TITLE 13
COURTS AND COURT PROCEDURE


Article


COURTS OF RECORD


Art. 1. General Provisions, 13-1-101 to 13-1-206.

Art. 1.5. Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act, 13-1.5-101 to 13-1.5-109.

Art. 2. Supreme Court, 13-2-101 to 13-2-127.

Art. 3. Judicial Departments, 13-3-101 to 13-3-113.

Art. 4. Court of Appeals, 13-4-101 to 13-4-113.

Art. 5. Judicial Districts, 13-5-101 to 13-5-305.

Art. 5.5. Commissions on Judicial Performance, 13-5.5-101 to 13-5.5-109.

Art. 6. County Courts, 13-6-101 to 13-6-504.

Art. 7. Superior Courts (Repealed).

Art. 8. Juvenile Court of Denver, 13-8-101 to 13-8-126.

Art. 9. Probate Court of Denver, 13-9-101 to 13-9-123.


MUNICIPAL COURTS


Art. 10. Municipal Courts, 13-10-101 to 13-10-126.


CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS


Art. 14. Civil Protection Orders, 13-14-101 to 13-14-104.


CHANGE OF NAME


Art. 15. Change of Name, 13-15-101 and 13-15-102.


COSTS


Art. 16. Costs - Civil Actions, 13-16-101 to 13-16-125.

Art. 17. Attorney Fees, 13-17-101 to 13-17-304.

Art. 17.5. Costs - Attorney Fees - Inmate Lawsuits, 13-17.5-101 to 13-17.5-108.


DAMAGES



Regulation of Actions and Proceedings


Art. 20. Actions, 13-20-101 to 13-20-1004.


Damages


Art. 21. Damages, 13-21-101 to 13-21-1106.


CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS


Art. 22. Age of Competence - Arbitration - Mediation, 13-22-101 to 13-22-507.

Art. 23. Structured Settlement Protection Act, 13-23-101 to 13-23-108.


EVIDENCE


Art. 25. Evidence - General Provisions, 13-25-101 to 13-25-135.

Art. 26. Uniform Photographic Records Act, 13-26-101 to 13-26-104.


FEES AND SALARIES


Art. 30. Compensation of Justices and Judges, 13-30-101 to 13-30-104.

Art. 31. Compensation of Clerks of Courts and Other Assistants (Repealed).

Art. 32. Fees of Clerks of Court, 13-32-101 to 13-32-114.

Art. 33. Fees of Jurors and Witnesses, 13-33-101 to 13-33-106.


FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER


Art. 40. Forcible Entry and Detainer - General Provisions, 13-40-101 to 13-40-126.


HABEAS CORPUS


Art. 45. Habeas Corpus - General Provisions, 13-45-101 to 13-45-121.


JOINT RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS


Art. 50. Joint Rights and Obligations, 13-50-101 to 13-50-105.

Art. 50.5. Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 13-50.5-101 to 13-50.5-106.


JUDGMENTS AND EXECUTIONS


Art. 51. Declaratory Judgments, 13-51-101 to 13-51-115.

Art. 51.5. Review of Land Use Decisions, 13-51.5-101 to 13-51.5-103.

Art. 52. Property Subject to Levy, 13-52-101 to 13-52-111.

Art. 53. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 13-53-101 to 13-53-108.

Art. 54. Property and Earnings Exempt, 13-54-101 to 13-54-107.

Art. 54.5. Garnishment, 13-54.5-101 to 13-54.5-111.

Art. 55. Method of Claiming Exemption, 13-55-101 to 13-55-110.

Art. 56. Levy and Sale - Real Estate, 13-56-101 to 13-56-201.

Art. 57. Sale of Chattels, 13-57-101 to 13-57-103.

Art. 58. Death of Parties, 13-58-101 to 13-58-105.

Art. 59. Execution Against the Body, 13-59-101 to 13-59-105.

Art. 60. Judgments Against Municipal Corporations, 13-60-101.

Art. 61. Garnishment of Public Servants, 13-61-101 to 13-61-105.

Art. 62. Uniform Foreign-country Money Judgments Recognition Act, 13-62-101 to 13-62-112.

Art. 62.1. Uniform Foreign-Money Claims Act, 13-62.1-101 to 13-62.1-118.

Art. 63. Default Judgments Based on Affidavits, 13-63-101.

Art. 64. Health Care Availability Act, 13-64-101 to 13-64-503.


JURIES AND JURORS


Art. 70. Juries and Jurors - General Provisions and Fees (Repealed).

Art. 71. Colorado Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act, 13-71-101 to 13-71-145.

Art. 72. Grand Jurors, 13-72-101 to 13-72-109.

Art. 73. Statewide Grand Juries, 13-73-101 to 13-73-108.

Art. 74. Judicial District Grand Juries, 13-74-101 to 13-74-110.


LIMITATION OF ACTIONS


Art. 80. Limitations - Personal Actions, 13-80-101 to 13-80-119.

Art. 81. Limitations - Persons Under Disability, 13-81-101 to 13-81-107.

Art. 82. Uniform Conflict of Laws - Limitation Periods, 13-82-101 to 13-82-107.


PRIORITY OF ACTIONS


Art. 85. Priority of Certain Civil Actions, 13-85-101 to 13-85-104.


WITNESSES


Art. 90. Witnesses, 13-90-101 to 13-90-210.

Art. 90.5. Interstate Depositions and Discovery Act, 13-90.5-101 to 13-90.5-107.

Art. 91. Office of the Child's Representative, 13-91-101 to 13-91-107.

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COURTS OF RECORD

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ARTICLE 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Annotations

 Cross references: For the disposition of fines and fees levied and collected in state courts, see § 30-10-102 (2); for the disposition of fines, penalties, or forfeitures collected pursuant to title 42, see § 42-1-217.

Annotations

 Law reviews: For a discussion of Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with courts and procedure, see 66 Den. U. L. Rev. 739 (1989); for a discussion of Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with courts and procedure, see 67 Den. U. L. Rev. 675 (1990).


Section


PART 1 ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS 

13-1-101. Clerks shall keep record books.

13-1-102. Entries in records.

13-1-103. Lost or destroyed records.

13-1-104. Application for new order or record.

13-1-105. Procedure where probate records destroyed.

13-1-106. Certified copy of record in supreme court or court of appeals.

13-1-107. Costs of replacement.

13-1-108. Judge may order adjournment.

13-1-109. Court may appoint trustee.

13-1-110. Appeal bond defective or insufficient.

13-1-111. Courts of record.

13-1-112. Clerk to keep seal.

13-1-113. Seal - how attached.

13-1-114. Powers of court.

13-1-115. Courts may issue proper writs.

13-1-116. Courts sit at county seat.

13-1-117. Juridical days.

13-1-118. Judicial holidays.

13-1-119. Judgment record and register of actions open for inspection.

13-1-119.5. Electronic access to name index and register of actions.

13-1-120. Proceedings in English - abbreviations.

13-1-121. Action not affected by vacancy.

13-1-122. When judge shall not act unless by consent.

13-1-123. Transfer of civil actions.

13-1-123.5. Transfer of venue - actions involving related persons.

13-1-124. Jurisdiction of courts.

13-1-125. Service of process.

13-1-126. Documents in court proceedings - designation by clerk of representative to attend court proceedings.

13-1-127. Entities - school districts - legislative declaration - representation.

13-1-128. Confidentiality of decisions of courts of record - violations - penalties.

13-1-129. Preferential trial dates.

13-1-130. Reports of convictions to department of education.

13-1-131. Speedy trial option in civil actions.

13-1-132. Use of interactive audiovisual devices in court proceedings.

13-1-133. Use of recycled paper.

13-1-134. Court automation system - juvenile or domestic actions.

13-1-135. Family courts - implementation report. (Repealed)

13-1-136. Civil protection orders - single set of forms.


PART 2 COURT SECURITY CASH FUND
COMMISSION 

13-1-201. Legislative declaration.

13-1-202. Definitions.

13-1-203. Court security cash fund commission - creation - membership.

13-1-204. Court security cash fund - creation - grants - regulations.

13-1-205. Grant applications - duties of counties.

13-1-206. Repeal of part.

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PART 1
ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

13-1-101. Clerks shall keep record books.

Statute text

The clerks of the courts of record in this state shall keep in their respective offices suitable books for indexing the records of their said offices, one to be known as the direct index and one as the inverse index.

History

 Source: L. 1889: p. 107, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1392. C.L. § 5610. CSA: C. 46, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-1-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Books of court are admissible as evidence. If the county court permits one of the books of its office to be taken into another court as evidence, the objection that the original, and not a certified copy, is produced is not tenable. McAllister v. People ex rel. Brisbane, 28 Colo. 156, 63 P. 308 (1900).

13-1-102. Entries in records.

Statute text

In said indexes, the clerks shall properly enter the title of each cause or matter instituted in said courts and the case number references to the various orders, rulings, judgments, papers, and other proceedings of the court in such cause or matter. Any case number reference may be to a file jacket, page in a record book, microfilm record, or computer record.

History

 Source: L. 1889: p. 107, § 2. R.S. 08: § 1393. C.L. § 5611. CSA: C. 46, § 2. CRS 53: § 37-1-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-2. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 596, § 1, effective July 1.

13-1-103. Lost or destroyed records.

Statute text

When the record of any judgment, or decree, or other proceeding of any judicial court of this state, or any part of the record of any judicial proceeding has been lost or destroyed, any party or person interested therein, on application by complaint in writing under oath to such court and on showing to the satisfaction of such court that the same has been lost or destroyed without fault or negligence of the party or person making such application, may obtain an order from such court authorizing the defect to be supplied by a duly certified copy of the original record, where the same can be obtained, which certificate shall thereafter have the same effect as the original record would have had in all respects.

History

 Source: L. 1889: p. 108, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1396. C.L. § 5614. CSA: C. 46, § 5. CRS 53: § 37-1-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-4.

13-1-104. Application for new order or record.

Statute text

When the loss or destruction of any record or part thereof has happened, and such defects cannot be supplied as provided in section 13-1-103, any party or person interested therein may make a written application to the court to which such record belonged, verified by affidavit, showing the loss or destruction thereof, and that certified copies thereof cannot be obtained by the party or person making such application, and the substance of the record so lost or destroyed, and that the loss or destruction occurred without the fault or negligence of the party or person making such application, and that the loss or destruction of the record, unless supplied, will or may result in damage to the party or person making such application. The court shall cause said application to be entered of record in said court, and due notice of said application shall be given by personal service of summons or by publication as in other cases; except that, in cases in which publication is required, the court may direct by order, to be entered of record, the form of the notice, and designate the newspaper in which the same shall be published. If, upon such hearing, said court is satisfied that the statements contained in said application are true, the court shall make an order embracing the substance and effect of the lost or destroyed record, which order shall be entered of record in said court and have the same effect which the original record would have had if the same had not been lost or destroyed insofar as concerns the party or person making such application and the persons who had been notified, as provided for in this section. The record in all cases where the proceeding was in rem and no personal service was had may be supplied upon like notice, as nearly as may be, as in the original proceeding.

History

 Source: L. 1889: p. 108, § 2. R.S. 08: § 1397. C.L. § 5615. CSA: C. 46, § 6. CRS 53: § 37-1-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-5.

13-1-105. Procedure where probate records destroyed.

Statute text

In case of the destruction by fire or otherwise of the records, or a part thereof, of any court having probate jurisdiction, the court may proceed, upon its own motion or upon the application in writing of any party in interest, to restore the records, papers, and proceedings of the court relating to the estate of deceased persons, including recorded wills and wills probated or filed for probate in said court. The power of restoration granted in this section shall also extend to the records, papers, proceedings, and documents of any previous court of probate which are or should be in the custody of a probate or district court. For the purpose of restoring said records, wills, papers, or proceedings, or any part thereof, the court may cause citations to be issued to all parties to be designated by it and may compel the attendance in court of any witness whose testimony may be necessary to establish any such record, or part thereof, and the production of any and all written and documentary evidence which it deems necessary in determining the true import and effect of the original record, will, paper, or other document belonging to the files of the court, and may make such orders and decrees establishing such original record, will, paper, document, or proceeding, or the substance thereof, as to it seems just and proper. The court may make all such rules and regulations governing the proceedings for the restoration of the record, will, paper, document, and proceeding pertaining to the court as in its judgment will best secure the rights and protect the interests of all parties concerned.

History

 Source: L. 1889: p. 109, § 3. R.S. 08: § 1398. C.L. § 5616. CSA: C. 46, § 7. CRS 53: § 37-1-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-6. L. 64: p. 224, § 56.

13-1-106. Certified copy of record in supreme court or court of appeals.

Statute text

In all causes which have been removed to the supreme court of this state or to the court of appeals, a duly certified copy of the record of such cause remaining in the supreme court or the court of appeals may be filed in the court from which said cause was removed, on motion of any party or person claiming to be interested therein, and the copy so filed shall have the same effect as the original record would have had if the same had not been lost or destroyed.

History

 Source: L. 1889: p. 110, § 4. R.S. 08: § 1399. C.L. § 5617. CSA: C. 46, § 8. CRS 53: § 37-1-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-7. L. 69: p. 269, § 3.

13-1-107. Costs of replacement.

Statute text

The person making the application for the restoration of records shall pay all the costs thereof.

History

 Source: L. 1897: p. 151, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1400. C.L. § 5621. CSA: C. 46, § 9. CRS 53: § 37-1-8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-8.

13-1-108. Judge may order adjournment.

Statute text

When in the opinion of the judge of any district or county court it is unnecessary or inadvisable to hold or convene any term of court fixed by statute, he may by an order in writing signed by him and filed with the clerk of such court adjourn the same sine die, or to a day certain, and the judges of said courts respectively have power to adjourn said courts, from time to time as may seem advisable, by written order signed and filed with the clerk of the court which may be so adjourned.

History

 Source: L. 1897: p. 151, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1407. C.L. § 5621. CSA: C. 46, § 12. CRS 53: § 37-1-9. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-9.

13-1-109. Court may appoint trustee.

Statute text

In all actions in any court of record of this state wherein any defendant is not found within the jurisdiction of the court and constructive service alone is had, and which is brought for the enforcement of an express, implied, or resulting trust, or for the removal of cloud from title to real estate, or for specific performance, or for the establishment of a lost or destroyed deed, conveyance, or instrument in writing, or for the establishment and proof of any conveyance, deed, or instrument in writing not properly proved and acknowledged, or in any other proceeding in rem, or affecting only specific property, where, according to the usual practice in courts of chancery, the court, if the defendant had been personally served, might direct or decree any act to be done or performed by the defendant in favor of plaintiff, the court may appoint a trustee for such defendant to do and perform in the place and stead of and for such defendant the acts required by the decree rendered in any such cause. Any act lawfully done by such trustee, under and in pursuance of any such decree, shall be as binding and effectual for all purposes as if done and performed by the defendant in pursuance of such decree.

History

 Source: L. 1887: p. 254, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1408. C.L. § 5622. CSA: C. 46, § 13. CRS 53: § 37-1-10. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-10.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For note, "Decrees in Rem Under the New Rules", see 13 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 140 (1941). For article, "A Decade of Colorado Law: Conflict of Laws, Security, Contracts and Equity", see 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 247 (1951).

13-1-110. Appeal bond defective or insufficient.

Statute text

If, at any time pending an appeal in any action, suit, or other proceeding, it appears to the appellate court that the appeal bond or undertaking is defective or insufficient or that any surety thereon has died, or has removed or is about to remove from this state, or has become or is likely to become insolvent, such appellate court shall order another appeal bond or undertaking, or such other and further security as to the appellate court seems proper, if the appellant or his attorney of record has been served with at least twenty-four hours' written notice of an application of the appellee for such order. If the appellant fails to comply with said order within ten days after the making of the same, the appeal shall be dismissed.

History

 Source: L. 19: p. 113, § 1. C.L. § 5623. CSA: C. 46, § 14. CRS 53: § 37-1-11. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-11. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 1575, § 11, effective July 10.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 The appellate court has full powers of determining the sufficiency of appeal bonds. Brown v. Ohman, 93 Colo. 561, 27 P.2d 588 (1933).

 An objection to the sufficiency of an appeal bond in a lower court cannot be raised for first time on review. Brown v. Ohman, 93 Colo. 561, 27 P.2d 588 (1933).

 In effect this section abolishes motions to dismiss appeals for insufficient bond, and substitutes a motion for new bond, and where no such motion is filed, a motion to dismiss for defective bond is properly overruled. Peters v. Peters, 82 Colo. 503, 261 P. 874 (1927).

 Powers of appellate court. The appellate court can set the amount of an appeal bond, order an additional surety, or approve the signature of a new surety on an old bond. Brown v. Ohman, 93 Colo. 561, 27 P.2d 588 (1933).

 Court can provide for addition of new sureties. If, after the approval of an appeal bond, it is found that a surety is insufficient, this section provides for the addition of new sureties, even after appeal. Zimmerman v. Combs, 91 Colo. 313, 14 P.2d 693 (1932).

 The fact that a new surety signed the first bond instead of new one is immaterial. Where on appeal the surety on the bond died and another was procured, the fact that the latter, through inadvertence, signed the first instead of the new bond, was held immaterial, where the bond signed had endorsed thereon the approval of the court clerk. Brown v. Ohman, 93 Colo. 561, 27 P.2d 588 (1933).

 Filing appeal bond without order fixing amount does not nullify appeal. Where on appeal from county to district court, the county judge entered an order reciting the filing of an appeal bond and its approval, the mere fact that there was no order fixing the amount of the bond did not nullify the appeal. Brown v. Ohman, 93 Colo. 561, 27 P.2d 588 (1933).

 Appeal bond as used in this statute means the cost bond described by C.A.R. 7 and not a supersedeas bond. Hart v. Schwab, 990 P.2d 1131 (Colo. App. 1999).

13-1-111. Courts of record.

Statute text

(1) Each of the following courts shall have a seal and shall be a court of record:

(a) The supreme court;

(b) The district courts;

(c) The county courts;

(d) The juvenile court in the city and county of Denver;

(e) The probate court in the city and county of Denver;

(f) Any court established by law and expressly denominated a court of record;

(g) Repealed.

(h) The court of appeals.

History

 Source: L. 1887: p. 212, § 412. Code 08: § 447. Code 21: § 449. Code 35: § 449. CRS 53: § 37-1-12. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-12. L. 64: p. 224, § 57. L. 72: p. 590, § 53. L. 77: (1)(h) added, p. 279, § 24, effective June 29. L. 79: IP(1) amended, p. 596, § 2, effective July 1. L. 85: (1)(g) repealed, p. 572, § 12, effective November 14, 1986.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 The acts of a court of record are known by its records. Judicial records are not only necessary but indispensable to the administration of justice. The court judgments can be evidenced only by its records. The acts of a court of record are known by its records alone and cannot be established by parol testimony. The court speaks only through its records, and the judge speaks only through the court. Herren v. People, 147 Colo. 442, 363 P.2d 1044 (1961).

13-1-112. Clerk to keep seal.

Statute text

The clerk of each court of record shall keep the seal thereof.

History

 Source: L. 1887: p. 212, § 413. Code 08: § 448. Code 21: § 450. Code 35: § 450. CRS 53: § 37-1-13. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-13.

13-1-113. Seal - how attached.

Statute text

(1) A seal of a court or public officer, when required on any writ, process, or proceeding or to authenticate a copy of any record or document, may be impressed with wax, wafer, or any other substance and then attached to the writ, process, or proceeding or to the copy of the record or document, or it may be impressed on the paper alone or electronically attached to or logically associated with an electronic record or document. When jury summonses, subpoenas, or subpoenas duces tecum are prepared by means of mechanical reproduction, the seal of the summoning court may be printed thereon instead of being impressed.

(2) A seal may also consist of a rubber stamp with a facsimile affixed thereon of the seal required to be used and may be placed or stamped upon the document requiring the seal with indelible ink.

History

 Source: L. 1887: p. 198, § 362. Code 08: § 396. Code 21: § 397. Code 35: § 397. CRS 53: § 37-1-14. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-14. L. 67: p. 70, § 1. L. 75: Entire section R&RE, p. 489, § 4, effective July 14. L. 80: (1) amended, p. 506, § 1, effective March 25. L. 2011: (1) amended, (HB 11-1018), ch. 18, p. 46, § 1, effective March 11.

13-1-114. Powers of court.

Statute text

(1) Every court has power:

(a) To preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;

(b) To enforce order in the proceedings before it or before a person empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;

(c) To compel obedience to its lawful judgments, orders, and process and to the lawful orders of its judge out of court in action or proceeding pending therein;

(d) To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers.

(2) Any judge of any court, when he reasonably believes that there is a risk of violence in the court, shall immediately advise the law enforcement agency designated to provide security for the court, and the law enforcement agency shall determine and provide appropriate security measures consistent with the degree of risk present. For the purpose of this subsection (2), a district or county judge shall have the assistance of the county sheriff, and a municipal judge shall have the assistance of the municipal police department. The court shall have discretion to assess all or part of the expense incurred in implementing such security measures as costs to be paid by the party or parties or other person or persons determined by the court to have necessitated such security measures.

(3) Any county sheriff or municipal peace officer providing security for persons involved in judicial proceedings in courts pursuant to subsection (2) of this section shall be immune from civil liability for damages except for gross negligence or reckless, wanton, or intentional misconduct.

History

 Source: L. 1887: p. 216, § 428. Code 08: § 463. Code 21: § 464. Code 35: § 464. CRS 53: § 37-1-15. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-15. L. 86: (2) and (3) added, p. 673, § 1, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 A county's duties under subsection (2) may not be reduced or ended pursuant to art. X, § 20(9) of the state constitution. State v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Mesa County, 897 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1995).

 Applied in Campbell v. District Court, 304 Colo. 195, 577 P.2d 1096 (1978).

13-1-115. Courts may issue proper writs.

Statute text

The courts have power to issue all writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of the power conferred on them by the constitution and laws of this state. The district courts have authority in ne exeat proceedings according to the usual practice in such cases in courts of chancery.

History

 Source: L. 1887: p. 217, § 434. L. 1891: p. 85, § 1. Code 08: § 469. Code 21: § 470. Code 35: § 470. CRS 53: § 37-1-16. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-16.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 The court, in a civil action, has authority to issue a writ of ne exeat to protect the interests of a litigant. Struble v. Hicks, 123 Colo. 16, 224 P.2d 932 (1950) (decided under repealed § 31 of appendix B, R.C.P. Colo., CSA, 1935, which was similar to this section).

 C.R.C.P. 106 merely abolished the form and not the substance of the remedial writs such as the writ of ne exeat. A district court still possesses the authority to issue a writ in the nature of ne exeat, which is designed to prevent a person from leaving the court's jurisdiction. In re People ex rel. B.C., 981 P.2d 145 (Colo. 1999).

13-1-116. Courts sit at county seat.

Statute text

Every court of record shall sit at the county seat of the county in which it is held, except as may be otherwise provided by law.

History

 Source: L. 1887: p. 214, § 418. Code 08: § 453. Code 21: § 455. Code 35: § 455. CRS 53: § 37-1-18. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-18.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 A district court can be in session only in its own county. State Bank v. Plummer, 46 Colo. 71, 102 P. 1082 (1909) (decided under repealed provisions antecedent to § 25 of appendix B, R.C.P. Colo., CSA, 1935).

 Moving trial to hospital to hear closing arguments, give instructions to jury, and allow jury to deliberate because of a seriously ill juror did not deprive court of jurisdiction and retrial will not constitute double jeopardy. People v. Higa, 735 P.2d 203 (Colo. App. 1987).

 Section 13-5-119 (2) is an exception to the county seat requirement in this section. City of Littleton v. County Comm'rs, 787 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1990).

13-1-117. Juridical days.

Statute text

The courts of justice may be held and judicial business may be transacted on any day except as provided in section 13-1-118.

History

 Source: L. 1887: p. 213, § 415. Code 08: § 450. Code 21: § 452. Code 35: § 452. CRS 53: § 37-1-19. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-19.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 There can be no exceptions to statutory days of judicial business. When the law has prescribed a time and place at which the judicial business of the county must be transacted, there can be no exception to the provision, unless it is expressly made by statute. State Bank v. Plummer, 46 Colo. 71, 102 P. 1082 (1909); Scott v. Stutheit, 21 Colo. App. 28, 121 P. 151 (1912) (decided under repealed provisions antecedent to § 25 of appendix B, R.C.P. Colo., CSA, 1935).

13-1-118. Judicial holidays.

Statute text

(1) No court shall be opened nor shall any judicial business be transacted on Sunday or any legal holiday except for the following purposes:

(a) To give, upon their request, instruction to a jury then deliberating on their verdict;

(b) To receive a verdict or discharge a jury;

(c) For the exercise of the powers of a judge in a criminal action or in a proceeding of a criminal nature;

(d) When it appears by the affidavit of the plaintiff, or someone in his behalf, in cases for the recovery of specific personal property, that the defendant is about to conceal, dispose of, or remove such property out of the jurisdiction of the court, an order for taking possession of the same may be issued and the writ or process executed on any day;

(e) When an application for writ of attachment is made, if it shall appear by the affidavit of the plaintiff, or someone in his behalf, that the defendant is about to dispose of, conceal, or remove property subject to execution or attachment out of the jurisdiction of the court, a writ of attachment may be issued and executed on any day.

(2) When the day fixed for the opening of a court falls on any of the days mentioned in this section, the court shall stand adjourned until the next succeeding day.

History

 Source: L. 1887: p. 213, § 416. Code 08: § 451. Code 21: §§ 451, 453. Code 35: § 453. CRS 53: § 37-1-20. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-20.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Verdicts may be received on a judicial holiday. Receiving a verdict is a ministerial act performed for the jury in a judicial proceeding. The weight of authority is to the end that verdicts, the result of trials started and concluded before Sunday, may be received on Sunday and statutory holidays. Carr v. People, 99 Colo. 477, 63 P.2d 1221 (1936) (decided under repealed § 23 of appendix B, R.C.P. Colo., CSA, 1935, which was similar to this section).

 Judgment entered on legal holiday not void and becomes effective next business day. Subsection (1) does not provide that any judicial business transacted in violation of its provisions is void. Rather, the statute is silent as to the effect of any order entered or other judicial business transacted in violation of its prohibitions. Subsection (2) provides that the effect of having a day fixed for the opening of a court that falls on a prohibited day is that "the court shall stand adjourned until the next succeeding day." Thus, the effect of the trial court's entry of an order reviving judgment on a legal holiday was not to invalidate the order but, rather, merely to postpone its effective date until the next day the courts were open. Arvada 1st Indus. Bank v. Hutchison, 15 P.3d 292 (Colo. App. 2000).

