A2 - Kerber, Wolfgang A2 - Podszun, Rupprecht T1 - Competition Agencies, Independence, and the Political Process T2 - Competition Policy and the Economic Approach: Foundations and Limitations PB - Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar Y1 - 2011/// SP - 291 EP - 311 N1 - Accession Number: 1300682; Reviewed Book ISBN: 978-1-84844-884-1; Keywords: Competition; Political; Political Process; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 201206 KW - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations D02 KW - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D72 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations L44 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1300682&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Farrell, Joseph AU - Pappalardo, Janis K. AU - Shelanski, Howard AD - Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission AD - Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission AD - Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Economics at the FTC: Mergers, Dominant-Firm Conduct, and Consumer Behavior JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2010/12// VL - 37 IS - 4 SP - 263 EP - 277 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 1289564; Keywords: Competition; Consumer; Consumer Protection; FTC; Firm; Merger; Protection; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201203 N2 - Economists at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) pursue the agency's competition and consumer protection missions. In this year's essay, in antitrust, we discuss the new Merger Guidelines, three exclusion cases, and R&D issues in the Thoratec/HeartWare merger and the Google/AdMob merger. In consumer protection, we discuss the FTC's new rule on debt settlement, our efforts to improve disclosures, and our recent work on appliance energy disclosures. KW - Consumer Protection D18 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation G38 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Economics of Regulation L51 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1289564&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-010-9268-2 UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zeithammer, Robert AU - Adams, Christopher AD - UCLA AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Sealed-Bid Abstraction in Online Auctions JO - Marketing Science JF - Marketing Science Y1 - 2010/11//November-December 2010 VL - 29 IS - 6 SP - 964 EP - 987 SN - 07322399 N1 - Accession Number: 1153076; Keywords: Fashion; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201102 N2 - This paper presents five empirical tests of the popular modeling abstraction that assumes bids from online auctions with proxy bidding can be analyzed "as if" they were bids from a second-price sealed-bid auction. The tests rely on observations of the magnitudes and timings of the top two proxy bids, with the different tests stemming from different regularity assumptions about the underlying distribution of valuation signals. We apply the tests to data from three eBay markets--MP3 players, DVDs, and used cars--and we reject the sealed-bid abstraction in all three data sets. A closer examination of these rejections suggests that they are driven by less experienced bidders. This consistent rejection casts doubt on several existing theories of online auction behavior and suggests some demand estimates based on the abstraction can be biased. To assess the direction and magnitude of this bias, we propose and estimate a new model in which some bidders conform to the abstraction while other bidders bid in a reactive fashion. Because reactive bidding can be at least partially detected from the data, we are able to estimate the underlying distribution of demand and compare it to what the sealed-bid abstraction implies. We find that our proposed model fits the data better, and our demand estimates reveal a large potential downward bias were we to assume the second-price sealed-bid model instead. KW - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D12 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 KW - Marketing M31 L3 - http://mktsci.journal.informs.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1153076&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://mktsci.journal.informs.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Tenn, Steven AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Relative Importance of the Husband's and Wife's Characteristics in Family Migration, 1960-2000 JO - Journal of Population Economics JF - Journal of Population Economics Y1 - 2010/10// VL - 23 IS - 4 SP - 1319 EP - 1337 SN - 09331433 N1 - Accession Number: 1136956; Keywords: Family; Migration; Spouse; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201011 N2 - We explore whether the growing labor force attachment of married women has increased the importance of the wife's characteristics in determining the household migration decision. To the contrary, we find that surprisingly little changed between 1960 and 2000. Wives were a weak determinant of family migration over the entire period. Our results suggest that it is difficult to balance two careers simultaneously, with households finding it optimal to focus primarily on the husband's career rather than settling for significantly inferior labor market outcomes for each spouse. KW - Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts J11 KW - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse J12 KW - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers J61 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/148 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1136956&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00148-009-0253-8 UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/148 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ashenfelter, Orley AU - Hosken, Daniel AD - Princeton U AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Effect of Mergers on Consumer Prices: Evidence from Five Mergers on the Enforcement Margin JO - Journal of Law and Economics JF - Journal of Law and Economics Y1 - 2010/08// VL - 53 IS - 3 SP - 417 EP - 466 SN - 00222186 N1 - Accession Number: 1239875; Keywords: Merger; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201106 N2 - In this paper, we propose a method to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. horizontal merger policy and apply it to the study of five recent consumer product mergers. We selected the mergers from those that, from the public record, seemed to be most problematic for the antitrust agencies. Thus we estimate an upper bound on the likely price effect of completed mergers. Our study employs retail scanner data and uses familiar panel data program evaluation procedures to measure price changes. Our results indicate that four of the five mergers resulted in some increases in consumer prices, while the fifth merger had little effect. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 L3 - http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=jlaweconomics UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1239875&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=jlaweconomics DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Simons, Joseph J. AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AD - Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Upward Pressure on Price Analysis: Issues and Implications for Merger Policy JO - European Competition Journal JF - European Competition Journal Y1 - 2010/08// VL - 6 IS - 2 SP - 377 EP - 396 SN - 17441056 N1 - Accession Number: 1135851; Keywords: Anti Competitive; Anticompetitive; Merger; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201011 N2 - Farrell and Shapiro's Upward Pressure on Price (UPP) framework is an innovative and elegant technique designed to evaluate mergers in differentiated product markets. The authors advance their approach primarily as a screen for unilateral effects cases, although others suggest that UPP might be implemented to create a presumption of anticompetitive effect. We raise two concerns with the methodology. First, there is no empirical evidence confirming that the method can reliably predict whether a merger is likely to increase price and second, UPP analysis screens or presumes as anticompetitive a very large universe of mergers. We develop simple simulations illustrating that a UPP-based approach would identify mergers as potentially problematic at levels that have not attracted serious scrutiny from any major antitrust authority in decades. Farrell and Shapiro's UPP methodology also has potential as an alternative to merger simulation. Here, we are cautiously optimistic that UPP analysis can replace the complex simulation models introduced by economists over the last 20 years. However, simulation analysis should not be used in any particular case without exogenous evidence confirming the basic predictions. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/ecj UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1135851&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/ecj DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Taylor, Christopher T. AU - Kreisle, Nicholas M. AU - Zimmerman, Paul R. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets: Empirical Evidence from Contract Changes in Southern California: Comment JO - American Economic Review JF - American Economic Review Y1 - 2010/06// VL - 100 IS - 3 SP - 1269 EP - 1276 SN - 00028282 N1 - Accession Number: 1105831; Keywords: Competition; Firm; Firms; Gasoline; Retail; Retailers; Vertical Integration; Vertically Integrated; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201006 N2 - In a paper in the March 2004 AER, Justine Hastings concludes that the acquisition of an independent gasoline retailer, Thrifty, by a vertically integrated firm, ARCO, is associated with sizable price increases at competing stations. To better understand the mechanism to which she attributes this effect--which combines vertical integration and rebranding--we attempted but ultimately failed to reproduce the results using alternative data. KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Firm Organization and Market Structure L22 KW - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts L42 KW - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels L71 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 L3 - http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1105831&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.3.1269 UR - http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Lacko, James M. AU - Pappalardo, Janis K. AD - Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission AD - Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Failure and Promise of Mandated Consumer Mortgage Disclosures: Evidence from Qualitative Interviews and a Controlled Experiment with Mortgage Borrowers JO - American Economic Review JF - American Economic Review Y1 - 2010/05// VL - 100 IS - 2 SP - 516 EP - 521 SN - 00028282 N1 - Accession Number: 1098790; Keywords: Consumer; Mortgage; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201005 KW - Household Saving; Personal Finance D14 KW - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages G21 L3 - http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1098790&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.2.516 UR - http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR TY - GEN AU - Adams, CP; AU - Brantner, VV; T1 - Estimating the cost of new drug development: Is it really $802 million? CT - Estimating the cost of new drug development: Is it really $802 million? JO - Health Affairs JF - Health Affairs Y1 - 2006/02/01/ VL - 25 IS - Feb SP - 420 EP - 428 SN - 02782715 AD - Fed Trade Commiss, Bur Econ, Washington, DC 20580, USA cadams@ftc.gov N1 - Accession Number: 43-08210; Language: English; References: 21; Section Heading: Sociology, Economics and Ethics N2 - This paper replicates the drug development cost estimates of Joseph DiMasi and colleagues ("The Price of Innovation"), using their published cost estimates along with information on success rates and durations from a publicly available data set. For drugs entering human clinical trials for the first time between 1989 and 2002, the paper estimated the cost per new drug to be $868 million. However, our estimates vary from around $500 million to more than $2,000 million, depending on the therapy or the developing firm. KW - Drugs--new; KW - Costs--drugs; KW - Research--drugs; KW - Economics--drugs; KW - Product development--drugs; UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ipa&AN=43-08210&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ipa ER - TY - JOUR AU - Harbour, Pamela Jones AU - Price, Laurel A. AD - Fulbright & Jawarski LLP AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - RPM and the Rule of Reason: Ready or Not, Here We Come? JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2010///Spring VL - 55 IS - 1 SP - 225 EP - 244 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 1124248; Keywords: Brand; Competition; Resale Price Maintenance; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201009 N2 - We argue that a structured rule of reason, anchored by a rebuttable presumption of illegality, is the appropriate legal standard for analyzing resale price maintenance (RPM) agreements between manufacturers and retailers. A presumption in favor of consumers is especially necessary in light of the transformative possibilities of e-commerce. Internet-based retailing innovations are likely to promote price-reducing distribution efficiencies. The spread of RPM to the Internet, however, is likely to retard such innovation and suppress efficiencies. We also argue that RPM analysis focused solely on interbrand competition will be insufficient, misleading, and biased in favor of manufacturers. Consumers undeniably benefit from competition among rival distributors of consumer goods. The inter/intrabrand distinction is significant only in single-brand distribution channels. In any event, innovation competition is more important to economic progress than both inter- and intrabrand competition. KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks L14 KW - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts L42 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1124248&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ippolito, Pauline M. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - RPM Myths That Muddy the Discussion JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2010///Spring VL - 55 IS - 1 SP - 151 EP - 165 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 1124246; Keywords: Firm; Firms; Innovation; Network; Piracy; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201009 N2 - Piracy is frequently considered as a reprehensible activity that harms the pirated firm. Our contribution reviews the different mechanisms and rationales supporting the idea that pirated firms may profit from the piracy (namely the indirect appropriation and bundled sales, the exposition effect and information acquisition, network effects, the Coase's time-inconsistency effect and the discovery of innovation and scarce talents). Beyond the theoretical arguments, we also devote attention to their relevance in the real world and show how they can lead to new policy insights. KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks L14 KW - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts L42 KW - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D O32 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1124246&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zimmerman, Paul R. T1 - Strategic incentives under vertical integration: the case of wireline-affiliated wireless carriers and intermodal competition in the US. JO - Journal of Regulatory Economics JF - Journal of Regulatory Economics Y1 - 2008/12// VL - 34 IS - 3 M3 - Article SP - 282 EP - 298 SN - 0922680X AB - In its review of the Cingular/AT&T Wireless merger, the FCC noted the potentially conflicting incentives of wireline-affiliated (vertically integrated) versus independent (non-integrated) wireless carriers to act as intermodal competitors in the wireline exchange access market. Specifically, because Cingular and Verizon Wireless are owned by wireline carriers, they may have an incentive to compete “less aggressively” within their parents’ wireline territories while AT&T Wireless, an independent wireless carrier, would not. This paper examines these and other hypotheses by examining pre-merger data on the wireless plans offered by the three carriers. The empirical analysis suggests that AT&T Wireless did not design its plans based upon a regional strategy, whereas Cingular offered substantially smaller-minute wireless plans within its parents’ wireline territories. However, the results also suggest that Verizon Wireless did not design its plans in a markedly different fashion within and outside of its parent’s wireline region. It is posited that these findings might reflect the differing ownership and control structures of Cingular and Verizon Wireless. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Journal of Regulatory Economics is the property of Springer Science & Business Media B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - WIRELESS communication systems KW - TELECOMMUNICATION KW - CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations KW - VERTICAL integration KW - INDUSTRIAL concentration KW - CELL phone systems KW - MOBILE communication systems KW - COMPETITION KW - UNITED States KW - Business cannibalization KW - Intermodal competition KW - K23 KW - L12 KW - L13 KW - L41 KW - L96 KW - Telecommunications KW - Vertical integration KW - Wireless telephony N1 - Accession Number: 34509848; Zimmerman, Paul R. 1; Email Address: pzimmerman@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: Bureau of Economics, Antitrust I, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 601 New Jersey Avenue, NW, Rm. 8103, Washington, DC 20580, USA; Issue Info: Dec2008, Vol. 34 Issue 3, p282; Thesaurus Term: WIRELESS communication systems; Thesaurus Term: TELECOMMUNICATION; Thesaurus Term: CONSOLIDATION & merger of corporations; Thesaurus Term: VERTICAL integration; Thesaurus Term: INDUSTRIAL concentration; Thesaurus Term: CELL phone systems; Thesaurus Term: MOBILE communication systems; Subject Term: COMPETITION; Subject: UNITED States; Author-Supplied Keyword: Business cannibalization; Author-Supplied Keyword: Intermodal competition; Author-Supplied Keyword: K23; Author-Supplied Keyword: L12; Author-Supplied Keyword: L13; Author-Supplied Keyword: L41; Author-Supplied Keyword: L96; Author-Supplied Keyword: Telecommunications; Author-Supplied Keyword: Vertical integration; Author-Supplied Keyword: Wireless telephony; NAICS/Industry Codes: 517210 Wireless Telecommunications Carriers (except Satellite); NAICS/Industry Codes: 811213 Communication Equipment Repair and Maintenance; NAICS/Industry Codes: 517910 Other telecommunications; NAICS/Industry Codes: 517911 Telecommunications Resellers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 517919 All Other Telecommunications; NAICS/Industry Codes: 334220 Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless Communications Equipment Manufacturing; Number of Pages: 17p; Illustrations: 3 Charts; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1007/s11149-008-9065-0 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=34509848&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zimmerman, Paul R. T1 - Statistical Variability and the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty. JO - American Law & Economics Review JF - American Law & Economics Review Y1 - 2009/01// VL - 11 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 370 EP - 398 AB - In a recent paper Donohue and Wolfers (D&W) critique a number of modern econometric studies purporting to demonstrate a deterrent effect of capital punishment. This paper focuses on D&W's central criticism of a study by Zimmerman; specifically, that the estimated standard errors on the subset of his regressions that suggest a deterrent effect are downward biased due to autocorrelation. The method that D&W rely upon to adjust Zimmerman's standard errors is, however, potentially problematic, and is also only one of several methods to address the presence of autocorrelation. To this end, Zimmerman's original models are subjected to several parametric corrections for autocorrelation, all of which result in statistically significant estimates that are of the same magnitude to his original estimates. The paper also presents results obtained from an alternative model whose specification is motivated on theoretical and statistical grounds. These latter results also provide some evidence supporting a deterrent effect. Finally, the paper discusses D&W's use of randomization testing and their contention that executions are not carried out often enough to plausibly deter murders. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER] AB - Copyright of American Law & Economics Review is the property of Oxford University Press / USA and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - ECONOMETRICS KW - REGRESSION analysis KW - CAPITAL punishment KW - PUNISHMENT in crime deterrence KW - AUTOCORRELATION (Statistics) KW - EXECUTIONS & executioners KW - MURDER N1 - Accession Number: 48014841; Zimmerman, Paul R. 1; Email Address: pzimmerman@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: U.S. Federal Trade Commission; Issue Info: Jan2009, Vol. 11 Issue 1, p370; Thesaurus Term: ECONOMETRICS; Thesaurus Term: REGRESSION analysis; Subject Term: CAPITAL punishment; Subject Term: PUNISHMENT in crime deterrence; Subject Term: AUTOCORRELATION (Statistics); Subject Term: EXECUTIONS & executioners; Subject Term: MURDER; Number of Pages: 29p; Illustrations: 4 Charts; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1093/aler/ahp003 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=48014841&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Did the European Union's Market Dominance Policy Have a Gap? Evidence from Enforcement in the United States JO - European Competition Journal JF - European Competition Journal Y1 - 2009/12// VL - 5 IS - 3 SP - 655 EP - 676 SN - 17441056 N1 - Accession Number: 1085532; Keywords: Collusion; Competition; Geographic Descriptors: EU; U.S.; Geographic Region: Europe; Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201002 N2 - The European Union (EU) and the United States (US) enforce the world's two best known merger policies. The EU addresses transactions that are likely to impede effective competition, historically, with some type of dominance analysis, while the US focuses on mergers that are likely to substantially lessen competition, using either a unilateral effects or a coordinated interaction (collusion) analysis. Although EU regulators identified a gap in their policy relative to the US regime, it is unclear if the gap is material. This paper uses simulation analysis and a review of a sample of US merger analyses to show the EU gap is relatively small and limited to collusion analysis. Policy differences, due to regime-specific enforcement standards, remain possible, because the gap only alleged a difference in safe harbour policies. KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 L3 - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/ecj UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1085532&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/ecj DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Bajari, Patrick AU - McMillan, Robert AU - Tadelis, Steven AD - U MN AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - U CA, Berkeley T1 - Auctions versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis JO - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization JF - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Y1 - 2009/10// VL - 25 IS - 2 SP - 372 EP - 399 SN - 87566222 N1 - Accession Number: 1064231; Keywords: Auction; Bidding; Procurement; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200910 N2 - Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we consider several possible determinants that may influence the choice of auctions versus negotiations. We then examine a comprehensive data set of private sector building contracts awarded in Northern California during the years 1995-2000. The analysis suggests a number of possible limitations to the use of auctions. Auctions may perform poorly when projects are complex, contractual design is incomplete, and there are few available bidders. Furthermore, auctions may stifle communication between buyers and sellers, preventing the buyer from utilizing the contractor's expertise when designing the project. Some implications of these results for procurement in the public sector are discussed. KW - Auctions D44 KW - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement H57 KW - State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories H76 KW - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock R53 L3 - http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1064231&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kades, Michael AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Whistling Past the Graveyard: The Problem with the Per Se Legality Treatment of Pay-for-Delay Settlements JO - Competition Policy International JF - Competition Policy International Y1 - 2009///Autumn VL - 5 IS - 2 SP - 143 EP - 163 SN - 15540189 N1 - Accession Number: 1095340; Keywords: Competition; Drug; Drugs; Firm; Firms; Monopoly; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201004 N2 - Arguably, the most important debate in antitrust jurisprudence involves pay-for-delay patent settlements in which the brand company pays the generic to stay out of the market. As a matter of economics, it will generally be most profitable if the brand and the generic firm avoid the possibility of competition and share the resulting monopoly profits; however, such settlements will reduce competition and increase the costs of drugs. If pay-for-delay settlements are legal, parties will enter them to the detriment of consumers. Current cases, in particular the Tamoxifen and Ciprofloxacin decisions, however, have gone a long way towards adopting just such a standard, a standard that is already having an effect. By adopting an approach without regard to its implications or erroneously suggesting that pay for delay settlements are an ineffective way to delay competition, courts are essentially whistling past the graveyard. KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Litigation Process K41 KW - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope L25 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology L65 KW - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital O34 L3 - https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/journal/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1095340&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/journal/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zimmerman, Paul R. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Statistical Variability and the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty JO - American Law and Economics Review JF - American Law and Economics Review Y1 - 2009///Fall VL - 11 IS - 2 SP - 370 EP - 398 SN - 14657252 N1 - Accession Number: 1094427; Keywords: Murder; Punishment; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201004 N2 - In a recent paper, Donohue and Wolfers (D&W) critique a number of modern econometric studies purporting to demonstrate a deterrent effect of capital punishment. This paper focuses on D&W's central criticism of a study by Zimmerman; specifically, that the estimated standard errors on the subset of his regressions that suggest a deterrent effect are downward biased due to autocorrelation. The method that D&W rely upon to adjust Zimmerman's standard errors is, however, potentially problematic, and is also only one of several methods to address the presence of autocorrelation. To this end, Zimmerman's original models are subjected to several parametric corrections for autocorrelation, all of which result in statistically significant estimates that are of the same magnitude to his original estimates. The paper also presents results obtained from an alternative model whose specification is motivated on theoretical and statistical grounds. These latter results also provide some evidence supporting a deterrent effect. Finally, the paper discusses D&W's use of randomization testing and their contention that executions are not carried out often enough to plausibly deter murders. KW - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K42 L3 - http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1094427&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Heeb, Randal D. AU - Kovacic, William E. AU - Marshall, Robert C. AU - Marx, Leslie M. AD - Bates White LLC AD - US Federal Trade Commission and George Washington U AD - PA State U AD - Duke U T1 - Symposium: Anti-competitive Behavior and International Law: Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms: Implications for the Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct JO - Chicago Journal of International Law JF - Chicago Journal of International Law Y1 - 2009///Summer VL - 10 IS - 1 SP - 213 EP - 231 SN - 15290816 N1 - Accession Number: 1057434; Keywords: Anti Competitive; Cartel; Firm; Firms; International Law; Law; Geographic Descriptors: EU; U.S.; Geographic Region: Europe; Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200909 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - International Law K33 KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://cjil.uchicago.edu/page/current-issue UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1057434&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://cjil.uchicago.edu/page/current-issue DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - McAlvanah, Patrick AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Are People More Risk-Taking in the Presence of the Opposite Sex? JO - Journal of Economic Psychology JF - Journal of Economic Psychology Y1 - 2009/04// VL - 30 IS - 2 SP - 136 EP - 146 SN - 01674870 N1 - Accession Number: 1043863; Keywords: Female; Risk; Risk Taking; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200906 N2 - This paper investigates whether exposure to the opposite sex induces greater risk-taking in both males and females. Experimental subjects evaluated a series of hypothetical monetary gambles before and after viewing pictures of opposite sex faces; control subjects viewed pictures of cars. Both males and females viewing opposite sex photos displayed a significant increase in risk tolerance, whereas the control subjects exhibited no significant change. Surprisingly, the attractiveness of the photo had no effect; subjects viewing photographs of attractive opposite sex persons displayed similar results as those viewing photographs of unattractive people. KW - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D12 KW - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty D81 KW - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination J16 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01674870 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1043863&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2008.10.002 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01674870 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zimmerman, Paul R. AU - Flaherty, Susan M.V. T1 - Location monopolies and prison phone rates JO - Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance JF - Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance Y1 - 2007/05// VL - 47 IS - 2 M3 - Article SP - 261 EP - 278 SN - 10629769 AB - Abstract: Prisoners incarcerated in state correctional facilities are often limited to making operator-assisted collect calls to their families and associates. Prison phone services are supplied by a single carrier who receives an exclusive service contract through a procurement auction conducted by the state''s Department of Corrections (DOC). To win the auction, a firm must offer the highest “kickback” or “site commission” to the DOC, which in turn is passed-on to the recipients of prison collect calls – typically family members – in the form of higher rates. The recipients have little choice but to pay these inflated rates since there is no other alternative for maintaining contact with their incarcerated loved one. Some states have attempted to alleviate the burden of excessive prison collect call rates by changing the methodology used to asses site commissions. The purpose of this study is to empirically evaluate the efficacy of these reforms. The empirical results suggest that the cost of receiving IntraLATA prison collect calls is approximately 41% higher in those states that impose site commissions based as a percentage of the carriers’ex post revenues relative to those states that impose fixed commissions ex ante. The results are shown to be highly robust with respect to model specification, estimation technique, and control for outliers. [Copyright &y& Elsevier] AB - Copyright of Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance is the property of Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - TELEPHONE systems KW - PRISON administration KW - TELEPHONE calls KW - PRISONS KW - Financial contracting KW - H72 KW - Location monopoly KW - Prisons KW - Social justice KW - Telecommunications N1 - Accession Number: 24867789; Zimmerman, Paul R. 1; Email Address: pzimmerman@ftc.gov; Flaherty, Susan M.V. 2; Email Address: sflaherty@towson.edu; Affiliations: 1: Bureau of Economics, Antitrust I, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC 20580, USA; 2: Department of Finance, Towson University, Towson, MD 21252, USA; Issue Info: May2007, Vol. 47 Issue 2, p261; Thesaurus Term: TELEPHONE systems; Subject Term: PRISON administration; Subject Term: TELEPHONE calls; Subject Term: PRISONS; Author-Supplied Keyword: Financial contracting; Author-Supplied Keyword: H72; Author-Supplied Keyword: Location monopoly; Author-Supplied Keyword: Prisons; Author-Supplied Keyword: Social justice; Author-Supplied Keyword: Telecommunications; NAICS/Industry Codes: 922140 Correctional Institutions; NAICS/Industry Codes: 236220 Commercial and Institutional Building Construction; NAICS/Industry Codes: 911220 Federal correctional services; NAICS/Industry Codes: 912120 Provincial correctional services; NAICS/Industry Codes: 517911 Telecommunications Resellers; Number of Pages: 18p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1016/j.qref.2006.12.002 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=24867789&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zimmerman, Paul R. AU - Benson, Bruce L. T1 - Alcohol and rape: An “economics-of-crime” perspective JO - International Review of Law & Economics JF - International Review of Law & Economics Y1 - 2007/12// VL - 27 IS - 4 M3 - Article SP - 442 EP - 473 SN - 01448188 AB - Abstract: Using a panel of state-level data over the years 1982–2000, this study explores the potential relationship between alcohol policy, alcohol consumption, and rape by considering a number of theoretical and methodological issues. First, the potential relationship is examined in the context of an economics-of-crime model, controlling for various deterrence and opportunity cost variables. Second, unlike most studies, consumption of liquor and wine are considered as well as consumption of beer. A third focus is on the potential endogeneity of alcohol consumption. A fourth consideration dictates the focus on rape-rates rather than other violent crime rates. Several studies have discovered a tendency for relatively high alcohol consumption by both offenders and victims. Since rape victims are virtually all female, and at least some alcohol policy variables appear to have differential impacts on females and heavy-drinking males, an examination of policy impacts for rape-rates, unlike other types of violent crime, can suggest the nature of the alcohol-consumption–violence relationship. The empirical results support an “alcohol-increases-potential-victims-vulnerability” hypothesis. In the context of the economic theory of crime, this lowers the expected cost of rape to potential offenders and raises rape-rates. Tests for endogeneity of alcohol consumption and resulting simultaneous equation estimates reinforce this implication because they suggest that potential victims respond to relatively high rape-rates by reducing alcohol consumption. [Copyright &y& Elsevier] AB - Copyright of International Review of Law & Economics is the property of Elsevier Science and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - ALCOHOLISM & crime KW - SEX crimes KW - RAPE KW - RAPE victims KW - Alcohol KW - Crime KW - Drinking KW - Rape KW - Victimization N1 - Accession Number: 27706052; Zimmerman, Paul R. 1; Email Address: pzimmerman@ftc.gov; Benson, Bruce L. 2; Email Address: bbenson@garnet.acns.fsu.edu; Affiliations: 1: Bureau of Economics, Antitrust I, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 601 New Jersey Avenue NW, Rm. 8103, Washington, DC 20580, United States; 2: Department of Economics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180, United States; Issue Info: Dec2007, Vol. 27 Issue 4, p442; Subject Term: ALCOHOLISM & crime; Subject Term: SEX crimes; Subject Term: RAPE; Subject Term: RAPE victims; Author-Supplied Keyword: Alcohol; Author-Supplied Keyword: Crime; Author-Supplied Keyword: Drinking; Author-Supplied Keyword: Rape; Author-Supplied Keyword: Victimization; Number of Pages: 32p; Document Type: Article L3 - 10.1016/j.irle.2007.09.002 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=27706052&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - Gen ID - 9999-22887-000 AN - 9999-22887-000 AU - McAlvanah, Patrick T1 - Preference Survey of College Students JF - PsycTESTS JO - PsycTESTS Y1 - 2009/// AD - McAlvanah, Patrick, Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, 600 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington, District of Columbia, United States, 20580 AV - Commercial: No; Permissions: May use for Research/Teaching; Fee: No. Test Items: Yes N1 - Accession Number: 9999-22887-000. Partial author list: First Author & Affiliation: McAlvanah, Patrick. Release Date: 20130812. Correction Date: 20151109. Instrument Type: Survey. Test Location: Text, Page 138. Test Format: Most questions consist of binary choices between hypothetical outcomes. A scale of 1 to 10 is also employed.. Language: English. Constructs: Preferences; Classification: Personality (7200). Population: Human (10); Male (30); Female (40). Age Group: Adulthood (18 yrs & older) (300). N2 - Administration Method: Electronic AB - Purpose: The purpose of the Preference Survey of College Students is to assess the appeal of various items a college student might encounter. AB - Description: The Preference Survey of College Students (McAlvanah, 2009) was developed to assess the appeal of various items a college student might encounter. Subjects initially answer questions that assess their risk preferences over monetary outcomes. The options are always a choice between a smaller certain reward and a risky larger reward. All questions consist of binary choices between hypothetical outcomes. The smaller certain amount adjusts based on a subject’s responses to assess a subject’s certain equivalent for a given gamble. Questions are included regarding delayed rewards. Next, respondents assess the appeal of various pictures on a scale of 1–10. (PsycTESTS Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved) KW - Preference Survey of College Students KW - Test Development U5 - Preference Survey of College Students [Test Development]Are people more risk-taking in the presence of the opposite sex?. (AN: 2009-04271-002 from PsycINFO) McAlvanah, Patrick; Apr, 2009. Source: Journal of Economic Psychology. 30(2), Elsevier Science, Netherlands; Apr, 2009; Administration: Electronic Age Group: Adulthood (18 yrs & older); Population: Human; Male; Female; Sample: College Students; Location: United States Keywords: Preference Survey of College Students; Test Development; Subjects: College Students; Preferences; Surveys; Test Construction; DO - 10.1037/t22887-000 L3 - Sample; Full text; 999922887_sample_001.pdf UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pst&AN=9999-22887-000&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - pmcalvanah@ftc.gov DP - EBSCOhost DB - pst ER - TY - GEN AU - Kovacic, William E. T1 - Extraterritoriality, Institutions, and Convergence in International Competition Policy. JO - American Society of International Law: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting JF - American Society of International Law: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting Y1 - 2003/12// M3 - Speech SP - 309 EP - 312 SN - 02725037 AB - Presents the text of the speech of William Kovacic, general counsel for the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, delivered at the 97th annual meeting of the American Society of International Law in Washington, D.C. which dealt on the extraterritoriality in international competition policy. KW - LAWYERS KW - ANTITRUST law KW - INTERNATIONAL trade KW - WASHINGTON (D.C.) KW - UNITED States KW - KOVACIC, William N1 - Accession Number: 14429124; Kovacic, William E. 1; Affiliations: 1: General Counsel, U.S. Federal Trade Commission; Issue Info: 2003, p309; Thesaurus Term: LAWYERS; Thesaurus Term: ANTITRUST law; Thesaurus Term: INTERNATIONAL trade; Subject: WASHINGTON (D.C.); Subject: UNITED States; NAICS/Industry Codes: 522293 International Trade Financing; NAICS/Industry Codes: 541110 Offices of Lawyers; People: KOVACIC, William; Number of Pages: 4p; Document Type: Speech UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=14429124&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ashenfelter, Orley C. AU - Hosken, Daniel S. AU - Weinberg, Matthew C. AD - Princeton U AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Drexel U T1 - Corrigendum: The Price Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag Whirlpool JO - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy JF - American Economic Journal: Economic Policy Y1 - 2014/02// VL - 6 IS - 1 SP - 308 EP - 309 SN - 19457731 N1 - Accession Number: 1414715; Keywords: Merger; Prices; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201402 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Appliances; Furniture; Other Consumer Durables L68 L3 - http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-policy/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1414715&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.6.1.308 UR - http://www.aeaweb.org/aej-policy/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR ID - 2013-18218-006 AN - 2013-18218-006 AU - McAlvanah, Patrick AU - Moul, Charles C. T1 - The house doesn’t always win: Evidence of anchoring among Australian bookies. JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization JA - J Econ Behav Organ Y1 - 2013/06// VL - 90 SP - 87 EP - 99 CY - Netherlands PB - Elsevier Science SN - 0167-2681 AD - Moul, Charles C., Miami University Farmer School of Business, Department of Economics, Oxford, OH, US, 45056 N1 - Accession Number: 2013-18218-006. Partial author list: First Author & Affiliation: McAlvanah, Patrick; Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, US. Release Date: 20140210. Publication Type: Journal (0100), Peer Reviewed Journal (0110). Format Covered: Electronic. Document Type: Journal Article. Language: English. Major Descriptor: Costs and Cost Analysis; Gambling; Horses; Money; Risk Assessment. Minor Descriptor: Games; Behavioral Economics. Classification: Recreation & Leisure (3740). Population: Human (10). Location: Australia. Methodology: Empirical Study; Quantitative Study. References Available: Y. Page Count: 13. Issue Publication Date: Jun, 2013. Publication History: First Posted Date: Mar 16, 2013; Accepted Date: Mar 2, 2013; Revised Date: Nov 28, 2012; First Submitted Date: Feb 24, 2012. Copyright Statement: All rights reserved. Elsevier B.V. 2013. AB - We examine Australian horseracing bookmakers’ responses to late scratches, instances in which a horse is abruptly withdrawn after betting has commenced. Our observed bookies exhibit anchoring on the original odds and fail to re-adjust odds fully on the remaining horses after a scratch, thereby earning lower profit margins and occasionally creating nominal arbitrage opportunities for bettors. We also examine which horses’ odds bookies adjust after a scratch and demonstrate diminished profit margins even after controlling for these endogenous adjustments. Our results indicate that bookies’ adjustments recover approximately 80% of lost profit margin but that bookies forgo the remaining 20% due to systematic under-adjustments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) KW - anchoring KW - bookies KW - horse racing KW - profit margins KW - betting KW - risk factors KW - risk assessment KW - behavioral economics KW - 2013 KW - Costs and Cost Analysis KW - Gambling KW - Horses KW - Money KW - Risk Assessment KW - Games KW - Behavioral Economics KW - 2013 DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.009 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2013-18218-006&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - moulcc@miamioh.edu UR - pmcalvanah@ftc.gov DP - EBSCOhost DB - psyh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kovacic, William E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Assessing the Quality of Competition Policy: The Case of Horizontal Merger Enforcement JO - Competition Policy International JF - Competition Policy International Y1 - 2009///Spring VL - 5 IS - 1 SP - 139 EP - 160 SN - 15540189 N1 - Accession Number: 1106319; Keywords: Competition; Competition Policy; Merger; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201006 N2 - This article suggests how a jurisdiction might best go about evaluating the quality of its competition policy system. It urges that competition agencies and collateral institutions strive to improve our ability to measure the economic effects of merger control and to verify the consequences of different approaches to enforcement. The article uses merger control in the United States as its main illustration, but the article's observations apply to other areas of competition policy oversight, as well. The article seeks to encourage the recent trend within the global competition policy community of accepting a norm that focuses greater attention on the evaluation of the economic effects of enforcement decisions--especially by developing better quantitative measures of actual economic effects--and the assessment of the processes by which competition agencies examine individual transactions. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/journal/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1106319&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/journal/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ashenfelter, Orley AU - Hosken, Daniel AU - Weinberg, Matthew AD - Princeton U AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Generating Evidence to Guide Merger Enforcement JO - Competition Policy International JF - Competition Policy International Y1 - 2009///Spring VL - 5 IS - 1 SP - 67 EP - 85 SN - 15540189 N1 - Accession Number: 1106316; Keywords: Merger; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201006 N2 - The challenge of effective merger enforcement is tremendous. U.S. antitrust agencies must, by statute, quickly forecast the competitive effects of mergers that occur in virtually every sector of the economy to determine if mergers can proceed. Surprisingly, given the complexity of the regulators' task, there is remarkably little empirical evidence on the effects of mergers to guide regulators. This paper describes the need for retrospective analysis of past mergers in building an empirical basis for antitrust enforcement, and provides guidance on the key measurement issues researchers confront in estimating the price effects of mergers. We also describe how evidence from merger retrospectives can be used to evaluate the economic models that predict the competitive effects of mergers. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 KW - Economics of Regulation L51 L3 - https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/journal/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1106316&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/journal/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AU - Williams, Mark D. AD - Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission AD - Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission T1 - A Critical Commentary on the Critical Comments on Critical Loss JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2008///Winter VL - 53 IS - 4 SP - 987 EP - 1025 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 1046441; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200907 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1046441&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AU - Fischer, Jeffrey H. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - A Practical Guide to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market Definition JO - Journal of Competition Law and Economics JF - Journal of Competition Law and Economics Y1 - 2008/12// VL - 4 IS - 4 SP - 1031 EP - 1063 SN - 17446414 N1 - Accession Number: 1020339; Keywords: Monopolists; Price Discrimination; Prices; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200903 N2 - The hypothetical monopolist test has been used to define antitrust markets for over 20 years. However, many of these applications occur within the enforcement agencies and thus the implementation process is not fully transparent to antitrust practitioners. This paper provides a study of 116 market definition decisions from the Federal Trade Commission's archives. We find that the agency rarely has trouble defining both product and geographic markets; in fact, the demand-side market definition process is relatively simple in over half of the cases reviewed. In many of the remaining matters, critical loss, analysis of natural experiments, and various studies of data patterns are undertaken to identify the relevant market. These studies show a remarkable variety in data requirements, sophistication, and analytical technique. Supply-side considerations affect a few markets and price discrimination supports more focused analysis in about 10 cases. KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1020339&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hosken, Daniel S. AU - McMillan, Robert S. AU - Taylor, Christopher T. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Retail Gasoline Pricing: What Do We Know? JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2008/11// VL - 26 IS - 6 SP - 1425 EP - 1436 SN - 01677187 N1 - Accession Number: 1008556; Keywords: Gasoline; Pricing; Retail; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200812 N2 - We use a data set consisting of a three year panel of prices from a sample of gasoline stations located in suburban Washington DC and a corresponding census of the region's stations to develop three new empirical findings about retail gasoline pricing. First, while average retail margins vary substantially over time (by more than 50% over the three years we analyze), the shape of the margin distribution remains relatively constant. Second, there is substantial heterogeneity in pricing behavior: stations charging very low or very high prices are more likely to maintain their pricing position than stations charging prices near the mean. Third, retail gasoline pricing is dynamic. Despite the heterogeneity in station pricing behavior, stations frequently change their relative pricing position in this distribution, sometimes dramatically. We then relate these three findings to relevant theories of retail pricing. While many models of retail pricing are consistent with some of our findings, we find that all have serious shortcomings. KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels L71 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1008556&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.02.003 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Alive and Kicking: Collusion Theories in Merger Analysis at the Federal Trade Commission JO - Competition Policy International JF - Competition Policy International Y1 - 2008///Autumn VL - 4 IS - 2 SP - 145 EP - 174 SN - 15540189 N1 - Accession Number: 1095321; Keywords: Collusion; Merger; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201004 N2 - This paper undertakes a systematic review of 75 merger decisions to identify the conditions that increase the likelihood of a collusion finding. Standard structural concerns are readily identified, while behavioral factors defy characterization. The results of the analysis also support a Folk Theorem in which structural concerns are validated with some type of performance evidence. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/journal/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1095321&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/journal/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Bedard, Kelly AU - Herman, Douglas A. AD - U CA, Santa Barbara AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Who Goes to Graduate/Professional School? The Importance of Economic Fluctuations, Undergraduate Field, and Ability JO - Economics of Education Review JF - Economics of Education Review Y1 - 2008/04// VL - 27 IS - 2 SP - 197 EP - 210 SN - 02727757 N1 - Accession Number: 0975140; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200806 N2 - This study examines the impact of fluctuations in entry-level labor market conditions on the graduate school enrollment decisions of newly minted undergraduate degree holders. Using repeated cross-section data for recently graduated science and engineering undergraduates from the National Survey of Recent College Graduates, and state-level unemployment rates to measure entry-level labor market conditions, we find that advanced degree enrollment patterns vary across the business cycle by undergraduate major, GPA, gender, and advanced degree type. KW - Analysis of Education I21 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/02727757 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0975140&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2006.09.007 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/02727757 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Zeithammer, Robert AU - Adams, Christopher AD - UCLA AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Rejoinder: Causes and Implications of Some Bidders Not Conforming to the Sealed-Bid Abstraction JO - Marketing Science JF - Marketing Science Y1 - 2010/11//November-December 2010 VL - 29 IS - 6 SP - 998 EP - 1000 SN - 07322399 N1 - Accession Number: 1153079; Keywords: Marketing; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201102 N2 - This paper presents the authors' rejoinder to Zeithammer and Adams [Zeithammer, R., C. Adams. 2010. The sealed-bid abstraction in online auctions. Marketing Sci. 29(6) 964-987]. This rejoinder clarifies and qualifies conclusions of the original paper and makes suggestions for fruitful areas of future research. In particular, the original paper shows that bidding style can make a big difference in managerial decisions, but a structural model would be necessary to make confident predictions under different reserve prices. The rejoinder also clarifies the interpretation of feedback as a measure of bidder experience, and the relationship between bidder experience and bidding style. KW - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D12 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 KW - Marketing M31 L3 - http://mktsci.journal.informs.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1153079&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://mktsci.journal.informs.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Mulholland, Joseph P. AD - US Federal Trade Commission A2 - Australian Productivity Commission T1 - Behavioural Economics and the Federal Trade Commission T2 - Behavioural Economics and Public Policy: Roundtable Proceedings: Melbourne, 8-9 August 2007 PB - Melbourne: Australian Productivity Commission Y1 - 2008/// SP - 67 EP - 87 N1 - Accession Number: 1050554; Reviewed Book ISBN: 978-1-74037-252-7; Keywords: Behavioral; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200907 KW - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles D03 KW - Consumer Protection D18 KW - Economics of Regulation L51 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1050554&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Ashenfelter, Orley AU - Ashmore, David AU - Baker, Jonathan B. AU - Gleason, Suzanne AU - Hosken, Daniel S. AD - Princeton U AD - Ashenfelter & Ashmore, Princeton, NJ AD - American U AD - Trinity College, Hartford AD - US Federal Trade Commission A2 - Norman, George T1 - Empirical Methods in Merger Analysis: Econometric Analysis of Pricing in FTC v. Staples T2 - Recent Developments in Monopoly and Competition Policy PB - Elgar Reference Collection. International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, vol. 217. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar Y1 - 2008/// SP - 353 EP - 367 RP - [2006] N1 - Accession Number: 1021953; Reviewed Book ISBN: 978-1-84720-484-4; Keywords: Merger; Pricing; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200903 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Personal, Professional, and Business Services L84 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1021953&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR ID - 106431352 T1 - Market watch. Estimating the cost of new drug development: is it really $802 million? Variations in cost estimates suggest that policymakers should not use a single number to characterize drug costs. AU - Adams CP AU - Brantner VV Y1 - 2006/03//Mar/Apr2006 N1 - Accession Number: 106431352. Language: English. Entry Date: 20060428. Revision Date: 20150711. Publication Type: Journal Article; tables/charts. Journal Subset: Health Services Administration; Peer Reviewed; USA. NLM UID: 8303128. KW - Drug Approval -- Economics KW - Pharmaceutical Companies -- Economics KW - Clinical Trials -- Economics KW - Costs and Cost Analysis KW - Databases, Health KW - Drugs, Investigational -- Economics KW - Probability KW - Replication Studies SP - 420 EP - 428 JO - Health Affairs JF - Health Affairs JA - HEALTH AFF VL - 25 IS - 2 CY - Bethesda, Maryland PB - Project HOPE/HEALTH AFFAIRS AB - This paper replicates the drug development cost estimates of Joseph DiMasi and colleagues ('The Price of Innovation'), using their published cost estimates along with information on success rates and durations from a publicly available data set. For drugs entering human clinical trials for the first time between 1989 and 2002, the paper estimated the cost per new drug to be $868 million. However, our estimates vary from around $500 million to more than $2,000 million, depending on the therapy or the developing firm. SN - 0278-2715 AD - Economist, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC; cadams@ftc.gov U2 - PMID: 16522582. UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=rzh&AN=106431352&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - rzh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Fei Liu AU - Zimmer, David M. T1 - The Effect of Switching Private Insurance Plans on Health Care Utilization. JO - B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy: Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy JF - B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy: Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy Y1 - 2006/01// VL - 5 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 1 EP - 27 SN - 15380645 AB - The switching of health insurance plans and health care utilization are potentially correlated with both observable and unobservable information. This paper presents a two-period model of health care utilization, and attempts to account for unobserved heterogeneity that simultaneously affects utilization and the decision to switch plans. Data used in this paper are drawn from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. Results indicate that non-HMO enrollees increase their utilization of non-emergency related care prior to switching to HMOs, and they decrease utilization after switching. Conversely, individuals enrolled in HMOs report lower levels of utilization before and higher utilization after they switch to non-HMOs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy: Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - MEDICAL care KW - HEALTH insurance KW - HEALTH maintenance organizations KW - EMERGENCY medical services KW - SURVEYS N1 - Accession Number: 21794364; Fei Liu 1; Email Address: liufei@indiana.edu; Zimmer, David M. 2; Email Address: dzimmer@ftc.gov; Affiliations: 1: Indiana University; 2: U.S. Federal Trade Commission; Issue Info: 2006, Vol. 5 Issue 1, p1; Thesaurus Term: MEDICAL care; Thesaurus Term: HEALTH insurance; Thesaurus Term: HEALTH maintenance organizations; Subject Term: EMERGENCY medical services; Subject Term: SURVEYS; NAICS/Industry Codes: 624230 Emergency and Other Relief Services; NAICS/Industry Codes: 913130 Municipal police services; NAICS/Industry Codes: 621491 HMO Medical Centers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 621494 Community health centres; NAICS/Industry Codes: 524111 Direct individual life, health and medical insurance carriers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 524112 Direct group life, health and medical insurance carriers; Number of Pages: 27p; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=21794364&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kovacic, William E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Lucky Trip? Perspectives from a Foreign Advisor on Competition Policy, Development and Technical Assistance JO - European Competition Journal JF - European Competition Journal Y1 - 2007/12// VL - 3 IS - 2 SP - 319 EP - 328 SN - 17441056 N1 - Accession Number: 0982159; Keywords: Competition; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200807 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/ecj UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0982159&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/ecj DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Adams, Christopher P. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Estimating Demand from eBay Prices JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2007/12// VL - 25 IS - 6 SP - 1213 EP - 1232 SN - 01677187 N1 - Accession Number: 0949994; Keywords: Auction; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200801 N2 - This paper presents results for identification and estimation of the value distribution from eBay auction prices. The paper presents results for eBay type auctions with independent private values and unobserved participation. It is first shown that the distribution of values is identified from observing the distribution of prices and knowing the distribution of potential bidders. The main identification result presents conditions for which the distribution of values and the distribution of potential bidders are simultaneously identified. Not surprisingly, the intuition is similar to the standard results for identifying demand from observed equilibrium prices. The estimation method suggested by the identification results is used to estimate the value distribution for the "C5" Chevrolet Corvette sold on eBay. The results suggest that a simple OLS model on prices will over estimate the mean value of the item. The estimation results are then used to calculate the optimal reserve price for these cars. The estimated optimal reserves are compared to the actual reserves. Actual hidden reserves are set much higher than actual non-hidden reserves. The evidence suggests sellers set Buy-It-Nows and hidden reserves optimally to account for re-listing opportunities. KW - Auctions D44 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0949994&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.04.008 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Adams, Christopher P. AU - Bajari, Patrick L. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - U MN T1 - Introduction to Online Auction Symposium JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2007/12// VL - 25 IS - 6 SP - 1159 EP - 1162 SN - 01677187 N1 - Accession Number: 0949990; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200801 KW - Introductory Material Y20 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0949990&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0167-7187-(07)00125-7 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Salinger, Michael A. AU - Ippolito, Pauline M. AU - Schrag, Joel L. AD - Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission AD - Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission AD - Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Economics at the FTC: Pharmaceutical Patent Dispute Settlements and Behavioral Economics JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2007/09// VL - 31 IS - 2 SP - 85 EP - 105 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 0950903; Keywords: Competition; Consumer Protection; Consumer; Drug; Drugs; FTC; Pharmaceutical; Property; Protection; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200801 N2 - Economics at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) supports both the competition and consumer protection missions of the agency. In this year's essay we discuss two issues, one from each of the agency's missions. First, we focus on intellectual property issues in pharmaceuticals. Specifically, we discuss the principal rationale for antitrust concerns about certain patent dispute settlements in the ethical drug industry. Then, we discuss consumer economics, our recent behavioral economics conference, and how behavioral economics influences our thinking about consumer policy. KW - Consumer Protection D18 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Economics of Regulation L51 KW - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology L65 KW - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital O34 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0950903&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-007-9151-y UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Taylor, Christopher T. AU - Hosken, Daniel S. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Economic Effects of the Marathon-Ashland Joint Venture: The Importance of Industry Supply Shocks and Vertical Market Structure JO - Journal of Industrial Economics JF - Journal of Industrial Economics Y1 - 2007/09// VL - 55 IS - 3 SP - 419 EP - 451 SN - 00221821 N1 - Accession Number: 0937944; Keywords: Concentration; Firm; Firms; Gasoline; Joint Venture; Market Structure; Merger; Petroleum; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200711 N2 - This study measures the effects of the Marathon/Ashland Petroleum (MAP) joint venture on rack and retail reformulated (RFG) gasoline prices in the four cities where both firms sold RFG before the joint venture. MAP was an early transaction in the recent era of petroleum mergers and resulted in large regional increases in concentration. While wholesale (rack) prices increased in the two cities experiencing the largest change in market structure in the year following the transaction, retail prices did not increase. Our results also highlight the importance of identifying the marginal source of supply in correctly identifying merger effects. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing L24 KW - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels L71 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-6451/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0937944&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-6451/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Vita, Michael G. T1 - Regulatory Restrictions on Vertical Integration and Control: The Competitive Impact of Gasoline Divorcement Policies. JO - Journal of Regulatory Economics JF - Journal of Regulatory Economics Y1 - 2000/11// VL - 18 IS - 3 M3 - Article SP - 217 EP - 233 SN - 0922680X AB - Gasoline "divorcement" regulations restrict the integration of gasoline refiners and retailers. Theoretically, vertical integration can harm competition, making it possible that divorcement policies could increase welfare; alternatively, these policies may reduce welfare by sacrificing efficiencies. This paper attempts to differentiate between these possibilities by estimating a reduced form equation for the real retail price of unleaded regular gasoline. I find that divorcement regulations raise the price of gasoline by about 2.60 per gallon, reducing consumers' surplus by over $100 million annually. This finding suggests that current proposals to further separate gasoline retailing from refining will be harmful to gasoline consumers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Journal of Regulatory Economics is the property of Springer Science & Business Media B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - GASOLINE industry KW - CONSUMERS KW - RETAIL industry KW - GAS prices KW - GASOLINE -- Anti-knock & anti-knock mixtures KW - PETROLEUM products N1 - Accession Number: 16664879; Vita, Michael G. 1; Affiliations: 1: United States Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C. 20580; Issue Info: Nov2000, Vol. 18 Issue 3, p217; Thesaurus Term: GASOLINE industry; Thesaurus Term: CONSUMERS; Thesaurus Term: RETAIL industry; Subject Term: GAS prices; Subject Term: GASOLINE -- Anti-knock & anti-knock mixtures; Subject Term: PETROLEUM products; NAICS/Industry Codes: 325998 All Other Miscellaneous Chemical Product and Preparation Manufacturing; NAICS/Industry Codes: 325999 All other miscellaneous chemical product manufacturing; NAICS/Industry Codes: 415290 Other new motor vehicle parts and accessories merchant wholesalers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 447190 Other Gasoline Stations; NAICS/Industry Codes: 424710 Petroleum Bulk Stations and Terminals; NAICS/Industry Codes: 324110 Petroleum Refineries; NAICS/Industry Codes: 412110 Petroleum and petroleum products merchant wholesalers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 424720 Petroleum and Petroleum Products Merchant Wholesalers (except Bulk Stations and Terminals); NAICS/Industry Codes: 486910 Pipeline Transportation of Refined Petroleum Products; NAICS/Industry Codes: 324199 All Other Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing; NAICS/Industry Codes: 453998 All Other Miscellaneous Store Retailers (except Tobacco Stores); NAICS/Industry Codes: 453999 All other miscellaneous store retailers (except beer and wine-making supplies stores); NAICS/Industry Codes: 452999 All other miscellaneous general merchandise stores; Number of Pages: 17p; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=16664879&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Vita, Michael G. T1 - Must Carry Regulations for Cable Television Systems: An Empirical Analysis. JO - Journal of Regulatory Economics JF - Journal of Regulatory Economics Y1 - 1997/09// VL - 12 IS - 2 M3 - Article SP - 159 EP - 172 SN - 0922680X AB - The 1992 Cable Act requires cable systems to carry local broadcasters. Noncarriage of local stations may represent an attempt by cable systems to disadvantage rivals, and thereby raise the prices of advertising and cable service. Alternatively, noncarriage might represent the efficient replacement of low-valued channels with more highly-valued programming. This study attempts to discriminate between these hypotheses with data on cable carriage decisions. The results support the efficiency hypothesis. Systems selling advertising are less likely to drop local stations than nonadvertisers. Dropped stations tend to have low audience ratings, and tend to originate in a different geographic market from the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] AB - Copyright of Journal of Regulatory Economics is the property of Springer Science & Business Media B.V. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) KW - BROADCASTERS KW - BROADCASTING industry KW - ADVERTISING KW - MARKETING KW - PORTAGES KW - TELEVISION viewers N1 - Accession Number: 16615564; Vita, Michael G. 1; Affiliations: 1: United States Federal Trade Commission Bureau of Economics, Washington, DC 20580.; Issue Info: Sep1997, Vol. 12 Issue 2, p159; Thesaurus Term: BROADCASTERS; Thesaurus Term: BROADCASTING industry; Thesaurus Term: ADVERTISING; Thesaurus Term: MARKETING; Subject Term: PORTAGES; Subject Term: TELEVISION viewers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 541850 Outdoor Advertising; NAICS/Industry Codes: 541890 Other Services Related to Advertising; NAICS/Industry Codes: 711512 Independent actors, comedians and performers; NAICS/Industry Codes: 334220 Radio and Television Broadcasting and Wireless Communications Equipment Manufacturing; NAICS/Industry Codes: 541613 Marketing Consulting Services; Number of Pages: 14p; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=16615564&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Cooper, James C. AU - Froeb, Luke AU - O'Brien, Daniel P. AU - Tschantz, Steven T1 - DOES PRICE DISCRIMINATION INTENSIFY COMPETITION? IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST. JO - Antitrust Law Journal JF - Antitrust Law Journal Y1 - 2005/01// VL - 72 IS - 2 M3 - Article SP - 327 EP - 373 SN - 00036056 AB - This article focuses on the antitrust implications of price discrimination based on consumer location by spatial competitors that, in contrast to monopoly price discrimination, lowers prices for all consumers. Spatial competitors, like most firms in the real world, sell products that are differentiated from those of their rivals. As a general proposition, antitrust law is hostile to price discrimination. This hostility appears to derive from a comparison of perfect competition to monopoly. There is now a considerable economic literature on oligopoly price discrimination, but its implications for antitrust analysis have yet to receive attention. KW - PRICE discrimination KW - ANTITRUST law KW - RESTRAINT of trade KW - CONSUMERS KW - COMMERCIAL crimes KW - COMPETITION N1 - Accession Number: 16371973; Cooper, James C. 1; Froeb, Luke 2; O'Brien, Daniel P. 3; Tschantz, Steven 4; Affiliations: 1: Attorney Advisor, Office of Policy Planning, U.S. Federal Trade Commission.; 2: Director, Bureau of Economics, U.S. Federal Trade Commission.; 3: Economist, Bureau of Economics, U.S. Federal Trade Commission.; 4: Associate Professor, Department of Mathematics, Vanderbilt University.; Issue Info: 2005, Vol. 72 Issue 2, p327; Thesaurus Term: PRICE discrimination; Thesaurus Term: ANTITRUST law; Thesaurus Term: RESTRAINT of trade; Thesaurus Term: CONSUMERS; Thesaurus Term: COMMERCIAL crimes; Subject Term: COMPETITION; Number of Pages: 47p; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=16371973&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - O'Brien, Daniel P. AU - Wickelgren, Abraham L. T1 - A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL LOSS ANALYSIS. JO - Antitrust Law Journal JF - Antitrust Law Journal Y1 - 2003/03// VL - 71 IS - 1 M3 - Article SP - 161 EP - 184 SN - 00036056 AB - Discusses the application of critical loss analysis in antitrust practice in the U.S. Common uses of critical loss analysis; main assumptions in critical loss analysis; Example of a standard critical loss analysis; Economics of critical loss; Consistency of critical loss analysis with the economic theory. KW - ANTITRUST law KW - UNITED States N1 - Accession Number: 10905497; O'Brien, Daniel P. 1; Wickelgren, Abraham L. 1; Affiliations: 1: U.S. Federal Trade Commission; Issue Info: 2003, Vol. 71 Issue 1, p161; Thesaurus Term: ANTITRUST law; Subject: UNITED States; Number of Pages: 24p; Illustrations: 2 Charts; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=10905497&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Lean, David F. T1 - First-Mover Advantages from Pioneering New Markets: Comment. JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 1994/04// VL - 9 IS - 2 M3 - Article SP - 177 EP - 180 SN - 0889938X AB - The article presents the author's comment on first-mover advantage from pioneering new markets. What was new in the situation was the availability of detailed product-line sales and cost information rarely available to scholars outside of industry. The researchers benefited from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission's use of its data gathering powers in obtaining promotional expense and sales data for virtually all-individual products that were present over a sixteen-year period in the markets they studied. KW - TRADE regulation KW - COMMERCIAL law KW - INDUSTRIAL policy KW - MARKETS KW - UNITED States KW - UNITED States. Federal Trade Commission N1 - Accession Number: 16831112; Lean, David F. 1; Affiliations: 1: U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C, U.S.; Issue Info: Apr1994, Vol. 9 Issue 2, p177; Thesaurus Term: TRADE regulation; Thesaurus Term: COMMERCIAL law; Thesaurus Term: INDUSTRIAL policy; Thesaurus Term: MARKETS; Subject: UNITED States ; Company/Entity: UNITED States. Federal Trade Commission; NAICS/Industry Codes: 926110 Administration of General Economic Programs; Number of Pages: 4p; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=16831112&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Tarr, David G. T1 - Effects of Restraining Steel Exports from the Republic of Korea and Other Countries to the United States and the European Economic Community. JO - World Bank Economic Review JF - World Bank Economic Review Y1 - 1987/04// VL - 1 IS - 3 M3 - Article SP - 397 EP - 418 N1 - Accession Number: 55992649; Tarr, David G. 1; Affiliations: 1: David G, Tarr is a senior economist with the U.S. Federal Trade Commission. This article is based on a larger study by the author (Tarr 1986a) which was completed while the author was a long-term consultant in the Development Research Department of the World Bank. The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of J. Michael Finger, Vittorio Corbo, Brian Hindley, Gregory Ingram, Morris Morkre, Hans Mueller, Chong Nam, Theophilos Priovolos, and Billy Yoo.; Issue Info: Apr1987, Vol. 1 Issue 3, p397; Number of Pages: 22p; Document Type: Article UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=buh&AN=55992649&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - buh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ashenfelter, Orley AU - Hosken, Daniel AU - Weinberg, Matthew AD - Princeton U AD - U.S. Federal Trade Commission AD - Drexel U T1 - Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers JO - Journal of Law and Economics JF - Journal of Law and Economics Y1 - 2014/08// VL - 57 IS - 3 SP - S67 EP - 100 SN - 00222186 N1 - Accession Number: 1502462; Keywords: Firm; Firms; Merger; Monopoly; Oligopolistic; Oligopoly; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Named Person: Bork, Robert H.; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201506 N2 - In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork viewed most mergers as either competitively neutral or efficiency enhancing. In his view, only mergers creating a dominant firm or monopoly were likely to harm consumers. Bork was especially skeptical of oligopoly concerns resulting from mergers. In this paper, we provide a critique of Bork's views on merger policy from The Antitrust Paradox. Many of Bork's recommendations have been implemented over time and have improved merger analysis. Bork's proposed horizontal merger policy, however, was too permissive. In particular, the empirical record shows that mergers in oligopolistic markets can raise consumer prices. KW - History of Economic Thought since 1925: Other B29 KW - History of Economic Thought: Individuals B31 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 L3 - http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=jlaweconomics UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1502462&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=jlaweconomics DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR ID - 2012-28774-003 AN - 2012-28774-003 AU - Pappalardo, Janis K. T1 - Are unintended effects of marketing regulations unexpected? JF - Marketing Science JO - Marketing Science Y1 - 2012/09//Sep-Oct, 2012 VL - 31 IS - 5 SP - 739 EP - 744 CY - US PB - Institute for Operations Research & the Management Sciences (INFORMS) SN - 0732-2399 SN - 1526-548X AD - Pappalardo, Janis K., Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, US, 20580 N1 - Accession Number: 2012-28774-003. Partial author list: First Author & Affiliation: Pappalardo, Janis K.; Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, US. Release Date: 20131014. Correction Date: 20151207. Publication Type: Journal (0100), Peer Reviewed Journal (0110). Format Covered: Electronic. Document Type: Comment/Reply. Language: English. Major Descriptor: Brand Preferences; Business Organizations; Food; Longitudinal Studies; Nutrition. Minor Descriptor: Educational Programs; Experimental Design; Consequence. Classification: Management & Management Training (3640); Marketing & Advertising (3940). Population: Human (10); Male (30). Location: US. Age Group: Adulthood (18 yrs & older) (300). References Available: Y. Page Count: 6. Issue Publication Date: Sep-Oct, 2012. Copyright Statement: INFORMS. 