13-1-119. Judgment record and register of actions open for inspection.

Statute text

The judgment record and register of actions shall be open at all times during office hours for the inspection of the public without charge, and it is the duty of the clerk to arrange the several records kept by him in such manner as to facilitate their inspection. In addition to paper records, such information may also be presented on microfilm or computer terminal.

History

 Source: L. 1887: p. 166, § 231. Code 08: § 250. Code 21: § 251. Code 35: § 251. CRS 53: § 37-1-21. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-21. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 596, § 3, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 The court did not err by taking judicial notice of defendant's probation status after determining the status from the state computer system. Since this section and Crim. P. 55 expressly approve of records kept and maintained in a state computer system, the court may take judicial notice of the court records contained in the system. People v. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d 1130 (Colo. App. 2008).

13-1-119.5. Electronic access to name index and register of actions.

Statute text

(1) Statewide electronic read-only access to the name index and register of actions of public case types shall be made available to the following agencies or attorneys appointed by the court:

(a) County departments as defined in section 19-1-103 (32), C.R.S., and attorneys who represent the county departments as county attorneys, as defined in section 19-1-103 (31.5), C.R.S., as it relates to the attorneys' work representing the county;

(b) The office of the state public defender, created in section 21-1-101, C.R.S.;

(c) Guardians ad litem under contract with the office of the child's representative, created in section 13-91-104, or authorized by the office of the child's representative to act as a guardian ad litem, as it relates to a case in which they are appointed by the court;

(d) Attorneys under contract with the office of the alternate defense counsel, created in section 21-2-101, C.R.S., as it relates to a case in which they are appointed by the court;

(e) Respondent parent counsel appointed by the court and paid by the judicial department as it relates to a case in which they are appointed by the court; and

(f) Criminal justice agencies as described in section 24-72-302 (3), C.R.S.

(2) The supreme court may adopt rules regarding access to the name index and register of actions, including rules identifying confidential information maintained in the system and state requirements for using the confidential information. All agencies with access pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall ensure that individuals who use the system receive training on appropriate usage and confidentiality of register of action information. Additionally, the state court administrator may monitor the use of the system and information through audits and the review of ad hoc queries or reports.

History

 Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 1240, § 1, effective August 5.

13-1-120. Proceedings in English - abbreviations.

Statute text

Every written proceeding in a court of justice in this state, or before a judicial officer, shall be in the English language, but such abbreviations as are now commonly used in that language may be used, and numbers expressed by figures or numerals in the customary manner.

History

 Source: L. 1887: p. 212, § 411. Code 08: § 446. Code 21: § 448. Code 35: § 448. CRS 53: § 37-1-22. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-22.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 The translation of instructions into Spanish for the use and instruction of a juror understanding that language alone would not be inhibited by the spirit of this section. The object of the provision is to secure a record in English, and this would in nowise be defeated. Trinidad v. Simpson, 5 Colo. 65 (1879) (decided under repealed provisions antecedent to § 18 of appendix B, R.C.P. Colo., CSA, 1935).

13-1-121. Action not affected by vacancy.

Statute text

No action or proceeding in a court of justice in this state shall be affected by a vacancy in the office of any of the judges, or by failure of a term thereof.

History

 Source: L. 1887: p. 212, § 410. Code 08: § 445. Code 21: § 447. Code 35: § 447. CRS 53: § 37-1-23. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-23.

13-1-122. When judge shall not act unless by consent.

Statute text

A judge shall not act as such in any of the following cases: In an action or proceeding to which he is a party, or in which he is interested; when he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity in the third degree; or when he has been attorney or counsel for either party in the action or proceeding, unless by consent of all parties to the action.

History

 Source: L. 1887: p. 216, § 429. Code 08: § 464. Code 21: § 465. Code 35: § 465. CRS 53: § 37-1-24. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-24.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Annotator's note. Since § 13-1-122 is similar to repealed provisions antecedent to § 28 of appendix B, R.C.P. Colo., CSA, 1935, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

 A judge must disqualify himself if he has a private interest. Any personal or private interest within this statute or rule would disqualify the county judge as the trial judge, and his refusal to remove himself as the trial judge would be grounds for reversal. Any action involving a situation where the trial judge may benefit in a pecuniary way depending upon his decision would be a prime example of a situation in which a trial judge would have no alternative other than to disqualify himself. Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296, 439 P.2d 43 (1968).

 Generally, a judge has a discretionary prerogative in the area of public interest. In the area of public interest, a judge upon being challenged, may in his discretionary prerogative remove himself, but if he refuses, his decision will not be reversed unless it is shown convincingly that his interest was so intense that a probability existed that his decision would be tainted. Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296, 439 P.2d 43 (1968).

 A differentiation must be made between a judge's private and public interest. In considering the trial court's purported interest in the subject and outcome of the school bond election contest, it is necessary to differentiate between a "private" interest and a "public" interest in the controversy and the outcome. Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296, 439 P.2d 43 (1968).

 Public interest as a citizen is not grounds for disqualification. An interest which a judge may have as a citizen in a public question or issue is no basis per se for his removal as the trial judge in an action contesting an election determinative of the public question or issue. Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296, 439 P.2d 43 (1968).

 A public interest is an interest shared by citizens generally in the affairs of local, state, or national government, and is not the same character of interest which compels disqualification as would a private interest. Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296, 439 P.2d 43 (1968).

 Interest in bond election may be so great so as to make it private interest. The attached affidavits and exhibits are insufficient to show that the county judge who was a qualified taxpaying elector, and who voted for and publicly approved the new school and bond issue, had such an interest in the bond election contest, or that he was so prejudiced against the contest action that he should have as a matter of law disqualified himself. Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296, 439 P.2d 43 (1968).

 Generally, obligations as taxpayer are not grounds for disqualification. The personal effect upon the trial judge, who as the owner of property would be charged with the obligation of the school bonds, is a pecuniary advantage or disadvantage so contingent, speculative, and remote as to be of no consequence. Public improvements, like new school buildings, may have the effect of increasing the tax obligation on real property but they also result in increasing the value of the property so that it is therefore next to impossible to state as a matter of certainty that a public improvement will be a disadvantage or advantage to any given piece of property. Russell v. Wheeler, 165 Colo. 296, 439 P.2d 43 (1968).

 Whether to disqualify himself in a civil case is a question within the discretion of the trial judge, and the judge's ruling on that issue will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. Colo. State Bd. of Agriculture v. First Nat'l Bank, 671 P.2d 1331 (Colo. App. 1983).

 A judge, having been of counsel for either party in the previous trial of the action, is under this section clearly disqualified from acting as judge in the trial of the case, and, where the disqualification is not waived by consent of the party he represented as counsel, has no authority to act judicially therein. O'Connell v. Gavett, 7 Colo. 40, 1 P. 902 (1883).

 He must by his own motion certify this to the district court. Under this section, a county judge who has acted as counsel in behalf of either litigant is not only disqualified from hearing motions to set aside judgments, but it is his duty on his own motion to certify the matters to the district court. People ex rel. Brown v. District Court, 26 Colo. 226, 56 P. 1115 (1899).

 Applied in Zoline v. Telluride Lodge Ass'n, 732 P.2d 635 (Colo. 1987).

13-1-123. Transfer of civil actions.

Statute text

When in any civil action pending in any court of record, whether filed as a special statutory proceeding, or otherwise, if for any reason the proceedings could be more expeditiously continued in another county, with the express consent of all parties, the court may order the cause transferred to any other county wherein the court finds the proceedings could be more expeditiously continued. No additional docket fee shall be required. Upon such a transfer being ordered, the clerk shall transfer all files, books, and records of the cause, or, if that is not practicable, he shall make, at the expense of the parties, and send to the clerk of the court to which the cause is transferred a certified copy of all records in the cause which are necessary for the continuation of the proceedings in the court to which such cause is transferred, and the cause shall continue in the court to which it is transferred with the same effect and force as though such cause were originally docketed in such court.

History

 Source: L. 59: p. 349, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-1-25. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-25.

Annotations

 Cross references: For venue and change of venue generally, see C.R.C.P. 98.

13-1-123.5. Transfer of venue - actions involving related persons.

Statute text

In addition to the authority to change venue granted by sections 19-2-105 and 19-3-201, C.R.S., for good cause shown, a court, on its own motion, on the motion of another court in this state, or on the motion of a party or guardian ad litem, may order the transfer of a pending action brought under title 14 or title 19, C.R.S., or rule 365 of the Colorado rules of county court civil procedure to a court in another county when there is an action pending in the other county that names the parent, guardian, or legal custodian of a child who is the subject of the action brought under title 14 or title 19, C.R.S. The county to which the action is being transferred must be one in which venue is proper. Upon an order for such transfer, the transferring court shall notify all parties of the transfer and transmit all documents to the receiving court. The transferred action shall continue in the court to which it is transferred with the same force and effect as though originally docketed in the receiving court.

History

 Source: L. 95: Entire section added, p. 46, § 1, effective January 1, 1996. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1687, § 13, effective January 1, 1997.

13-1-124. Jurisdiction of courts.

Statute text

(1) Engaging in any act enumerated in this section by any person, whether or not a resident of the state of Colorado, either in person or by an agent, submits such person and, if a natural person, such person's personal representative to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state concerning any cause of action arising from:

(a) The transaction of any business within this state;

(b) The commission of a tortious act within this state;

(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real property situated in this state;

(d) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk residing or located within this state at the time of contracting;

(e) The maintenance of a matrimonial domicile within this state with respect to all issues relating to obligations for support to children and spouse in any action for dissolution of marriage, legal separation, declaration of invalidity of marriage, or support of children if one of the parties of the marriage continues without interruption to be domiciled within the state;

(f) The engaging of sexual intercourse in this state as to an action brought under article 4 or article 6 of title 19, C.R.S., with respect to a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse, as set forth in verified petition; or

(g) The entering into of an agreement pursuant to part 2 or 5 of article 22 of this title.

History

 Source: L. 65: p. 472, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-26. L. 82: (1)(c) and (1)(d) amended and (1)(e) added, p. 280, § 1, effective April 2. L. 91: (1)(f) added, p. 248, § 2, effective July 1. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 359, § 1, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations


Analysis


I. General Consideration.
  A. In General.
  B. Constitutionality.
  C. Procedure.
II. Transacting Business.
  A. In General.
  B. Minimum Contacts Principle.
  C. What Constitutes Transacting Business.
  D. Agency Theory.
III. Commission of Tort.
IV. Real Property in Colorado.
V. Contracts of Insurance.
VI. Maintenance of Matrimonial Domicile.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

A. In General.

 Law reviews. For note, "One Year Review of Colorado Law -- 1964", see 42 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1965). For comment discussing the impact of Shaffer v. Heitner (433 U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed.2d 683 (1977)) on state long arm statute, see 55 Den. L.J. 365 (1978). For article, "Federal Practice and Procedure", see 56 Den. L.J. 491 (1979). For article, "Jurisdiction and Service of Process Beyond Colorado Boundaries", see 11 Colo. Law. 648 (1982). For article, "Legislative Activities in Family Law", see 11 Colo. Law. 1560 (1982). For article, "Federal Practice and Procedure", which discusses a recent Tenth Circuit decision dealing with in personam jurisdiction, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 219 (1985).

 This section and § 13-1-125 are sometimes referred to as the "long arm" or "single act" statute. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451, 412 P.2d 428 (1966); Cox v. District Court, 160 Colo. 437, 417 P.2d 792 (1966); Geer Co. v. District Court, 172 Colo. 48, 469 P.2d 734 (1970).

 Section is procedural, not substantive. This statute, an example of "long arm" statutes, is "procedural" rather than "substantive" and may operate retrospectively. Its effect is not to create a right or liability where none existed before; its only effect is to broaden the procedure whereby one seeking redress against an alleged tortfeasor may compel him to answer in the forum initially determined by the plaintiff to be the most convenient. Smith v. Putnam, 250 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Colo. 1965).

 Section merely establishes a new mode of obtaining jurisdiction of the person of the defendant in order to secure existing rights. Smith v. Putnam, 250 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Colo. 1965).

 Section was passed by the general assembly in order to extend rather than to limit the jurisdiction of the courts of the state. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491, 418 P.2d 527 (1966).

 Due process inquiry is all that is necessary. By extending jurisdiction to the maximum limits permissible under the United States and Colorado Constitutions, the general assembly obviated the need for further statutory analysis. New Frontier Media, Inc. v. Freeman, 85 P.3d 611 (Colo. App. 2003).

 Federal court's jurisdiction in diversity cases. In diversity cases, the federal district court's jurisdiction is coextensive with the state court's. Ruggieri v. Gen. Well Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982).

 Jurisdiction based on facts at time of complaint. An amendment of a pleading to justify long arm jurisdiction must be based on facts existing at the time the complaint was filed. Jenkins v. Glen & Helen Aircraft, Inc., 42 Colo. App. 118, 590 P.2d 983 (1979).

 Personal jurisdiction and venue distinguished. Personal jurisdiction is a question of the court's power to exercise control over defendants while venue is primarily a matter of choosing a convenient forum. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).

 Resolution of personal jurisdiction generally takes precedence over the determination of the propriety of venue. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).

 Resolution of jurisdictional issues under section frequently involves an ad hoc analysis of the facts. Waterval v. District Court, 620 P.2d 5 (Colo. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 960, 101 S. Ct. 3108, 69 L. Ed.2d 971 (1981).

 Privilege defenses such as lack of personal jurisdiction or improper venue may be lost by failure to assert them seasonably, by formal submission in a cause, or by submission through conduct. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).

 Mere filing of or participation in motion does not necessarily entail waiver to defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction or improper venue. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).

 Request for award of attorney fees, as part of motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, does not constitute a general appearance and does not waive defense of lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendants did not seek affirmative relief; rather, they only defended against plaintiff's claims. Gognat v. Ellsworth, 224 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2009).

 For discussion of conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction, see Bennett Waites Corp. v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 810 (D. Colo. 1983).

 Section need not be relied on when service is made inside Colorado. It is not necessary to rely on "long arm" statute to sustain jurisdiction of district court over foreign corporation where service of process was not made outside of state, but was made upon agent of foreign corporation in the state. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491, 418 P.2d 527 (1966).

 Jurisdiction over foreign corporation where personal service effected in state. Colorado state courts have jurisdiction over a foreign corporation qualified to do business in the state where personal service on the foreign corporation is effected within the state, regardless of the fact that the cause of action does not arise out of the foreign corporation's business activity within the state, but, to the contrary, arises out of a transaction occurring in another state. Budde v. Kentron Hawaii, Ltd., 565 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1977).

 Burden imposed upon one who seeks remedy under long arm statute is to allege in complaint sufficient facts to support reasonable inference that defendants engaged in conduct described in statute which subjects them to in personam jurisdiction. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432, 506 P.2d 367 (1973); Jenkins v. Glen & Helen Aircraft, Inc., 42 Colo. App. 118, 590 P.2d 983 (1979); Shon v. District Court, 199 Colo. 90, 605 P.2d 472 (1980).

 This section requires purposeful acts performed within forum state by defendant in relation to the contract. Weyrich v. Lively, 361 F. Supp. 1147 (D. Colo. 1973).

 Prima facie showing of threshold jurisdiction is sufficient and may be determined from allegations of complaint. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432, 506 P.2d 367 (1973).

 A plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of threshold jurisdiction, which may be determined from the allegations of the complaint, to withstand defendant's motion to dismiss under, C.R.C.P. 12(b)(2). Pioneer Astro Indus., Inc. v. District Court, 193 Colo. 409, 566 P.2d 1067 (1977).

 In determining whether a prima facie showing has been established, it is appropriate to consider the allegations of the complaint as well as any other evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to dismiss. Fleet Leasing, Inc. v. District Court, 649 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1982).

 A party may make the required prima facie showing of threshold jurisdiction by alleging jurisdictional facts in the complaint, by submitting affidavits, or presenting evidence at the hearing on the motion to dismiss or to quash service of process. Panos Inv. Co. v. District Court, 662 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1983).

 The allegations of the complaint, as well as any evidence introduced by the parties at any hearing conducted to determine the jurisdictional issue, may be considered to determine whether the plaintiff has established such prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Scheuer v. District Court, 684 P.2d 249 (Colo. 1984).

 Prima facie showing required. A party asserting personal jurisdiction over a defendant under the long arm statute must make a prima facie showing of threshold jurisdiction. Fleet Leasing, Inc. v. District Court, 649 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1982).

 When defendant asserts permissive claim, long arm jurisdiction becomes general in personam. By the assertion of a permissive counter-claim and a cross-claim, claimant was invoking of the jurisdiction of the court in its own behalf, and expanded the limited in personam jurisdiction originally acquired under the long arm statute into general in personam jurisdiction. T.L. Smith Co. v. District Court, 163 Colo. 444, 431 P.2d 454 (1967).

 Where a defendant in a civil action files various cross-claims and third-party claims, the jurisdiction of the court is invoked and the defendant waives any objection to the issue of a personam jurisdiction. Fagerberg v. Webb, 678 P.2d 544 (Colo. App. 1983).

 Finding that long-arm statute cannot be properly invoked is a final determination that defendants are not subject to the court's jurisdiction and an appeal can be taken therefrom. Wilbourn v. Hagan, 716 P.2d 485 (Colo. App. 1986).

 In general, the activities of a non-resident subject him to long-arm jurisdiction if the quality, nature, and frequency of his conduct in Colorado is such that the non-resident should reasonably anticipate being haled into the Colorado courts. Von Palffy-Erdoed v. Bugescu, 708 P.2d 816 (Colo. App. 1985); Pub. Warranty Corp. v. Mullins, 757 P.2d 1140 (Colo. App. 1988).

 Trial court had personal jurisdiction over estate after plaintiffs amended complaint to name estate and estate's special administrator as defendants instead of deceased, non-existent defendant before any answer had been filed in the case. This cured the defect in personal jurisdiction contained in the original complaint. Currier v. Sutherland, 218 P.3d 709 (Colo. 2009).

 Distinction between subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction. This section, together with defendant's note submitting to jurisdiction of Colorado courts for purposes of enforcement, conferred subject-matter jurisdiction. However, in absence of valid service of process under § 13-1-125 and C.R.C.P. 4 court lacked personal jurisdiction and judgment was void. United Bank of Boulder, N.A. v. Buchanan, 836 P.2d 473 (Colo. App. 1992).

 A party's lack of capacity to sue or be sued has no bearing upon a court's subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Currier v. Sutherland, 218 P.3d 709 (Colo. 2009).

 A deceased defendant's lack of capacity to be sued does not divest a court of subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Subject matter jurisdiction involves a court's power to hear a particular type of case or grant a specific type of relief. Currier v. Sutherland, 218 P.3d 709 (Colo. 2009).

 Applied in Nations Enters., Inc. v. Process Equip. Co., 40 Colo. App. 390, 579 P.2d 655 (1978); Adolph Coors Co. v. A. Genderson & Sons, 486 F. Supp. 131 (D. Colo. 1980); Goldenhersh v. Febrey, 711 P.2d 717 (Colo. App. 1985); Rogers v. Clipper Cruise Lines, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 143 (D. Colo. 1986); In re Ness, 759 P.2d 844 (Colo. App. 1988).

B. Constitutionality.

 Jurisdiction to extend to constitutional limits. The Colorado general assembly, in enacting this section, intended to extend the jurisdiction of the courts to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Jenner & Block v. District Court, 197 Colo. 184, 590 P.2d 964 (1979); Halliburton Co. v. Texana Oil Co., 471 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Colo. 1979); Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980); Waterval v. District Court, 620 P.2d 5 (Colo. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 960, 101 S. Ct. 3108, 69 L. Ed.2d 971 (1981); Fleet Leasing, Inc. v. District Court, 649 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1982); Panos Inv. Co. v. District Court, 662 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1983); Beckman v. Carlson, 553 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Colo. 1983); Scheuer v. District Court, 684 P.2d 249 (Colo. 1984); Pub. Warranty Corp. v. Mullins, 757 P.2d 1140 (Colo. App. 1988).

 This statute confers jurisdiction, limited only by the bounds of the fourteenth amendment, consistent with the standards of due process enunciated in Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington and subsequent cases. Cleverock Energy Corp. v. Trepel, 609 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909, 100 S. Ct. 1836, 64 L. Ed.2d 261 (1980).

 The general assembly did not intend that this section be construed to permit jurisdiction to be asserted where to do so would violate due process of law. Le Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin v. District Court, 620 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1980).

 Constitutionality depends upon its application to the facts. The constitutionality of any state long arm statute depends on the manner of its particular application to the facts presented. Circle A Drilling Co. v. Sheehan, 251 F. Supp. 242 (D. Colo. 1966).

 This section meets the due process test of Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington (326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)), i.e., that the activity of the defendant "establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice to permit the state to enforce the obligation which appellant has incurred there". Zerr v. Norwood, 250 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Colo. 1966).

 It does not offend notions of fair play and substantial justice. Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he is not present within the territory of the forum, he must have certain minimum contacts such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491, 418 P.2d 527 (1966); Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783 (1968); People ex rel. Jeffers v. Gibson, 181 Colo. 4, 508 P.2d 374 (1973).

 Quality and nature of activity must be considered in determining jurisdiction. In order to assure fairness and justice, the trial court must look at the quality and nature of the defendant's activity in determining whether the assertion of jurisdiction complies with due process. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).

 The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with a forum state. It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783 (1968).

 Convenience alone insufficient for judgment against nonresident. Due process of law does not contemplate that a state may make a binding judgment in personam against a nonresident defendant merely out of considerations of convenience. Fleet Leasing, Inc. v. District Court, 649 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1982).

 An assertion of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant must satisfy both the requirements of the Colorado long-arm statute and the requirements of due process of law. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Daniel, McKee & Co., 791 P.2d 14 (Colo. App. 1990).

 Determination of jurisdiction involves a two-tiered inquiry. Court must first determine whether the statute provides a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction, and then must consider whether exercise of jurisdiction would violate federal due process principles. Schocket v. Classic Auto Sales, Inc., 817 P.2d 561 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 832 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1992).

C. Procedure.

 When evidentiary hearing appropriate. In its discretion, a court may address a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on documentary evidence alone or by holding an evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing may be appropriate when the proffered evidence is conflicting or when the plaintiff's affidavits are incredible. However, if the jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits of the case, caution is advised to avoid endangering the substantive right to a jury trial. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187 (Colo. 2005); Goettman v. North Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 (Colo. 2007).

 If the issue is to be resolved on documentary evidence alone, plaintiff needs only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction to defeat the motion to dismiss. Allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true to the extent they are not contradicted by defendant's competent evidence. Goettman v. North Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 (Colo. 2007).

 The court may not resolve disputed material issues of jurisdictional fact without a hearing. Goettman v. North Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 (Colo. 2007).

 Purpose of inquiry is to screen out cases in which personal jurisdiction is obviously lacking and those in which the jurisdictional challenge is patently bogus. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187 (Colo. 2005); Goettman v. North Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 (Colo. 2007).

II. TRANSACTING BUSINESS.

A. In General.

 Law reviews. For comment on White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, appearing below, see 39 U. Colo. L. Rev. 443 (1967). For note, "Doing Business in Colorado for Foreign Corporations: Service of Process, Qualification, Taxation", see 49 Den. L.J. 529 (1973). For article, "Constitutional Law", which discusses a recent Tenth Circuit decision dealing with minimum contacts, see 64 Den. U. L. Rev. 209 (1987). For article, "Civil Procedure", which discusses recent Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with jurisdiction, see 65 Den. U. L. Rev. 405 (1988).

 No jurisdiction unless defendant "present" in state. Unless the level of a defendant's activity is sufficient to make him "present" in the forum state, there is no jurisdiction where the cause of action is unrelated to the forum state activities. Automated Quill, Inc. v. Chernow, 455 F. Supp. 428 (D. Colo. 1978).

 Substantial connection rather than physical presence required. Although it is not necessary that the defendant be physically present in the state for purposes of transacting business, there must be a substantial connection between the business transacted and the forum state. Weyrich v. Lively, 361 F. Supp. 1147 (D. Colo. 1973); Custom Vinyl Compounding v. Bushart & Assoc., 810 F. Supp. 285 (D. Colo. 1992).

 "Substantial contacts" with Colorado held not present. Beckman v. Carlson, 553 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Colo. 1983); Vickery v. Amarillo Freightliner Sales, Inc., 695 P.2d 306 (Colo. App. 1984); Behagen v. Amateur Basketball Assn. of U.S.A., 744 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1010, 105 S. Ct. 1879, 85 L. Ed.2d 171 (1985); Sands v. Victor Equip. Co., 616 F. Supp. 1532 (D. Colo. 1985); GCI 1985 -1 LTD. v. Murray Props. P'ship, 770 F. Supp. 585 (D. Colo. 1991).

B. Minimum Contacts Principle.

 Law reviews. For article, "A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction", see 60 U. Colo. L. Rev. 5 (1989).

 This section codifies minimum contacts principles. The question of when a state can obtain in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident by service of process outside the state is basically governed by the "minimum contacts" test enunciated in Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945).

 In order for the nonresident defendant to be subject to the state's personal jurisdiction, "he has certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'". The Colorado "long arm" statute was designed to codify the "minimum contacts" principle. Lichina v. Futura, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 1966); Jenner & Block v. District Court, 197 Colo. 184, 590 P.2d 964 (1979); Premier Corp. v. Newsom, 620 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1980); Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).

 Minimal contacts are necessary for the operation of this section. Cox v. District Court, 160 Colo. 437, 417 P.2d 792 (1966).

 Minimal contacts are necessary to satisfy due process requirements. It is clear that this section is based on certain minimum contacts which must satisfy requisites of due process in accord with the test of Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington. Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 449 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1971).

 For jurisdiction to attach under subsection (1)(b), certain "minimum contacts" between the forum state and the defendant are necessary in order not to offend traditional notions of due process, fair play, and substantial justice. E.R. Callender Printing Co. v. District Court, 182 Colo. 25, 510 P.2d 889 (1973).

 The essential requirement of the "minimum contacts" rule is that "the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws". Lichina v. Futura, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 1966).

 The minimum amount of contacts required to exercise personal jurisdiction depends on whether the plaintiff has alleged general or specific jurisdiction. A court has general jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant conducted continuous and systematic activities that are of a general business nature in the forum state. A court has specific jurisdiction over a defendant if the injuries triggering the litigation arise out of and are related to activities that are significant and purposefully directed by the defendant at the residents of the forum state. Found. for Knowledge in Dev. v. Interactive Design Consultants, 234 P.3d 673 (Colo. 2010).

 Test for determining if courts may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident is whether the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction is authorized by statute, and, if so, whether such exercise is consistent with constitutional requirements of due process. Vickery v. Amarillo Freightliner Sales, Inc., 695 P.2d 306 (Colo. App. 1984).

 The test to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice requires that (1) the defendant must purposely avail himself of the privilege of acting in Colorado or of causing important consequences here; (2) the cause of action must arise from the consequences in Colorado of the defendant's activities; (3) the activities of the defendant or the consequences of those activities must have a substantial enough connection with Colorado to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. Duckworth v. M.M. Cole Publ'g Co., 38 Colo. App. 33, 552 P.2d 520 (1976); Automated Quill, Inc. v. Chernow, 455 F. Supp. 428 (D. Colo. 1978); Associated Inns & Restaurant Co. of Am. v. Dev. Assocs., 516 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Colo. 1981); H2O Eng'g, Inc. v. Leidy's, Inc., 799 P.2d 432 (Colo. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 811 P.2d 38 (Colo. 1991); RAF Fin. v. Resurgens, 127 Bankr. 458 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991); Alameda Nat. Bank v. Kanchanapoom, 752 F. Supp. 367 (D. Colo. 1990); Plus Sys., Inc. v. New England Network, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 111 (D. Colo. 1992); F.D.I.C. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 937 F. Supp. 1461 (D. Colo. 1996); Gwynn v. Transcor Am., Inc., 26 F. Supp.2d 1256 (D. Colo. 1998).

 Unfairness factor in determining sufficient contacts. While fairness is not an affirmative basis for granting jurisdiction, unfairness may become a factor in determining whether certain contacts are sufficient. Cleverock Energy Corp. v. Trepel, 609 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909, 100 S. Ct. 1836, 64 L. Ed.2d 261 (1980).

 Court applied the U.S. supreme court "stream of commerce plus" test articulated in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987), to conclude minimum contacts established. Etchieson v. Cent. Purchasing LLC, 232 P.3d 301 (Colo. App. 2010).

 Each case must be decided on its own facts. On the question of "doing business" every case must be decided solely on its own facts. The complete test is one of total impact. The corporation must have certain minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Elliot v. Edwards Eng'g Corp., 257 F. Supp. 537 (D. Colo. 1965).

 Whether in a particular case a nonresident defendant, who is served outside the forum state, has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state to warrant the latter in exercising in personam jurisdiction over the person of such nonresident necessarily depends on the facts of the case at hand. Premier Corp. v. Newsom, 620 F.2d 219 (10th Cir. 1980).

 Even single contact is sufficient to sustain jurisdiction where the cause of action arose out of that contact. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).

 Single act does not uniformly result in the exercise of jurisdiction when that act is not substantial enough to make the defendant "present". Trans-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. A Little Bit of Swed., Inc., 658 P.2d 271 (Colo. App. 1982).

 One meeting constituting sole contact insufficient. Where the only contact the defendant had with Colorado was an initial meeting with the plaintiff, this one meeting did not constitute the minimum contacts requirement. Weyrich v. Lively, 361 F. Supp. 1147 (D. Colo. 1973).

 Quantity of contact cannot be measured by dollar value alone. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).

 No minimal contact if cause arose outside state and no control over representative. Plaintiff's claim did not arise out of any dealing the company had in Colorado. This important factor, combined with almost a complete absence of control over representative, requires that the motion to quash the summons be granted. Elliott v. Edwards Eng'g Corp., 257 F. Supp. 537 (D. Colo. 1965).

 The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state. Circle A Drilling Co. v. Sheehan, 251 F. Supp. 242 (D. Colo. 1966); Knight v. District Court, 162 Colo. 14, 424 P.2d 110 (1967).

 The mere existence of a contract executed by a Colorado resident, is not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over an absent nonresident defendant. To hold otherwise would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 449 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1971).

 Nonresident attorney's relationship with client provided sufficient connection for jurisdiction. A professional relationship of substantial duration and a client's claimed reliance upon her nonresident attorney's advice with respect to the client's financial interests, the attorney's failure to communicate with the client or to take any action in regard to the client's interests may be productive of adverse consequences to the client in this state so as to provide a sufficient connection and render reasonable the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the nonresident. Waterval v. District Court, 620 P.2d 5 (Colo. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 960, 101 S. Ct. 3108, 69 L. Ed.2d 971 (1981); Keefe v. Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, P.C., 40 P.3d 1267 (Colo. 2002).

 Agreement by nonresident defendant attorney to represent a Colorado corporation and the attorney's subsequent conduct were acts by which the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Colorado and thus was reasonably subject to Colorado's long arm statute jurisdiction. Scheuer v. District Court, 684 P.2d 249 (Colo. 1984).

 Sales, promotional and distributional channels reveal minimal contacts. The affidavit does reveal "minimal contact" in Colorado as required by due process because it clearly reflects that defendant set up channels of sales promotion and distribution in Colorado for the purpose of selling its products in Colorado. Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117, 433 P.2d 335 (1967).

 Manufacturer's promotional activities and solicitation of customers while in Colorado, together with actual sales, was sufficient to invoke long-arm jurisdiction. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).

 Contacts were sufficient to find jurisdiction over manufacturer of medical syringe. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).

 Contacts found insufficient where sale took place outside of Colorado and issues of tort concerned creation of contract and terms. Vickery v. Amarillo Freightliner Sales, Inc., 695 P.2d 306 (Colo. App. 1984).

 Jurisdiction not proper. Jurisdiction is not proper merely because the defendants received a check drawn on a Colorado bank or because the defendants wrote several letters regarding the contract to the plaintiff in Colorado. Ruggieri v. Gen. Well Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982).

 Jurisdiction is not proper in Colorado merely because one of the parties to a contract is a Colorado resident. Ruggieri v. Gen. Well Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982); SGI Air Holdings II LLC v. Novartis Int'l, AG, 192 F. Supp.2d 1195 (D. Colo. 2002).

 Minimum contacts sufficient. In executing a contract of guarantee in another state of payment of rent and performance of lease covenants, where petitioner induced lessors to furnish their consent for the assignment of a lease of Colorado real property, the facts amply justify long-arm jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Giger v. District Court, 189 Colo. 305, 540 P.2d 329 (1975).

 An out-of-state bank, which issued letter of credit in connection with Colorado real estate transaction, inducing reliance by purchaser's agent, had sufficient connection with Colorado to permit exercise of jurisdiction under this section in agent's action against bank for consequences resulting from cancellation of letter. Van Schaack & Co. v. District Court, 189 Colo. 145, 538 P.2d 425 (1975).

 Nonresident publishing company had sufficient contacts with the state of Colorado for the assumption of in personam jurisdiction where it initiated the contract with the plaintiff at his residence in Colorado and solicited the resultant contract, and the parties intended the plaintiff prepare the manuscripts at home in Colorado and submit them to the company's offices in Chicago for publication. Duckworth v. M.M. Cole Publ'g Co., 38 Colo. App. 33, 552 P.2d 520 (1976).

 Where a New York resident contracted to have brochures mailed throughout the United States, including Colorado, and where said New York resident opened a checking account in Colorado to receive the money generated by the mailing, there were sufficient contacts to allow in personam jurisdiction by Colorado courts. At Home Magazine v. District Court, 194 Colo. 331, 572 P.2d 476 (1977).

 It is not unreasonable to subject a guarantor to the jurisdiction of courts in the very state where an obligation is specifically payable when the makers fail to perform their obligations and the guarantee becomes operable. Panos Inv. Co. v. District Court, 662 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1983).

 Negotiating and signing an agreement in this state to personally guarantee a portion of a corporation's debts constitutes sufficient contacts for a court of this state to exercise personal jurisdiction over such a person. Mr. Steak, Inc. v. District Court, 194 Colo. 519, 574 P.2d 95 (1978).

 Execution of promissory notes, given in conjunction with and as part and parcel of the contract for purchase of Colorado real property, constituted sufficient acts to meet the minimum contacts test. Brownlow v. Aman, 740 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1984).

 Where president of defendant corporation came to Colorado and, in the course of various business negotiations, orally agreed to the terms of an oil development contract under which the defendant corporation was obligated to send payment to plaintiff corporation in Colorado for the performance of supervisory and managerial functions under the contract and defendant corporation reasonably could have anticipated that plaintiff corporation's duties under the contract would be largely performed at their headquarters in Colorado, defendant corporation had sufficient contacts with Colorado to meet the test of due process. Cleverock Energy Corp. v. Trepel, 609 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909, 100 S. Ct. 1836, 64 L. Ed.2d 261 (1980).

 Communication with buyer, acceptance of payments, and attempted repossession in Colorado by agent constitute minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction. Von Palffy-Erdoed v. Bugescu, 708 P.2d 816 (Colo. App. 1985).

 Phone calls, letters, facsimiles, and e-mails in addition to a contract, although unsigned, provide evidence that foreign defendant pursued a continuing business relationship sufficient to meet the minimum contacts requirement. AST Sports Science, Inc. v. CLF Distribution Ltd., 514 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2008).

 For other examples of satisfaction of minimum contacts requirements, see Lichina v. Futura, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 1966).

 Contact with Colorado through actions of agent may be sufficient to bring defendant within jurisdiction. H2O Eng'g, Inc. v. Leidy's, Inc., 799 P.2d 432 (Colo. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 811 P.2d 38 (Colo. 1991).

 Minimum contacts insufficient. Requisite minimum contacts did not exist as between foreign manufacturer and Colorado. Ferrari, S.p.A. SEFAC v. District Court, 185 Colo. 136, 522 P.2d 105 (1974), overruled in part in Classic Auto Sales, Inc. v. Schocket, 832 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1992).

 Where corporate buyer's only contact with Colorado was to place an order in Kansas City for the purchase of goods and merchandise from a Colorado seller, the minimum contacts necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process are absent, and, therefore, in personam jurisdiction over the corporate buyer cannot be obtained by means of the long-arm statute. E.R. Callender Printing Co. v. District Court, 185 Colo. 25, 510 P.2d 889 (1973).

 Execution, in California, of contract executed in Colorado by another, by guarantor, who was California resident, does not provide that quantum of minimum contact with Colorado such that the maintenance of a suit against the guarantor to recover on the contract would not offend traditional notions of due process. D.E.B. Adjustment Co. v. Dillard, 32 Colo. App. 184, 508 P.2d 420 (1973).

 The mere planting of fish in Utah, which fish "entered" Colorado and caused injury, did not constitute sufficient contacts with Colorado to subject those planting the fish to personal jurisdiction in Colorado. Colo. River Water Conservation v. Andrus, 476 F. Supp. 966 (D. Colo. 1979).

 Where an out-of-state bank's only connection to Colorado was its probable knowledge that the letter of credit it issued was going to be used in the sale of Colorado property to a Colorado corporation, this slight connection does not meet the "minimum contacts" standard, and the assertion of jurisdiction in a Colorado forum violates the out-of-state bank's right to due process. Leney v. Plum Grove Bank, 670 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1982).

 Since British asbestos manufacturer did not distribute or market its product in Colorado, there was not sufficient contact between the manufacturer and Colorado to establish personal jurisdiction. Ward v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Colo. 1988).

 Individuals who transported an inmate from Oregon to Colorado under a contract for extradition transportation between their employer and the Colorado department of corrections availed themselves of the privilege of acting in Colorado, committed tortious acts in Colorado, and caused important consequences in Colorado, making the exercise of jurisdiction over them reasonable, where one individual allegedly sexually assaulted the inmate and the other failed to report the assaults. Gwynn v. Transcor Am., Inc., 26 F. Supp.2d 1256 (D. Colo. 1998).

 Alleged patent infringer's activities in Colorado were too tenuous to establish that it purposely availed itself of the forum. Although the company advertised its product in national magazines that reach Colorado, no evidence was presented demonstrating that the company made deliberative efforts, either direct or indirect, to serve the Colorado market. The fact that the advertisements resulted in telephone inquiries about the product was insufficient to establish that the company took advantage of the Colorado market or its laws. Also, no sales of the product occurred in Colorado. Therefore, the company did not have sufficient contact with the state to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Dart Intern., Inc. v. Interactive Target Sys., 877 F. Supp. 541 (D. Colo. 1995).

 Defendant lacks sufficient contacts with Colorado for Colorado courts to exercise jurisdiction over defendant where contracts regarding purchase of defendant's interest were signed out of state, defendant did not travel to Colorado regarding the purchase or the interest, and did not conduct any business in Colorado. Sender v. Powell, 902 P.2d 947 (Colo. App. 1995).

 Activities of the partnership satisfy the minimum-contacts test as to individual partners. Through the instrumentality of the partnership, individual partners purposely availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business activities and invoked the benefits and protections of the law. Intercontinental Leasing, Inc. v. Anderson, 410 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1969); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Deloitte & Touche, 822 F. Supp 1512 (D. Colo. 1993).

 Where damaged product was brought into Colorado by purchaser from another state, and defendant's only contact amounted to less than one-half of one percent of annual sales, (which did not include this particular damaged item), there was not sufficient business contact to warrant exercise of personal jurisdiction. Day v. Snowmass Stables, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1993).

 Rigid "last event" test rejected. While appropriate in conflict-of-laws analysis, for purposes of application of long-arm statute it is not flexible enough to give Colorado courts jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause. Classic Auto Sales, Inc. v. Schocket, 832 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1992).

C. What Constitutes Transacting Business.

 What constitutes doing business is a matter of state law. So long as the dictates of federal due process are met, what constitutes doing business within a state is a matter of state law. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491, 418 P.2d 527 (1966).

 Whether claim arose out of business transacted in Colorado is a factor. While whether a claim arose out of business done in this state is one factor that may be considered, the supreme court has, in promulgating state law on this subject, clearly indicated that this is not necessarily the controlling element in determining whether the corporation has sufficient contacts in this state to subject it to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state when service is made within the state. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491, 418 P.2d 527 (1966).

 Transaction of business test is a case by case determination. The standards for considering whether or not jurisdiction attaches under the statute on the basis of transaction of business within the state are those of a case by case analysis considering, among other things, regular and systematic activity, continuity of contacts, promotion and utilization of channels of interstate commerce, benefits and protections afforded by the state, casualness of presence, and an estimate of inconveniences. People ex rel. Jeffers v. Gibson, 181 Colo. 4, 508 P.2d 374 (1973).

 Ongoing and continuous business relationship. Where defendants actively solicited plaintiff's business in Colorado and had an ongoing and continuous business relationship for a period of close to two years, defendants have purposely availed themselves of the privilege of conducting business in Colorado. Combs Airways, Inc. v. Trans-Air Supply Co., 560 F. Supp. 865 (D. Colo. 1983).

 Execution of contract within state. If a nonresident comes to Colorado and, within the boundaries of this state, executes a contract and receives earnest money, the defendant is within the purview of the Colorado long arm statute, and it does not offend traditional notions of fair play to require the defendant to appear in a federal district court in Colorado when a dispute arises over the return of the earnest money. East Vail Townhomes, Inc. v. Eurasian Dev. D.A., Inc., 716 F.2d 1346 (10th Cir. 1983).

 Contract negotiations, plus Colorado is place of "entering into", are sufficient. Where negotiations leading to the contract upon which this action is brought were conducted in Colorado, and the contract itself provided that Colorado is the place of "entering into" the agreement, nondomiciliary defendant's contracts were constitutionally sufficient to support service under long arm statute. Clinic Masters, Inc. v. McCollar, 269 F. Supp. 395 (D. Colo. 1967).

 Even though the "last act", such as the signing of a contract, may have occurred outside the geographical confines of the forum state, nevertheless, the statutory test of a claim arising out of the transaction of any business within the state may still be met by the showing of other "purposeful acts", performed within the forum state by the defendant in relation to the contract, even though such acts were preliminary, or even subsequent, to the execution of the contract itself. Knight v. District Court, 162 Colo. 14, 424 P.2d 110 (1967); Classic Auto Sales, Inc. v. Schocket, 832 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1992).

 Contract for the transport of inmates from other states to Colorado constitutes the transaction of business within the state and establishes the general jurisdiction requirement that contacts with the forum state are systematic and continuous. Gwynn v. Transcor Am., Inc., 26 F. Supp.2d 1256 (D. Colo. 1998).

 Activity in furtherance of a contract is sufficient to give the court long arm jurisdiction. If the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state, this is enough to give the court jurisdiction. It is not even necessary that defendant or his agent be physically present in the state for the purpose of transacting business. Colorado-Florida Living, Inc. v. Deltona Corp., 338 F. Supp. 880 (D. Colo. 1972).

 A conditional sales interest indicates business transaction. The fact that defendant retained a conditional sale interest and could have enforced its right to repossess the ski lift in the Colorado courts was a sufficient contact. Defendant was enjoying the benefits and protections of Colorado law, and was willing to service the lift. This is a further indication of the continuing nature of the defendant's business transactions in Colorado. Lichina v. Futura, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 1966).

 Contract negotiations by mail do not constitute transacting business. Major negotiations and execution of the agreement were conducted by an exchange of correspondence and documents between the parties or their representatives in Kansas and Colorado respectively. None of the crucial steps took place wholly within the state of Colorado. Plaintiff's contention that a one-day trip to Colorado and defendants' tour of its plant in Eaton, Colorado, are sufficient business contacts to confer in personam jurisdiction on this court is erroneous. Since neither defendant came to Colorado to "sell" plaintiff a license agreement and since no negotiations were conducted here, their obvious purpose was not to avail themselves of the privilege of conducting business here. In these circumstances, the minimum contacts necessary for an exercise of personal jurisdiction do not exist. Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 449 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1971).

 Defendants' mere execution of a contract with plaintiff, a Colorado corporation, did not constitute doing business in Colorado for purposes of this section. New Frontier Media, Inc. v. Freeman, 85 P.3d 611 (Colo. App. 2003).

 Phone conversations and in-state negotiations deemed "doing business". Where the transaction forming the basis of the action was shaped by negotiations in Denver between defendant A and plaintiff as well as telephone conversations between defendant A in Colorado and defendant B in Texas and where an agreement to execute a note and personal guaranties was entered into in Colorado, by having engaged in these telephone conversations, defendant B transacted business within Colorado and caused important business consequences in this state, within the test set forth by the Colorado Supreme Court in Van Schaack & Co. v. District Court, 189 Colo. 145, 538 P.2d 425 (1975), sufficient and substantial enough so that the assertion of personal jurisdiction was both fair and reasonable. Halliburton Co. v. Texana Oil Co., 471 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Colo. 1979).

 Plaintiff established prima facie case of specific jurisdiction over defendant under subsection (1)(a) by alleging that defendant came to Colorado to talk about forming a joint venture with plaintiff involving use of plaintiff's trade secrets and that the parties agreed to such joint venture during these meetings. Gognat v. Ellsworth, 224 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2009).

 Subjecting defendant to the jurisdiction of Colorado courts is consistent with due process since defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Colorado. Defendant allegedly negotiated and entered into a joint venture while in Colorado with a Colorado resident and regularly communicated with that resident about the joint venture while in Colorado and by telephone and email. Gognat v. Ellsworth, 224 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2009).

 The asserted sale of goods by the defendants in Colorado is too speculative to provide the requisite jurisdictional contacts since solicitations were made from Kansas and since the defendants maintain no sales or service personnel here. There has been no showing of the volume or extent of the defendants' sales or the relation of those sales to the license agreement. For personal jurisdiction purposes, the quality and nature of that activity is too indirect and remote from the license agreement upon which plaintiff has brought suit. Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 449 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1971).

 An out-of-state seller whose agents never enter Colorado is not subject to long arm jurisdiction. If an out-of-state milk handler has no outlets in Colorado, none of his employees come into the state, and the handler is divested of ownership of the milk before it enters Colorado, then the handler is not doing business in Colorado and the Colorado courts do not have jurisdiction over the handler under the Colorado long arm statute and do not have authority to grant injunctions against him under the Colorado marketing act. People ex rel. Jeffers v. Gibson, 181 Colo. 4, 508 P.2d 374 (1973).

 Corporate visit plus sending sales materials is a transaction of business. The visit of the assistant general sales manager of a Delaware corporation to Colorado in connection with franchise negotiations and the receipt of customer's lists, contracts, and other sales materials at plaintiff's offices in Denver constitute the transaction of business within the state of Colorado, which would authorize service of process upon the defendant outside the state of Colorado when the cause of action arises from that transaction and the failure to grant the franchise. Colorado-Florida Living, Inc. v. Deltona Corp., 338 F. Supp. 880 (D. Colo. 1972).

 Manufacturer who assembles in Colorado subject to long arm. This section grants jurisdiction under "long arm" to Colorado courts in an action against a North Carolina manufacturer of products assembled and sold in Colorado. Czarnick v. District Court, 175 Colo. 482, 488 P.2d 562 (1971).

 Where the parent and its subsidiary maintain separate identities and charge each other for service performed, as reinsurance, the corporations will be treated as separate entities for the purpose of determining personal jurisdiction. Perlman v. Great States Life Ins. Co., 164 Colo. 493, 436 P.2d 124 (1968).

 A nonpresent parent corporation is not "doing business" because of mere presence of subsidiary. Although a corporation is totally owned by another corporation, the mere presence in Colorado of the wholly-owned subsidiary, standing alone, does not in and of itself subject the nonpresent parent corporation to the state's jurisdiction where the two companies are operated as distinct entities. Bolger v. Dial-A-Style Leasing Corp., 159 Colo. 44, 409 P.2d 517 (1966); SGI Air Holdings II LLC v. Novartis Int'l, AG, 192 F. Supp.2d 1195 (D. Colo. 2002).

 The relationship of a holding company and the subsidiaries of which the holding company owns stock is not of a nature to support an agency relationship, or consequently, personal jurisdiction over the holding company or its day-to-day managing company. SGI Air Holdings II LLC v. Novartis Int'l, AG, 192 F. Supp.2d 1195 (D. Colo. 2002).

 Stock ownership of subsidiary is not doing business. Neither does stock ownership in a domestic company nor common directors establish that defendant was doing business in Colorado. Perlman v. Great States Life Ins. Co., 164 Colo. 493, 436 P.2d 124 (1968).

 It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws. Circle A Drilling Co. v. Sheehan, 251 F. Supp. 242 (D. Colo. 1966); Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 449 F.2d 775 (10th Cir.), aff'd, 323 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo. 1971).

 Jurisdiction will attach if the defendant purposely initiates or acquiesces in activity conducted within the forum state on its behalf. It must also avail itself of the protection of the forum state's law. Once that activity has been initiated, a single incident, substantial in nature, which gives rise to the plaintiff's claim will suffice to confer personal jurisdiction upon the courts of the forum state. Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/J Mfg. Co., 323 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 449 F.2d 775 (10th. Cir. 1971).

 Phone conversations, correspondence, and receipt of check are not purposeful acts. The interstate telephone conversations, correspondence, and the receipt in Illinois by petitioner of checks drawn on a Denver bank by respondent do not constitute acts by which the petitioner purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within Colorado, thus invoking the benefits of its laws. Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783 (1968).

 Nor does advertising in national magazines distributed within the forum state alone constitute a transaction of business within that state. Such a contact is simply too tenuous upon which to found a claim of jurisdiction. Safari Outfitters, Inc. v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 448 P.2d 783 (1968).

 An advertisement in a national magazine is not in itself sufficient to establish contacts in Colorado. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Emide Corp., 496 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Colo. 1980).

 Transactions carried on in a state wholly by mail may be sufficient to constitute a doing of business within the state sufficient to enable the state to exercise in personam jurisdiction over the corporation. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491, 418 P.2d 527 (1966).

 Even the activities of even a single salesman certainly may be sufficient to constitute the doing of business within a state even though those activities do not involve the actual concluding of contracts but involve only solicitation of orders and service calls. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491, 418 P.2d 527 (1966).

 When the activities of the agent are a continuous course of dealing. While it is clear that casual or intermittent presence of the corporation's agent within the state is not enough to support in personam jurisdiction based upon service on an agent, the United States supreme court has held that when the activities of the agent are such as to constitute a continuous course of dealings within the state, due process is not denied by the exercise of in personam jurisdiction through service on the agent in the state. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491, 418 P.2d 527 (1966).

 Corporation's control over its representative. The amount of control the corporation exerted over its representative in the state and the fact that the representative maintains a listing in the Denver telephone directory are factors which point toward "doing business". Elliott v. Edwards Eng'g Corp., 257 F. Supp. 537 (D. Colo. 1965).

 The payment of congressional salaries by merely transferring money to banks in Colorado does not establish minimum contacts with Colorado. Thus the clerk of the U.S. house of representatives and the secretary of the U.S. senate could not be reached by Colorado's long-arm statute and the court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over them. Shaffer v. Clinton, 54 F. Supp.2d 1014 (D. Colo. 1999).

 Negotiation, execution, and delivery of a note in Colorado is transacting business. The negotiation of a loan from a Colorado bank, in Colorado, with the execution and delivery to the bank of a promissory note is transacting business within this state within the meaning of the statute. Knight v. District Court, 162 Colo. 14, 424 P.2d 110 (1967).

 Mere fact that part of consideration for note is Colorado contract is not sufficient. The note was executed in Montana. Presumably all negotiations took place there. The only contact with Colorado is the fact that part of the consideration was a contract executed in Colorado. Such contact does not satisfy "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice". Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945); Circle A Drilling Co. v. Sheehan, 251 F. Supp. 242 (D. Colo. 1966).

 A note is a specialty and is not to be regarded as the same transaction as that which gave rise to the debt. The note stands alone. Circle A Drilling Co. v. Sheehan, 251 F. Supp. 242 (D. Colo. 1966).

 Demand for payment of note executed outside state insufficient. Where a promissory note was executed and delivered outside of Colorado and, later, one of the parties relocated in Colorado and mailed a letter out of state demanding payment of the note, the contacts within the state are not sufficient for in personam jurisdiction. Associated Inns & Restaurant Co. of Am. v. Dev. Assocs., 516 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Colo. 1981).

 Where foreign note is merely a renewal of a Colorado loan transacting of business continues. Though the petitioners admittedly executed the renewal note in Utah, they had each nonetheless performed in Colorado several "purposeful acts" relative thereto, but for the original loan in Colorado, there never would have been a renewal note. Knight v. District Court, 162 Colo. 14, 424 P.2d 110 (1967).

 Actions of internal revenue officials insufficient. Officials who were out-of-state residents and who at no time worked in, or traveled in connection with work, in this state had not transacted business for purposes of this section. First Western Govern. Sec., Inc. v. U.S., 578 F. Supp. 212 (D. Colo. 1984).

 A nonresident who filed a required claim in a probate proceeding does not constitute the transaction of business by the nonresident for purposes of Colorado's long-arm statute. Harman v. Stillwell, 944 P.2d 665 (Colo. App. 1997).