2012. AB - Comments on an article by Christine Moorman et al. (see record [rid]2012-28774-001[/rid]). Authors places the work of Moormanet al. within a broad historical policy context. The NLEA involves a classic debate over the role of marketing in society. In this essay authors consider how subtle issues in the original debate lead to an alternative explanation for the findings of Moorman et al. Second, authors uses Moorman et al. as a springboard to highlight the need for more contributions by marketing researchers to inform and improve public policy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) KW - unintended nutrition consequences KW - firm response KW - education act KW - food products KW - longitudinal quasi-experimental design KW - brand taste KW - 2012 KW - Brand Preferences KW - Business Organizations KW - Food KW - Longitudinal Studies KW - Nutrition KW - Educational Programs KW - Experimental Design KW - Consequence KW - 2012 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2012-28774-003&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - jpappalardo@ftc.gov DP - EBSCOhost DB - psyh ER - TY - JOUR ID - 2012-17931-007 AN - 2012-17931-007 AU - Pappalardo, Janis K. T1 - Product literacy and the economics of consumer protection policy. T3 - Special issue on product literacy JF - Journal of Consumer Affairs JO - Journal of Consumer Affairs JA - J Consum Aff Y1 - 2012///Sum 2012 VL - 46 IS - 2 SP - 319 EP - 332 CY - United Kingdom PB - Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd. SN - 0022-0078 SN - 1745-6606 AD - Pappalardo, Janis K. N1 - Accession Number: 2012-17931-007. Partial author list: First Author & Affiliation: Pappalardo, Janis K.; Federal Trade Commission, DC, US. Other Publishers: Blackwell Publishing. Release Date: 20130114. Publication Type: Journal (0100), Peer Reviewed Journal (0110). Format Covered: Electronic. Document Type: Journal Article. Language: English. Major Descriptor: Consumer Behavior; Consumer Protection; Economics; Literacy; Policy Making. Minor Descriptor: Decision Making. Classification: Consumer Attitudes & Behavior (3920). Population: Human (10). References Available: Y. Page Count: 14. Issue Publication Date: Sum 2012. Publication History: First Posted Date: Jul 2, 2012. Copyright Statement: The American Council on Consumer Interests. 2012. AB - Invited essay considers questions about competing theories of consumer behavior and their implications for consumer policy. There is surprisingly little serious debate among scholars from different disciplines or subdisciplines about the evidence for and against different models of consumer decision making. This essay defines product literacy and discusses where the concept fits within the law and economics of consumer protection. It is hoped this will clarify what it means to be a rational consumer vs. a reasonable consumer vs. an irrational consumer. These different views can lead to different policies with different implications for consumer choice and consumer welfare. Most importantly, the FTC’s consumer protection policy is based upon a reasonable consumer. It is argued that the reasonable consumer standard is quite consistent with consumer economics models of consumer behavior, in which consumers maximize utility (not necessarily wealth) subject to wealth constraints, time constraints, and household production constraints. By highlighting confusion over the definitions of key terms, it is hoped that scholars will move toward more productive debate about consumer behavior and best practices for consumer protection in the twenty-first century. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) KW - consumer product literacy KW - consumer protection policies KW - economics KW - 2012 KW - Consumer Behavior KW - Consumer Protection KW - Economics KW - Literacy KW - Policy Making KW - Decision Making KW - 2012 DO - 10.1111/j.1745-6606.2012.01233.x UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2012-17931-007&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - jpappalardo@ftc.gov DP - EBSCOhost DB - psyh ER - TY - CHAP AU - Evans, David S. AU - Salinger, Michael A. AD - LECG and U College London AD - US Federal Trade Commission and Boston U A2 - Choi, Jay Pil T1 - Curing Sinus Headaches and Tying Law: An Empirical Analysis of Bundling Decongestants and Pain Relievers T2 - Recent Developments in Antitrust: Theory and Evidence PB - CESifo Seminar Series. Cambridge and London: MIT Press Y1 - 2007/// SP - 91 EP - 124 N1 - Accession Number: 1065709; Reviewed Book ISBN: 978-0-262-03356-5; Keywords: Bundling; Law; Geographic Descriptors: EU; U.S.; Geographic Region: Europe; Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200910 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations L44 KW - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology L65 KW - Marketing M31 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1065709&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AU - Williams, Mark D. AD - Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission AD - Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission A2 - Zerbe, Richard O., Jr. A2 - Kirkwood, John B. T1 - Generalized Critical Loss for Market Definition T2 - Research in Law and Economics: A Journal of Policy. Volume 22 PB - Amsterdam and Boston: Elsevier, JAI Press Y1 - 2007/// SP - 41 EP - 58 N1 - Accession Number: 0973891; Reviewed Book ISBN: 978-0-7623-1348-8; ; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200806 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0973891&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Marx, Leslie M. AD - US Federal Trade Commission and Duke U T1 - Economics at the Federal Communications Commission JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2006/12// VL - 29 IS - 4 SP - 349 EP - 368 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 0895118; Keywords: FCC; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200703 N2 - This article reviews several issues confronted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) over the past year and discusses some of the economic analysis employed by the FCC in examining these issues. The article also identifies areas in which future academic research would be valuable to the agency. KW - Governmental Property H82 KW - Economics of Regulation L51 KW - Telecommunications L96 KW - Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy L98 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0895118&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-006-9120-x UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Salinger, Michael A. AU - Anderson, Keith B. AU - Garmon, Christopher J. AU - Schmidt, David R. AU - Yun, John M. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Economics at the FTC: Data Intensive Mergers and Policy R&D JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2006/12// VL - 29 IS - 4 SP - 327 EP - 348 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 0895117; Keywords: Competition; Consumer Protection; Consumer; Merger; Protection; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200703 N2 - Economics at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) supports both the competition and consumer protection missions of the agency. In this year's essay we discuss a range of activities focusing on data-intensive antitrust cases in the hospital and consumer products industries. We also discuss our most recent work on gasoline pricing. Policy-focused research and competition advocacy takes center stage as we discuss some health care advocacy work in the administration of pharmaceutical insurance benefits and efforts to understand the real estate business more completely. Finally, we describe our efforts to quantify the extent of "identity theft". KW - Consumer Protection D18 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0895117&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-006-9121-9 UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kovacic, William E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - An Integrated Competition Policy to Deter and Defeat Cartels JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2006///Winter VL - 51 IS - 4 SP - 813 EP - 835 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 0892136; Keywords: Cartel; Competition; Law; Policy; Procurement; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200703 N2 - Commissioner William Kovacic of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission proposes a four-prong strategy to improve the enforcement of section 1. Recognizing the issues surrounding the use of circumstantial evidence, he proposes a reformulation of the law to embrace the use of economics to separate purely unilateral behavior from impermissible coordination. He also proposes the use of bounties to identify cartel conduct, adjustments in the public procurement process to deter seller coordination, and a greater role for the FTC in identifying such anticompetitive practices that might include the issuance of guidelines and administrative rules. Some of these ideas, particularly on the use of bounties, challenge traditional thinking, and suffice it to say that they can be expected to generate a lively debate on both sides of the Atlantic. KW - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement H57 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0892136&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Tenn, Steven AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Avoiding Aggregation Bias in Demand Estimation: A Multivariate Promotional Disaggregation Approach JO - Quantitative Marketing and Economics JF - Quantitative Marketing and Economics Y1 - 2006/12// VL - 4 IS - 4 SP - 383 EP - 405 SN - 15707156 N1 - Accession Number: 0887385; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200702 N2 - Demand models produce biased results when applied to data aggregated across stores with heterogeneous promotional activity. We show how to modify extant aggregate demand frameworks to avoid this problem. First a consumer-level model is developed, which is then integrated over the heterogeneous stores to arrive at aggregate demand. Our approach is highly practical since it requires only standard scanner data of the type produced by the major vendors. Using data for super-premium ice cream, we apply the proposed methodology to the random coefficients logit demand framework. KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 KW - Marketing M31 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11129 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0887385&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11129-006-9011-3 UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11129 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kelly, Kenneth H. AU - Morkre, Morris E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - One Lump or Two: Unitary versus Bifurcated Measures of Injury at the USITC JO - Economic Inquiry JF - Economic Inquiry Y1 - 2006/10// VL - 44 IS - 4 SP - 740 EP - 752 SN - 00952583 N1 - Accession Number: 0883409; Keywords: Dumping; Import; International Trade; Trade; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200701 N2 - The most popular methodology used by the US International Trade Commission (USITC) commissioners to determine whether dumped and/or subsidized imports injure competing domestic industries has been rejected by reviewing bodies because it does not distinguish injury caused by unfairly traded imports from other demand or supply changes. We estimate injury to the domestic industry due to changes in unfairly traded import price and to other causes for 44 USITC dumping and/or subsidy investigations. Change in unfairly traded import price was typically not the most important cause of injury to the domestic industry. KW - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations F13 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291465-7295/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0883409&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291465-7295/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Adams, Christopher P. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Optimal Team Incentives with CES Production JO - Economics Letters JF - Economics Letters Y1 - 2006/07// VL - 92 IS - 1 SP - 143 EP - 148 SN - 01651765 N1 - Accession Number: 0883479; Keywords: Incentives; Profit Sharing; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200701 N2 - This paper models an optimal incentive contract and a simple partnership with CES production functions. The results suggest that when employee inputs are complements, firm-wide incentives such as profit sharing and partnerships are quite valuable, even in large firms. KW - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods J33 KW - Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects M52 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01651765 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0883479&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.01.027 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01651765 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ashenfelter, Orley AU - Ashmore, David AU - Baker, Jonathan B. AU - Gleason, Suzanne AU - Hosken, Daniel S. AD - Princeton U AD - Ashenfelter & Ashmore, Princeton, NJ AD - American U AD - Trinity College, Hartford AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Empirical Methods in Merger Analysis: Econometric Analysis of Pricing in FTC v. Staples JO - International Journal of the Economics of Business JF - International Journal of the Economics of Business Y1 - 2006/07// VL - 13 IS - 2 SP - 265 EP - 279 SN - 13571516 N1 - Accession Number: 0878984; Keywords: Merger; Pricing; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200612 N2 - In 1997, the US Federal Trade Commission challenged the proposed merger of two office supply superstores, Staples and Office Depot in US District Court. Both the government and merging parties presented econometric studies examining the merger's likely impact on consumer pricing, predicting a price increase of 8.6% and 0.9% respectively. This article uses the extensive public record to provide a detailed discussion of the econometric models used in the case and to show how differences between the models led to the discrepancy between these estimates. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 L3 - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0878984&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. AU - Froeb, Luke M. AU - Geweke, John F. AU - Taylor, Christopher T. AD - NERA Economic Consulting AD - Vanderbilt U AD - U IA AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - A Variance Screen for Collusion JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2006/05// VL - 24 IS - 3 SP - 467 EP - 486 SN - 01677187 N1 - Accession Number: 0858817; Keywords: Collusion; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200608 N2 - In this paper, we examine price movements over time around the collapse of a bid-rigging conspiracy. While the mean decreased by 16%, the standard deviation increased by over 200%. We hypothesize that conspiracies in other industries would exhibit similar characteristics and search for "pockets" of low price variation as indicators of collusion in the retail gasoline industry in Louisville. We observe no such areas around Louisville in 1996-2002. KW - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement H57 KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0858817&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.10.003 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Kovacic, William E. AU - Marshall, Robert C. AU - Marx, Leslie M. AU - Raiff, Matthew E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - PA State U AD - Duke U AD - Bates White LLC USA A2 - Dimitri, Nicola A2 - Piga, Gustavo A2 - Spagnolo, Giancarlo T1 - Bidding Rings and the Design of Anti-collusive Measures for Auctions and Procurements T2 - Handbook of Procurement PB - Cambridge and New York: PB - Cambridge University Press Y1 - 2006/// SP - 381 EP - 411 N1 - Accession Number: 0948607; Reviewed Book ISBN: 978-0-521-87073-3; Keywords: Auction; Bidding; Procurement; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200801 KW - Auctions D44 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 KW - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks L14 KW - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures; Technology Licensing L24 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0948607&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Economic Models and the Merger Guidelines: A Case Study JO - Review of Law and Economics JF - Review of Law and Economics Y1 - 2006/// VL - 2 IS - 1 SP - 53 EP - 84 SN - 15555879 N1 - Accession Number: 0895129; Keywords: Merger; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200703 N2 - Merger analysis is a field in which economic theory is systematically applied, day-in, day-out. Economics structures the definition of the relevant market, and then economics drives the evaluation of the likely competitive effect of the merger. Exactly which models are used by Federal Trade Commission staff would be of great interest to the stake-holder community, as would any details on how the models are applied. This paper provides those details with an in-depth study of the FTC merger review process focused on single market horizontal mergers evaluated between 1993 and 2003. Five different market models are identified with a homogeneous goods analysis (two choices) useful in about one-third of the cases and a differentiated goods analysis (three choices) relevant for the others. Unilateral effects analysis was used in slightly more than half of the cases and coordinated interaction theories in just less than half. Evidence contained in hot documents, validated customer concerns and event analyses appears to play an important role in confirming the implications of Guidelines-based theoretical models of a merger's competitive effect. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 L3 - http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rle UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0895129&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rle DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Liu, Fei AU - Zimmer, David M. AD - IN U AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Effect of Switching Private Insurance Plans on Health Care Utilization JO - B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy JF - B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy Y1 - 2006/// VL - 5 IS - 1 SP - 1 EP - 25 SN - 15380645 N1 - Accession Number: 0892243; Keywords: HMO; Health Care; Health Insurance; Health; Health Insurance; Insurance; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200703 N2 - The switching of health insurance plans and health care utilization are potentially correlated with both observable and unobservable information. This paper presents a two-period model of health care utilization, and attempts to account for unobserved heterogeneity that simultaneously affects utilization and the decision to switch plans. Data used in this paper are drawn from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. Results indicate that non-HMO enrollees increase their utilization of non-emergency related care prior to switching to HMOs, and they decrease utilization after switching. Conversely, individuals enrolled in HMOs report lower levels of utilization before and higher utilization after they switch to non-HMOs. KW - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies G22 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health I18 L3 - http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0892243&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Cooper, James AU - Froeb, Luke AU - O'Brien, Daniel AU - Vita, Michael AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Vanderbilt U AD - US Department of Justice AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - A Critique of Professor Church's Report on the Impact of Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers on Competition JO - Journal of Competition Law and Economics JF - Journal of Competition Law and Economics Y1 - 2005/12// VL - 1 IS - 4 SP - 785 EP - 795 SN - 17446414 N1 - Accession Number: 0897135; Keywords: Competition; Merger; Vertical Restraints; Geographic Descriptors: EU; Geographic Region: Europe; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200704 N2 - We discuss Professor Jeffrey Church's report to the European Commission in 2004 on the effects of vertical restraints and mergers. Although thorough and accurate, the report could be misinterpreted by practitioners, as it does not emphasize that market power is only a necessary condition for harm to competition, and that most vertical mergers that present the possibility of competitive harm also present economic efficiencies that are intrinsic to the integration. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts L42 L3 - http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0897135&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Froeb, Luke M. AU - Cooper, James C. AU - Frankena, Mark W. AU - Pautler, Paul A. AU - Silvia, Louis AD - Vanderbilt U AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Economics at the FTC: Cases and Research, with a Focus on Petroleum JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2005/11// VL - 27 IS - 3 SP - 223 EP - 252 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 0819954; Keywords: Acquisition; Competition; Merger; Oil; Petroleum; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200602 N2 - Economics at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) covers both the antitrust and consumer protection missions. In this year's essay, we focus mainly on the competition-side of the agency. Drawing on a wealth of recent research, we provide descriptive and analytical information about the petroleum industry. Mergers, as always, were a major preoccupation of the FTC, and we discuss a few oil industry mergers as well as one leading litigated case-Arch Coal's acquisition of Triton Coal. Finally, we review the empirical literature on the effects of vertical restraints, noting that the literature supporting an animus toward such restraints is surprisingly weak. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 KW - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels L71 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0819954&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-005-3493-0 UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kovacic, William E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Achieving Better Practices in the Design of Competition Policy Institutions JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2005///Fall VL - 50 IS - 3 SP - 511 EP - 517 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 0818071; Keywords: Competition; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200602 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0818071&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Cooper, James C. AU - Froeb, Luke M. AU - O'Brien, Dan AU - Vita, Michael G. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2005/09// VL - 23 IS - 7-8 SP - 639 EP - 664 SN - 01677187 N1 - Accession Number: 0812309; Keywords: Vertical Restraints; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200601 N2 - The legality of nonprice vertical practices in the U.S. is determined by their likely competitive effects. An optimal enforcement rule combines evidence with theory to update prior beliefs, and specifies a decision that minimizes the expected loss. Because the welfare effects of vertical practices are theoretically ambiguous, optimal decisions depend heavily on prior beliefs, which should be guided by empirical evidence. Empirically, vertical restraints appear to reduce price and/or increase output. Thus, absent a good natural experiment to evaluate a particular restraint's effect, an optimal policy places a heavy burden on plaintiffs to show that a restraint is anticompetitive. KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts L42 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0812309&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.04.003 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Newhouse, David AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Persistence of Income Shocks: Evidence from Rural Indonesia JO - Review of Development Economics JF - Review of Development Economics Y1 - 2005/08// VL - 9 IS - 3 SP - 415 EP - 433 SN - 13636669 N1 - Accession Number: 0808968; Keywords: Elasticity; Farm Household; Households; Rural; Geographic Descriptors: Indonesia; Geographic Region: Asia; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200512 N2 - This paper estimates the persistence of transient income shocks to farm households in rural Indonesia. Persistence is defined as the elasticity of a household's 1997 household per capita income with respect to its 1993 per capita income, controlling for time-invariant characteristics of the household. Local rainfall levels are used as an exogenous source of transitory variation in 1993 income. Four main conclusions emerge. First, roughly 30% of household income shocks remain after four years. Second, the persistence of negative and positive shocks is approximately equal; if anything, positive shocks last longer. Third, neither positive nor negative income shocks disproportionately affect poor households. Finally, measurement error in income and unobserved household heterogeneity are important sources of bias. These findings cast doubt on common arguments advocating public intervention to stabilize or redistribute income, and suggest that anti-poverty policy should address more permanent causes of household poverty. KW - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D12 KW - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development O12 KW - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration O15 KW - Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure O18 KW - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q12 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-9361/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0808968&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-9361/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Raut, Lakshmi K. AU - Tran, Lien H. AD - CA State U, Fullerton and US Social Security Administration AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Parental Human Capital Investment and Old-Age Transfers from Children: Is It a Loan Contract or Reciprocity for Indonesian Families? JO - Journal of Development Economics JF - Journal of Development Economics Y1 - 2005/08// VL - 77 IS - 2 SP - 389 EP - 414 SN - 03043878 N1 - Accession Number: 0789313; Keywords: Children; Human Capital; Intergenerational Transfers; Reciprocity; Redistribution; Geographic Descriptors: Indonesia; Geographic Region: Asia; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200508 N2 - This paper proposes two alternative models of intergenerational transfers linking parental investment in human capital of children to old-age support. The first model formulates these transfers as a pure loan contract and the second model as self-enforcing reciprocity. Both models predict neutrality of intergenerational redistribution of resources within the family, also known as the "difference in income transfer derivatives property". Two models, however, provide different reasons for the failure of this property, and yield different policy implications for parental human capital investment and provision of old-age support. Specification tests on the Indonesian Family Life Survey data reject the pure loan model in favor of the reciprocity model. The estimated difference in income transfer derivatives for this data is found to be significantly higher than the difference estimated by Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff Altonji et al. (1992) [Altonji, J. G., Hayashi, F. and Kotlikoff, L. J. (1992). Is the Extended Family Altruistically Linked? Direct Tests Using Micro Data. The American Economic Review, vol. 82(5): 1177-98.] for the U.S. PSID data. KW - Altruism; Philanthropy D64 KW - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving D91 KW - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth J13 KW - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity J24 KW - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration O15 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03043878 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0789313&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.04.003 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03043878 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Garmon, Christopher AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - A Note on Negligence and Collusion-Proof Liability JO - International Review of Law and Economics JF - International Review of Law and Economics Y1 - 2005/06// VL - 25 IS - 2 SP - 256 EP - 263 SN - 01448188 N1 - Accession Number: 0819064; Keywords: Liability; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200602 N2 - Principals are often held at least partially liable for the accidental harm caused by their agents. If the liability of the principal and agent is contingent on the court's establishment of the agent's negligence, the principal has an incentive to withhold evidence of the agent's negligence. Since the principal is often in the best position to monitor the agent and gather such evidence, this can lead the agent to take insufficient care in avoiding accidents. This paper will show that a collusion-proof liability scheme gives the principal no incentive to withhold evidence and induces the same level of preventive care as strict vicarious liability. KW - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design D82 KW - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics K13 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01448188 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0819064&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2005.06.006 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01448188 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. AU - Adams, Christopher P. AU - Metz, Albert D. AD - NERA Economic Consulting AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Moody's Investors Service T1 - Pharmaceutical Development Phases: A Duration Analysis JO - Journal of Pharmaceutical Finance, Economics and Policy JF - Journal of Pharmaceutical Finance, Economics and Policy Y1 - 2005/// VL - 14 IS - 4 SP - 19 EP - 41 SN - 15385698 N1 - Accession Number: 0894314; Keywords: Drug; Drugs; Pharmaceutical; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200703 N2 - This paper estimates a duration model of late stage drug development in the pharmaceutical industry using publicly available data. The paper presents descriptive results on the estimated relationship between a particular drug's characteristics such as therapy category, route of administration and originator's size, and that drug's pathway through the three stages of human clinical trials and regulatory review. The results suggest that drugs with longer durations are less likely to succeed, drugs from larger firms are more likely to succeed and faster in the later phases of development, drugs indicated for cancer are more likely to fail and have longer durations. We find that durations fell between 1995 and 2002, consistent with the view that the Prescription Drug User Fee Act helped reduce time to market. KW - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology L65 KW - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D O32 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0894314&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Tenn, Steven AU - Yun, John M. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - When Adding a Fuel Efficient Car Increases an Automaker's CAFE Penalty JO - Managerial and Decision Economics JF - Managerial and Decision Economics Y1 - 2005/01//January-February 2005 VL - 26 IS - 1 SP - 51 EP - 54 SN - 01436570 N1 - Accession Number: 0771115; Keywords: Car; Fuel; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200504 N2 - We derive the conditions that cause an automaker's Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) fine to increase when it sells an additional, fuel efficient car. Raising the CAFE standards would broaden the range of fuel economies that produce this effect. KW - Automobiles; Other Transportation Equipment L62 KW - Energy: Government Policy Q48 KW - Pollution Control Adoption Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects Q52 KW - Transportation Economics: Government Pricing and Policy R48 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291099-1468/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0771115&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291099-1468/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Harbour, Pamela Jones AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - An Enforcement Perspective on the Work of Robert L. Steiner: Why Retailing and Vertical Relationships Matter JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2004///Winter VL - 49 IS - 4 SP - 985 EP - 998 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 0772421; Keywords: Retailing; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200505 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts L42 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0772421&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Froeb, Luke AU - Hosken, Daniel AU - Pappalardo, Janis AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Economics Research at the FTC: Information, Retrospectives, and Retailing JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2004/12// VL - 25 IS - 4 SP - 353 EP - 374 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 0771584; Keywords: Merger; Regulation; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200504 N2 - Individual Federal Trade Commission (FTC) cases invariably raise broad questions about consumers, markets, and effective enforcement policy. Recent consumer protection cases raise questions about information regulation. Horizontal merger enforcement has recently focused on retrospective analysis of mergers and the role of the retail sector in predicting the effects of manufacturer mergers. In this paper, we describe research by the FTC's Bureau of Economics that addresses these three areas. We argue that such research is well worth the agency's relatively small resource investment because it demonstrably contributes to more thoughtful policy analysis and better policy outcomes. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks L14 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Marketing M31 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0771584&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11151-004-4853-x UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Breen, Denis A. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Union Pacific/Southern Pacific Rail Merger: A Retrospective on Merger Benefits JO - Review of Network Economics JF - Review of Network Economics Y1 - 2004/09// VL - 3 IS - 3 SP - 283 EP - 322 SN - 14469022 N1 - Accession Number: 0934670; Keywords: Merger; Rail; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200710 N2 - This retrospective case study of merger efficiencies focuses on the 1996 merger of two large, U.S. rail networks. Information on the public record permits some evaluation of pre-merger efficiency claims, and the weighing of those claims against regulatory and antitrust standards. Access to additional public and non-public information also permits at least a preliminary determination that a number of the claimed efficiencies were plausibly merger-specific and actually realized post-merger. This is contrary to skepticism expressed about merger efficiency claims, both generally and with respect to this particular rail merger, and thereby illustrates the value of doing retrospective studies of merger outcomes. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation L92 L3 - http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rne UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0934670&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rne DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Langenfeld, James A. AU - Silvia, Louis AD - LECG Inc, Evanston, IL and Loyola U Chicago AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Restraint Cases: An Update JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2004///Fall VL - 49 IS - 3 SP - 521 EP - 591 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 0760732; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200502 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0760732&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hosken, Daniel AU - Taylor, Christopher T. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Discussion of 'Using Stationarity Tests in Antitrust Market Definition.' JO - American Law and Economics Review JF - American Law and Economics Review Y1 - 2004///Fall VL - 6 IS - 2 SP - 465 EP - 475 SN - 14657252 N1 - Accession Number: 0742700; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200409 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 KW - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels L71 L3 - http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0742700&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Wickelgren, Abraham L. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Comment on 'Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients.' JO - American Law and Economics Review JF - American Law and Economics Review Y1 - 2004///Fall VL - 6 IS - 2 SP - 434 EP - 439 SN - 14657252 N1 - Accession Number: 0742698; Keywords: Lawyer; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200409 N2 - Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2003) propose a novel system for eliminating the conflict of interest between lawyers and clients over how hard the lawyer should work on a given case. In their analysis of the system, however, Polinsky and Rubinfeld implicitly assume that the lawyer's marginal cost of effort is common knowledge. This comment shows that, when this assumption is relaxed, though their scheme does reduce the agency problem relative to the standard contingency fee arrangement, it no longer eliminates it. KW - Litigation Process K41 L3 - http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0742698&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://aler.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hosken, Daniel AU - Reiffen, David AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Commodity Futures Trading Commission T1 - How Retailers Determine Which Products Should Go on Sale: Evidence from Store-Level Data JO - Journal of Consumer Policy JF - Journal of Consumer Policy Y1 - 2004/06// VL - 27 IS - 2 SP - 141 EP - 177 SN - 01687034 N1 - Accession Number: 0743527; Keywords: Consumer; Pricing; Retail; Retailers; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200409 N2 - Recent theoretical research on retail pricing dynamics provides an explanation of why retailers periodically put items on sale, even when their costs are unchanged. The authors extend this research to show that more popular items (i.e., those that appeal to a wide range of consumers) are more likely to go on sale. One implication of the proposed model is that a good is more likely to be on sale when demand for the good is at its season peak (e.g., eggs at Easter). This implication is tested using store-level retail price data, and the prediction is borne out for the categories of goods that are examined. Additional tests also support the premise that popularity and frequency of sales are positively related. KW - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D12 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 KW - Marketing M31 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/10603 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0743527&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/10603 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Wickelgren, Abraham L. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Innovation, Market Structure and the Holdup Problem: Investment Incentives and Coordination JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2004/05// VL - 22 IS - 5 SP - 693 EP - 713 SN - 01677187 N1 - Accession Number: 0737841; Keywords: Duopoly; Innovation; Market Structure; Monopoly; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200408 N2 - I analyze the innovation incentives under monopoly and duopoly provision of horizontally differentiated products purchased via bilateral negotiations, integrating the market structure and innovation literature with the holdup literature. I show that competition can improve local incentives for non-contractible investment. Because innovation levels are generally strategic substitutes, however, there can be multiple duopoly equilibria. In some circumstances, monopoly can provide a coordination device that can lead to greater expected welfare despite inferior local innovation incentives. The conditions for this to be the case, however, are quite restrictive. KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives O31 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0737841&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.06.003 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AU - Kleit, Andrew N. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - PA State U T1 - Art of the Deal: The Merger Settlement Process at the Federal Trade Commission JO - Southern Economic Journal JF - Southern Economic Journal Y1 - 2004/04// VL - 70 IS - 4 SP - 977 EP - 997 SN - 00384038 N1 - Accession Number: 0732374; Keywords: Firm; Merger; Regulation; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200406 N2 - This paper models the modern merger review process in which an enforcement agency, here the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), interacts with the acquiring firm to determine the outcome of antitrust regulation. Our empirical implementation of a game theoretic analysis tests whether decisions are driven by the costs and benefits of the proposed enforcement initiative as well as whether firms' responses are colored by competitive and institutional considerations. With respect to firms, the results suggest that mergers are driven by the opportunity to capture efficiencies. In contrast, the structural (anticompetitive) characteristics of mergers do not seem to impact firms' litigation decisions. Firms, however, are deterred from fighting the FTC by the potential negative impact on their reputations. In addition, "hostage effects" associated with the size of the noncontroversial portion of acquisitions held up by the FTC's competitive concerns also affect firm decisions. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Business and Securities Law K22 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://journal.southerneconomic.org/loi/soec UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0732374&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://journal.southerneconomic.org/loi/soec DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Garmon, Christopher AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Complements Integration and Foreclosure: The Case of Joint Consumption JO - Southern Economic Journal JF - Southern Economic Journal Y1 - 2004/04// VL - 70 IS - 4 SP - 893 EP - 904 SN - 00384038 N1 - Accession Number: 0732369; Keywords: Monopolists; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200406 N2 - In some cases, complementary products are sold to different sets of agents to aid in transactions between them. In the context of a simplified model, this article shows that a monopolist has an incentive to integrate into and foreclose other sellers of a complementary product used in fixed proportions with the monopolized product, but which is sold to different consumers. While these latter consumers are made worse off by integration and leverage, output is expanded and the monopolist's original consumers are made better off. The effect of integration and leverage on overall welfare is uncertain. I illustrate this model with an example involving trucking fleet cards (sold to trucking companies) and fuel desk point-of-sale systems (sold to truck stops) that are used in conjunction when diesel fuel is purchased. KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 KW - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts L42 KW - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation L92 L3 - http://journal.southerneconomic.org/loi/soec UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0732369&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://journal.southerneconomic.org/loi/soec DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Yun, John M. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Publicity and the Optimal Punitive Damage Multiplier JO - International Review of Law and Economics JF - International Review of Law and Economics Y1 - 2004/03// VL - 24 IS - 1 SP - 15 EP - 27 SN - 01448188 N1 - Accession Number: 0770509; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200504 N2 - When punitive damage awards create publicity, this could affect the behavior of uncompensated victims, which has implications for the optimal punitive damage multiplier. A new adjusted multiplier is derived that incorporates publicity into the analytical framework. Assuming that all victims receive uniform punitive awards, the result is a lower punitive multiplier relative to the standard result. The extent of the adjustment will depend on the likelihood of publicity, the strength of the publicity, and the number of victims. Plus, under certain litigation cost conditions, if courts allow heterogeneous punitive awards, then efficiency is improved relative to uniform awards. KW - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics K13 KW - Litigation Process K41 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01448188 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0770509&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2004.03.002 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01448188 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hosken, Daniel AU - Reiffen, David AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Commodity Futures Trading Commission T1 - Patterns of Retail Price Variation JO - RAND Journal of Economics JF - RAND Journal of Economics Y1 - 2004///Spring VL - 35 IS - 1 SP - 128 EP - 146 SN - 07416261 N1 - Accession Number: 0736899; Keywords: Grocery; Retail; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200407 N2 - We examine retail price variation across a range of goods and regions of the United States. We find that the typical grocery product has a regular price and stays at that price at least 50% of the time, and that most deviations from that regular price are downward. Temporary discounts or sales, while infrequent, account for 20% to 50% of the annual variation in retail prices for most product categories. Although existing models of retail sales yield predictions consistent with some aspects of the retail pricing distributions, all of these models fail to explain other important aspects of retail pricing identified here. KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291756-2171/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0736899&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291756-2171/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Taylor, Christopher T. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Economic Effects of Withdrawn Antidumping Investigations: Is There Evidence of Collusive Settlements? JO - Journal of International Economics JF - Journal of International Economics Y1 - 2004/03// VL - 62 IS - 2 SP - 295 EP - 312 SN - 00221996 N1 - Accession Number: 0681965; Keywords: Agreement; Anti Dumping; Antidumping; Collusion; Import; Trade; Geographic Descriptors: Selected Countries; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200404 N2 - This paper analyzes the effects of antidumping cases initiated from 1990 to 1997 that ended in withdrawn petitions without a suspension agreement or voluntary restraint agreement. Monthly import data are used to estimate the price and quantity effects of the withdrawn cases. The estimated effects of the petition being withdrawn do not support the accepted wisdom that withdrawn petitions are a signal of collusion. This is an important issue, since out-of-court settlements of unfair trade cases which restrict quantities or increase prices are not only welfare reducing but are also actionable under the antitrust laws; they are not exempt under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. KW - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations F13 KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00221996 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0681965&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00051-5 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00221996 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Taylor, Christopher T. AD - US Federal Trade Commission A2 - Young, Stephen T1 - The Impact of Host Country Government Policy on US Multinational Investment Decisions T2 - Multinationals and public policy. Volume 1 PB - Elgar Reference Collection. International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, vol. 173. PB - Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: PB - Elgar Y1 - 2004/// SP - 427 EP - 439 RP - [2000] N1 - Accession Number: 0806266; Reviewed Book ISBN: 1-84064-950-X; Keywords: Multinational; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200512 KW - Multinational Firms; International Business F23 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0806266&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Kovacic, William E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission A2 - Epstein, Richard A. A2 - Greve, Michael S. T1 - Toward a Domestic Competition Network T2 - Competition laws in conflict: Antitrust jurisdiction in the global economy PB - Washington, D.C.: PB - AEI Press; distributed by Client Distribution Services, Jackson, Tenn. Y1 - 2004/// SP - 316 EP - 332 N1 - Accession Number: 0805583; Reviewed Book ISBN: 0-8447-4201-5; Keywords: Competition; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200512 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0805583&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - DeGraba, Patrick AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Reconciling the Off-Net Cost Pricing Principle with Efficient Network Utilization JO - Information Economics and Policy JF - Information Economics and Policy Y1 - 2004///Special Issue VL - 16 IS - 3 SP - 475 EP - 494 SN - 01676245 N1 - Accession Number: 0754673; Keywords: Pricing; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200412 N2 - The off-net-cost pricing principle argues that under a broad range of environments a positive "access" charge paid by originating networks to interconnected terminating networks would cause retail on-net usage rates to be set equal to their off-net counterparts, and that these rates would fully reflect the access charge. However, other work provides reasonable conditions under which on-net usage rates will not reflect access charges, but would be set to induce the social surplus maximizing level of on-net usage. This paper harmonizes these two apparently opposing results by showing that retail usage rates depend on two effects. One is a rent seeking effect on the part of networks and the other is an efficient utilization effect. In models in which the rent seeking effect is more important, on-net usage rates will tend to equal their off-net counterparts and incorporate the access charge. In models in which the efficient utilization effect matters more, on-net usage rates will not equal their off-net counterparts and will tend to promote efficient on-net utilization. KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Telecommunications L96 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01676245 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0754673&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2004.01.011 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01676245 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Wickelgren, Abraham L. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - A Model of Welfare-Reducing Settlement JO - Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy JF - Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy Y1 - 2004/// VL - 3 IS - 1 SP - 1 EP - 20 SN - 15380645 N1 - Accession Number: 0749610; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200410 N2 - While it is typically taken for granted that settlement of lawsuits increases social welfare, this paper shows that settlement can lower welfare. If the defendant has private information about the harm from his action both at the time of the action and the time of settlement bargaining, then defendants who cause different levels of harm can pay the same settlement amount in a partial pooling equilibrium. Settlement acts as a damage cap, preventing the defendant's liability from increasing with the harm over the full range of possible harms, leading to under-deterrence. This result holds even though the social planner can choose the socially optimal damage rule. KW - Litigation Process K41 L3 - http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0749610&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coleman, Mary T. AU - Meyer, David W. AU - Scheffman, David T. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Vanderbilt U T1 - Economic Analyses of Mergers at the FTC: The Cruise Ships Mergers Investigation JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2003/09// VL - 23 IS - 2 SP - 121 EP - 155 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 0678313; Keywords: Economics; Economists; Merger; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200403 N2 - This paper provides an overview of how economists at the Federal Trade Commission assess the potential competitive effects of mergers, with a focus on the types of quantitative analyses frequently employed. The paper first outlines the general approach employed at the Federal Trade Commission to review mergers. The paper then describes analyses done in the investigation of proposed mergers in the cruise line industry as a specific example. Of particular interest in this example are the analyses used to assess the potential for coordinated interaction as a result of the merger. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism L83 KW - Role of Economics; Role of Economists A11 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0678313&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:REIO.0000006910.18832.0e UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Holt, Debra J. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Internet and Auto Sales: Benefits and Barriers JO - Journal of Private Enterprise JF - Journal of Private Enterprise Y1 - 2003///Fall VL - 19 IS - 1 SP - 21 EP - 37 SN - 0890913X N1 - Accession Number: 0674287; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200402 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 KW - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software L86 L3 - http://journal.apee.org/index.php/Category:Issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0674287&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://journal.apee.org/index.php/Category:Issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Bivins, Laura L. AU - Krishna, Kala AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - PA State U T1 - Transferability of Migration Licences and the Distribution of Potential Rents JO - Economics Letters JF - Economics Letters Y1 - 2003/09// VL - 80 IS - 3 SP - 323 EP - 328 SN - 01651765 N1 - Accession Number: 0671040; Keywords: Migration; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200401 N2 - This paper compares the effects of migration restrictions under transferability and non-transferability of licenses. There is reason to expect that a policy of making licenses non-transferable will not only affect production efficiency, but also allow producers to capture more of the potential migration rents. KW - International Migration F22 KW - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers J61 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01651765 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0671040&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00114-9 UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01651765 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Ippolito, Pauline M. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Asymmetric Information in Product Markets: Looking to Other Sectors for Institutional Approaches JO - American Journal of Agricultural Economics JF - American Journal of Agricultural Economics Y1 - 2003/08// VL - 85 IS - 3 SP - 731 EP - 736 SN - 00029092 N1 - Accession Number: 0662317; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200310 KW - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility L15 KW - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness Q13 L3 - http://ajae.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0662317&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://ajae.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Taylor, Christopher T. AU - Fischer, Jeffrey H. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Unlisted T1 - A Review of West Coast Gasoline Pricing and the Impact of Regulations JO - International Journal of the Economics of Business JF - International Journal of the Economics of Business Y1 - 2003/07// VL - 10 IS - 2 SP - 225 EP - 243 SN - 13571516 N1 - Accession Number: 0663225; Keywords: Gasoline; Pricing; Regulation; Retail; Wholesale; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200310 N2 - There have been numerous proposals for legislating restrictions on vertical supply relationships on the West Coast and elsewhere. However, there has not been a systematic examination of gasoline prices on the West Cost, relative to the rest of the country, to understand the size of possible pricing anomalies. We examine the differences in the price of gasoline on the West Coast and the Gulf Coast both at the rack (wholesale) and retail. We also examine structural factors that have kept average West Coast prices higher than elsewhere, such as the higher costs to produce CARB gasoline and higher opportunity costs to produce conventional gasoline, higher shipping costs, Unocal's patents on CARB gasoline blending, higher taxes, Oregon's ban on self-service gasoline, and higher land costs. While a number of these factors are difficult to quantify, they would appear to explain most or possibly all of the measured difference in average prices. KW - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels L71 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Economics of Regulation L51 L3 - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0663225&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hadeishi, Hajime AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Economic Well-Being and Fertility in France: Nuits, 1744-1792 JO - Journal of Economic History JF - Journal of Economic History Y1 - 2003/06// VL - 63 IS - 2 SP - 489 EP - 505 SN - 00220507 N1 - Accession Number: 0661039; Keywords: Birth; Fertility; Well Being; Geographic Descriptors: France; Geographic Region: Europe; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200309 N2 - This study investigates the relationship between income and fertility in Nuits-Saint-Georges, a small Burgundian town. Nuits offers a rich location to study fertility because of its broad range of occupations, income, and literacy. I constructed a data set that linked fertility through 1792 for couples married between 1744 and 1779 with fiscal records tracking the families' tax payments. Controlling for occupation and literacy, my principle findings were that wealthier families had more births, changes in fertility were positively correlated with increases in income over the life cycle, and marital fertility in Nuits steadily declined over the latter eighteenth century. KW - Economic History: Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy: Europe: Pre-1913 N33 KW - General Welfare; Well-Being I31 KW - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth J13 L3 - http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayBackIssues?jid=JEH UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0661039&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayBackIssues?jid=JEH DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Degraba, Patrick AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - A Bottleneck Input Supplier's Opportunity Cost of Competing Downstream JO - Journal of Regulatory Economics JF - Journal of Regulatory Economics Y1 - 2003/05// VL - 23 IS - 3 SP - 287 EP - 297 SN - 0922680X N1 - Accession Number: 0657706; Keywords: Entry; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200308 N2 - Should the supplier of a bottleneck input be prevented from vertically integrating downstream unless the (perhaps regulated) price of the input is set equal to costs? This issue has arisen with respect to the entry of incumbent local exchange carriers into the provision of long distance services. While competitors (and likely society) would prefer the bottleneck facility to be priced at marginal cost, this paper shows that entry by the bottleneck supplier when its price exceeds marginal cost will typically be welfare improving. The intuition is that the integrated firm behaves as if its marginal cost of the bottleneck input is lower than the price of the input, which results in lower prices, and increased welfare. This effect outweighs the potential distortions in the market caused by the artificial cost difference between the integrated firm and its competitors, and under plausible conditions can outweigh the effects of a competing firm exiting the market as a result of the integration. KW - Firm Organization and Market Structure L22 KW - Economics of Regulation L51 KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 KW - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts L42 KW - Telecommunications L96 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11149 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0657706&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11149 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Pautler, Paul A. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Evidence on Mergers and Acquisitions JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 2003///Spring VL - 48 IS - 1 SP - 119 EP - 221 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 0665917; Keywords: Acquisition; Merger; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200311 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 KW - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading G14 KW - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages G21 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Air Transportation L93 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0665917&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Schmidt, David AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Playing Safe in Coordination Games: The Roles of Risk Dominance, Payoff Dominance, and History of Play JO - Games and Economic Behavior JF - Games and Economic Behavior Y1 - 2003/02// VL - 42 IS - 2 SP - 281 EP - 299 SN - 08998256 N1 - Accession Number: 0652813 Partial authors List; ; Keywords: Games; Two Player; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200307 N2 - This paper presents results from a series of experiments designed to test the impact on subject behavior of changes in the risk dominance and payoff dominance characteristics of two player coordination games. The main finding is that changes in risk dominance significantly affect play of the subjects, whereas changes in the level of payoff dominance do not. Observed history of play also has an important influence on subject behavior, both when subjects are randomly rematched after each game and when they remain matched with the same individual for a sequence of games. KW - Noncooperative Games C72 KW - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief D83 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/08998256 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0652813&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/08998256 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Fields, Gary S. AU - Cichello, Paul L. AU - Freije, Samuel AU - Menendez, Marta AU - Newhouse, David AD - Cornell U AD - Xavier U AD - Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administracion, Caracas AD - DELTA, Paris AD - US Federal Trade Commission A2 - Fields, Gary S. A2 - Pfeffermann, Guy T1 - Escaping from Poverty: Household Income Dynamics in Indonesia, South Africa, Spain, and Venezuela T2 - Pathways out of poverty: Private firms and economic mobility in developing countries PB - Boston; Dordrecht and London: PB - Kluwer Academic; PB - Washington, D.C.: PB - International Finance Corporation Y1 - 2003/// SP - 13 EP - 34 N1 - Accession Number: 0785016; Reviewed Book ISBN: 1-4020-7412-3; 0-8213-5404-3; Keywords: Households; Income; Poverty; Geographic Descriptors: Indonesia; South Africa; Spain; Venezuela; Geographic Region: Asia; Africa; Europe; Latin America and the Caribbean; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200508 KW - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D12 KW - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions D31 KW - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty I32 KW - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs I38 KW - Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration O15 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0785016&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Ahn, T. K. AU - Ostrom, Elinor AU - Schmidt, David AU - Walker, James AD - IN U AD - IN U AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - IN U A2 - Ostrom, Elinor A2 - Walker, James T1 - Trust in Two-Person Games: Game Structures and Linkages T2 - Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research PB - Series on Trust, vol. 6. PB - New York: PB - Russell Sage Foundation Y1 - 2003/// SP - 323 EP - 351 N1 - Accession Number: 0784819; Reviewed Book ISBN: 0-87154-647-7; Keywords: Games; Two Person; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200508 KW - Noncooperative Games C72 KW - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification Z13 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0784819&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Baughman, Reagan AU - DiNardi, Daniela AU - Holtz-Eakin, Douglas AD - U MI AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Syracuse U T1 - Productivity and Wage Effects of 'Family-Friendly' Fringe Benefits JO - International Journal of Manpower JF - International Journal of Manpower Y1 - 2003/// VL - 24 IS - 3 SP - 247 EP - 259 SN - 01437720 N1 - Accession Number: 0666473; Keywords: Fringe Benefits; Pay; Productivity; Wage; Women; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200311 N2 - Family-supportive employment benefits have become increasingly popular in recent years as an employer response to the increasing labor force participation of women, and the consequent need to balance work and family life. Economic theory predicts that these types of fringe benefits could at least partially pay for themselves through a combination of increased productivity and lower wages. A survey of 120 employers in an upstate New York county provides data on benefits packages and outcome measures that are used to test this hypothesis. We find that employers who offer flexible sick leave and child care assistance experience measurable reductions in turnover. Employers who offer benefits like flexible scheduling policies and child care also appear to offset part of the cost of these benefits by paying lower entry-level wages than do their competitors. KW - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity J24 KW - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions J32 KW - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination J16 KW - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials J31 KW - Labor Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs J63 KW - Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects M52 L3 - http://www.emeraldinsight.com/ijm.htm UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0666473&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.emeraldinsight.com/ijm.htm DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR ID - 2010-21364-014 AN - 2010-21364-014 AU - McAlvanah, Patrick T1 - Subadditivity, patience, and utility: The effects of dividing time intervals. JF - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization JO - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization JA - J Econ Behav Organ Y1 - 2010/11// VL - 76 IS - 2 SP - 325 EP - 337 CY - Netherlands PB - Elsevier Science SN - 0167-2681 AD - McAlvanah, Patrick, Patrick McAlvanah, Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Mail Drop NJ 4136, Washington, DC, US N1 - Accession Number: 2010-21364-014. Partial author list: First Author & Affiliation: McAlvanah, Patrick; Patrick McAlvanah, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, US. Release Date: 20101122. Publication Type: Journal (0100), Peer Reviewed Journal (0110). Format Covered: Electronic. Document Type: Journal Article. Language: English. Major Descriptor: Choice Behavior; Money. Minor Descriptor: Time. Classification: Cognitive Processes (2340). Population: Human (10). Location: US. Age Group: Adulthood (18 yrs & older) (300). Methodology: Empirical Study; Experimental Replication; Quantitative Study. References Available: Y. Page Count: 13. Issue Publication Date: Nov, 2010. Publication History: First Posted Date: Jul 8, 2010; Accepted Date: Jun 30, 2010; Revised Date: Jun 22, 2010; First Submitted Date: Oct 29, 2008. Copyright Statement: All rights reserved. Elsevier B.V. 2010. AB - Previous work has demonstrated that time discounting is subadditive: individuals exhibit more impatience evaluating a delay as divided into sub-intervals. This paper argues that subdivision affects both components of intertemporal choice, the utility function as well as the intertemporal discount function. In my first experiment, I demonstrate that differential concavity of utility for gains and convexity for losses implies that the discounting of losses is even more subadditive than the discounting of gains. Individuals display even more relative impatience over divided time intervals for negative amounts of money than for positive amounts of money. My second experiment utilizes alternative elicitation methods, which impose an intertemporal status quo, to highlight these utility effects. Subadditivity is stronger when delaying an early gain than for hastening a later gain. The reverse pattern holds for losses; discounting is more subadditive when hastening a later loss than for delaying an earlier loss. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) KW - subadditivity KW - patience KW - utility KW - intertemporal choice KW - money KW - time interval KW - 2010 KW - Choice Behavior KW - Money KW - Time KW - 2010 DO - 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.06.009 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2010-21364-014&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - pmcalvanah@ftc.gov DP - EBSCOhost DB - psyh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Scheffman, David T. AU - Coleman, Mary T. AD - Bureau of Econ, US Federal Trade Commission AD - Bureau of Econ, US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Current Economic Issues at the FTC JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2002/12// VL - 21 IS - 4 SP - 357 EP - 371 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 0636179; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200303 N2 - This paper provides a summary of recent economic issues of particular interest in the Bureau of Economics (BE) of the FTC. Further development of empirical analyses suitable for antitrust investigations is currently of particular interest to BE. This paper outlines several areas where BE has focused in the past year including: (1) Unilateral effects; (2) coordinated interaction; (3) merger retrospectives; (4) natural experiments; (5) price discrimination; (6) intellectual property; (7) healthcare; and (8) energy. For each area, we discuss the issues under consideration, the work that is being done, and what additional research would be useful. KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0636179&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Thomas, Charles J. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Effect of Asymmetric Entry Costs on Bertrand Competition JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2002/05// VL - 20 IS - 5 SP - 589 EP - 609 SN - 01677187 N1 - Accession Number: 0605973; Keywords: Competition; Entry; Firm; Firms; Price Setting; Pricing; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200206 N2 - By permitting firms to have different entry costs, I generalize two previously studied models of two-stage entry and pricing amongst Bertrand competitors. I find that the existing results depend critically on the symmetry assumption. For example, if firms' entry decisions are observed before price-setting occurs, then total welfare can increase following the introduction of a potential entrant, in contrast to the unambiguous welfare reduction found in the symmetric setting. If firms' entry decisions are unobserved before price-setting occurs, then the expected price typically decreases or remains unchanged following the introduction of a potential entrant, in contrast to the unambiguous price increase found in the symmetric setting. In both price-setting environments, competition increases following the introduction of potential entrants with sufficiently low entry costs, a finding that is obscured by focusing on the symmetric models. KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Market Structure and Pricing: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D43 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0605973&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Yun, John M. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Offsetting Behavior Effects of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards JO - Economic Inquiry JF - Economic Inquiry Y1 - 2002/04// VL - 40 IS - 2 SP - 260 EP - 270 SN - 00952583 N1 - Accession Number: 0603350; Keywords: Automobile; Vehicles; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200205 N2 - Research has concluded that regulatory attempts to improve fuel economy, such as the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards, lower the average weight of an automobile. Ceteris paribus, this reduction in weight is detrimental to the overall level of vehicle safety. However, this study attempts to explicitly measure possible behavioral responses on the part of drivers that could offset some of the loss in safety. The results indicate that CAFE, although increasing the vulnerability rate by approximately 20%, has reduced the accident rate by 26%. The net effect on the fatality rate is a decrease of approximately 6%. KW - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D12 KW - Automobiles; Other Transportation Equipment L62 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291465-7295/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0603350&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291465-7295/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Thomas, Charles J. AU - Wilson, Bart J. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - George Mason U T1 - A Comparison of Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations JO - RAND Journal of Economics JF - RAND Journal of Economics Y1 - 2002///Spring VL - 33 IS - 1 SP - 140 EP - 155 SN - 07416261 N1 - Accession Number: 0606670; Keywords: Auctions; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200206 N2 - We compare first-price auctions to an exchange process that we term "multilateral negotiations." In multilateral negotiations, a buyer solicits price offers for a homogeneous product from sellers with privately known costs, and then plays the sellers off one another to obtain additional price concessions. Using the experimental method, we find that with four sellers, transaction prices are statistically indistinguishable in the two institutions, but with two sellers, prices are higher in multilateral negotiations than in first-price auctions. The institutions are equally efficient with two sellers, but multilateral negotiations are slightly more efficient with four sellers. KW - Auctions D44 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291756-2171/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0606670&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291756-2171/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AD - Bureau of Econ, US Federal Trade Commission T1 - A Test of Political Control of the Bureaucracy: The Case of Mergers JO - Economics and Politics JF - Economics and Politics Y1 - 2002/03// VL - 14 IS - 1 SP - 1 EP - 18 SN - 09541985 N1 - Accession Number: 0603379; Keywords: Administration; Bureaucracy; Congress; Merger; Political; Presidential; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200205 N2 - This paper tests a model of political control of the bureaucracy using a data set of mergers evaluated by the Federal Trade Commission between 1983 and 2000. The results support a sophisticated control model in which the President sets the agenda within the scope of policies acceptable to Congress. Changes in Presidential administration and in the composition of Congress can, but do not necessarily, affect merger policy. Instead, the shift in policy depends on how the institutions of the Presidency and Congress interact both in the previous and current periods. KW - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption D73 KW - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D72 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291468-0343/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0603379&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291468-0343/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Wellford, Charissa P. AD - US Federal Trade Commission A2 - Holt, Charles A2 - Isaac, R. Mark T1 - Antitrust: Results from the Laboratory T2 - Experiments investigating market power PB - Research in Experimental Economics, vol. 9. PB - Amsterdam; London and New York: PB - Elsevier Science, JAI Y1 - 2002/// SP - 1 EP - 60 N1 - Accession Number: 0767497; Reviewed Book ISBN: 0-7623-0964-4; ; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200504 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0767497&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Bulow, Jeremy AU - Huang, Ming AU - Klemperer, Paul AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Stanford U AD - Nuffield College, U Oxford A2 - Biais, Bruno A2 - Pagano, Marco T1 - Toeholds and Takeovers T2 - New research in corporate finance and banking PB - Oxford and New York: PB - Oxford University Press Y1 - 2002/// SP - 91 EP - 116 RP - [1999] N1 - Accession Number: 0733882; Reviewed Book ISBN: 0-19-924323-9; 0-19-924324-7; Keywords: Takeover; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200407 KW - Auctions D44 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0733882&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hertzendorf, Mark N. AU - Overgaard, Per Baltzer AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - U Aarhus T1 - Price Competition and Advertising Signals: Signaling by Competing Senders JO - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy JF - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy Y1 - 2001///Winter VL - 10 IS - 4 SP - 621 EP - 662 SN - 10586407 N1 - Accession Number: 0595586; Keywords: Advertising; Differentiation; Duopolists; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200202 N2 - Can price and advertising be used by vertically differentiated duopolists to signal qualities to consumers? We show that pure price separation is impossible if the vertical differentiation is small, while adding dissipative advertising ensures the existence of separating equilibria. Two simple, but nonstandard, equilibrium refinements are introduced to deal with the multisender nature of the game, and they are shown to produce a unique separating and a unique pooling profile. Pooling results in a zero-profit Bertrand outcome. Separation gives strictly positive duopoly profits, and dissipative advertising is used by the high-quality firm when products are sufficiently close substitutes. Finally, compared to the complete-information benchmark, the separating prices of both firms are distorted upwards when the degree of vertical differentiation is large, and downwards when it is small. KW - Advertising M37 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility L15 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291530-9134/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0595586&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291530-9134/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hosken, Daniel AU - Reiffen, David AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Multiproduct Retailers and the Sale Phenomenon JO - Agribusiness JF - Agribusiness Y1 - 2001///Winter VL - 17 IS - 1 SP - 115 EP - 137 SN - 07424477 N1 - Accession Number: 0558181; Keywords: Pricing; Retailers; Retailing; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200104 N2 - Two common features of retailing are that each retailer sells many different products, and that pricing strategies differ across products. This paper extends previous work on single-product retailer competition to a multiproduct setting. Specifically, we derive equilibrium pricing strategies for perishable and nonperishable goods. We find the intuition used to explain pricing dynamics for nonperishable items in single-product models generalizes to the multiproduct setting. Moreover, because goods are substitute means of attracting customers within the multiproduct setting, price changes for the nonperishable good will affect the perishable good price. In addition, the multiproduct setting generates a rich set of implications, some of which we empirically examine. For example, we find that, consistent with the theory, perishable and nonperishable price changes are negatively correlated. This and other evidence suggests that pricing dynamics are related in predictable ways to product characteristics, such as consumers' storage costs. KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291520-6297/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0558181&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291520-6297/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hosken, Daniel AU - Simpson, John David AD - Bureau of Econ, US Federal Trade Commission AD - Bureau of Econ, US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Have Supermarket Mergers Raised Prices? An Event Study Analysis JO - International Journal of the Economics of Business JF - International Journal of the Economics of Business Y1 - 2001/11// VL - 8 IS - 3 SP - 329 EP - 342 SN - 13571516 N1 - Accession Number: 0595406; Keywords: Acquisition; Acquisitions; Firm; Firms; Merger; Retail; Supermarket; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200202 N2 - Antitrust enforcement of supermarket merger activity during the late 1980s and early 1990s was less stringent than it had been before or has been since. For six announcements of supermarket acquisitions during this period, this study examines the abnormal stock returns of rival firms to determine if investors believed these acquisitions would lead to higher retail prices. These abnormal returns imply that investors expected that the average retail price change associated with these types of acquisitions ranges from a 0.12% decrease to a 0.05% increase. Thus, our results suggest that investors generally did not view these acquisitions as anticompetitive. KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 L3 - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0595406&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijb20 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Simpsom, John David AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Did May Company's Acquisition of Associated Dry Goods Corporation Reduce Competition? An Event Study Analysis JO - Review of Industrial Organization JF - Review of Industrial Organization Y1 - 2001/06// VL - 18 IS - 4 SP - 351 EP - 362 SN - 0889938X N1 - Accession Number: 0563154; Keywords: Acquisition; Acquisitions; Competition; Concentration; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200105 N2 - May Department Store's 1986 acquisition of Associated Dry Goods substantially increased concentration among department stores in Denver and Southern California. When this acquisition was announced, department store chains with stores in these areas had higher abnormal returns than other department store chains. This finding suggests that this acquisition may have reduced competition among department stores since investors would have bid up the stock price of rival department stores if they believed that this acquisition would lead to higher retail prices in Denver and Southern California. KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0563154&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/11151 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - O'Brien, Daniel P. AD - Bureau of Economics, US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Microsoft Antitrust Case: Comment JO - Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade JF - Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade Y1 - 2001/03// VL - 1 IS - 1 SP - 53 EP - 61 SN - 15661679 N1 - Accession Number: 1273352; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 201112 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software L86 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/10842 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1273352&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1011572626690 UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/10842 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Hilke, John C. AD - US Federal Trade Commission A2 - Amato, Giuliano A2 - Laudati, Laraine L. T1 - Joining the Electric Industry Policy Debate at the State Level T2 - The anticompetitive impact of regulation PB - Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: PB - Elgar; distributed by American International Distribution Corporation, Williston, Vt. Y1 - 2001/// SP - 378 EP - 393 N1 - Accession Number: 0675145; Reviewed Book ISBN: 1-84064-677-2; ; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200402 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 KW - Economics of Regulation L51 KW - Electric Utilities L94 KW - Industry Studies: Utilities and Transportation: Government Policy L98 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0675145&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Wojcik, Charlotte AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Alternative Models of Demand for Automobiles JO - Economics Letters JF - Economics Letters Y1 - 2000/08// VL - 68 IS - 2 SP - 113 EP - 118 SN - 01651765 N1 - Accession Number: 0531686; Keywords: Automobile; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200009 N2 - This paper uses data on automobile purchases to compare two alternatives to the multinomial logit model. The results indicate that the nested logit model is likely to be superior to the more general Berry-Levinsohn-Pakes model for applications using aggregate-level data. KW - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis D12 KW - Automobiles; Other Transportation Equipment L62 KW - Model Construction and Estimation C51 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01651765 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0531686&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01651765 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Taylor, Christopher T. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - The Impact of Host Country Government Policy on US Multinational Investment Decisions JO - World Economy JF - World Economy Y1 - 2000/05// VL - 23 IS - 5 SP - 635 EP - 647 SN - 03785920 N1 - Accession Number: 0530925; Keywords: Multinational; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200008 KW - Multinational Firms; International Business F23 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-9701/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0530925&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-9701/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Glasner, David AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Classical Monetary Theory and the Quantity Theory JO - History of Political Economy JF - History of Political Economy Y1 - 2000///Spring VL - 32 IS - 1 SP - 39 EP - 59 SN - 00182702 N1 - Accession Number: 0533903; Keywords: Monetary; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200010 KW - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General E50 KW - History of Economic Thought: Classical (includes Adam Smith) B12 L3 - http://hope.dukejournals.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0533903&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://hope.dukejournals.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Blonigen, Bruce A. AU - Taylor, Christopher T. AD - U OR AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - R&D Intensity and Acquisitions in High-Technology Industries: Evidence from the US Electronic and Electrical Equipment Industries JO - Journal of Industrial Economics JF - Journal of Industrial Economics Y1 - 2000/03// VL - 48 IS - 1 SP - 47 EP - 70 SN - 00221821 N1 - Accession Number: 0514245; Keywords: Acquisition; Acquisitions; Electrical Equipment; Electronics; Firm; R&D; Technology; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200005 N2 - Theory suggests R&D intensity and acquisition activity may be either directly or inversely related. However, we know relatively little about which firms are responsible for acquisition activity in high-technology industries, which are not only R&D-intensive, but also have substantial acquisition activity in the United States. Using a panel of 217 US electronic and electrical equipment firms from 1985-93 and limited dependent variable estimation techniques, we find a substantial negative correlation between R&D-intensity and a firm's propensity to acquire. This result is surprisingly robust to numerous sensitivity tests and is significant in both the "within" and "between" dimensions of our data. KW - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D O32 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment L63 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-6451/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0514245&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-6451/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - DeGraba, Patrick AU - Mohammed, Rafi AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Monitor Company T1 - Intertemporal Mixed Bundling and Buying Frenzies JO - RAND Journal of Economics JF - RAND Journal of Economics Y1 - 1999///Winter VL - 30 IS - 4 SP - 694 EP - 718 SN - 07416261 N1 - Accession Number: 0512479; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200004 N2 - By initially selling goods only in bundles and subsequently selling unsold units individually, a multiproduct seller can create a buying frenzy in which his profit is higher than it would be if he sold all units individually at their market clearing prices. In this frenzy, high-valuation customers buy a bundle because they expect quantity rationing when units are sold individually. Their purchases reduce the quantity to be sold individually, causing the shortages that result in rationing. The bundle's price exceeds the sum of the individual prices, a fact observed in markets for rock concert tickets. KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Marketing M31 KW - Intertemporal Firm Choice: Investment, Capacity, and Financing D92 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291756-2171/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0512479&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291756-2171/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Baker, Jonathan B. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Policy Watch: Developments in Antitrust Economics JO - Journal of Economic Perspectives JF - Journal of Economic Perspectives Y1 - 1999///Winter VL - 13 IS - 1 SP - 181 EP - 194 SN - 08953309 N1 - Accession Number: 0488627; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 199905 N2 - This article highlights recent developments in antitrust economics that have influenced the way the federal antitrust enforcement agencies analyze five issues: efficiencies from mergers, entry conditions, practices facilitating coordination, exclusionary practices, and the unilateral competitive effects of mergers. KW - Antitrust Law K21 L3 - http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0488627&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.13.1.181 UR - http://www.aeaweb.org/jep/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Pitofsky, Robert AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Competition Policy in a Global Economy--Today and Tomorrow JO - Journal of International Economic Law JF - Journal of International Economic Law Y1 - 1999/09// VL - 2 IS - 3 SP - 403 EP - 411 SN - 13693034 N1 - Accession Number: 0503020; Keywords: Competition; Policy; Geographic Descriptors: EU; U.S.; Geographic Region: Europe; Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 199911 KW - International Law K33 KW - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations F13 KW - Multinational Firms; International Business F23 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 KW - Antitrust Law K21 L3 - http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0503020&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/by/year DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Bulow, Jeremy AU - Huang, Ming AU - Klemperer, Paul AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - Stanford U AD - Nuffield College, Oxford U T1 - Toeholds and Takeovers JO - Journal of Political Economy JF - Journal of Political Economy Y1 - 1999/06// VL - 107 IS - 3 SP - 427 EP - 454 SN - 00223808 N1 - Accession Number: 0494810; Keywords: Auctions; Bid; Shareholder; Takeover; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 199908 N2 - Toeholds have an enormous impact in 'common-value' takeover battles, such as those between two financial bidders. This contrasts with the small impact of a toehold in a 'private-value' auction. The authors' results are consistent with empirical findings that a toehold helps a buyer win an auction, sometimes very cheaply. A controlling minority shareholder may, therefore, be effectively immune to outside offers. A target may benefit by requiring 'best and final' sealed-bid offers or by selling a cheap toehold or options to a 'white knight.' The authors' analysis extends to regulators selling 'stranded assets,' creditors bidding in bankruptcy auctions, and so forth. KW - Auctions D44 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 L3 - http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=jpoliecon UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0494810&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublication?journalCode=jpoliecon DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Reiffen, David AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - On the Equivalence of Resale Price Maintenance and Quantity Restrictions JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization Y1 - 1999/02// VL - 17 IS - 2 SP - 277 EP - 288 SN - 01677187 N1 - Accession Number: 0484276; Keywords: Monopolists; Resale Price Maintenance; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 199903 N2 - When demand is known with certainty, there is a clear mapping between a monopolist's pricing and output decisions. This suggests an equivalence between a monopolist manufacturer specifying a minimum (maximum) retail price and imposing a maximum (minimum) quantity on its retailers. This paper shows that while the effect of maximum resale price maintenance (RPM) can always be replicated by an appropriate quantity floor, the minimum RPM outcome cannot always be replicated by an appropriately-chosen quantity ceiling. As such, the analysis provides one reason that manufacturers will choose a price floor rather than quantity ceiling, even though a quantity ceiling would appear to lead to lower monitoring costs. KW - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts L42 KW - Firm Organization and Market Structure L22 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0484276&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01677187 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Oliver, Geoffrey D. AD - US Federal Trade Commission A2 - Mattox, Gale A. A2 - Oliver, Geoffrey D. A2 - Tucker, Jonathan B. T1 - Germany in Transition: Introduction T2 - Germany in transition: A unified nation's search for identity PB - Boulder and Oxford: PB - Westview Press in cooperation with the Robert Bosch Foundation Y1 - 1999/// SP - 55 EP - 60 N1 - Accession Number: 0569365; Reviewed Book ISBN: 0-8133-9150-4; 0-8133-9151-2; ; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200107 KW - General Outlook and Conditions E66 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0569365&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Dranove, David AU - Ludwick, Richard AD - Northwestern U AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Competition and Pricing by Nonprofit Hospitals: A Reassessment of Lynk's Analysis JO - Journal of Health Economics JF - Journal of Health Economics Y1 - 1999/01// VL - 18 IS - 1 SP - 87 EP - 98 SN - 01676296 N1 - Accession Number: 0484434; Keywords: Hospital; Hospitals; Non Profit; Nonprofit; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 199903 KW - Analysis of Health Care Markets I11 KW - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs L31 L3 - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01676296 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0484434&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01676296 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR ID - 105297943 T1 - How the Federal Trade Commission is fighting cancer treatment scams. AU - Kando-Pineda C Y1 - 2010/01// N1 - Accession Number: 105297943. Language: English. Entry Date: 20100312. Revision Date: 20150711. Publication Type: Journal Article. Journal Subset: Biomedical; Blind Peer Reviewed; Editorial Board Reviewed; Expert Peer Reviewed; USA. Special Interest: Oncologic Care. NLM UID: 101261852. KW - Education KW - Fraud -- Prevention and Control KW - Oncologic Care KW - Government KW - World Wide Web SP - 50 EP - 51 JO - Journal of Oncology Practice JF - Journal of Oncology Practice JA - J ONCOL PRACT VL - 6 IS - 1 CY - Alexandria, Virginia PB - American Society of Clinical Oncology SN - 1554-7477 AD - Division of Consumer and Business Education, Federal Trade Commission, 600 Pennsyvlania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20580; ckando@ftc.gov U2 - PMID: 20539734. DO - 10.1200/JOP.091016 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=rzh&AN=105297943&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - rzh ER - TY - JOUR AU - Rothchild, John AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Making the Market Work: Enhancing Consumer Sovereignty through the Telemarketing Sales Rule and the Distance Selling Directive JO - Journal of Consumer Policy JF - Journal of Consumer Policy Y1 - 1998/09// VL - 21 IS - 3 SP - 279 EP - 313 SN - 01687034 N1 - Accession Number: 0487270; Keywords: Consumer Sovereignty; Consumer; Telemarketing; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; EU; Geographic Region: Northern America; Europe; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 199904 N2 - This article analyzes the provisions of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, which the Federal Trade Commission promulgated in 1995 pursuant to the 1994 Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act. The author proposes a framework through which the Rule may be understood as embodying a regulatory strategy of controlling abusive telemarketing by enhancing the effectiveness of market forces. In particular, the Rule works by improving the quantity and quality of information flowing to consumers, preventing the occurrence of transactions that the consumer does not truly intend, preventing telemarketers from evading the effects of market forces governing availability of payment mechanisms, and enhancing the effectiveness of the contract regime.The article then applies the same framework to the 1997 Distance Selling Directive of the European Union, yielding several recommendations that EU member countries may find useful when transposing the Directive into national law. The author also discusses some of the special considerations that EU member countries should take account of when transposing the Directive's requirements in the context of electronic commerce. KW - Consumer Protection D18 KW - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods L52 KW - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law K23 KW - Marketing M31 L3 - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/10603 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0487270&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://link.springer.com/journal/volumesAndIssues/10603 DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Kelly, Kenneth H. AU - Morkre, Morris E. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Do Unfairly Traded Imports Injure Domestic Industries? JO - Review of International Economics JF - Review of International Economics Y1 - 1998/05// VL - 6 IS - 2 SP - 321 EP - 332 SN - 09657576 N1 - Accession Number: 0482387; Keywords: Anti Dumping; Antidumping; Duty; Import; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 199901 N2 - There is a widespread popular belief that American industry is being destroyed by unfairly traded imports, that is, those that are subsidized or dumped. This claim is tested with data (where available) from all final US government countervailing duty and antidumping duty investigations between 1980 and 1988. Using a computable partial equilibrium model, upper bounds of the impact of unfairly traded imports on the revenue of competing domestic industries are computed. It is found that for most industries the effect of unfairly traded imports is minor. KW - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations F13 KW - Empirical Studies of Trade F14 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-9396/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0482387&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291467-9396/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Rodriguez, A. E. AU - Williams, Mark D. AD - Price Waterhouse AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Recent Decisions by the Venezuelan and Peruvian Agencies: Lessons for the Export of Antitrust JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 1998///Spring VL - 43 IS - 1 SP - 147 EP - 178 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 0470396; Geographic Descriptors: Venezuela; Peru; Geographic Region: Latin America and the Caribbean; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 199808 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods H87 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0470396&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Boner, Roger Alan AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Antitrust and State Action in Transition Economies JO - Antitrust Bulletin JF - Antitrust Bulletin Y1 - 1998///Spring VL - 43 IS - 1 SP - 71 EP - 103 SN - 0003603X N1 - Accession Number: 0470394; Keywords: Transitional Economies; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Ukraine; Kazakhstan; Geographic Region: Northern America; Europe; Asia; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 199808 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 KW - Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Planning, Coordination, and Reform P21 L3 - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0470394&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.federallegalpublications.com/antitrust-bulletin/all DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Silvia, Louis AU - Leibenluft, Robert F. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Health Economics Research and Antitrust Enforcement JO - Health Economics JF - Health Economics Y1 - 1998/03// VL - 7 IS - 2 SP - 163 EP - 166 SN - 10579230 N1 - Accession Number: 0459564; Keywords: Health; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 199807 KW - Health: General I10 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations L44 L3 - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291099-1050/issues UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0459564&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/%28ISSN%291099-1050/issues DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Tom, Willard K. AU - Newberg, Joshua A. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Federal Trade Commission and U TX A2 - Anderson, Robert D. A2 - Gallini, Nancy T. T1 - U.S. Enforcement Approaches to the Antitrust-Intellectual Property Interface T2 - Competition policy and intellectual property rights in the knowledge-based economy PB - Industry Canada Research Series, vol. 9. PB - Calgary: PB - University of Calgary Press Y1 - 1998/// SP - 343 EP - 393 N1 - Accession Number: 0555398; Reviewed Book ISBN: 1-895176-97-2; Keywords: Property; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200103 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital O34 KW - Technological Change: Government Policy O38 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0555398&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Balto, David A. AD - US Federal Trade Commission A2 - Gabel, David A2 - Weiman, David F. T1 - Access Demands and Network Joint Ventures T2 - Opening networks to competition: The regulation and pricing of access PB - Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series. PB - Boston; Dordrecht and London: PB - Kluwer Academic Y1 - 1998/// SP - 181 EP - 220 N1 - Accession Number: 0536581; Reviewed Book ISBN: 0-7923-8019-3; Keywords: Joint Venture; Network; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Canada; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200011 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks L14 KW - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages G21 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Microelectronics; Computers; Communications Equipment L63 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0536581&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Deyak, Timothy A. AU - Sawyer, W. Charles AU - Sprinkle, Richard L. AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - U Southern MS AD - U TX, El Paso T1 - Changes in the Income and Price Elasticities of U.S. Import Demand JO - Economia Internazionale JF - Economia Internazionale Y1 - 1997/05// VL - 50 IS - 2 SP - 161 EP - 175 SN - 0012981X N1 - Accession Number: 0435223; Keywords: Import; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 199712 N2 - Previous research on the estimation of income and price elasticities of U.S. import demand has indicated that these elasticities may have changed over time. To examine this issue, alternative specifications of the U.S. import demand function for the total time series and the fixed and flexible exchange rate periods are considered. It was found that the U.S. import demand function was not homogeneous in the fixed exchange rate period and homogeneous in the flexible exchange rate period. Recursive regression estimates of the income elasticity indicate that it has risen over time. The price elasticities are shown to be quite volatile in the 1970s, but more stable during the 1980s. These results imply that researchers estimating import demand elasticities may need to be cautious about the specification when the time series encompasses a change in the exchange rate regime. KW - Empirical Studies of Trade F14 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0435223&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Simpson, John AD - US Federal Trade Commission A2 - Zerbe, Richard O., Jr. A2 - Kovacic, William T1 - When Does New Entry Deter Collusion? T2 - Research in law and economics. Volume 18 PB - Greenwich, Conn. and London: PB - JAI Press Y1 - 1997/// SP - 229 EP - 239 N1 - Accession Number: 0525561; Reviewed Book ISBN: 0-7623-0121-X; Keywords: Collusion; Entry; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 200005 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies L12 KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Antitrust Law K21 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 KW - Economics of Regulation L51 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0525561&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Yao, Dennis A. AD - US Federal Trade Commission and Wharton School, U PA A2 - Chatterjee, Kalyan A2 - Gray, Barbara T1 - Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures: An Overview T2 - International joint ventures: Economic and organizational perspectives PB - Boston; Dordrecht and London: PB - Kluwer Academic Y1 - 1995/// SP - 145 EP - 151 N1 - Accession Number: 0452085; Reviewed Book ISBN: 0-7923-9603-0; Keywords: Joint Venture; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 199805 KW - Multinational Firms; International Business F23 KW - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General L40 KW - Antitrust Law K21 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0452085&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Smith, Loren K. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - New Market Policy Effects on Used Markets: Theory and Evidence JO - B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy JF - B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy: Topics in Economic Analysis and Policy Y1 - 2009/// VL - 9 IS - 1 SN - 19351682 N1 - Accession Number: 1068620; Keywords: Aircraft; Prices; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200911 N2 - Because of linkages between markets for new and used durable goods, economic policies that target new durable good markets, such as tax incentives or antitrust legislation, are likely to affect used goods markets as well. I use a simple theoretical model to illustrate how an exogenous shock to prices of new durable goods affects prices and trade frequencies of corresponding used goods. The model predicts that if prices of new durable goods increase, then prices of used goods will also increase. In addition, if the distribution of consumer preferences for quality are relatively concentrated among those with a high preference for quality, then trade in used good markets will slow. The predictions of the model are supported by an empirical analysis of the market for new and used wide-body commercial aircraft following a major change in effective aircraft prices caused by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The Act effectively increased prices of new aircraft by an average of $6.5 million. At the same time, used aircraft prices increased by an average of $2.9 million to $7.7 million and used aircraft sales fell between 23 to 36 percent. These results suggest that policies that affect new durable good markets can have significant effects on used markets as well. KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Automobiles; Other Transportation Equipment L62 KW - Air Transportation L93 L3 - http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1068620&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/topics/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Coate, Malcolm B. AD - US Federal Trade Commission T1 - Theory Meets Practice: Barriers to Entry in Merger Analysis JO - Review of Law and Economics JF - Review of Law and Economics Y1 - 2008/// VL - 4 IS - 1 SN - 15555879 N1 - Accession Number: 0987367; Keywords: Competition; Entry; Merger; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200808 N2 - Barriers to entry are a necessary, but not sufficient condition for a merger to adversely affect competition. As a barrier definition must be linked to the specific theory of competitive concern under review to be meaningful, a theoretical barrier definition is unlikely to be useful. Instead, an operational definition of barriers to entry is required. This paper explores the operationalization of the Merger Guidelines barrier to entry concept. A review of the files observes that most matters involve multiple entry scenarios, so it is often impossible to draw strict conclusions for the individual characteristics of timeliness, likelihood, or sufficiency. However, by following each entry scenario through the three-stage analysis, it is possible to identify barriers to entry in 109 of the 138 matters reviewed. Within this analysis, the timeliness consideration is generally supported by the best evidence, while the likelihood characteristic leaves the most room for improvement. A total of 55 matters exhibit evidence of recent entry and 46 files report expectations of future entry. A few files detail innovative net present value analyses to determine the profitability of entry into the market. This type of financial analysis offers the promise of a quantitative approach to likelihood analysis. KW - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance G34 KW - Labor Law K31 KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L13 KW - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices L41 L3 - http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rle UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0987367&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/rle DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR AU - Hosken, Daniel AU - Reiffen, David AD - US Federal Trade Commission AD - US Commodity Futures Trading Commission T1 - Pricing Behavior of Multiproduct Retailers JO - B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Topics in Theoretical Economics JF - B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics: Topics in Theoretical Economics Y1 - 2007/// VL - 7 IS - 1 SN - 19351704 N1 - Accession Number: 0949302; Keywords: Pricing; Retailers; Publication Type: Journal Article; Update Code: 200801 N2 - This paper develops a model of competition among multiproduct retailers that is consistent with observed pricing regularities, such as the facts that virtually all products have large mass points in their price distributions and that most deviations fall below these mass points. The basis of the model is that, when consumers prefer to buy a bundle of goods from the same retailer, a given discount on any one good in the bundle will have a similar effect on consumers' likelihood of visiting that retailer. Consequently, discounts on goods sold by a retailer are substitute instruments for attracting customers, and factors that influence one goods' price will also affect other goods' prices. Hence, if intertemporal price changes are a means of price discriminating (as the literature suggests), then the impact of these changes will be reflected in the prices of many goods--including those for which discrimination is infeasible. KW - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms L11 KW - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce L81 L3 - http://www.bepress.com/bejte/topics/ UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0949302&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - http://www.bepress.com/bejte/topics/ DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - CHAP AU - Yao, Dennis AD - US Federal Trade Commission and U PA A2 - Leitzel, Jim A2 - Tirole, Jean T1 - Incentive-Based Procurement Oversight by Protest: Discussion T2 - Incentives in procurement contracting PB - Pew Studies in Economics and Security. PB - Boulder and Oxford: PB - Westview Press Y1 - 1993/// SP - 57 EP - 59 N1 - Accession Number: 0395844; Reviewed Book ISBN: 0-8133-8566-0; Keywords: Procurement; Geographic Descriptors: U.S.; Geographic Region: Northern America; Publication Type: Collective Volume Article; Update Code: 199610 KW - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D72 KW - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement H57 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=0395844&site=ehost-live&scope=site DP - EBSCOhost DB - ecn ER - TY - JOUR ID - 2007-16693-003 AN - 2007-16693-003 AU - Desrochers, Debra M. AU - Holt, Debra J. T1 - Children's exposure to television advertising: Implications for childhood obesity. JF - Journal of Public Policy & Marketing JO - Journal of Public Policy & Marketing Y1 - 2007///Fal 2007 VL - 26 IS - 2 SP - 182 EP - 201 CY - US PB - American Marketing Association SN - 0743-9156 SN - 1547-7207 AD - Desrochers, Debra M. N1 - Accession Number: 2007-16693-003. Partial author list: First Author & Affiliation: Desrochers, Debra M.; Department, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, US. Release Date: 20080225. Correction Date: 20110704. Publication Type: Journal (0100), Peer Reviewed Journal (0110). Format Covered: Electronic. Document Type: Journal Article. Language: English. Major Descriptor: Childhood Development; Epidemiology; Health; Obesity; Television Advertising. Classification: Eating Disorders (3260). Population: Human (10). Location: US. Age Group: Childhood (birth-12 yrs) (100); Preschool Age (2-5 yrs) (160); School Age (6-12 yrs) (180). Methodology: Empirical Study; Quantitative Study. References Available: Y. Page Count: 20. Issue Publication Date: Fal 2007. AB - In 2005, the Institute of Medicine declared that the prevalence of childhood obesity in the United States ranks as a major health concern. Although the role of television advertising as a possible contributor has received considerable research attention, most previous studies have not included a detailed analysis of children's exposure on all programming or made comparisons with earlier estimates. Therefore, the Bureau of Economics staff at the Federal Trade Commission undertook a comprehensive analysis of television advertising to determine how many and what types of advertisements children are exposed to today and how the findings compare with their exposure before the rise in obesity. This article presents the major findings of the Federal Trade Commission's report and discusses several other issues that help inform the obesity debate. The article's insights will be useful to policy makers, researchers, marketers, and other constituencies involved in developing solutions to the obesity problem. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) KW - childrens exposure KW - television advertising KW - childhood obesity KW - health KW - prevalence KW - 2007 KW - Childhood Development KW - Epidemiology KW - Health KW - Obesity KW - Television Advertising KW - 2007 DO - 10.1509/jppm.26.2.182 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2007-16693-003&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - dholt@ftc.gov UR - Debra.M.Desrochers.1@nd.edu DP - EBSCOhost DB - psyh ER - TY - JOUR ID - 2007-07494-011 AN - 2007-07494-011 AU - Anderson, Keith B. T1 - The costs and benefits of do-not-call regulations: A comment on Beard and Abernethy's 'Consumer prices and the Federal Trade Commission's 'do-not-call' program.' JF - Journal of Public Policy & Marketing JO - Journal of Public Policy & Marketing Y1 - 2007///Spr 2007 VL - 26 IS - 1 SP - 144 EP - 148 CY - US PB - American Marketing Association SN - 0743-9156 SN - 1547-7207 AD - Anderson, Keith B. N1 - Accession Number: 2007-07494-011. Partial author list: First Author & Affiliation: Anderson, Keith B.; Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, US. Release Date: 20071126. Correction Date: 20110704. Publication Type: Journal (0100), Peer Reviewed Journal (0110). Format Covered: Electronic. Document Type: Comment/Reply. Language: English. Major Descriptor: Consumer Attitudes; Costs and Cost Analysis; Marketing; Policy Making; Telecommunications Media. Classification: Consumer Psychology (3900). Population: Human (10). References Available: Y. Page Count: 5. Issue Publication Date: Spr 2007. AB - In a 2005 Journal of Public Policy & Marketing article, T. R. Beard and A. M. Abernethy (see record [rid]2005-15302-007[/rid]) estimate that the Federal Trade Commission's do-not-call regulations could plausibly be increasing the amount the average household pays for long-distance service by $19-$39 per year. However, their approach causes them to overstate the possible costs significantly. An expanded model and more plausible parameter values result in cost estimates of no more than $6-$22 per year. Furthermore, the benefits of the do-not-call regulations--the ability of consumers to avoid the interruptions caused by unwanted commercial telephone calls--suggest that the benefits of avoiding unwanted calls from long-distance providers are greater than the costs of the regulations if consumers value the time taken up by unwanted telemarketing calls at more than $8-$27 per hour. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) KW - consumer prices KW - Federal Trade Commission KW - policy making KW - marketing tools KW - telemarketing calls KW - 2007 KW - Consumer Attitudes KW - Costs and Cost Analysis KW - Marketing KW - Policy Making KW - Telecommunications Media KW - 2007 DO - 10.1509/jppm.26.1.144 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2007-07494-011&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - kanderson@ftc.gov DP - EBSCOhost DB - psyh ER - TY - JOUR ID - 2006-20729-003 AN - 2006-20729-003 AU - Anderson, Keith B. T1 - Who Are the Victims of Identity Theft? The Effect of Demographics. JF - Journal of Public Policy & Marketing JO - Journal of Public Policy & Marketing Y1 - 2006///Fal 2006 VL - 25 IS - 2 SP - 160 EP - 171 CY - US PB - American Marketing Association SN - 0743-9156 SN - 1547-7207 AD - Anderson, Keith B. N1 - Accession Number: 2006-20729-003. Partial author list: First Author & Affiliation: Anderson, Keith B.; Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, US. Release Date: 20070430. Correction Date: 20110704. Publication Type: Journal (0100), Peer Reviewed Journal (0110). Format Covered: Electronic. Document Type: Journal Article. Language: English. Major Descriptor: Business; Demographic Characteristics; Law Enforcement; Self-Concept. Minor Descriptor: Authority; Consumer Behavior. Classification: Civil Rights & Civil Law (4210); Consumer Attitudes & Behavior (3920). Population: Human (10); Male (30); Female (40). Location: US. Age Group: Adulthood (18 yrs & older) (300); Young Adulthood (18-29 yrs) (320); Thirties (30-39 yrs) (340); Middle Age (40-64 yrs) (360). Methodology: Empirical Study; Quantitative Study. References Available: Y. Page Count: 12. Issue Publication Date: Fal 2006. AB - Using the Federal Trade Commission's 2003 identity theft survey data, this article examines the relationship between a person's demographic characteristics and the likelihood of experiencing identity theft. Among other factors, the risk of identity theft appears to be higher for people with higher incomes, for younger consumers, and for women. A person's risk of being a victim of identity theft may depend, at least in part, on how many noncash accounts the consumer has and the intensity of their use. It may also depend on where the consumer conducts business and the precautions the consumer exercises. Because data to measure these factors directly are not available, differences in the risk faced by demographic groups may reflect differences in these considerations. This article should be of interest to those who are concerned with educating consumers about limiting identity theft risk and to law enforcement authorities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) KW - victims KW - identity theft KW - demographics effects KW - law enforcement authorities KW - consumer exercises KW - 2006 KW - Business KW - Demographic Characteristics KW - Law Enforcement KW - Self-Concept KW - Authority KW - Consumer Behavior KW - 2006 DO - 10.1509/jppm.25.2.160 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2006-20729-003&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - kanderson@ftc.gov DP - EBSCOhost DB - psyh ER - TY - JOUR ID - 2005-00806-006 AN - 2005-00806-006 AU - Tenn, Steven T1 - An Alternative Measure of Relative Education to Explain Voter Turnout. JF - The Journal of Politics JO - The Journal of Politics JA - J Polit Y1 - 2005/02// VL - 67 IS - 1 SP - 271 EP - 282 CY - United Kingdom PB - Blackwell Publishing SN - 0022-3816 SN - 1468-2508 AD - Tenn, Steven, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, US, 20580 N1 - Accession Number: 2005-00806-006. Partial author list: First Author & Affiliation: Tenn, Steven; Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC, US. Other Publishers: Cambridge University Press; Univ of Chicago Press; Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Release Date: 20050705. Correction Date: 20160125. Publication Type: Journal (0100), Peer Reviewed Journal (0110). Format Covered: Electronic. Document Type: Journal Article. Language: English. Major Descriptor: Education; Political Participation; Voting Behavior. Classification: Political Processes & Political Issues (2960). Population: Human (10); Male (30); Female (40). Location: US. Age Group: Adulthood (18 yrs & older) (300); Young Adulthood (18-29 yrs) (320); Thirties (30-39 yrs) (340); Middle Age (40-64 yrs) (360). Methodology: Empirical Study; Quantitative Study. Page Count: 12. Issue Publication Date: Feb, 2005. AB - Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry (1996) develop a theory in which relative, rather than absolute education determines political participation. Empirical tests of this theory have been unable to isolate the effect of education from other factors that impact participation. We propose an alternative definition in which education is measured relative to those born in the same year. This is used to estimate a model of voter turnout that controls for both absolute and relative education. The results show that this new measure of relative education has far more explanatory power than does absolute education. This finding has significant implications regarding how education affects both aggregate voter turnout levels and inequality in voter participation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) KW - political participation KW - voter turnout KW - education KW - 2005 KW - Education KW - Political Participation KW - Voting Behavior KW - 2005 DO - 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00317.x UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2005-00806-006&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - stenn@ftc.gov DP - EBSCOhost DB - psyh ER - TY - JOUR ID - 2002-11547-003 AN - 2002-11547-003 AU - Rhodes, S. D. AU - Bowie, D. A. AU - Hergenrather, K. C. T1 - Collecting behavioural data using the world wide web: Considerations for researchers. JF - Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health JO - Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health JA - J Epidemiol Community Health Y1 - 2003/01// VL - 57 IS - 1 SP - 68 EP - 73 CY - United Kingdom PB - BMJ Publishing Group SN - 0143-005X AD - Rhodes, S. D., University of North Carolina School of Public Health, Department of Health Behavior and Health Education, Campus Box 7440, Chapel Hill, NC, US, 27599-7440 N1 - Accession Number: 2002-11547-003. PMID: 12490652 Other Journal Title: British Journal of Preventive & Social Medicine. Partial author list: First Author & Affiliation: Rhodes, S. D.; University of North Carolina School of Public Health, Department of Health Behavior & Health Education, Chapel Hill, NC, US. Release Date: 20040112. Publication Type: Journal (0100), Peer Reviewed Journal (0110). Format Covered: Print. Document Type: Journal Article. Language: English. Major Descriptor: Computer Searching; Data Collection; Internet; Professional Ethics; Sampling (Experimental). Classification: Research Methods & Experimental Design (2260). References Available: Y. Page Count: 6. Issue Publication Date: Jan, 2003. AB - Aimed to identify and describe advantages, challenges, and ethical considerations of web based behavioural data collection. The advantages of using the world wide web to collect behavioural data include rapid access to numerous potential respondents and previously hidden populations, respondent openness and full participation, opportunities for student research, and reduced research costs. Challenges identified include issues related to sampling and sample representativeness, competition for the attention of respondents, and potential limitations resulting from the much cited 'digital divide', literacy, and disability. Ethical considerations include anonymity and privacy, providing and substantiating informed consent, and potential risks of malfeasance. Computer mediated communications, including electronic mail, the world wide web, and interactive programs will play an ever increasing part in the future of behavioural science research. Justifiable concerns regarding the use of the world wide web in research exist, but as access to, and use of, the internet becomes more widely and representatively distributed globally, the world wide web will become more applicable. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved) KW - world wide web KW - behavioural data collection KW - ethical considerations KW - informed consent KW - sampling KW - behavioural science research KW - 2003 KW - Computer Searching KW - Data Collection KW - Internet KW - Professional Ethics KW - Sampling (Experimental) KW - 2003 DO - 10.1136/jech.57.1.68 UR - https://auth.lib.unc.edu/ezproxy_auth.php?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=psyh&AN=2002-11547-003&site=ehost-live&scope=site UR - Scott_Rhodes@unc.edu DP - EBSCOhost DB - psyh ER -