 Economic injury in Colorado insufficient. Where defendant welded a pipe in Italy which was subsequently used by the plaintiff Colorado corporation in Texas, where the weld failed, allegedly causing economic injury in Colorado, the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court under this section. Res. Inv. Corp. v. Hughes Tool Co., 561 F. Supp. 1236 (D. Colo. 1983).

 Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction under the transaction of business subsection where his complaint failed to allege any facts in support of his conclusory statement that "defendants transacted business" in Colorado and his affidavit and response to motion to dismiss did not contain any additional facts that would sufficiently support jurisdiction. Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503 (10th Cir. 1995).

 Defendant's continuing contractual relationship with plaintiff was insufficient to allow personal jurisdiction over it in Colorado. Trial court did not err in determining that defendant did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting business activities within Colorado. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Arkhangelskgeoldobycha, 94 P.3d 1208 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 123 P.3d 1187 (Colo. 2005).

 Defendant's contacts to the state were necessitated by virtue of the plaintiff's moving its principal place of business to Colorado. Contacts that are necessitated by the plaintiff's unilateral move are given much less weight. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187 (Colo. 2005).

 The continuous presence of four employees of the defendant non-resident corporation in Colorado who are employed for the purpose of soliciting orders on behalf of such corporation constitutes sufficient contact in the forum for personal jurisdiction over the corporation. Schlesinger v. Merrill Pub. Co., 675 F. Supp. 591 (D. Colo. 1987).

 An individual who has become an officer or a director of a Colorado corporation has sufficiently transacted business within the state to subject himself to the jurisdiction of its courts with respect to claims made by the corporation or by others on behalf of the corporation arising out of the individual's duties as an officer or director. Pub. Warranty Corp. v. Mullins, 757 P.2d 1140 (Colo. App. 1988).

 Execution of note. When a person executes a note outside of this state but the note expressly obligates him to pay money to a resident of this state, he may be properly sued in Colorado. The single act of executing the note constituted a substantial enough connection to render exercise of jurisdiction reasonable under the circumstances. Kingston v. Brussat, 698 F. Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1988); Alameda Nat. Bank v. Kanchanapoom, 752 F. Supp. 367 (D. Colo. 1990).

 Defendants who induced plaintiff to rely on defendants' representations resulting in extension of more than two million dollars in credit and shipment of more than two million dollars worth of products from Colorado to defendants' clients are subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado. Contacts which included seven face-to-face meetings in two states, one mailing, and twenty-eight phone calls over a four-month period were sufficient to satisfy both transaction-of-business standards and due process requirements. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Daniel, McKee & Co., 791 P.2d 14 (Colo. App. 1990).

 Because its promotional efforts were directed towards Colorado residents through local media advertising in Colorado, defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in this state and should reasonably have anticipated being subject to the jurisdiction of the Colorado courts. Martinez v. Farmington Motors, Inc., 931 P.2d 546 (Colo. App. 1996).

 Purported father found to have transacted business in state. Purported father's sending of letter agreeing to pay support that father knew would be relied upon by Colorado authorities for purpose of determining eligibility for public assistance constituted transacting business in this state. In re Parental Responsibilities of H.Z.G., 77 P.3d 848 (Colo. App. 2003).

D. Agency Theory.

 Agency theory explained. Under Colorado's long-arm statute, a nonresident defendant may be subject to personal jurisdiction in Colorado based on the imputed contacts of defendant's agent. To establish this agency theory, jurisdictional facts must connect the actions of the agent to the principal by either "the transaction of any business" or "the commission of a tortious act." Goettman v. North Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 (Colo. 2007).

 Jurisdiction and liability separate issues. A court's determination of agency for the purpose of personal jurisdiction is a separate determination from, and is not dispositive of, the substantive issue of defendant's liability for the actions of the agent. For jurisdictional purposes, plaintiff needs only make a prima facie showing of the connection between the actions of the agent and the principal. Goettman v. North Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 (Colo. 2007).

 Due process requires that jurisdictional facts be examined to determine whether either general or specific jurisdiction exists and, if so, whether it is reasonable for the court to exercise that jurisdiction. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187 (Colo. 2005); Goettman v. North Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 (Colo. 2007).

 Australian corporation was properly subject to personal jurisdiction because, although general jurisdiction was lacking due to the corporation's absence of business contacts with Colorado, plaintiff made a prima facie showing of specific jurisdiction based on documentary evidence showing the corporation sent its agent on a business trip to various states, including Colorado, during the course of which trip the agent went to a restaurant with a coworker, became intoxicated, and caused an automobile accident that killed the coworker. Further, under the circumstances, it was held reasonable to require the corporation to defend in Colorado due to the legitimate interests of Colorado in protecting the safety of its roads and providing a forum for the plaintiff. Goettman v. North Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 (Colo. 2007).

III. COMMISSION OF TORT.

 Law reviews. For comment on Vandermee v. District Court, appearing below, see 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 471 (1968).

 Section is constitutional. The new "long arm" statute, insofar as it permits the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents who commit a tortious act within the state of Colorado is not unconstitutional. Zerr v. Norwood, 250 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Colo. 1966).

 Where tortious act is committed within state, there need not be additional minimum contacts in state to meet constitutional requirements of due process. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432, 506 P.2d 367 (1973).

 Tortious act. The noun "act" implies a single occurrence, a specific event, one happening. The adjective "tortious" implies an act with an attending injury proximately related to that act. The use of the term "tortious act" implies the total act embodying the cause and the effect through the continuum of time. Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117, 433 P.2d 335 (1967).

 Our long arm statute grants Colorado courts jurisdiction over persons who commit tortious acts within this state. Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972).

 Colorado residents have local forum for damages inflicted on them by nonresidents. The legislative purpose, which inspired the adoption of the long arm statute, was the expansion of our court's jurisdiction within constitutional limitations in order to provide a local forum for Colorado residents who suffer damages in Colorado as a result of tortious acts of nonresidents. Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117, 433 P.2d 335 (1967).

 Court has jurisdiction over nonresident motorist in Colorado accident. A nonresident motorist who is involved in an automobile accident in a particular state has established a sufficient contact with that state to warrant its courts in asserting in personam jurisdiction over him to determine the merits of any controversy that may happen to arise out of that accident. Zerr v. Norwood, 250 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Colo. 1966).

 Foreign corporation may be summoned based on tortious act of its agent within Colorado although "transacting business" standard may not be met. Goettman v. North Fork Valley Rest., 176 P.3d 60 (Colo. 2007).

 "Tortious act" is to be liberally construed but not to create a new tort. Although our supreme court has said that the term, "tortious act", is to be liberally construed to carry out the intent of the general assembly, it cannot be so liberally construed as to create a tort. People in Interest of D.R.B., 30 Colo. App. 603, 498 P.2d 1166 (1972), aff'd sub nom., A.R.B. v. G.L.P., 180 Colo. 439, 507 P.2d 468 (1973).

 The fathering of an illegitimate child in and of itself is not a "tortious act". People in Interest of D.R.B., 30 Colo. App. 603, 498 P.2d 1166 (1972), aff'd sub nom. A.R.B. v. G.L.P., 180 Colo. 439, 507 P.2d 468 (1973).

 Fact that person dies in Colorado does not constitute tortious act. Ferrari, S.p.A. SEFAC v. District Court, 185 Colo. 136, 522 P.2d 105 (1974), overruled in part in Classic Auto Sales, Inc. v. Schocket, 832 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1992).

 Disclosure of internal revenue agent's report concerning Colorado resident, in place other than Colorado, did not give rise to a tort in this state. First Western Govern. Sec., Inc. v. U.S., 578 F.Supp. 212 (D. Colo. 1984).

 Injury must result from intended or foreseeable use. An additional requirement to be met before subjecting an alien manufacturer to personal jurisdiction is that the injury complained of must have resulted from a use intended or foreseeable by the manufacturer. Alliance Clothing, Ltd. v. District Court, 187 Colo. 400, 532 P.2d 351 (1975).

 Use of foreign product in United States or state must be foreseen. In all the tort cases subjecting alien manufacturers to personal jurisdiction by long-arm statutes, the courts noted that the manufacturer could reasonably foresee that his product would be used in the United States or in the state in question. Alliance Clothing, Ltd. v. District Court, 187 Colo. 400, 532 P.2d 351 (1975).

 Misrepresentations inducing reliance justify jurisdiction. Where the defendants make an affirmative misrepresentation intending to induce, and actually inducing, justifiable reliance by the plaintiff in Colorado, which causes him damages in Colorado, the defendants purposefully avail themselves of Colorado by proximately causing tort damage in Colorado. Ruggieri v. Gen. Well Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982).

 Telephone conversations which are nothing more than informational are inadequate to support a finding of personal jurisdiction. Bennett Waites Corp. v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 810 (D. Colo. 1983).

 Two letters, an electronic presentation, and a conference call were sufficient contacts to establish prima facie showing that Colorado court has personal jurisdiction over defendant. First Horizon Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Wellspring Capital Mgmt., LLC, 166 P.3d 166 (Colo. App. 2007).

 Participation in conference calls and failure to correct material omissions established a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. Although contacts were limited, the exercise of jurisdiction would be consistent with due process. First Horizon Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Wellspring Capital Mgmt., LLC, 166 P.3d 166 (Colo. App. 2007).

 Out-of-state repair of motor vehicle insufficient. Where the defendant truck stop's sole contact with Colorado was its allegedly negligent repair of the brakes on the truck driven in Colorado by the plaintiff, and it could not be proven that the truck stop had conducted any other activity in the state, the district court's exercise of jurisdiction violates due process. Fleet Leasing, Inc. v. District Court, 649 P.2d 1074 (Colo. 1982).

 As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell its products for ultimate use in another state, it is not unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects in those products. Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117, 433 P.2d 335 (1967); Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972).

 Corporation must by some act avail itself of privilege of doing business in forum state. It is essential in each case "that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state". Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972).

 This test has been generalized to mean that the defendant must have taken voluntary action calculated to have an effect in the forum state. Granite States Volkswagen, Inc. v. District Court, 177 Colo. 42, 492 P.2d 624 (1972).

 Statute does not apply to tortious act outside of state. The statute clearly provides that personal jurisdiction can only be grounded on the commission of a tortious act within the state, and the general assembly did not include tortious acts committed without the state which gave rise to injuries within the state. Had that been the legislative intent it could have been accomplished by specific language to that effect. Before this statute has any effect, both the asserted negligent act or acts of the nonresident defendant, as well as the injury they produce, must occur within the state of Colorado. Lichina v. Futura, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 252 (D. Colo. 1966). But see Vandermee v. District Court, 164 Colo. 117, 433 P.2d 335 (1967).

 But a tortious act committed outside the state may come within this section once it causes injury or damage within this state. Pace v. D & D Fuller CATV Const., Inc., 748 P.2d 1314 (Colo. App. 1987), aff'd, 780 P.2d 520 (Colo. 1989); Schocket v. Classic Auto Sales, Inc., 817 P.2d 561 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 832 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1992).

 For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), allegations of tortious conduct in another state which causes injury in Colorado have been held to constitute a prima facie showing of a tortious act within Colorado. Marquest Med. Prods., Inc. v. Daniel, McKee & Co., 791 P.2d 14 (Colo. App. 1990); Schocket v. Classic Auto Sales, Inc., 817 P.2d 561 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 832 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1992).

 Negligent conduct initiated in foreign state which proximately results in injury incurred in Colorado constitutes tortious conduct within the meaning of long arm statute. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432, 506 P.2d 367 (1973); Scheuer v. District Court, 684 P.2d 249 (Colo. 1984); Found. for Knowledge in Dev. v. Interactive Design Consultants, 234 P.3d 673 (Colo. 2010).

 To bring one under the jurisdiction of the Colorado court by use of the tort section of this section, sufficient facts need be alleged to support a claim that the alleged tortfeasor was negligent and that the negligent conduct proximately resulted in injury that occurred in Colorado, even if that conduct was initiated in a foreign state. Shaw v. Aurora Mobile Homes & Real Estate, Inc., 36 Colo. App. 321, 539 P.2d 1366 (1975).

 Section may be relied on even if tort committed prior to effective date. This section and § 13-1-125 may be constitutionally applied where the complaint is filed after the effective date of the statute, though the tortious act complained of occurred before the effective date of the statute. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451, 412 P.2d 428 (1966).

 Retrospective application of this section is in accord with sound public policy. At the time of the accident, the defendant was a resident of Colorado. This fact, in itself, in addition to providing a sufficient contact with the state to satisfy the requirement of due process, makes it reasonable to conclude that the defendant might have expected to be subject to suit in Colorado for torts that she may have committed here during that period. Smith v. Putnam, 250 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Colo. 1965).

 Generally, courts of one state do not have jurisdiction over foreign administrator or executor and should not interfere with administration of decedent's estate in foreign jurisdiction. However, rule must give way to legislative enactments in appropriate circumstances, such as where administrator's decedent has committed tort in state of forum. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432, 506 P.2d 367 (1973).

 In personam jurisdiction may be obtained over personal representative of deceased nonresident tortfeasor. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432, 506 P.2d 367 (1973).

 Plaintiff need not prove merits of action -- commission of tort within state -- to initially establish in personam jurisdiction. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432, 506 P.2d 367 (1973); Jenner & Block v. District Court, 197 Colo. 184, 590 P.2d 964 (1979).

 Facts constituting commission of a tortious act within this state. Jenner & Block v. District Court, 197 Colo. 184, 590 P.2d 964 (1979).

 Contact insufficient to justify personal jurisdiction. C.F.H. Enters., Inc. v. Heatcool, 538 F. Supp. 774 (D. Colo. 1982).

 "Effects" test, as established by U.S. supreme court, specifies that where a defendant's intentional actions, taken outside the forum, are expressly directed at causing a harmful effect within the forum state, such actions are sufficient to satisfy due process in the context of an intentional tort. D & D Fuller CATV Const., Inc. v. Pace, 780 P.2d 520 (Colo. 1989).

 Defendant's alleged tortious acts that have an effect in Colorado, without other contacts with Colorado, did not support a reasonable inference that defendant engaged in conduct subjecting it to personal jurisdiction. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Arkhangelskgeoldobycha, 94 P.3d 1208 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 123 P.3d 1187 (Colo. 2005).

 Jurisdiction over nonresident tortfeasor requires that the injury itself occur in Colorado, even if the negligent act occurs in another state. McAvoy v. District Court, 757 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1988); AST Sports Science, Inc. v. CLF Distribution Ltd., 514 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2008).

 Where Colorado resident was injured in an accident with a Washington resident in Washington due to alleged negligent actions which occurred in Washington, the allegations of subsequent treatment for the injury in Colorado, and effects of the accident which were manifest in Colorado, were not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the Colorado court under the long-arm statute. McAvoy v. District Court, 757 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1988).

 In order to satisfy the statutory standard for assertion of long arm jurisdiction, it is not necessary that both the tortious conduct constituting the cause and the injury constituting the effect take place in Colorado. However, the injury in the forum state must be direct, not consequential or remote. F.D.I.C. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 937 F. Supp. 1461 (D. Colo. 1996).

 Plaintiff's allegation of a tort caused by unauthorized disbursements from a London account failed to allege that defendants engaged in any tortious conduct in Colorado. Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503 (10th Cir. 1995).

 Plaintiff failed to allege an injury in Colorado sufficient to invoke personal jurisdiction under subsection (1)(b) where alleged unauthorized disbursals occurred in London and were from a London account. That plaintiff may have been economically affected in Colorado simply because he lived here is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under subsection (1)(b). Wenz v. Memery Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503 (10th Cir. 1995).

 The loss of profits in the state of plaintiff's domicile is insufficient to sustain long-arm jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. The injury in the forum state must be direct, not consequential or remote. When both the tortious conduct and the injury occur in another state, the fact that the plaintiff resides in Colorado and experiences some economic consequences here is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on a Colorado court. AMAX Potash Corp. v. Trans-Resources, Inc., 817 P.2d 598 (Colo. App. 1991); Gognat v. Ellsworth, 224 P.3d 1039 (Colo. App. 2009).

 A person's conduct causes a minor child to leave a custodial parent, when the parent does not consent, or prevents a child's return to such parent, such conduct constitutes a tortious act. D & D Fuller CATV Const., Inc. v. Pace, 780 P.2d 520 (Colo. 1989).

 Defendant's allegedly tortious action in collecting upon a voided wage assignment was expressly directed at causing a harmful effect within the forum state and thus created a sufficient nexus between defendant and the forum state so as to satisfy due process. Vogan v. County of San Diego, 193 P.3d 336 (Colo. App. 2008).

 Tortious conduct in a foreign state which causes injury in Colorado may be deemed to be an act committed in Colorado so as to satisfy the long-arm statute. Ranger v. Fortune Ins. Co., 817 P.2d 600 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Tort claims of intentional and negligent misrepresentations directed into Colorado during the course of telephone conversations from outside the state into the state are sufficient to constitute tortious acts within the state under this section. Broadview Fin., Inc. v. Entech Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 859 F. Supp. 444 (D. Colo. 1994).

 Personal jurisdiction existed over nonresident attorney and his law firm which, in addressing two letters to plaintiff in Colorado, purposely directed their activities toward Colorado and plaintiff's injuries relate to that contact with Colorado. First Entm't, Inc. v. Firth, 885 F. Supp. 216 (D. Colo. 1995).

 Exercise of jurisdiction held proper where defendants, in connection with sale of sports car through Nebraska dealership, placed ad in national magazine, made allegedly fraudulent representations via telephone to Colorado plaintiff, and knew that car would be transported to and used in Colorado. Schocket v. Classic Auto Sales, Inc., 817 P.2d 561 (Colo. App. 1991), aff'd, 832 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1992).

IV. REAL PROPERTY IN COLORADO.

 Transaction involving Colorado property gives long arm jurisdiction. This section commonly referred to as the long arm statute specifically provides that a person who transacts business in the state of Colorado or owns real property in the state of Colorado submits himself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Colorado in any action arising from the transaction of such business or the ownership of such property. McHenry F.S., Inc., v. Clausen, 30 Colo. App. 253, 491 P.2d 592 (1971).

 Being the state with greatest interest in transaction, jurisdiction in Colorado not offensive. Where a contract to purchase land was signed by both parties outside the state of Colorado but the defendant came to Colorado to view the property and employed a Colorado firm of consulting engineers to conduct a survey of the property, and the contract to purchase the property was prepared in Colorado, and the real estate broker and the vendor of the property were both Colorado residents, and the subject matter of the contract, the real estate, was located in Colorado thereby making Colorado the state with the greatest interest in the transaction, the defendant's purposeful acts in this state were significant, and the jurisdiction of the district court obtained through the long arm statute did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Dwyer v. District Court, 188 Colo. 41, 532 P.2d 725 (1975).

 Once defendants are personally served, court acquires in personam jurisdiction. Where the claims asserted against the defendants arose out of their title to certain real property and their transfer of that property to a company, and the defendants were personally served with process in the state of Illinois pursuant to the provisions of this section, consequently, the trial court obtained in personam jurisdiction over them. McHenry F.S., Inc. v. Clausen, 30 Colo. App. 253, 491 P.2d 592 (1971).

 Nonresidency of all parties does not defeat long arm jurisdiction. The argument that since both the plaintiff and the defendants were residents of Illinois, the long arm statute was not available is without merit. McHenry F.S., Inc. v. Clausen, 30 Colo. App. 253, 491 P.2d 592 (1971).

V. CONTRACTS OF INSURANCE.

 Reinsurance contract subject to law of state where made. The negotiation and execution outside the state of a contract of reinsurance is not doing business in the state where the insured property is situated and the original risk was assumed. Reinsurance effected under a contract made in one state does not constitute doing business in another, although the risks covered by the reinsurance agreement were in the latter state and were covered by the reinsurance contract. Perlman v. Great States Life Ins. Co., 164 Colo. 493, 436 P.2d 124 (1968).

 Plaintiff must prove reinsurance treaty was executed in Colorado. As to the reinsurance treaties, the record fails to show that these were executed in Colorado. Plaintiff has the burden of proof in regard to this essential assertion of jurisdiction. Perlman v. Great States Life Ins. Co., 164 Colo. 493, 436 P.2d 124 (1968).

 Mere fact that certain individuals who live in Colorado were parties to a reinsurance contract is insufficient to meet the minimum contacts test. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Equitas Ltd., 987 P.2d 954 (Colo. App. 1999).

 Insurance company and liquidator subject to jurisdiction. Where an insurance company solicited and did substantial business in Colorado, the company, and its liquidator in case the company is insolvent, is subject to jurisdiction under the provisions of this section. Insurance Affiliates, Inc. v. O'Connor, 522 F. Supp. 703 (D. Colo. 1981).

VI. MAINTENANCE OF MATRIMONIAL DOMICILE.

 Trial court held to have acquired personal jurisdiction over husband for purposes of dividing marital property. In re Booker, 833 P.2d 734 (Colo. 1992).

 A spouse's affidavit that the spouse has resided and continues to reside in Colorado is sufficient for a Colorado court to exercise long arm jurisdiction over the husband under subsection (1)(e). In re Akins, 932 P.2d 863 (Colo. App. 1997).

 Entry of foreign decree that determined only the status of the marriage without addressing the division of marital property did not deprive the Colorado court of the power to divide property exclusive of husband's military pension and to award maintenance and child support. In re Akins, 932 P.2d 863 (Colo. App. 1997).

 Federal act preempts state rules regarding jurisdiction over a military pension. Under the supremacy clause, the terms of the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouse's Protection Act preempt state rules with respect to a court's jurisdiction to consider the military pension as a marital asset. In re Akins, 932 P.2d 863 (Colo. App. 1997).

13-1-125. Service of process.

Statute text

(1) Service of process upon any person subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Colorado may be made by personally serving the summons upon the defendant or respondent outside this state, in the manner prescribed by the Colorado rules of civil procedure, with the same force and effect as if the summons had been personally served within this state.

(2) No service of any summons or other process upon any corporation shall be made outside the state in the manner provided in subsection (1) of this section when such corporation maintains an agent for process upon whom service may be made as provided in rule 4 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure.

(3) Nothing in this section shall limit or affect the right to serve any process as prescribed by the Colorado rules of civil procedure.

History

 Source: L. 65: p. 472, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-1-27. L. 82: p. 280, § 2.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the manner of service, see C.R.C.P. 4.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations


Analysis


I. General Consideration.
II. Proper Service.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

 Law reviews. For note, "One Year Review of Colorado Law -- 1964", see 42 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1965). For article, "Jurisdiction and Service of Process Beyond Colorado Boundaries", see 11 Colo. Law. 748 (1982). For article, "Legislative Activities in Family Law", see 11 Colo. Law. 1560 (1982).

 This section and § 13-1-124 are sometimes referred to as the "long arm" or "single act" statute. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451, 412 P.2d 428 (1966); Cox v. District Court, 160 Colo. 437, 417 P.2d 792 (1966).

 Purpose of sections was to extend the court's jurisdiction. These sections were passed by the general assembly in order to extend, rather than to limit the jurisdiction of the courts of the state. White-Rodgers Co. v. District Court, 160 Colo. 491, 418 P.2d 527 (1966).

 Section may be used even when cause arose before effective date. This section and § 13-1-124 may be constitutionally applied where the complaint is filed after the effective date of the statute, though the tortious act complained of occurred before the effective date of the statute. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451, 412 P.2d 428 (1966); Cox v. District Court, 160 Colo. 437, 417 P.2d 792 (1966).

 Retrospective application of this section is in accord with sound public policy. Smith v. Putnam, 250 F. Supp. 1017 (D. Colo. 1965).

 For discussion of conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction, see Bennett Waites Corp. v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 810 (D. Colo. 1983).

 Applied in Nations Enters, Inc. v. Process Equip. Co., 40 Colo. App. 390, 579 P.2d 655 (1978); Adolph Coors Co. v. A. Genderson & Sons, 486 F. Supp. 131 (D. Colo. 1980); Beckman v. Carlson, 553 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Colo. 1983).

II. PROPER SERVICE.

 Transacting of business may not be proved unless process is properly served. Since respondents did not serve process on a foreign corporation by personal service as required by the "long arm" statute, its provisions concerning contacts sufficient to establish doing business are inapplicable under § 7-9-119. Geer Co. v. District Court, 172 Colo. 48, 469 P.2d 734 (1970).

 It is improper to dismiss a complaint because of improper or invalid service of process. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451, 412 P.2d 428 (1966).

 Quashing of process is not reviewable by writ of error. An order quashing a purported service of process is not tantamount to a judgment of dismissal and under our rules is not such an order as is subject to review by writ of error. Hoen v. District Court, 159 Colo. 451, 412 P.2d 428 (1966).

 Process must be served on defendant at usual place of abode. The fact that the serviceman's usual place of abode was not the place of service is sufficient as a matter of law to overcome the prima facie showing made by the sheriff's return and that the service must therefore be set aside. Neher v. District Court, 161 Colo. 445, 422 P.2d 627 (1967).

 Term "usual place of abode" is not necessarily synonymous with domicile. The term "usual place of abode" has generally been construed to mean the place where that person is actually living at the time service is attempted. It is not necessarily synonymous with "domicile". Neher v. District Court, 161 Colo. 445, 422 P.2d 627 (1967).

 For necessity of process being served by proper person, see Martin v. Denver Juvenile Court, 177 Colo. 261, 493 P.2d 1093 (1972).

 Process will not be quashed for lack of jurisdiction if plaintiff makes prima facie showing. Where plaintiff makes prima facie showing of threshold jurisdiction in complaint, process is not vulnerable to motion to quash based upon lack of jurisdiction. Texair Flyers, Inc. v. District Court, 180 Colo. 432, 506 P.2d 367 (1973).

13-1-126. Documents in court proceedings - designation by clerk of representative to attend court proceedings.

Statute text

Documents from the office of the clerk of any court of record to be used as evidence in court proceedings shall be acknowledged, exemplified, verified, or attested to in a manner which shall make unnecessary the personal appearance of such clerk in court proceedings to acknowledge, exemplify, verify, or attest to the validity of such documents. The clerk of any court of record may designate a representative to attend court proceedings if the clerk is subpoenaed for the purpose of acknowledging, exemplifying, verifying, or attesting to the validity of documents furnished by the clerk's office.

History

 Source: L. 79: Entire section added, p. 596, § 4, effective July 1.

13-1-127. Entities - school districts - legislative declaration - representation.

Statute text

(1) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:

(a) "Closely held entity" means an entity, as defined in section 7-90-102 (20), C.R.S., with no more than three owners.

(a.2) "Cooperative" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (9), C.R.S.

(a.5) "Corporate licensed child placement agency" means an entity that places, or arranges for placement of, the care of any child with any family, person, or institution other than persons related to said child and that is licensed by the department of human services pursuant to section 26-6-104, C.R.S., as a child placement agency.

(b) "Corporation" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (10), C.R.S.

(c) "Entity" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (20), C.R.S.

(d) "Limited liability company" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (32), C.R.S.

(e) "Limited partnership" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (34), C.R.S.

(f) "Limited partnership association" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (35), C.R.S.

(g) "Nonprofit association" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (38), C.R.S.

(h) "Nonprofit corporation" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (39), C.R.S.

(i) "Officer" means a person generally or specifically authorized by an entity to take any action contemplated by this section.

(j) "Owner" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 7-90-102 (43), C.R.S.

(k) "School district" means a school district organized and existing pursuant to law but does not include a junior college district.

(l) "Truancy proceedings" means judicial proceedings for the enforcement of the "School Attendance Law of 1963", article 33 of title 22, C.R.S., brought pursuant to section 22-33-108, C.R.S.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in section 13-6-407, a closely held entity may be represented before any court of record or any administrative agency by an officer of such closely held entity if:

(a) The amount at issue in the controversy or matter before the court or agency does not exceed ten thousand dollars, exclusive of costs, interest, or statutory penalties, on and after January 1, 1991; and

(b) The officer provides the court or agency, at or prior to the trial or hearing, with evidence satisfactory to the court or agency of the authority of the officer to appear on behalf of the closely held entity in all matters within the jurisdictional limits set forth in this section.

(2.3) For the purposes of this section, each of the following persons shall be presumed to have the authority to appear on behalf of the closely held entity upon providing evidence of the person's holding the specified office or status:

(a) An officer of a cooperative, corporation, or nonprofit corporation;

(b) A general partner of a partnership or of a limited partnership;

(c) A person in whom the management of a limited liability company is vested or reserved; and

(d) A member of a limited partnership association.

(2.5) (a) The general assembly hereby finds and determines that the practice of law should not include the representation of a corporation in workers' compensation proceedings by an authorized employee of such corporation. While the general assembly respectfully recognizes the jurisdiction of the supreme court with respect to the regulation of the practice of law, it hereby finds and declares that the representation of a corporation in workers' compensation cases by an authorized employee of that corporation does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. The general assembly has determined that the decision of a president or secretary of a corporation to have a corporate employee represent the corporation in a workers' compensation case is a business decision made voluntarily and knowingly by persons who are qualified and accustomed to making business decisions. The general assembly has further determined that allowing such representation will not hamper the orderly and proper disposition of workers' compensation cases and may expedite and facilitate such disposition. An employee of a defendant corporation with experience in the operations of such corporation and knowledge of the necessary facts and law can afford a defendant corporation with representation which is the substantial equivalent to, and may in some cases, be more effective than, a licensed attorney. The general assembly hereby declares that the protections afforded by the restrictions set forth by the supreme court with respect to the unauthorized practice of law are unnecessary for the described form of representation because the general public is not likely to be harmed by such representation. Further, the general assembly respectfully recommends that the supreme court adopt rules which permit and regulate such representation in which event the general assembly may choose to repeal this statute in deference to the supreme court's rules.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section concerning the amount at issue, any corporation which is in compliance with the requirements otherwise imposed on corporations by law may be represented by any employee of the corporation who is so authorized by the president or secretary of such corporation, in proceedings authorized under the "Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado", articles 40 to 47 of title 8, C.R.S., exclusive of proceedings before the industrial claim appeals office under part 3 of article 43 of title 8, C.R.S., appeals to the court of appeals under section 8-43-307, C.R.S., and summary reviews by the supreme court under section 8-43-313, C.R.S.

(3) The court may rely upon a written resolution of a closely held entity that allows a named officer to appear in the closely held entity's behalf.

(4) A closely held entity's exercise of the option authorized by this section to be represented by an officer shall not alone be construed to establish personal liability of the representing officer or any other officer, director, owner, or shareholder for action taken by that closely held entity.

(5) A corporate licensed child placement agency, as defined in paragraph (a.5) of subsection (1) of this section, that is in compliance with the requirements otherwise imposed on closely held entities by law, may be represented by any named officer or designated agent of the agency in any proceeding involving the termination of the parent-child relationship pursuant to the "Colorado Children's Code", title 19, C.R.S., or in any proceeding involving a petition for adoption pursuant to section 19-5-208, C.R.S.

(6) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to restrict the classes of persons who, or circumstances in which persons, may be represented by other persons, or may appear in person, before Colorado courts or administrative agencies.

(7) (a) A school district board of education may authorize, by resolution, one or more employees of the school district to represent the school district in truancy proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction; except that the authorization of the board of education shall not extend to representation of the school district before a court of appeals or before the Colorado supreme court.

(b) A court may rely on the written resolution of the school district board of education that authorizes the named employee to represent the school district in truancy proceedings.

(c) An authorized employee who represents a school district in truancy proceedings pursuant to the provisions of this subsection (7) shall not be subject to the provisions of section 12-5-112, C.R.S.

(d) A school district board of education's exercise of the option authorized by this section to be represented in truancy proceedings by an employee shall not alone be construed to establish personal liability of the representing employee or any other employee or a school director of the school district for action taken by the school district.

History

 Source: L. 83: Entire section added, p. 598, § 1, effective May 25. L. 84: (1)(c) amended, p. 450, § 1, effective March 16. L. 90: IP(2) and (2)(a) amended, p. 849, § 3, effective May 31; (2)(a) amended, p. 854, § 1, effective July 1. L. 91: (2.5) added, p. 1285, § 1, effective April 14. L. 92: (1)(a.5) and (5) added, pp. 179, 180, §§ 2, 3, effective March 20; (2.5) amended, p. 276, § 1, effective April 14. L. 94: (1)(a.5) amended, p. 2639, § 85, effective July 1. L. 98: (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) amended and (2.3) and (6) added, p. 489, § 1, effective February 1, 1999. L. 2007: (1)(k), (1)(l), and (7) added, pp. 165, 164, §§ 2, 1, effective March 22.

Annotations

 Cross references: (1) For representation of corporations in the small claims division of county court, see § 13-6-407.

 (2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act amending the introductory portion to subsection (2) and subsection (2)(a), see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990. For the legislative declaration contained in the 1994 act amending subsection (1)(a.5), see section 1 of chapter 345, Session Laws of Colorado 1994.

Annotations


RECENT ANNOTATIONS

Annotations

 Trial court erred in permitting non-attorney manager to represent limited liability company (LLC) since LLC could not satisfy the amount in controversy requirement of the statutory exception in subsection (2). Weston v. T&T, LLC, __ P.3d __ (Colo. App. 2011) [published May 26, 2011].

 LLC not entitled to a new trial, however, because any error in permitting non-attorney manager to represent LLC was invited by LLC. Weston v. T&T, LLC, __ P.3d __ (Colo. App. 2011) [published May 26, 2011].

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Assuming that defendant church existed as a de facto corporation, if the pastor were recognized as a corporate officer, the pastor could represent the defendant in court. Where there was no showing that the pastor was a corporate officer, however, the pastor could not represent the defendant church. People v. LaPorte Church of Christ, 830 P.2d 1150 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Applied in Keller Corp. v. Kelley, 187 P.3d 1133 (Colo. App. 2008).

13-1-128. Confidentiality of decisions of courts of record - violations - penalties.

Statute text

(1) Each decision of a court of record shall be confidential until publicly announced.

(2) (a) If it appears that the provisions of subsection (1) of this section have been violated, petition shall be made to the chief judge of the district court for the city and county of Denver for the appointment of a special prosecutor and the convening of a grand jury.

(b) The chief judge, for good cause shown, shall appoint the special prosecutor and shall order the impaneling of a grand jury in accordance with the provisions of article 73 of this title. Any special prosecutor appointed pursuant to this section shall be compensated as provided in section 20-1-308, C.R.S.

(3) An action for violation of subsection (1) of this section may only be commenced by the return of an indictment by a grand jury notwithstanding any provision of section 16-5-101, C.R.S., to the contrary.

(4) Any person who knowingly violates the provisions of subsection (1) of this section commits a class 6 felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as provided in section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S.

History

 Source: L. 87: Entire section added, p. 539, § 1, effective July 1. L. 89: (4) amended, p. 827, § 31, effective July 1. L. 2002: (4) amended, p. 1487, § 120, effective October 1.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (4), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

13-1-129. Preferential trial dates.

Statute text

(1) In any civil action filed in any court of record in this state, the court shall grant a motion for a preferential trial date which is accompanied by clear and convincing medical evidence concluding that a party suffers from an illness or condition raising substantial medical doubt of survival of that party beyond one year and which satisfies the court that the interests of justice will be served by granting such motion for a preferential trial date.

(2) In any civil action filed in any court of record in this state, the court may grant a motion for a preferential trial date upon the motion of a party who is a natural person at least seventy years of age and a finding by the court that such claim is meritorious, unless the court finds that such party does not have a substantial interest in the case as a whole.

(3) A motion under this section may be filed and served at any time when the case is at issue and a party meets the requirements of subsection (1) or (2) of this section.

(4) Upon the granting of a motion for a preferential trial date, the court shall set the case for trial not more than one hundred twenty days from the date the motion was filed. The court shall establish an accelerated discovery schedule in all such cases. No continuance shall be granted beyond the one-hundred-twenty-day period except for physical or mental disability of a party or a party's attorney or upon a showing of other good cause. Any such continuance shall be for no more than one hundred twenty days, and only one such continuance shall be granted to a party.

History

 Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 858, § 1, effective July 1.

13-1-130. Reports of convictions to department of education.

Statute text

When a person is convicted of, pleads nolo contendere to, or receives a deferred sentence for a felony and the court knows the person is a current or former employee of a school district or a charter school in this state or holds a license or authorization pursuant to the provisions of article 60.5 of title 22, C.R.S., the court shall report such fact to the department of education.

History

 Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 1025, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 1843, § 22, effective August 2. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 2514, § 1, effective June 5.

13-1-131. Speedy trial option in civil actions.

Statute text

If a trial date has not been fixed by the court in any civil action within ninety days from the date the case is at issue, upon agreement of all the parties, the parties may elect to have the matter heard by a master, appointed by the court in accordance with the Colorado rules of civil procedure. When such a trial is held before a master, the parties shall pay the costs of such trial, as allocated fairly among the parties by the master. The master shall have all the powers of a judge.

History

 Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 851, § 11, effective May 31.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act enacting this section, see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990.

13-1-132. Use of interactive audiovisual devices in court proceedings.

Statute text

(1) Except for trials, when the appearance of any person is required in any court of this state, such appearance may be made by the use of an interactive audiovisual device. An interactive audiovisual device shall operate so as to enable the person and the judge or magistrate to view and converse with each other simultaneously.

(2) Notwithstanding any provision of this section, a judge or magistrate may order a person to appear in court.

(3) A full record of such proceeding shall be made.

(4) The supreme court may prescribe rules of procedure pursuant to section 13-2-109 to implement this section.

History

 Source: L. 92: Entire section added, p. 318, § 1, effective April 29.

13-1-133. Use of recycled paper.

Statute text

(1) The general assembly finds and declares that there is a need to expand upon existing laws which foster the effective and efficient management of solid waste by requiring that certain documents submitted by attorneys-at-law to state courts of record be submitted on recycled paper. The general assembly further finds that such expansion will protect and enhance the environment and the health and safety of the citizens of Colorado.

(2) (a) (I) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (2), no document shall be submitted by an attorney to a court of record after January 1, 1994, unless such document is submitted on recycled paper. The provisions of this section shall apply to all papers appended to each such document.

(II) (A) Procedures adopted to implement the provisions of this section shall not impede the conduct of court business nor create grounds for an additional cause of action or sanction.

(B) No document shall be refused by a court of record solely because it was not submitted on recycled paper.

(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to apply to:

(I) Photographs;

(II) An original document that was prepared or printed prior to January 1, 1994;

(III) A document that was not created at the direction or under the control of the submitting attorney;

(IV) Facsimile copies otherwise permitted to be filed with a court of record in lieu of the original document; however, if the original is also required to be filed, such original shall be submitted in compliance with this section;

(V) Existing stocks of nonrecycled paper and preprinted forms acquired or printed prior to January 1, 1994.

(3) The provisions of this section shall not be applicable if recycled paper is not readily available.

(4) For purposes of this section, unless the context requires otherwise:

(a) "Attorney" means an attorney-at-law admitted to practice law before any court of record in this state.

(b) "Courts of record" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 13-1-111.

(c) "Document" means any pleading or any other paper submitted as an appendix to such pleading by an attorney, which document is required or permitted to be filed with a clerk of court concerning any action to be commenced or which is pending before a court of record.

(d) "Recycled paper" means paper with not less than fifty percent of its total weight consisting of secondary and postconsumer waste and with not less than ten percent of such total weight consisting of postconsumer waste.

History

 Source: L. 93: Entire section added, p. 622, § 2, effective July 1.

Annotations

 Cross references: For further provisions concerning the purchase of recycled paper and recycled products, see §§ 24-103-207, 25-16.5-102, and 30-11-109.5.

13-1-134. Court automation system - juvenile or domestic actions.

Statute text

(1) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that the accurate and efficient exchange of information between the courts and state family service agencies is beneficial in providing aid to families in need in Colorado. Further, the general assembly declares that the use of a computer automation system to link the courts with each other and with state family service agencies for the purpose of the exchange of information regarding families would aid in identifying and providing services to families in need. It is for this reason that the general assembly has adopted this section.

(2) (a) On or before January 15, 1996, the state court administrator shall establish and administer a program for automation of the court computer technology systems in order to link the juvenile courts and district courts involved in domestic actions around the state with each other and with state family service agencies, including, but not limited to, the department of human services, the juvenile probation department, law enforcement offices, and any other agency involved in the investigation, evaluation, or provision of services to families involved in domestic actions pursuant to title 19, C.R.S., and articles 4 and 10 of title 14, C.R.S. Said automation system shall provide those parties linked to the system with automatic access to information obtained by any one of the parties in regard to a family or family member involved in said domestic actions; except that said automation system shall not include information which is required to be kept confidential under any state or federal law.

(b) Repealed.

(3) The provisions of this section shall not affect the confidentiality of juvenile records.

History

 Source: L. 93: Entire section added, p. 931, § 1, effective May 28. L. 94: (2) amended, p. 2639, § 86, effective July 1. L. 96: (2)(b) repealed, p. 1264, § 175, effective August 7.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1994 act amending subsection (2), see section 1 of chapter 345, Session Laws of Colorado 1994. For the legislative declaration contained in the 1996 act repealing subsection (2)(b), see section 1 of chapter 237, Session Laws of Colorado 1996.

13-1-135. Family courts - implementation report. (Repealed)

History

 Source: L. 93: Entire section added, p. 1256, § 1, effective June 6. L. 96: (1) repealed, p. 1264, § 176, effective August 7. L. 98: (2) repealed, p. 818, § 13, effective August 5.

13-1-136. Civil protection orders - single set of forms.

Statute text

(1) The general assembly hereby finds that the statutes provide for the issuance of several types of civil protection orders to protect the public, but that many of these protection orders have many elements in common. The general assembly also finds that consolidating the various forms for issuing and verifying service of civil protection orders and creating, to the extent possible, a standardized set of forms that will be applicable to the issuance and service of civil protection orders will simplify the procedures for issuing these protection orders and enhance the efficient use of the courts' and citizens' time and resources.

(2) On or before July 1, 2003, the state court administrator, pursuant to the rule-making authority of the Colorado supreme court, shall design and make available to the courts copies of a standardized set of forms that shall be used in the issuance and verification of service of civil protection orders issued pursuant to article 14 of this title or section 14-10-108, C.R.S., or rule 365 of the Colorado rules of county court civil procedure. The state court administrator shall design the standardized set of forms in such a manner as to make the forms easy to understand and use and in such a manner as will facilitate and improve the procedure for requesting, issuing, and enforcing civil protection orders.

(3) In developing the standardized set of forms for the issuance and verification of service of civil protection orders pursuant to this section, the state court administrator shall work with representatives of municipal, county, and district court judges, law enforcement, a member of the Colorado bar association, and representatives of other interested groups.

History

 Source: L. 98: Entire section added, p. 243, § 1, effective April 13. L. 99: (2) amended, p. 501, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2002: Entire section amended, p. 493, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 1002, § 3, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Standard form of order not necessary under this section in probate court guardianship case where restraining order was entered as part of a broader order concerning parenting time. People ex rel. A.R.D., 43 P.3d 632 (Colo. App. 2001).

——————————

PART 2
COURT SECURITY CASH FUND
COMMISSION

13-1-201. Legislative declaration.

Statute text

(1) The general assembly hereby finds that:

(a) Ensuring the safety of employees and users of state court facilities is a significant component of ensuring access to justice for the people of the state of Colorado;

(b) Responsibility for providing security for state court facilities lies with the county governments; and

(c) Colorado is a geographically, demographically, and economically diverse state and this diversity affects the funding and services of individual counties. Although the provision of security for state court facilities is a county responsibility, the variation in funds available to individual counties may not allow fundamental security measures to be met in each county.

(2) The general assembly, therefore, determines and declares that:

(a) The creation of the court security cash fund commission and the court security cash fund will be beneficial to, and in the best interests of, the people of the state of Colorado; and

(b) The goals of the commission and the cash fund shall be to:

(I) Provide supplemental funding for ongoing security staffing in the counties with the most limited financial resources; and

(II) Provide moneys to counties for court security equipment costs, training of local security teams on issues of state court security, and emergency needs related to court security.

History

 Source: L. 2007: Entire part added, p. 1264, § 1, effective May 25.

13-1-202. Definitions.

Statute text

As used in this part 2, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Commission" means the court security cash fund commission created in section 13-1-203.

(2) "Fund" means the court security cash fund created in section 13-1-204.

(3) "Local security team" means a group of individuals from a county that oversees issues of court security for the county and that includes, at a minimum, the chief judge of the district court in the county or his or her designee, the sheriff or his or her designee, and a county commissioner or county manager or his or her designee.

History

 Source: L. 2007: Entire part added, p. 1265, § 1, effective May 25.

13-1-203. Court security cash fund commission - creation - membership.

Statute text

(1) There is hereby created in the judicial department the court security cash fund commission to evaluate grant applications received pursuant to this part 2 and make recommendations to the state court administrator for awarding grants from the court security cash fund. The commission shall be appointed no later than July 1, 2007.

(2) (a) The commission shall be composed of seven members, as follows:

(I) Two representatives of an association that represents county commissioners who are recommended by the association and who are appointed by the governor;

(II) Two representatives of an association that represents county sheriffs who are recommended by the association and who are appointed by governor;

(III) Two members of the judicial branch who are appointed by the chief justice; and

(IV) One member of the general public who is appointed by the chief justice.

(b) The commission membership described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) shall include, at all times, at least one representative from a county in which the population is above the median population for the state of Colorado, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs, and at least one representative from a county in which the population is below the median population for the state of Colorado, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs.

(3) The term of office of each member of the commission shall be three years; except that, of those members first appointed, one member representing each entity shall be appointed for a one-year term and one member representing each entity shall be appointed for a two-year term. A vacancy shall be filled by the respective appointing authority for the unexpired term only.

(4) Members of the commission shall serve without compensation and without reimbursement for expenses.

History

 Source: L. 2007: Entire part added, p. 1265, § 1, effective May 25.

13-1-204. Court security cash fund - creation - grants - regulations.

Statute text

(1) (a) There is hereby created in the state treasury the court security cash fund. The moneys in the fund shall be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly for the implementation of this part 2. The state court administrator is authorized to accept gifts, grants, or donations from any private or public source for the purpose of implementing this part 2. All private and public moneys received by the state court administrator from gifts, grants, or donations shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the fund in addition to any moneys that may be appropriated to the fund directly by the general assembly.

(b) A five-dollar surcharge shall be assessed and collected as provided by law on docket fees and jury fees for specified civil actions filed on and after July 1, 2007, on docket fees for criminal convictions entered on and after July 1, 2007, on filing fees for specified probate filings made on and after July 1, 2007, on docket fees for specified special proceeding filings made on and after July 1, 2007, on fees for specified filings in water matters initiated on and after July 1, 2007, and on docket fees for specified traffic infraction penalties assessed on and after July 1, 2007. The surcharge shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the surcharge to the fund.

(c) (I) All investment earnings derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the fund shall remain in the fund and shall not be transferred or revert to the general fund at the end of any fiscal year. Any unexpended and unencumbered moneys remaining in the fund at the end of any fiscal year shall remain in the fund and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or any other fund.

(II) Notwithstanding any provision of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) to the contrary, on April 20, 2009, the state treasurer shall deduct one million five hundred thousand dollars from the court security cash fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.

(III) Notwithstanding any provision of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (c) to the contrary, on July 1, 2009, the state treasurer shall deduct five hundred thousand dollars from the court security cash fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.

(2) Moneys from the fund that are distributed to counties pursuant to this part 2 shall be used to supplement existing county funding for purposes related to security of facilities containing a state court or probation office and shall not be used to supplant moneys already allocated by the county for such purposes.

(3) All moneys credited to the fund shall be available for grants awarded by the state court administrator, based on recommendations of the commission, to counties for the purposes described in this part 2; except that the state court administrator may use up to ten percent of the moneys annually appropriated from the fund for administrative costs incurred through the implementation of this part 2. The state court administrator, subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly, is hereby authorized to expend moneys appropriated from the fund pursuant to this part 2.

(4) In accordance with the principles set out in section 13-1-205, the commission shall adopt guidelines prescribing the procedures to be followed in making, filing, and evaluating grant applications, the criteria for evaluation, and other guidelines necessary for administering the fund.

History

 Source: L. 2007: Entire part added, p. 1266, § 1, effective May 25. L. 2009: (1)(c) amended, (SB 09-208), ch. 149, p. 619, § 7, effective April 20; (1)(c)(III) added, (SB 09-279), ch. 367, p. 1925, § 3, effective June 1.

13-1-205. Grant applications - duties of counties.

Statute text

(1) To be eligible for moneys from the fund, a local security team shall apply to the commission through the state court administrator for moneys to be used as specified in this part 2 and in accordance with the timelines and guidelines adopted by the commission and using the application form provided by the commission. For the commission to consider a grant application, the application shall be signed by the administrative authority of each entity that is represented on the local security team.

(2) Grants from the fund shall be used to fund counties that meet the criteria specified in subsection (4) of this section for:

(a) The provision of court security staffing at a facility containing a state court or probation office;

(b) The purchase of security equipment or related structural improvements for a facility containing a state court or probation office;

(c) The provision of training on issues of court security; or

(d) Miscellaneous funding needs associated with issues of court security or security equipment.

(3) Moneys credited to the fund that are available for grant distribution shall be awarded based on the following priority schedule:

(a) Requests from counties that meet the criteria specified in subsection (4) of this section shall have the highest priority; and

(b) Requests for moneys for personnel costs shall be given subsequent priority.

(4) Counties that meet at least two of the following criteria shall be given the highest priority for need-based grants for court security personnel services pursuant to this part 2:

(a) Counties in which the total population is below the state median, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs;

(b) Counties in which the per capita income is below the state median, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs;

(c) Counties in which property tax revenues are below the state median, as determined by the most recent data published by the department of local affairs; or

(d) Counties in which the total county population living below the federal poverty line is greater than the state median, as determined by the most recent census published by the United States bureau of the census.

History

 Source: L. 2007: Entire part added, p. 1267, § 1, effective May 25. L. 2010: (4)(d) amended, (HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2068, § 21, effective August 11.

13-1-206. Repeal of part.

Statute text

(1) This part 2 is repealed, effective July 1, 2017.

(2) Prior to repeal, the court security cash fund commission shall be reviewed as provided in section 2-3-1203, C.R.S.

History

 Source: L. 2007: Entire part added, p. 1268, § 1, effective May 25.

——————————

ARTICLE 1.5
UNIFORM TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION
 RECIPROCAL ACCESS ACT


Section

13-1.5-101. Short title.

13-1.5-102. Definitions.

13-1.5-103. Forum.

13-1.5-104. Right to relief.

13-1.5-105. Applicable law.

13-1.5-106. Equality of rights.

13-1.5-107. Right additional to other rights.

13-1.5-108. Waiver of sovereign immunity.

13-1.5-109. Uniformity of application and construction.

13-1.5-101. Short title.

Statute text

This article may be cited as the "Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act".

History

 Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 451, § 1, effective July 1.

13-1.5-102. Definitions.

Statute text

As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Reciprocating jurisdiction" means a state of the United States of America, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a territory or possession of the United States of America, or a province or territory of Canada, which has enacted this article or provides substantially equivalent access to its courts and administrative agencies.

(2) "Person" means an individual person, a corporation, a business trust, an estate, a trust, a partnership, an association, a joint venture, a government in its private or public capacity, a governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal entity.

History

 Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 451, § 1, effective July 1.

13-1.5-103. Forum.

Statute text

An action or other proceeding for injury or threatened injury to property or person in a reciprocating jurisdiction caused by pollution originating, or that may originate, in this jurisdiction may be brought in this jurisdiction.

History

 Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 451, § 1, effective July 1.

13-1.5-104. Right to relief.

Statute text

A person who suffers, or is threatened with, injury to his person or property in a reciprocating jurisdiction caused by pollution originating, or that may originate, in this jurisdiction has the same rights to relief with respect to the injury or threatened injury and may enforce those rights in this jurisdiction as if the injury or threatened injury occurred in this jurisdiction.

History

 Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 452, § 1, effective July 1.

13-1.5-105. Applicable law.

Statute text

The law to be applied in an action or other proceeding brought pursuant to this article, including what constitutes pollution, is the law of this jurisdiction excluding choice of law rules.

History

 Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 452, § 1, effective July 1.

13-1.5-106. Equality of rights.

Statute text

This article does not accord a person injured or threatened with injury in another jurisdiction any rights superior to those that the person would have if injured or threatened with injury in this jurisdiction.

History

 Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 452, § 1, effective July 1.

13-1.5-107. Right additional to other rights.

Statute text

The right provided in this article is in addition to and not in derogation of any other rights.

History

 Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 452, § 1, effective July 1.

13-1.5-108. Waiver of sovereign immunity.

Statute text

The defense of sovereign immunity is applicable in any action or other proceeding brought pursuant to this article only to the extent that it would apply to a person injured or threatened with injury in this jurisdiction.

History

 Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 452, § 1, effective July 1.

13-1.5-109. Uniformity of application and construction.

Statute text

This article shall be applied and construed to carry out its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this article among jurisdictions enacting it.

History

 Source: L. 84: Entire article added, p. 452, § 1, effective July 1.

——————————

ARTICLE 2
SUPREME COURT

Annotations

 Cross references: For procedural rules adopted by the supreme court, see C.A.R. 1 to 58.


Section

13-2-101. Terms of supreme court.

13-2-102. Special terms.

13-2-103. Open sessions - oral arguments.

13-2-104. Quorum - adjournment.

13-2-105. Continuance of causes.

13-2-106. Process from supreme court.

13-2-107. Judge shall not act as attorney.

13-2-108. Rules of civil procedure.

13-2-109. Rules of criminal procedure.

13-2-110. Court to prescribe rules and forms.

13-2-111. Employees - compensation.

13-2-112. Duties of bailiff.

13-2-113. Fees of clerk of supreme court.

13-2-114. Seal of supreme court.

13-2-115. Pensions of supreme court judges.

13-2-116. Disposition of law books.

13-2-117. Librarian to have charge of library.

13-2-118. Duties of librarian.

13-2-119. Disposition of fees.

13-2-120. Supreme court library fund.

13-2-121. Manner of disbursement.

13-2-122. Supreme court and court of appeals opinions published.

13-2-123. Duty of reporter.

13-2-124. Publication of reports.

13-2-125. Purchase, distribution, and sale of reports.

13-2-126. Reports and session laws furnished.

13-2-127. Method for review.

13-2-101. Terms of supreme court.

Statute text

In each year there shall be three terms of the supreme court: One beginning on the second Monday in September, another beginning on the second Monday in January, and another beginning on the second Monday in April.

History

 Source: L. 1889: p. 443, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1409. C.L. § 5624. CSA: C. 46, § 15. CRS 53: § 37-2-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-1.

13-2-102. Special terms.

Statute text

Special terms of said court may be called under such general rules and regulations as may be adopted by the court.

History

 Source: G.L. § 2614. G.S. § 3235. R.S. 08: § 1410. C.L. § 5625. CSA: C. 46, § 16. CRS 53: § 37-2-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-2.

13-2-103. Open sessions - oral arguments.

Statute text

The court shall be in open session as often as practicable during each of its terms to hear and determine matters and causes which may come before it, and, at the discretion of the court, oral arguments may be allowed on final hearing in any cause on the request of any party thereto.

History

 Source: L. 1889: p. 443, § 2. R.S. 08: § 1411. C.L. § 5626. CSA: C. 46, § 17. CRS 53: § 37-2-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-3. L. 85: Entire section amended, p. 568, § 1, effective May 31.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Oral arguments in the supreme court when requested are a matter of right, but they are subject to reasonable regulation by the court, and failure to request constitutes a waiver. In re Morrish's Estate, 105 Colo. 349, 97 P.2d 442 (1939).

 Oral arguments must be requested and may be regulated. Oral arguments are granted only on request, and are subject to reasonable regulation by the court. Brown v. Maier, 96 Colo. 1, 38 P.2d 905 (1934).

 Failure to request privilege of oral argument on application for supersedeas is a waiver, in case the court should render final judgment on such application. Brown v. Maier, 96 Colo. 1, 38 P.2d 905 (1934).

13-2-104. Quorum - adjournment.

Statute text

If a quorum of the justices of the supreme court is not present on the first day of any term, the court shall stand adjourned from day to day until a quorum attends; and said court, if a quorum is present, may adjourn to any day specified, as may be deemed advisable.

History

 Source: G.L. § 2602. G.S. § 3225. R.S. 08: § 1412. C.L. § 5627. CSA: C. 46, § 18. CRS 53: § 37-2-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-4.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Quorum means the majority of the entire body. This section clearly determines, that which is necessarily implied in § 5 of art. VI, Colo. Const., that a quorum of the justices may transact business and decide cases. This section does not define a quorum. The word, therefore, must be held to be used in its ordinary meaning, and that meaning is a majority of the entire body. Snider v. Rinehart, 18 Colo. 18, 31 P. 716 (1892); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. People ex rel. Wilson, 68 Colo. 487, 190 P. 513 (1920).

13-2-105. Continuance of causes.

Statute text

All matters, suits, and causes undisposed of at any term of the supreme court shall stand continued to the next succeeding term.

History

 Source: G.L. § 2607. G.S. § 3229. R.S. 08: § 1413. C.L. § 5628. CSA: C. 46, § 19. CRS 53: § 37-2-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-5.

13-2-106. Process from supreme court.

Statute text

All process issued out of the supreme court shall bear teste in the name of the chief justice, be signed by the clerk of the court, sealed with its seal, and made returnable according to law or the rules and orders of the court and shall be executed by the officer to whom the same is directed.

History

 Source: G.L. § 2603. G.S. § 3226. R.S. 08: § 1416. C.L. § 5629. CSA: C. 46, § 20. CRS 53: § 37-2-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-6.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Scire facias must be directed to sheriff of county where defendant resides. A scire facias or summons to hear errors issued by the clerk of the supreme court must be directed to the sheriff of the county where the defendant in error resides or may be found, and no other person than such sheriff or his authorized deputy has authority to serve such summons. An attempted service of such summons made by a person not authorized by law to make such service is a nullity. Wellington v. Beck, 29 Colo. 73, 66 P. 881 (1901).

13-2-107. Judge shall not act as attorney.

Statute text

No justice of the supreme court shall practice as an attorney-at-law in any of the courts of the state, nor give advice touching any cause pending or to be brought therein.

History

 Source: G.L. § 2608. G.S. § 3230. R.S. 08: § 1419. C.L. § 5631. CSA: C. 46, § 22. CRS 53: § 37-2-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-7.

13-2-108. Rules of civil procedure.

Statute text

The supreme court has the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the courts of record in the state of Colorado the practice and procedure in civil actions and all forms in connection therewith; except that no rules shall be made by the supreme court permitting or allowing trial judges to comment to the jury on the evidence given on the trial. Such rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigants. The supreme court shall fix the dates when such rules take effect and the extent to which they apply to proceedings then pending, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.

History

 Source: L. 39: p. 264, § 1. CSA: omitted. CRS 53: § 37-2-8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-8. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 597, § 5, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 There reposes in the supreme court the power to adopt rules for the regulation of practice and conduct of the business of courts of record in this state. People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo. 551, 357 P.2d 352 (1960).

 It may not diminish federal jurisdiction. This section authorizing the supreme court to prescribe rules of civil procedure in civil actions gave it no authority to modify, abridge, or enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction of federal courts. People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo. 551, 357 P.2d 352 (1960).

 Nor abridge, modify, or enlarge substantive rights. The supreme court had no power to give legal effect to modifications which unquestionably would "abridge", "enlarge", or "modify" substantive rights of litigants. People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo. 551, 357 P.2d 352 (1960).

 What is procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo. 551, 357 P.2d 352 (1960).

 The supreme court by rule cannot invest trial courts with an expanded jurisdiction. People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 144 Colo. 551, 357 P.2d 352 (1960).

 Where there is a conflict between a statute and a rule, the former must govern; rules of court can neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify substantive rights of a litigant. Sherman v. Colo. Springs Planning Comm'n, 729 P.2d 1014 (Colo. App. 1986), aff'd, 763 P.2d 292 (Colo. 1988); Herstam v. Bd. of Dirs., 895 P.2d 1131 (Colo. App. 1995).

 Applied in Inwood Indus., Inc. v. Priestley, 37 Colo. App. 78, 545 P.2d 732 (1975); Zimmerman v. Mozer, 10 Bankr. 1002 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981).

13-2-109. Rules of criminal procedure.

Statute text

(1) The supreme court has the power to prescribe, from time to time, rules of pleading, practice, and procedure with respect to all proceedings in all criminal cases in all courts of the state of Colorado.

(2) The supreme court shall fix the dates when such rules take effect and the extent to which they apply to proceedings then pending.

History

 Source: L. 60: p. 118, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-2-34. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-27.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the Colorado rules of criminal procedure, see chapter 29 of the Colorado court rules.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Colorado Criminal Procedure -- Does It Meet Minimum Standards?", see 28 Dicta 14 (1951). For article, "One Year Review of Criminal Law and Procedure", see 39 Dicta 81 (1962). For article, "The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defense Lawyer's Conflicting Ethical Obligations to the Court and to His Client", see 59 Den. L.J. 75 (1981).

13-2-110. Court to prescribe rules and forms.

Statute text

The supreme court from time to time may institute rules of practice, and prescribe forms of process to be used, and regulations for the keeping of the records and proceedings of the court, not inconsistent with the constitution or laws of this state.

History

 Source: G.L. § 2604. G.S. § 3227. R.S. 08: § 1418. C.L. § 5630. CSA: C. 46, § 21. CRS 53: § 37-2-9. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-9.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Power to make rules is the constitutional right of the supreme court, aside from any common-law right or statutory grant. Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931).

 The word "rules" is synonymous with practice, procedure, custom, method, and system. Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931).

 Rules must not be inconsistent with the constitution or statute laws of the state. There is no statute giving costs to a defendant in case of a reversal of a criminal case, and the supreme court cannot award them under the guise of a power to prescribe rules of practice. Boykin v. People, 23 Colo. 183, 46 P. 635 (1896).

 The court seriously questions the power of the general assembly to make any rules or to enact any laws relative to procedure in courts. It is doubtful if the general assembly could have enacted any law with reference to procedure in courts of record unless that power had been expressly or tacitly surrendered to it by the judiciary. Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 278 P. 780 (1929).

 Courts always have regulated their own practice and procedure. The act of the general assembly granting the supreme court the power to prescribe rules was not a delegation of legislative power, for the court has always regulated its own practice and procedure. Ernst v. Lamb, 73 Colo. 132, 213 P. 994 (1923).

 The general assembly may not attempt to regulate the court's discretionary granting of a final decree in a divorce action for this is a procedural matter. Walton v. Walton, 86 Colo. 1, 278 P. 780 (1929).

13-2-111. Employees - compensation.

Statute text

(1) The supreme court may appoint one clerk, two deputy clerks, one librarian of the supreme court library, one reporter and an assistant reporter of its decisions, two bailiffs, and such additional clerical assistants as may be necessary.

(2) Each justice of the supreme court may appoint one or more law clerks and such clerical personnel as may be necessary to assist him in fulfilling the duties of his office.

(3) All employees appointed under the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall be appointed and compensated pursuant to the provisions of section 13-3-105.

History

 Source: L. 1891: p. 368, § 1. L. 05: p. 357, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1420. L. 11: p. 610, § 1. L. 17: p. 514, § 1. C.L. § 5632. L. 23: p. 614, § 2. L. 27: p. 677, § 1. CSA: C. 46, §§ 23, 24. L. 37: p. 497, § 3. L. 49: p. 402, § 1. L. 53: p. 295, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-2-10. L. 59: p. 350, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-10. L. 79: (1) and (3) amended, p. 597, § 6, effective July 1. L. 81: (2) R&RE, p. 874, § 1, effective June 18.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the reporter of decisions in the court of appeals, see § 13-4-111 (1).

13-2-112. Duties of bailiff.

Statute text

(1) The bailiff appointed shall attend upon the court and the judges thereof. It is the duty of the bailiff to assist the librarian of the supreme court, when not otherwise engaged.

(2) In case of the absence of the bailiff, the court or judges may appoint some suitable person to act in his stead, and the person so appointed shall perform like services and shall receive the same salary as the bailiff.

History

 Source: L. 1891: p. 368, §§ 2, 3. R.S. 08: §§ 1423, 1424. C.L. §§ 5635, 5636. CSA: C. 46, §§ 28, 29. CRS 53: § 37-2-13. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-11.

13-2-113. Fees of clerk of supreme court.

Statute text

Except for the court of appeals docket fees, the supreme court is authorized to fix such fees for the services of the clerk of said court, in causes pending therein, as to the court seems proper, such fees to be paid by the parties to a cause pursuant to law and the order of the court.

History

 Source: G.L. § 1162. G.S. § 1417. R.S. 08: § 1425. C.L. § 5637. CSA: C. 46, § 30. CRS 53: § 37-2-14. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-12. L. 82: Entire section amended, p. 285, § 1, effective July 1.

Annotations

 Cross references: For fees payable upon appeal and procedure for waiver thereof, see C.A.R. 12.

13-2-114. Seal of supreme court.

Statute text

The seal of the supreme court shall be one and three-quarter inches in diameter, with a device inscribed thereon as follows: Upon a ground of white the figure of justice sitting faced to the left, but with body and face inclined to the front, arms outstretched, and holding in her left hand the scales and in her right the sword of justice. Upon the left, and just above the ground, shall appear the rising sun, with golden rays proceeding therefrom. On the right, and resting upon the ground, a shield, having inscribed thereon the coat of arms of the state of Colorado, the upper part of the shield leaning upon the figure of justice; upon the right of the shield a vine extending from the ground to the top of the shield; above the inscription and around the edge of the seal shall be the words "supreme court"; below the inscription and around the edge of the seal shall be the words, "State of Colorado", engraved thereon.

History

 Source: G.L. § 2618. G.S. § 3238. R.S. 08: § 1427. C.L. § 5639. CSA: C. 46, § 32. CRS 53: § 37-2-15. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-13.

13-2-115. Pensions of supreme court judges.

Statute text

(1) Any person who has served as a judge of the supreme court of Colorado for not less than ten years, who has ceased to hold said office, and who has reached the age of sixty-five years is entitled to receive an annual pension during the remainder of his life in the amount of one-fourth of the annual salary of an associate judge of the supreme court. If such judge has served twenty years or more and has attained the age of seventy-two years, the annual pension shall be one-third of the annual salary of an associate judge of the supreme court. All pensions due under this section shall be paid monthly out of the general fund of this state.

(2) Upon the death of any judge, eligible to receive an annual pension pursuant to this section, who leaves a surviving spouse of at least sixty-five years of age to whom he has been married for at least twenty years, such spouse is entitled to receive a pension during the remainder of such spouse's life, or as long as such spouse remains unmarried, in the amount of seven thousand dollars per year, payable monthly from the general fund of this state.

(3) It is the intent of this section to limit the benefits payable under this section to persons, or their widows, who have terminated their service on the supreme court prior to May 16, 1974, or whose election or appointment to the supreme court took place prior to May 16, 1974. The retirement benefits payable to judges of the supreme court who are appointed subsequent to May 16, 1974, shall be as otherwise provided by law.

History

 Source: L. 25: p. 504, § 1. CSA: C. 46, § 33. L. 39: p. 317, § 1. L. 53: p. 238, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-2-16. L. 55: p. 262, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-14. L. 67: p. 452, § 1. L. 69: p. 242, § 1. L. 74: Entire section amended, p. 233, § 1, effective May 16. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 295, § 4, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "New Supreme Court Rule", see 24 Dicta 161 (1947).

 Nowhere are pensions mentioned in the constitution of Colorado. Unless the granting of them is expressly prohibited, or language is used that by necessary implication must be construed as a prohibition, the power to grant them exists as a residual power of the state. Bedford v. White, 106 Colo. 439, 106 P.2d 469 (1940).

 This section is not unconstitutional. Bedford v. White, 106 Colo. 439, 106 P.2d 469 (1940).

 Judges ceasing to serve prior to enactment. Judges of the supreme court of this state are eligible to receive pensions under this section even though they have ceased to serve in that capacity when this section became law. Bedford v. White, 106 Colo. 439, 106 P.2d 469 (1940).

13-2-116. Disposition of law books.

Statute text

(1) The state librarian and all other officers who receive for public use from any other state or territory, or any officer thereof, or any other person any books of judicial reports or public statutes or any other books of law shall forthwith cause one copy of such books or statutes, and all of such books of reports, and other books of law to be deposited in the library of the supreme court, there to remain.

(2) The supreme court librarian shall furnish the supreme court annually, as the court may direct, a report designating any such copies of judicial reports, statutes, or books of law which, in the librarian's opinion, can be properly removed from the supreme court library and disposed of.

(3) The supreme court may take action pursuant to such report by ordering any copies of such judicial reports, statutes, or books of law designated therein disposed of in such manner as it shall determine.

History

 Source: G.L. § 2623. G.S. § 3242. R.S. 08: § 1428. L. 11: p. 488, § 1. C.L. § 5640. CSA: C. 46, § 34. CRS 53: § 37-2-17. L. 57: p. 317, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-15.

13-2-117. Librarian to have charge of library.

Statute text

The librarian of the supreme court, under the direction of the court, shall have custody of the books pertaining to the library of the supreme court.

History

 Source: G.L. § 2621. G.S. § 3240. R.S. 08: omitted. C.L. § 5641. CSA: C. 46, § 35. L. 37: p. 495, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-2-18. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-16.

13-2-118. Duties of librarian.

Statute text

It is the duty of the librarian to keep his office open every day in the year, Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays excepted, from 8:30 a.m. until 5 p.m. of each day, so that the public may have access to the library, under such rules and regulations as the supreme court may prescribe.

History

 Source: G.L. § 2622. G.S. § 3241. R.S. 08: § 1429. C.L. § 5642. CSA: C. 46, § 36. CRS 53: § 37-2-19. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-17.

13-2-119. Disposition of fees.

Statute text

(1) At the end of each month, all fees collected by the clerk of the supreme court during said month, except fees for admission to the bar and attorney registration fees, shall be deposited by the clerk with the state treasurer, by whom the same shall be kept separate and apart from all other funds in the state treasurer's hands.

(2) (Deleted by amendment, L. 98, p. 685, § 1, effective July 1, 1998.)

History

 Source: L. 07: p. 594, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1430. L. 19: p. 680, § 1. C.L. § 5643. CSA: C. 46, § 37. CRS 53: § 37-2-20. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-18. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 597, § 7, effective July 1. L. 82: Entire section amended, p. 285, § 2, effective July 1. L. 98: Entire section amended, p. 685, § 1, effective July 1.

13-2-120. Supreme court library fund.

Statute text

The funds so set apart, together with the balance of the fund now in the state treasurer's hands and designated as the "supreme court library fund", shall be known as the "supreme court library fund", and the supreme court is authorized to use said fund for the purchase of books for the supreme court library, for paying the expenses of binding briefs and other documents for use in said library, for the purchase and maintenance of bookcases, catalogues, furniture, fixtures, and other equipment for said library, and for such other library service expenses as the chief justice deems necessary.

History

 Source: L. 07: p. 594, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1430. L. 19: p. 680, § 2. C.L. § 5644. CSA: C. 46, § 38. CRS 53: § 37-2-21. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-19. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 541, § 1, effective April 6.

13-2-121. Manner of disbursement.

Statute text

The state controller is authorized to draw warrants upon said fund, from time to time upon certificate, of the sums required for the purposes specified in section 13-2-120 under the signature of the chief justice or a majority of the judges of the supreme court, and the state treasurer is directed to pay the same out of said fund.

History

 Source: L. 07: p. 594, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1430. L. 19: p. 680, § 3. C.L. § 5645. CSA: C. 46, § 39. CRS 53: § 37-2-22. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-20.

13-2-122. Supreme court and court of appeals opinions published.

Statute text

The opinions of the supreme court of the state of Colorado and of the court of appeals shall be published in volumes of the size, as nearly as may be, as present volumes of the Colorado reports, and containing not less than six hundred fifty pages each.

History

 Source: L. 1891: p. 369, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1431. C.L. § 5646. CSA: C. 46, § 40. CRS 53: § 37-2-23. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-21. L. 69: p. 269, § 4.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 The publication of the opinions of the supreme court is not the publication of "department reports", within the meaning of § 29 of art. V, Colo. Const., which requires the printing, binding, and distribution of department reports to be performed under contract to be given to the lowest responsible bidder. Gillette v. Peabody, 19 Colo. App. 356, 75 P. 18 (1904).

13-2-123. Duty of reporter.

Statute text

It is the duty of the reporter of the decisions of said courts, within four months after a sufficient number of opinions to constitute a volume of the prescribed size have been delivered to him, to compile and prepare the same for publication, together with such other proceedings of the supreme court as the justices thereof may designate for insertion in such volume, with syllabi, title pages, digest, and table of cases reported.

History

 Source: L. 1891: p. 370, § 2. R.S. 08: § 1434. C.L. § 5649. CSA: C. 46, § 43. CRS 53: § 37-2-26. L. 63: p. 268, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-22. L. 69: p. 269, § 5.

13-2-124. Publication of reports.

Statute text

(1) In lieu of the publication of the opinions of the supreme court and the court of appeals as provided for in this article, the supreme court may designate the published volumes of the decisions of the supreme court and the court of appeals, as the same are published by any person, firm, or corporation, to be the official reports of the decisions of the supreme court and the court of appeals. Any publication so designated as the official reports may include both the opinions of the supreme court and the court of appeals in the same volume.

(2) When any law of this state refers to the reports of the supreme court of the state of Colorado, said law shall be construed as referring to the reports in which are also contained the reported opinions of the court of appeals created pursuant to article 4 of this title.

(3) All books, both bound and unbound, and matrices covering the reports of the supreme court and the court of appeals which were published prior to July 1, 1982, and which are in the custody of the supreme court shall remain in the custody of the supreme court for the purpose of sale or replacement, and the supreme court may fix the price at which the prior official reports of the supreme court and the court of appeals are to be sold to the public. The supreme court may replace any lost or destroyed books free of cost if such books were originally distributed free of cost. The supreme court may authorize the reprinting of any prior volumes, the replacement supply of which has become exhausted or insufficient. The supreme court may also contract for the storage of such books and to sell, give away, destroy, or otherwise dispose of any excess books, bound or unbound, which it deems not needed to provide a reasonable replacement supply.

History

 Source: L. 1891: p. 370, § 3. R.S. 08: § 1435. L. 19: p. 682, § 1. C.L. § 5650. L. 27: p. 678, § 1. CSA: C. 46, § 44. CRS 53: § 37-2-27. L. 57: p. 318, §§ 1, 2. L. 63: p. 268, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-23. L. 69: p. 269, § 6. L. 82: Entire section R&RE, p. 287, § 1, effective July 1.

13-2-125. Purchase, distribution, and sale of reports.

Statute text

(1) Upon the publication of each volume of the reports of the supreme court and the court of appeals under contract with the judicial department, the publisher shall be responsible for distributing as many copies as are required to meet the needs of the state in accordance with a list provided by the librarian of the supreme court. Costs of mailing incurred in such distribution shall be borne by the state from appropriations made to the judicial department.

(2) The distribution pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall include the following:

(a) State and territorial libraries, as directed by the librarian of the supreme court;

(b) The library of congress and of the United States supreme court;

(c) The attorney general and secretary of state of Colorado, and officials of the executive branch as required;

(d) District attorneys and judges of Colorado courts of record;

(e) The justices and reporter of the Colorado supreme court;

(f) The law library of the university of Colorado, and the library of any other accredited law school in Colorado;

(g) Copies for use in the supreme court library and by the general assembly;

(h) Copies to be used for exchange purposes in the maintenance of the supreme court library, as directed by the librarian of the supreme court;

(i) Office of legislative legal services.

(3) All copies distributed to offices and agencies of the state of Colorado are at all times the property of the state and not the personal property of the incumbents of the respective offices and shall be so marked as the property of the state. This shall not apply to the justices and reporter of the supreme court as to volumes prepared during their tenure of office.

(4) The publisher shall sell the reports of the supreme court and the court of appeals to the public at a price which is set at the cost of the report plus a twenty percent markup for handling. The publisher shall retain the markup charges and remit to the state the costs of the reports sold as reimbursement to the general fund for payment by the state of the expenses of publication thereof. The unsold copies of all reports shall remain the property of the state and shall be returned by the publisher to the secretary of state upon the termination of the contract for publication. Until otherwise designated by law or order of the chief justice of the Colorado supreme court, the secretary of state shall be the legal custodian of the reports of the supreme court and the court of appeals. The secretary of state shall sell any remaining copies of such reports to the public at such cost plus twenty percent and transmit the sale proceeds to the state treasurer for deposit to the credit of the general fund.

History

 Source: L. 1891: p. 371, § 7. R.S. 08: § 1438. C.L. § 5653. L. 27: p. 680, § 1. CSA: C. 46, § 46. L. 37: p. 495, § 2. CRS 53: § 37-2-30. L. 63: p. 269, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-24. L. 75: (1), IP(2), and (4) amended, p. 850, § 2, effective July 1. L. 76: (1) and (4) amended, p. 515, § 1, effective April 19. L. 88: (2)(i) amended, p. 310, § 18, effective May 23.

13-2-126. Reports and session laws furnished.

Statute text

(1) The legal custodian of publications of the state of Colorado is directed to furnish to the law library of the university of Colorado free of charge from existing stocks if feasible and in any event as such publications are from time to time issued:

(a) Thirty copies each of the reports of the supreme court of the state of Colorado; and

(b) Fifty copies each of the session laws and of any published regulations and decisions of the various administrative agencies of the state of Colorado; and

(c) Five copies each of the Colorado yearbook; and

(d) Two copies each of published legislative journals, published opinions and reports of the attorney general, and printed briefs and abstracts of record of the supreme court of Colorado.

(2) The law library is authorized to exchange any or all of the above publications for like publications of other jurisdictions.

History

 Source: L. 15: p. 482, § 1. C.L. § 5655. CSA: C. 46, § 48. L. 49: p. 338, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-2-32. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-25. L. 75: IP(1) amended, p. 851, § 3, effective July 1.

13-2-127. Method for review.

Statute text

Appellate review by the supreme court of any action or proceeding of an inferior tribunal, whether such action or proceeding is civil, criminal, special, statutory, common law, or otherwise, shall be prescribed by rule of the supreme court, except as otherwise provided by law.

History

 Source: L. 41: p. 369, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-2-33. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-2-26. L. 64: p. 225, § 58. L. 69: p. 269, § 7.

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ARTICLE 3
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENTS


Section

13-3-101. State court administrator.

13-3-102. Surveys - conferences - reports.

13-3-103. Nominating and discipline commissions - expenses.

13-3-104. State shall fund courts.

13-3-105. Personnel - duties - qualifications - compensation - conditions of employment.

13-3-106. Judicial department operating budget - fiscal procedures.

13-3-107. Consolidation of offices of clerks of court in certain counties.

13-3-108. Maintenance of court facilities - capital improvements.

13-3-109. Retirement - past service benefits.

13-3-110. Expenses and compensation of judges outside county of residence.

13-3-111. Appointment of retired or resigned justice or judge pursuant to agreement of parties - appointment discretionary.

13-3-112. Report on increase in docket fees. (Repealed)

13-3-113. "Family-friendly Courts Act".

13-3-101. State court administrator.

Statute text

(1) There is created, pursuant to section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution, the position of state court administrator, who shall be appointed by the justices of the supreme court at such compensation as shall be determined by them. The state court administrator is responsible to the supreme court and shall perform such duties as assigned to him by the chief justice and the supreme court.

(2) The state court administrator shall employ such other personnel as the supreme court deems necessary to aid the administration of the courts, as provided in section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution.

(3) The state court administrator shall establish standards to ensure proficiency in court reporting in the courts of this state. The state court administrator shall also develop or cause to be developed examinations no less difficult than the examinations of the national shorthand reporters association and shall qualify those individuals who successfully complete such examination.

(4) Repealed.

(5) The state court administrator shall provide to the director of research of the legislative council criminal justice information and statistics and any other related data requested by the director. The state court administrator shall provide to the state commission on judicial performance and to district commissions on judicial performance case management statistics for justices and judges being evaluated.

(6) The state court administrator shall make grants from the family violence justice fund pursuant to the provisions of section 14-4-107, C.R.S.

(7) (a) The state court administrator shall make grants from the family-friendly court program cash fund pursuant to the provisions of section 13-3-113.

(b) Repealed.

(8) Repealed.

(9) The state court administrator is authorized to seek federal funding as it becomes available on behalf of the state court system for the establishment, maintenance, or expansion of veterans' treatment courts.

History

 Source: L. 53: p. 236, § 1. CRS 53: § 37-10-1. L. 59: p. 356, § 1. L. 67: p. 453, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-1. L. 77: (3) added, p. 779, § 1, effective June 19; (4) added, p. 861, § 1, effective July 1, 1979. L. 79: (4)(a)(III) amended, p. 1663, § 130, effective July 19. L. 84: (4) repealed, p. 453, § 1, effective March 26. L. 94: (5) added, p. 1098, § 11, effective May 9. L. 99: (6) added, p. 1180, § 6, effective June 2. L. 2002: (7) added, p. 631, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2005: (7)(b) repealed, p. 1004, § 2, effective June 2. L. 2006: (8) added, p. 1590, § 1, effective June 2. L. 2008: (5) amended, p. 1284, § 13, effective July 1. L. 2010: (9) added, (HB 10-1104), ch. 139, p. 465, § 2, effective April 16.

Annotations

 Editor's note: (1) The effective date for amendments made to this section by chapter 216, L. 77, was changed from July 1, 1978, to April 1, 1979, by chapter 1, First Extraordinary Session, L. 78, and was subsequently changed to July 1, 1979, by chapter 157, § 21, L. 79. See People v. McKenna, 199 Colo. 452, 611 P.2d 574 (1980).

 (2) Subsection (8)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (8), effective January 1, 2007. (See L. 2006, p. 1590.)

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act adding subsection (9), see section 1 of chapter 139, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "The System for Administration of Justice in Colorado", see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 299 (1956). For article, "Colorado's Program to Improve Court Administration", see 38 Dicta 1 (1961).

13-3-102. Surveys - conferences - reports.

Statute text

(1) The state court administrator under the direction of the chief justice shall make a continuous survey of the conditions of the dockets and the business of the courts of record and shall make reports and recommendations thereon to the chief justice.

(2) The chief justice shall assemble the judges of the courts of record at least once yearly to discuss such recommendations and such other business as will benefit the judiciary and the expedition of the business of the several courts. When so summoned, the judges of the courts of record shall attend such conferences at the expense of the state of Colorado. Each judge shall file a verified itemized statement of the mileage and all moneys actually paid out for personal maintenance expenses in attending such conferences with the court administrator, who shall audit the same and submit it to the state controller. The state controller shall draw a warrant therefor, which warrant shall be paid by the state treasurer out of the appropriate fund. Unless excused by illness, such judges are required to attend the conferences unless excused by the chief justice.

(3) Repealed.

History

 Source: L. 53: p. 236, § 2. CRS 53: § 37-10-2. L. 59: p. 357, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-2. L. 67: p. 453, § 6. L. 97: (3) repealed, p. 1482, § 37, effective June 3.

13-3-103. Nominating and discipline commissions - expenses.

Statute text

(1) Members of judicial nominating commissions appointed pursuant to section 24 of article VI of the state constitution and members of the commission on judicial discipline appointed pursuant to section 23 of article VI of the state constitution shall be reimbursed for actual and necessary personal maintenance expenses while performing official duties, together with mileage at the rate prescribed for state officers and employees in section 24-9-104, C.R.S., for each mile actually and necessarily traveled in going to and returning from the place where official duties are performed.

(2) The mileage and expenses incurred by members of judicial nominating commissions and members of the commission on judicial discipline shall be paid from funds appropriated to the judicial department of the state. Each commission member shall keep an account of the mileage and all moneys actually paid out for personal maintenance expenses and shall file a verified itemized statement thereof with the court administrator, who shall audit the same and submit it to the state controller. The state controller shall draw a warrant therefor, which warrant shall be paid by the state treasurer out of the appropriate fund.

History

 Source: L. 53: p. 237, § 3. CRS 53: § 37-10-3. L. 59: p. 358, § 1. L. 67: p. 454, § 7. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-3. L. 72: p. 590, § 55. L. 79: (1) amended, p. 597, § 8, effective July 1. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 1576, § 12, effective July 10.

13-3-104. State shall fund courts.

Statute text

(1) The state of Colorado shall provide funds by annual appropriation for the operations, salaries, and other expenses of all courts of record within the state, except for county courts in the city and county of Denver and municipal courts.

(2) When a board of county commissioners determines that any furniture or equipment transferred to the judicial department as of January 1, 1970, has historic value, it shall remain in the county courthouse and revert to the county when no longer used by the judicial department.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 246, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-6. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 780, § 1, effective May 24. L. 2006: (1) amended, p. 141, § 6, effective August 7.

13-3-105. Personnel - duties - qualifications - compensation - conditions of employment.

Statute text

(1) The supreme court, pursuant to section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution, shall prescribe, by rule, a personnel classification plan for all courts of record to be funded by the state, as provided in section 13-3-104.

(2) Such personnel classification and compensation plan shall include:

(a) A basic compensation plan of pay ranges to which classes of positions are assigned and may be reassigned;

(b) The qualifications for each position or class of positions, including education, experience, special skills, and legal knowledge;

(c) An outline of the duties to be performed in each position or class of positions;

(d) The classification of all positions based on the required qualifications and the duties to be performed, taking into account, where applicable, the amount and kinds of judicial business in each court of record subject to the provisions of this section;

(e) The number of full-time and part-time positions, by position title and classification, in each court of record subject to the provisions of this section;

(f) The procedures for and the regulations governing the appointment and removal of court personnel; and

(g) The procedures for and regulations governing the promotion or transfer of court personnel.

(3) The supreme court shall also prescribe by rule:

(a) The amount, terms, and conditions of sick leave and vacation time for court personnel, including annual allowance and accumulation thereof; and

(b) Hours of work and other conditions of employment.

(4) To the end that all state employees are treated generally in a similar manner, the supreme court, in promulgating rules as set forth in this section, shall take into consideration the compensation and classification plans, vacation and sick leave provisions, and other conditions of employment applicable to employees of the executive and legislative departments.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 246, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-7.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 The Colorado judicial system personnel rules do not create an objective expectation of tenure which should be characterized as a property interest subject to due process protection. Hamm v. Scott, 426 F. Supp. 950 (D. Colo. 1977).

 Contractual right of certified employee to continued employment would violate state policy. Even if the language of Colorado judicial system personnel rules 25 and 26, which relate to the dismissal of certified employees, could be read to create a contractual right to continued employment, a certified employee could not prevail because the recognition of such a contract would violate the expressed public policy of the state of Colorado. Hamm v. Scott, 426 F. Supp. 950 (D. Colo. 1977).

 The fourteenth amendment affords no extraordinary protection. Even if it were assumed that a certified employee had a recognizable property interest which would not be contrary to express public policy, the fourteenth amendment affords him no protection other than the ordinary protections that would be afforded in a court of law on a breach of contract suit. Hamm v. Scott, 426 F. Supp. 950 (D. Colo. 1977).

 Requirements for protection of certified employee. The minimum opportunity to learn of the reasons for the action terminating employment and a chance to address the decision-maker is all that would be required as protection to a certified employee. Hamm v. Scott, 426 F. Supp. 950 (D. Colo. 1977).

13-3-106. Judicial department operating budget - fiscal procedures.

Statute text

(1) (a) The court administrator, subject to the approval of the chief justice, shall prepare annually a consolidated operating budget for all courts of record subject to the provisions of section 13-3-104, such budget to be known as the judicial department operating budget.

(b) The court administrator, subject to the approval of the chief justice, shall prepare an annual budget request upon forms and according to procedures agreed to by the executive director of the department of personnel and the joint budget committee of the general assembly. The budget request documents and such additional information as may be requested shall be submitted to the department of personnel and the joint budget committee according to the same time schedule for budgetary review and analysis required of all executive agencies. The governor shall include recommendations for court appropriations as part of his or her regular budget message and according to section 24-37-301, C.R.S. The general assembly, upon recommendation of the joint budget committee, shall make appropriations to courts based on an evaluation of the budget request and the availability of state funds.

(2) The court administrator, subject to the approval of the chief justice, shall prescribe the procedures to be used by the judicial department and each court of record subject to the provisions of section 13-3-104, with respect to:

(a) The preparation of budget requests;

(b) The disbursement of funds appropriated to the judicial department by the general assembly;

(c) The purchase of forms, supplies, equipment, and other items as authorized in the judicial department operating budget; and

(d) Any other matter relating to fiscal administration.

(3) The court administrator shall consult with the state controller in the preparation of regulations pertaining to budgetary and fiscal procedures and forms and the disbursement of funds.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 246, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-8. L. 72: p. 590, § 56. L. 76: (1)(b) amended, p. 301, § 28, effective May 20. L. 83: (1)(b) amended, p. 971, § 27, effective July 1, 1984. L. 95: (1)(b) amended, p. 638, § 24, effective July 1.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1995 act amending subsection (1)(b), see section 112 of chapter 167, Session Laws of Colorado 1995.

13-3-107. Consolidation of offices of clerks of court in certain counties.

Statute text

(1) The chief justice, pursuant to his authority under section 5 of article VI of the state constitution, may consolidate the offices of the clerks of the district and county courts in any county when he finds that there is insufficient judicial business to warrant the maintenance of separate offices.

(2) When the offices of the clerk of the district and county courts are so consolidated, the consolidated office shall be under a single clerk, who shall be both the clerk of the district court and the clerk of the county court; except that all functions, operations, and records required to be kept separate shall be so kept.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 247, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-9. L. 79: (1) amended, p. 598, § 9, effective July 1.

13-3-108. Maintenance of court facilities - capital improvements.

Statute text

(1) The board of county commissioners in each county shall continue to have the responsibility of providing and maintaining adequate courtrooms and other court facilities including janitorial service, except as otherwise provided in this section.

(2) The court administrator, subject to the approval of the chief justice, shall prepare annually a capital construction budget. The capital construction budget shall specify: The additional court housing facilities required for each court; the estimated cost of such additional structures or facilities and whether such additional court structures or facilities will include space used by other governmental units for nonjudicial purposes; and a detailed report on the present court facilities currently in use and the reasons for their inadequacy.

(3) (Deleted by amendment, L. 97, p. 1482, § 38, effective June 3, 1997.)

(4) (a) The chief justice is authorized to approve payment of state funds for the construction of any capital improvement facilities to be used for judicial purposes authorized and approved by the general assembly.

(b) The court administrator, with the approval of the chief justice, shall enter into leasing agreements with the governing body of the appropriate local unit of government when joint construction is authorized, or when the approved facilities are also to be used for nonjudicial purposes. The leasing agreement shall provide for the payment of state funds for that portion of the construction costs related to the operation of the courts.

(5) Construction or remodeling of any court or court-related facility shall be commenced only with prior approval of the chief justice of the Colorado supreme court after consultation with the board of county commissioners; except that a board of county commissioners, at its discretion, may take such actions.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 247, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-10. L. 72: p. 591, § 57. L. 75: (5) added, p. 565, § 1, effective July 1; (5) added, p. 558, § 9, effective July 1. L. 78: (2) and (3) amended, p. 261, § 43, effective May 23. L. 97: (2) and (3) amended, p. 1482, § 38, effective June 3. L. 2006: (5) amended, p. 142, § 7, effective August 7.

Annotations

 Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (5) by House Bill 75-1049 and House Bill 75-1055 were harmonized.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Historically, Colorado law has placed the duty of providing a suitable courthouse upon the county commissioners of each county. Lawson v. Pueblo County, 36 Colo. App. 370, 540 P.2d 1136 (1975).

 Even though the general assembly indicated its intention to take over from the counties the financial burden of providing judicial facilities, the general assembly has not provided funds for the construction of court facilities in the various counties of the state, and the burden of providing courtroom space and facilities remains with the counties. Lawson v. Pueblo County, 36 Colo. App. 370, 540 P.2d 1136 (1975).

 Mandamus appropriate. The language of subsection (1) meets the test for mandamus relief, and thus, an action in the nature of mandamus is available as a proper means of enforcing the statute. Lawson v. Pueblo County, 36 Colo. App. 370, 540 P.2d 1136 (1975); State v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Mesa County, 897 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1995).

 Judicial guidelines. To achieve compliance with subsection (1) requiring county commissioners to provide adequate court facilities, without undue encroachment upon the prerogatives of the county commissioners, a judgment should give reasonable guidelines delineating what would constitute "adequate" space and then should direct that the space and related facilities be provided within a specific time. Included among the guidelines should be such physical requirements as dimensions, partitions, ventilation, security of prisoners, etc., as well as other details which would lead to creation of courtroom facilities of a character and quality commensurate with the proper and effective administration of justice. Lawson v. Pueblo County, 36 Colo. App. 370, 540 P.2d 1136 (1975).

 Court exceeded its authority in issuing order requiring the board of county commissioners to provide a new judicial facility. While court does have the inherent authority to order the board to provide a new courthouse, the record does not demonstrate that the chief justice approved the initiation of the proceeding as required by subsection (5). In re Court Facilities for the Routt County Combined Ct., 107 P.3d 981 (Colo. App. 2004).

 Mandamus order containing only one alternative unacceptable. While an action in the nature of mandamus will lie to enforce subsection (1), a judgment designating one alternative course of action that the county commissioners must follow in meeting the requirements of the subsection constitutes an unacceptable intrusion into the exclusive province of the executive branch of government, and, accordingly, the specific course of action to be followed by the county commissioners in complying with the subsection and with a mandamus judgment must be one of their choosing. Lawson v. Pueblo County, 36 Colo. App. 370, 540 P.2d 1136 (1975).

 Subsection (5) is applied in Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1984).

 A county's duties under this section may not be reduced or ended pursuant to art. X, § 20(9) of the state constitution. State v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Mesa County, 897 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1995).

13-3-109. Retirement - past service benefits.

Statute text

(1) Past service benefits in the public employees' retirement association shall be purchased for each employee covered under sections 13-3-104 and 13-3-105 who, on January 1, 1970, meets all of the following conditions:

(a) Is sixty years of age or older;

(b) Was not a member of a county or a city and county retirement plan, or, if a member, is not eligible to receive a deferred annuity;

(c) If a member of a county or a city and county retirement plan, has withdrawn the funds credited to his account with the county or city and county retirement fund, and paid the full amount thereof, exclusive of any voluntary contributions to such county or city and county retirement plan, into the public employees' retirement association, or who withdraws such funds and deposits them with the public employees' retirement association no later than March 31, 1970.

(2) (a) When an employee meets all of the conditions in subsection (1) of this section, the public employees' retirement association shall grant him prior service credit based on length of service in a court, or department thereof, covered under sections 13-3-104 and 13-3-105, up to a maximum of five years.

(b) The public employees' retirement association shall calculate the cost of granting such prior service credit to each employee, after giving credit for the amount paid, if any, by the employee, and shall bill the judicial department for such cost. In the event that the cost for an employee is less than the amount paid in by him pursuant to subsection (1) (c) of this section, the treasurer of the public employees' retirement association shall instead refund the difference to the employee.

(c) The judicial department shall include the total of such billings in its appropriation request. The grant of prior service credits provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) shall be made only if an appropriation therefor is made by the general assembly.

(3) (a) Any employee under the age of sixty years covered under sections 13-3-104 and 13-3-105 who has been a member of a county or city and county retirement plan may purchase prior service credit by withdrawing the funds credited to his account with the county or city and county retirement fund and paying the full amount thereof into the public employees' retirement fund.

(b) The public employees' retirement association shall calculate the amount of prior service credit purchased by an employee as provided in paragraph (a) of this subsection (3) and shall so notify him.

(c) An employee covered under sections 13-3-104 and 13-3-105 may also purchase prior service credit, not to exceed the actual number of years of employment in a court of record, or department thereof, by making a direct payment to the public employees' retirement association in an amount determined by the public employees' retirement association to be actuarially sound and without expense to the state.

(4) For the purposes set forth in article 51 of title 24, C.R.S., the employees for whom prior service credit is granted under this section shall be considered to have been employees of the state for the period of such prior service.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 248, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-11. L. 79: (3)(c) amended, p. 603, § 1, effective June 19. L. 87: (1)(c), (2)(b), (3)(c), and (4) amended, p. 1091, § 5, effective July 1.

13-3-110. Expenses and compensation of judges outside county of residence.

Statute text

(1) When it is necessary for any district court judge, in the discharge of his duties, to hold court or transact judicial business outside the county of his residence, whether within or without the judicial district in which he resides, he shall be reimbursed for his actual and necessary expenses in the manner prescribed by rule of the supreme court, together with mileage at the rate prescribed for state officers and employees in section 24-9-104, C.R.S., for each mile actually and necessarily traveled going to and returning from the place where he is engaged in judicial duties.

(2) When any county judge, juvenile court judge, or probate court judge is assigned to perform judicial duties in a court outside of his county of residence pursuant to section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution, he shall be reimbursed for his actual and necessary expenses in the manner prescribed by rule of the supreme court, together with mileage at the rate prescribed for state officers and employees in section 24-9-104, C.R.S., for each mile actually and necessarily traveled going to and returning from the place where he is engaged in judicial duties.

(3) (a) When any county judge is assigned to perform judicial duties in a district, probate, or juvenile court outside of the judicial district in which he resides, as provided in section 13-6-218, he shall be paid for each day of such judicial duty, in addition to reimbursement for expenses and mileage as provided in this section, an amount equal to the difference between his per diem salary and the per diem salary of the judge of the court to which he is assigned.

(b) (I) When any county judge from a county of Class C or Class D is assigned to perform judicial duties in any district court pursuant to section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution, and when the duties the county judge performs increase the county judge's workload beyond the percentage of workload for which he or she is paid pursuant to section 13-30-103 (1) (l), the county judge shall be paid for each day of such judicial duty, in addition to the county judge's normal part-time salary and to reimbursement for expenses and mileage as provided in this section, an amount equal to the per diem salary of the judge of the district court to which the county judge is assigned.

(II) When any county judge from a county of Class C or Class D is assigned to perform judicial duties in any other county court pursuant to section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution, and when the duties the county judge performs increase the county judge's workload beyond the percentage of workload for which he or she is paid pursuant to section 13-30-103 (1) (l), the county judge shall be paid for each day of such judicial duty, in addition to the county judge's normal part-time salary and to reimbursement for expenses and mileage as provided in this section, an amount equal to the per diem salary of a full-time county judge.

(c) For the purposes of this subsection (3), the per diem salary of a judge shall be computed by dividing his annual salary by the figure two hundred forty.

(4) When a retired justice of the supreme court or retired judge of any other court of record is assigned to judicial duties pursuant to section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution, he shall be compensated as provided in said section and be reimbursed for his actual and necessary expenses in the manner prescribed by rule of the supreme court, together with mileage at the rate prescribed for state officers and employees in section 24-9-104, C.R.S., for each mile actually and necessarily traveled in going to and returning from the place where he is engaged in judicial duties.

(5) Any mileage and expenses incurred by a judge or a retired justice or judge pursuant to this section, except judges assigned to the county court of the city and county of Denver, shall be paid by the state pursuant to section 13-3-104. The records and procedures for such payment shall be prescribed by the state court administrator pursuant to section 13-3-106.

(6) Any per diem salary pursuant to subsection (3) or (4) of this section shall be paid by the state pursuant to section 13-3-104. The records and procedures for such payments shall be prescribed by the state court administrator pursuant to section 13-3-106.

History

 Source: L. 71: p. 366, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-11-12. L. 72: p. 187, § 1. L. 79: (1), (2), and (4) amended, p. 598, § 10, effective July 1. L. 82: (3)(b) amended, p. 289, § 1, effective March 17. L. 85: (2) and (3)(a) amended, p. 569, § 2, effective November 14, 1986. L. 89: (1), (2), and (4) amended, p. 747, § 1, effective July 1. L. 97: (3)(b) amended, p. 768, § 3, effective July 1, 1998.

Annotations

 Cross references: For compensation of justices and judges, see § 13-30-103.

13-3-111. Appointment of retired or resigned justice or judge pursuant to agreement of parties - appointment discretionary.

Statute text

(1) Upon agreement of all appearing parties to a civil action that a specific retired or resigned justice of the supreme court or a retired or resigned judge of any other court be assigned to hear the action and upon agreement that one or more of the parties shall pay the agreed upon salary of the selected justice or judge, together with all other salaries and expenses incurred, the chief justice may assign any retired or resigned justice or retired or resigned intermediate appellate, district, county, probate, or juvenile court judge who consents temporarily to perform judicial duties for such action.

(2) The decision as to whether a retired or resigned justice or judge shall be assigned to judicial duties, pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, shall be entirely within the discretion of the chief justice. The chief justice may require such undertakings as in his or her opinion may be necessary to ensure that proceedings held pursuant to this section shall be without expense to the state.

(3) Such appointment may be made at any time after the action is at issue.

(4) Orders, decrees, verdicts, and judgments resulting from hearings or trials presided over by a judge appointed pursuant to this section shall have the same force and effect as orders, decrees, verdicts, or judgments resulting from a hearing or trial presided over by a regularly serving judge.

(5) Orders, decrees, verdicts, and judgments resulting from hearings or trials presided over by a judge appointed pursuant to this section may be enforced or appealed in the same manner as orders, decrees, verdicts, or judgments resulting from a hearing or trial presided over by a regularly sitting judge.

(6) The salaries and expenses paid to judges appointed pursuant to this section shall be at the rate agreed upon by the parties and the judge.

(7) The supreme court may promulgate such rules as may be necessary to implement this section.

History

 Source: L. 81: Entire section added, p. 875, § 1, effective May 26. L. 96: (1) to (3) and (6) amended, p. 128, § 1, effective August 7. L. 98: Entire section amended, p. 92, § 1, effective March 23.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "A Practical Guide to Trials by 'Appointment' Under C.R.S. § 13-3-111", see 26 Colo. Law. 69 (November 1997). For article, "Privatizing Family Law Adjudications: Issues and Procedures", see 34 Colo. Law. 95 (August 2005). For article, "Appointed Judges Under New C.R.C.P. 122: A Significant Opportunity for Litigants", see 34 Colo. Law. 37 (September 2005).

13-3-112. Report on increase in docket fees. (Repealed)

History

 Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 851, § 10, effective May 31. L. 96: Entire section repealed, p. 1267, § 187, effective August 7.

13-3-113. "Family-friendly Courts Act".

Statute text

(1) Short title. This section shall be known and may be cited as the "Family-friendly Courts Act".

(2) Legislative declaration. (a) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that many families experience challenges and transitions with legal ramifications that often necessitate court involvement. Frequently individuals and family members attend court or visit other governmental offices for juvenile delinquency proceedings, domestic relations proceedings, protective proceedings related to domestic abuse or domestic violence, child protection proceedings, meetings with probation officers, and other matters. Many persons who attend court proceedings are responsible for the care of young children. For many such individuals, child care issues can distract from, if not present obstacles or even barriers to, effective and complete participation in ongoing court proceedings. The general assembly finds that these issues were acknowledged and addressed in the 1999 report entitled "Creating Family Friendly Courts in Colorado: Children's Centers for the Courthouse", which report was submitted by the Colorado supreme court family friendly facilities task force and which report recommended the establishment of children's centers in courthouses.

(b) The general assembly further finds that the same individuals who are in need of child care services when they are participating in court proceedings may also benefit from the availability of information and resource referrals relating to certain types of services within the community, including services addressing at-risk youth, employment counseling, employment training and placement, health education and counseling, financial management, education, legal counseling and referral, mediation, domestic abuse and domestic violence, fatherhood programs, and substance abuse.

(c) The general assembly further finds that individuals who are involved in court proceedings may have additional court-ordered service needs involving their children, including, but not limited to, supervised parenting time and the transfer of the physical custody of a child from one parent to the other.

(d) The general assembly therefore determines and declares that the creation of family-friendly court programs is beneficial to and in the best interests of the citizens of Colorado. The general assembly further finds that the goal of such programs shall primarily be providing quality child care in or near courthouses to the children of individuals and families who attend court-related proceedings, but that such programs may also provide additional court-related family services at the facility and shall serve as a clearinghouse of information and resource referrals for program patrons concerning the wide variety of available services in the community, including services that provide help to at-risk youth, educational services, health services, mental health services, substance abuse services, legal services, and domestic abuse information.

(3) Definitions. For purposes of this section:

(a) "At-risk youth" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 25-20.5-203 (3), C.R.S.

(b) "Domestic abuse" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 13-14-101 (2).

(c) "Domestic violence" shall have the same meaning as set forth in section 18-6-800.3 (1), C.R.S.

(d) "Family-friendly court services" means child care and court-related family services provided in the courthouse or courthouse complex or in reasonable proximity to the courthouse.

(e) "Program" means the family-friendly court program established pursuant to this section.

(4) Provision of family-friendly court services. There is hereby created the family-friendly court program. The purpose of the program shall be to provide quality family-friendly court services to families and the children of individuals who are attending court proceedings or related matters and to serve as a central location for the dissemination of information to families about resources and services relating to at-risk youth, employment counseling, employment training and placement, health education and counseling, financial management, education, legal counseling and referral, mediation, domestic abuse and domestic violence, fatherhood programs, and substance abuse. Grants awarded pursuant to this section shall be used to establish and maintain new family-friendly court programs in judicial districts throughout the state that do not have comparable existing programs, as well as to enhance existing family-friendly court programs.

(5) Grant applications - duties of judicial districts. (a) To be eligible for moneys from the family-friendly court program cash fund, created in subsection (6) of this section, for the provision of family-friendly court services, a judicial district shall apply to the state court administrator in accordance with the timelines and guidelines adopted by the state court administrator, using an application form provided by the state court administrator.

(b) The state court administrator, in determining which judicial districts may receive grant moneys pursuant to this section, shall consider the extent that a judicial district is responsible for:

(I) Actively recruiting qualified and skilled child care providers to provide quality child care services to families and children of individuals who are attending court proceedings or related matters;

(II) Conducting the necessary criminal history checks through the Colorado bureau of investigation and hiring qualified and appropriate child care providers;

(III) Selecting and establishing a safe physical location in the courthouse or in the courthouse complex or in reasonable proximity to the courthouse, for the provision of child care services;

(IV) When reasonably practicable in consideration of funding, staffing, and assistance from other public and private organizations, providing additional court-related family services to families and children experiencing the challenges and transitions that necessitate court involvement, including, but not limited to, supervised parenting time and transfer of the physical custody of a child from one parent to the other;

(V) Soliciting information from community-based organizations, faith communities, governmental entities, schools, community mental health centers, local nonprofit or not-for-profit agencies, local law enforcement agencies, businesses, and other community service providers about the following services and resources for the purpose of providing such information to patrons of the family-friendly court services:

(A) Youth services, including but not limited to youth mentoring services, services to prevent or reduce youth crime and violence, student dropout prevention and intervention services, and any other services that may be available in the community, the goal and purpose of which are to assist at-risk youth;

(B) Multipurpose service centers for displaced homemakers pursuant to article 15.5 of title 8, C.R.S., and other information to assist displaced homemakers, which information shall relate to employment counseling, employment training, employment placement, health education and counseling services, financial management services, educational services, and legal counseling and services;

(C) Information related to health insurance and health care coverage, including but not limited to the children's basic health plan and dental health plan, established pursuant to article 8 of title 25.5, C.R.S., and the baby and kid care program, established pursuant to section 25.5-5-205, C.R.S.;

(D) Substance abuse programs that are available in the community;

(E) Services and potential financial resources that may be available for victims of domestic abuse or domestic violence, including but not limited to counseling for persons who are victims of domestic abuse and their dependents, advocacy programs that assist victims in obtaining services and information, and educational services for victims of domestic violence;

(F) Fatherhood programs that are available in the community; and

(G) Any other services that would be beneficial to families experiencing challenges and transition necessitating court involvement, including but not limited to family stabilization services as provided in section 19-1-125, C.R.S., and mediation services; and

(VI) Providing to persons staffing the program training and ongoing support with regard to the available resources and additional referrals provided through the program at each court location.

(c) The judicial districts that are selected by the state court administrator to provide family-friendly court services shall be responsible for:

(I) Implementing a method of evaluating the effectiveness of the family-friendly court program and assessing the impact of the child care and informational services provided through the program; and

(II) Reporting annually to the state court administrator concerning the results of the judicial district's evaluation of the family-friendly court program as well as an accounting of fiscal contributions received and expenditures made by the judicial district for the implementation, administration, and maintenance of the program and such other information that the state court administrator may require or that the judicial district determines to be relevant and informative.

(d) The judicial districts that are selected by the state court administrator to provide family-friendly court services that provide child care services shall meet the licensing requirements for child care facilities set forth in part 1 of article 6 of title 26, C.R.S., and all child care licensing rules promulgated by the state board of human services in connection therewith.

(e) In addition to grants received from the state court administrator pursuant to this section, judicial districts implementing or enhancing existing family-friendly court programs pursuant to this section are authorized to accept any funds, grants, gifts, or donations from any private or public source for the purpose of implementing this section; except that no grant or donation shall be accepted if the conditions attached to the grant or donation require the expenditure thereof in a manner contrary to law. Any such moneys received by a judicial district shall be credited to the family-friendly court program cash fund created in subsection (6) of this section for grants awarded by the board pursuant to this section.

(6) Family-friendly court program cash fund. (a) There is hereby created in the state treasury the family-friendly court program cash fund. The moneys in the family-friendly court program cash fund shall be subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly for the implementation of this section. The state court administrator is authorized to accept on behalf of the state any grants, gifts, or donations from any private or public source for the purpose of this section. All private and public funds received through grants, gifts, or donations shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the family-friendly court program cash fund in addition to any moneys that may be appropriated to the cash fund directly by the general assembly. In addition, commencing July 1, 2002, the one-dollar surcharge set forth in section 42-4-1701 (4) (a) (VI), C.R.S., shall be transmitted to the state treasurer who shall credit the same to the family-friendly court program cash fund created in this subsection (6). All investment earnings derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the fund shall remain in the fund and shall not be transferred or revert to the general fund of the state at the end of any fiscal year.

(b) All moneys in the family-friendly court program cash fund, created in paragraph (a) of this subsection (6), shall be available for grants awarded by the state court administrator to judicial districts seeking to implement or enhance existing family-friendly court programs and administrative costs associated with the implementation and administration of this section. The state court administrator, subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly, is hereby authorized to expend moneys appropriated to the judicial department from the family-friendly court program cash fund to judicial districts seeking to establish or enhance family-friendly court programs pursuant to this section.

(6.5) Notwithstanding any provision of subsection (6) of this section to the contrary, on April 20, 2009, the state treasurer shall deduct two hundred thousand dollars from the family-friendly court program cash fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.

(7) The state court administrator shall announce to all judicial districts the availability of grants pursuant to this section for the establishment and maintenance or enhancement of family-friendly court services programs in the judicial districts.

(8) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2005, p. 1000, § 1, effective June 2, 2005.)

History

 Source: L. 2002: Entire section added, p. 627, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2004: (3)(b) amended, p. 554, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2005: (5)(b)(V)(C) amended, p. 764, § 19, effective June 1; (2), (3)(d), (4), (5), and (8) amended, p. 1000, § 1, effective June 2. L. 2006: (5)(b)(V)(C) amended, p. 2001, § 45, effective July 1. L. 2009: (6.5) added, (SB 09-208), ch. 149, p. 620, § 8, effective April 20.

Annotations

 Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (5)(b)(V)(C) by House Bill 05-1337 and Senate Bill 05-030 were harmonized.

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ARTICLE 4
COURT OF APPEALS


Section

13-4-101. Establishment.

13-4-102. Jurisdiction.

13-4-102.1. Interlocutory appeals of determinations of questions of law in civil cases.

13-4-103. Number of judges - qualifications.

13-4-104. Term of office - selection.

13-4-104.5. Temporary judicial duties.

13-4-105. Chief judge.

13-4-106. Divisions.

13-4-107. Place of court.

13-4-108. Supreme court review.

13-4-109. Certification of cases to the supreme court.

13-4-110. Determination of jurisdiction - transfer of cases.

13-4-111. Employees - compensation.

13-4-112. Fees of the clerk of court of appeals.

13-4-113. Publication of decisions.

13-4-101. Establishment.

Statute text

There is hereby created the court of appeals, pursuant to section 1 of article VI of the state constitution. The court of appeals shall be a court of record. Judges of the court of appeals may serve in any state court with full authority as provided by law, when called upon to do so by the chief justice of the supreme court.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 265, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-1. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 1247, § 1, effective April 5.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Court of appeals created to relieve appellate backlog. Colorado has now provided for an intermediate court of appeals, which will relieve the appellate backlogs caused by the press of court business in recent years. Tanksley v. Warden State Penitentiary, 429 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1970).

13-4-102. Jurisdiction.

Statute text

(1) Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the court of appeals shall have initial jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments of, and interlocutory appeals of certified questions of law in civil cases pursuant to section 13-4-102.1 from, the district courts, the probate court of the city and county of Denver, and the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver, except in:

(a) Repealed.

(b) Cases in which a statute, a municipal charter provision, or an ordinance has been declared unconstitutional;

(c) Cases concerned with decisions or actions of the public utilities commission;

(d) Water cases involving priorities or adjudications;

(e) Writs of habeas corpus;

(f) Cases appealed from the county court to the district court, as provided in section 13-6-310;

(g) Summary proceedings initiated under articles 1 to 13 of title 1 and article 10 of title 31, C.R.S.;

(h) Cases appealed from the district court granting or denying postconviction relief in a case in which a sentence of death has been imposed.

(2) The court of appeals has initial jurisdiction to:

(a) Review awards or actions of the industrial claim appeals office, as provided in articles 43 and 74 of title 8, C.R.S.;

(b) Review orders of the banking board granting or denying charters for new state banks, as provided in article 102 of title 11, C.R.S.;

(c) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2006, p. 761, § 19, effective July 1, 2006.)

(d) Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the Colorado podiatry board, as provided in section 12-32-108.7, C.R.S.;

(e) Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the Colorado state board of chiropractic examiners as provided in section 12-33-121, C.R.S.;

(f) Review actions of the Colorado medical board in refusing to grant or in revoking or suspending a license or in placing the holder thereof on probation, as provided in section 12-36-119, C.R.S.;

(g) Review actions of the board of dental examiners in refusing to issue or renew or in suspending or revoking a license to practice dentistry or dental hygiene, as provided in section 12-35-130, C.R.S.;

(h) Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the board of nursing as provided in articles 38 and 42 of title 12, C.R.S.;

(i) Review actions of the state board of optometry in refusing to grant or renew, revoking, or suspending a license, issuing a letter of admonition, or placing a licensee on probation or under supervision, as provided by section 12-40-119 (2) (e), C.R.S.;

(j) Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the director of the division of registrations as provided in article 41 of title 12, C.R.S.;

(k) Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the state board of pharmacy, as provided in section 12-22-125.5, C.R.S.;

(l) Review decisions of the board of education of a school district in proceedings for the dismissal of a teacher, as provided in section 22-63-302 (10), C.R.S.;

(m) Review final decisions or orders of the Colorado real estate commission, as provided in parts 1, 3, and 4 of article 61 of title 12, C.R.S.;

(n) Review final decisions and orders of the Colorado civil rights commission, as provided in parts 3, 4, and 7 of article 34 of title 24, C.R.S.;

(o) Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the passenger tramway safety board, as provided in section 25-5-708, C.R.S.;

(p) Review decisions of the state personnel board, as provided in section 24-50-125.4, C.R.S.;

(q) Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the state electrical board, as provided in article 23 of title 12, C.R.S.;

(r) Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the state board of licensure for architects, professional engineers, and professional land surveyors, as provided in section 12-25-309 (5), C.R.S.;

(s) Review final actions and orders of the boards, as defined in section 12-43-201 (1), C.R.S., that are appropriate for judicial review and final actions;

(t) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2008, p. 426, § 25, effective August 5, 2008.)

(u) Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the coal mine board of examiners, as provided in section 34-22-107 (8), C.R.S.;

(v) Review final actions and orders of the director of the division of registrations appropriate for judicial review, as provided in section 12-55.5-115, C.R.S.;

(w) Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the examining board of plumbers;

(x) Review decisions of the board of assessment appeals, as provided in section 39-8-108 (2), C.R.S.;

(y) Repealed.

(z) Review final actions of the committee on anticompetitive conduct established pursuant to section 12-36.5-106, C.R.S.;

(aa) (Deleted by amendment, L. 98, p. 818, § 14, effective August 5, 1998.)

(bb) Review final actions taken pursuant to article 38.1 of title 12, C.R.S., by the state board of nursing in the division of registrations in the department of regulatory agencies;

(cc) Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the securities commissioner, as provided in section 11-59-117, C.R.S.;

(dd) Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the commissioner of insurance, pursuant to title 10, C.R.S.;

(ee) Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the Colorado racing commission, as provided in section 12-60-507 (3), C.R.S.;

(ff) Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the Colorado passenger tramway safety board, as provided in section 25-5-708, C.R.S.;

(gg) Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the department of revenue relating to penalties for violations of statutes relating to the sale of cigarettes and tobacco products to minors pursuant to section 24-35-505 (5), C.R.S.;

(hh) Review final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the state board of veterinary medicine, as provided in section 12-64-112 (2), C.R.S.;

(ii) Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the director of the division of registrations as provided in section 12-37-107 (4), C.R.S.;

(jj) Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the executive director of the department of labor and employment, as provided in section 8-20-104, C.R.S.;

(kk) Review all final actions and orders appropriate for judicial review of the director of the division of registrations in the department of regulatory agencies, as provided in section 12-40.5-110, C.R.S.

(3) The court of appeals shall have authority to issue any writs, directives, orders, and mandates necessary to the determination of cases within its jurisdiction.

(4) (Deleted by amendment, L. 95, p. 235, § 4, effective April 17, 1995.)

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 265, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-2. L. 73: p. 358, § 2. L. 74: (1)(a) repealed, p. 236, § 4, effective July 1. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 555, § 2, effective April 9; (2) amended, p. 459, § 9, effective July 1. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 717, § 2, effective July 1. L. 78: (2) amended, p. 302, § 4, effective July 1. L. 79: (2) amended, p. 919, § 1, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 803, § 5, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 553, § 1, effective March 1, 1980. L. 80: (1)(g) amended, p. 438, § 2, effective January 1, 1981. L. 83: (2) amended, p. 473, § 4, effective April 5. L. 85: (2) amended, p. 566, § 12, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 484, § 2, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 532, § 12, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 505, § 21, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 510, § 8, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 538, § 13, effective July 1; IP(1) and (1)(f) amended, p. 570, § 3, effective November 14, 1986. L. 86: (2) amended, p. 978, § 9, effective April 3; (2) amended, p. 653, § 31, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 498, § 116, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 621, § 34, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 1217, § 14, effective July 1. L. 88: (2)(x) added, p. 1305, § 14, effective April 29; (2)(o) and (2)(p) amended and (2)(u) added, p. 1199, § 9, effective May 3; (2)(o) and (2)(p) amended and (2)(r) added, p. 470, § 12, effective July 1; (2)(o) amended and (2)(s) and (2)(t) added, p. 568, § 6, effective July 1; (2)(o) and (2)(p) amended and (2)(v) added, p. 582, § 2, effective July 1; (2)(q) added, p. 502, § 22, effective July 1; (2)(w) added, p. 593, § 19, effective July 1. L. 89: (2)(m) amended, p. 744, § 23, effective April 3; (2)(y), (2)(z), and (2)(aa) added, pp. 728, 747, 406, §§ 31, 4, 6, effective July 1. L. 89, 1st Ex. Sess.: (2)(bb) added, p. 13, § 3, effective July 7. L. 90: (2)(l) amended, p. 1128, § 2, effective July 1. L. 91: (2)(cc) added, p. 2425, § 4, effective June 8; (2)(a) amended and (4) added, p. 1337, § 54, effective July 1. L. 92: (2)(dd) added, p. 1613, § 167, effective May 20; (1)(b) amended, p. 271, § 1, effective July 1. L. 93: (2)(ee) added, p. 1235, § 2, effective July 1; (2)(ee) added, p. 1033, § 14, effective July 1; (2)(ff) added, p. 1532, § 1, effective July 1. L. 94: (2)(y) repealed, p. 705, § 7, effective April 19; (1)(h) added, p. 1474, § 3, effective July 1. L. 95: (2)(a) and (4) amended, p. 235, § 4, effective April 17; (2)(f) amended, p. 1072, § 24, effective July 1; (2)(aa) amended, p. 419, § 6, effective July 1. L. 98: (2)(s) amended, p. 1158, § 28, effective July 1; (2)(gg) added, p. 1186, § 4, effective July 1; (2)(o) and (2)(aa) amended, p. 818, § 14, effective August 5. L. 2001: (2)(ii) added, p. 1260, § 8, effective June 5; (2)(hh) added, p. 480, § 13, effective July 1. L. 2003: (2)(jj) added, p. 1828, § 21, effective May 21; (2)(b) amended, p. 1209, § 18, effective July 1. L. 2004: (2)(c) amended, p. 1310, § 52, effective May 28; (2)(g) amended, p. 857, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2006: (2)(c) and (2)(r) amended, p. 761, § 19, effective July 1. L. 2008: (2)(kk) added, p. 830, § 3, effective July 1; (2)(s) and (2)(t) amended, p. 426, § 25, effective August 5. L. 2010: (2)(f) amended, (HB 10-1260), ch. 403, p. 1985, § 70, effective July 1; IP(1) amended, (HB 10-1395), ch. 364, p. 1719, § 1, effective August 11. L. 2011: IP(2) and (2)(i) amended, (SB 11-094), ch. 129, p. 451, § 29, effective April 22; IP(2) and (2)(s) amended, (SB 11-187), ch. 285, p. 1326, § 66, effective July 1.

Annotations

 Editor's note: (1) Amendments to subsection (2) by House Bill 79-1234 and Senate Bill 79-038 were harmonized with Senate Bill 79-099, effective March 1, 1980. Amendments to subsection (2) by Senate Bill 85-013, Senate Bill 85-049, House Bill 85-1030, House Bill 85-1031, House Bill 85-1032, and House Bill 85-1209 were harmonized. Amendments to subsection (2) by Senate Bill 86-011, Senate Bill 86-012, Senate Bill 86-165, House Bill 86-1029, and House Bill 86-1268 were harmonized. Amendments to subsection (2)(ee) by House Bill 93-1034 and House Bill 93-1268 were harmonized.

 (2) Section 34 of chapter 129, Session Laws of Colorado 2011, provides that the act amending the introductory portion of subsection (2) and subsection (2)(i) applies to conduct occurring on or after April 22, 2011.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2003 act enacting subsection (2)(jj), see section 1 of chapter 279, Session Laws of Colorado 2003.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "The Problem of Delay in the Colorado Court of Appeals", see 58 Den. L.J. 1 (1980).

 General assembly may change appellate subject matter jurisdiction. The changes brought about by this section, § 13-4-108, and § 13-4-110 pertain to the subject matter, i.e., jurisdiction of the supreme court and court of appeals and, as such, the changes are within the authority of the general assembly. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 Statutes pertaining to the creation of appellate remedies take precedence over judicial rules of procedure. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 A court cannot adopt a rule which changes jurisdiction. The supreme court has authority to adopt rules for the regulation of the business of the courts and the procedure to be followed by litigants in doing that business. Nonetheless, absent constitutional authority, it is equally clear that this court cannot adopt a rule which changes jurisdiction of a court contrary to a provision of a statute. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 Where the general assembly has enacted statutes prescribing appellate procedure, this court may not modify the jurisdiction granted it by statute. People v. Meyers, 43 Colo. App. 63, 598 P.2d 526 (1979).

 The manner in which subject matter jurisdiction is exercised is properly within the scope of the supreme court's rule-making powers vested by § 2(1) of art. VI, Colo. Const. This procedure has been established and is set forth in C.A.R. 50-57. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 Court of appeals has no jurisdiction over constitutionality of a city charter. Where claimant contends that a city charter provision is unconstitutional, the Colorado court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to decide the issue. McCamant v. City & County of Denver, 31 Colo. App. 287, 501 P.2d 142 (1972).

 Jurisdiction of court of appeals to hear appeal. Whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the district court, or any part thereof, depends upon whether the matters presented were properly before the district court. Zaharia v. County Court ex rel. County of Jefferson, 673 P.2d 378 (Colo. App. 1983).

 An appeal that is filed before the entry of final judgment does not remove jurisdiction from the trial court. People v. Rosales, 134 P.3d 429 (Colo. App. 2005).

 The final judgment of the district court, following a trial de novo, is subject to review by the court of appeals under both § 13-6-310 and this section. Bovard v. People, 99 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2004).

 This section provides that court of appeals does not have initial jurisdiction over appeals from summary proceeding under certain election statutes, but statute does not bar court of appeals' jurisdiction after the supreme court has declined to exercise its initial jurisdiction. Zivian v. Brooke-Hitching, 28 P.3d 970 (Colo. App. 2001).

 Right to appeal to courts from special assessment for public improvements does not exist except by statute. Orchard Court Dev. Co. v. City of Boulder, 182 Colo. 361, 513 P.2d 199 (1973).

 Subsection (1)(h) expressly divests the court of appeals of jurisdiction over appeals from postconviction proceedings in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. When this provision is combined with § 16-12-101.5 and §§ 16-12-201 to 16-12-210, the legislature has made plain that it does not want the court of appeals to resolve issues arising from cases in which the death penalty has been imposed. People v. Owens, 219 P.3d 379 (Colo. App. 2009).

 Subsection (2)(x) does not, by its language, limit the court of appeals' jurisdiction to review board of assessment appeals decisions that are not related to property valuation. Prop. Tax Adjustment Specialists, Inc. v. Mesa County Bd. of Comm'rs, 956 P.2d 1277 (Colo. App. 1998).

 Final judgment defined. A final judgment is defined as one which ends the particular action in which it is entered, leaving nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties involved in the proceeding. D.H. v. People, 192 Colo. 542, 561 P.2d 5 (1977); Harding Glass Co. v. Jones, 640 P.2d 1123 (Colo. 1982); People in Interest of S.M.O., 931 P.2d 572 (Colo. App. 1996).

 A decision on the merits is a final judgment for appeal purposes despite any outstanding issue of attorney fees and certification pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54 (b) is not a prerequisite to appellate review of the merits of a case if a judgment has been entered and only the issue of attorney fees remains to be determined. Baldwin v. Bright Mortg. Co., 757 P.2d 1072 (Colo. 1988).

 An arbitrator's award is not a "final judgment" within the meaning of this section. S. Washington Assoc. v. Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217 (Colo. 1992).

 Order granting a stay in action pending resolution of case involving similar issues in another state was not a final appealable order where the issues and parties were not identical in the two proceedings and the order did not preclude plaintiff from seeking to lift the stay based upon a showing of prejudice. Things Remembered v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 924 P.2d 1089 (Colo. App. 1996).

 Court of appeals jurisdiction is limited to review of final orders, and the parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the court by consent. Arevalo v. Colo. Dept. of Human Servs., 72 P.3d 436 (Colo. App. 2003).

 Court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to review the trial court's interpretation and enforcement of a settlement agreement until the trial court either certifies its orders as final pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b) or issues an order that outlines the parties' exact responsibilities pursuant to the settlement agreement and services plan and does not allow the trial court to further modify or vacate these responsibilities. Arevalo v. Colo. Dept. of Human Servs., 72 P.3d 436 (Colo. App. 2003).

 A judgment of conviction is not final until sentence is imposed. Absent a specific finding that the victim did not suffer a pecuniary loss, restitution is a mandatory part of the sentence. Thus, absent such a finding, sentencing is not final until restitution is ordered. People v. Rosales, 134 P.3d 429 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Order of dismissal without prejudice is a final judgment when the applicable statute of limitations period has expired. SMLL, L.L.C. v. Daly, 128 P.3d 266 (Colo. App. 2005).

 A transfer order from juvenile to district court is not a final judgment from which appeal lies because it is interlocutory in nature and in no sense completely determines the rights of the parties. D.H. v. People, 192 Colo. 542, 561 P.2d 5 (1977).

 Remand for further proceedings before city council of case against ordinance was final appealable order. Where the city council in enacting a special assessment ordinance had made all the required findings and in an action to enjoin the assessment, the district court, without explicitly stating whether it was affirming or reversing the council's action, remanded the case to the council for further proceedings, such action by the district court constituted final judgment and the court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider any appeal from the district court's order. Cline v. City of Boulder, 35 Colo. App. 349, 532 P.2d 770 (1975).

 Trial court's order on attorney fees was a final judgment and could have been reviewed by the court of appeals if a party had appealed some other aspect of the case and the matter was otherwise properly before the court. Bye v. District Court, 701 P.2d 56 (Colo. 1985).

 However, court of appeals has initial jurisdiction to review an order regarding attorney fees that has been certified as final by the trial court, even though other claims in the underlying action are pending before the trial court. Steven A. Gall, P.C. v. District Court, 965 P.2d 1268 (Colo. 1998).

 A postjudgment collection order is final if the order ends the particular part of the action in which it is entered, leaves nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties as to that part of the proceeding, and is more than a ministerial or administrative determination. Luster v. Brinkman, __ P.3d __ (Colo. App. 2010).

 No review of issue raised first time on appeal. Questioning the constitutionality of a statute for the first time in an appellate brief will not successfully raise the issue for review by Colorado supreme court on appeal. Manka v. Martin, 200 Colo. 260, 614 P.2d 875 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 913, 101 S. Ct. 1354, 67 L. Ed.2d 338 (1981).

 No jurisdiction over constitutionality of statute. Court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, despite a supreme court order stating that jurisdiction of the case "shall be retained by the court of appeals" because the general assembly did not intend to confer upon the supreme court the power to expand and contract the jurisdictional authority of the court of appeals. People v. Salazar, 715 P.2d 1265 (Colo. App. 1985), cert. denied, 744 P.2d 80 (Colo. 1987); Kollodge v. Charnes, 741 P.2d 1260 (Colo. App. 1987); People v. Woertman, 786 P.2d 443 (Colo. App. 1989); Flores v. Dept. of Rev., 802 P.2d 1175 (Colo. App. 1990); People v. Truesdale, 804 P.2d 287 (Colo. App. 1990); Lucchesi v. State, 807 P.2d 1185 (Colo. App. 1990); People v. Merrill, 816 P.2d 958 (Colo. App. 1991); People v. Robinson, 833 P.2d 832 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Court of appeals has jurisdiction over constitutionality of a statute when issue raised in appeal of decisions of statutorily created tribunals under subsection (2). Indus. Comm'n v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 690 P.2d 839 (Colo. 1984).

 Statute does not otherwise limit court of appeals authority to address constitutional issues raised in a Colorado appellate rule promulgated by the Colorado supreme court. Refusal to address the constitutional issues raised over C.A.R. 3.4 may mean that appellants would have no forum for their arguments, thus court of appeals concluded it had jurisdiction to address appellant's challenges to constitutionality of the rule. People ex rel. T.D., 140 P.3d 205 (Colo. App.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1020, 127 S. Ct. 564, 166 L. Ed. 2d 411, and 549 U.S. 1024, 127 S. Ct. 565, 166 L. Ed. 2d 419 (2006).

 Constitutional challenges to sales and use tax provisions of municipal code made to an administrative agency but were not made in declaratory judgment action in district court are not properly preserved for appellate review. Arapahoe Roofing & Sheet Metal v. Denver, 831 P.2d 451 (Colo. 1992).

 Jurisdiction of the court of appeals was not precluded by subsection (1)(b) since the court was being asked to determine the facial constitutionality of an executive order of the mayor of the city and county of Denver rather than a statute, charter provision, or ordinance. Casados v. City & County of Denver, 832 P.2d 1048 (Colo. App. 1992) (decided prior to 1992 amendment to subsection (1)(b)), rev'd on other grounds, 862 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005, 114 S. Ct. 1372, 128 L. Ed.2d 48 (1994).

 General assembly's authority to determine the jurisdiction of the court of appeals is exclusive. S. Washington Assoc. v. Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217 (Colo. 1992).

 Parties to an arbitration agreement cannot define and prescribe the powers of a court of law. Where a contract term purported to allow an appellate court to conduct a substantive review of the arbitration panel's award, contrary to the controlling statutes, clause was void and unenforceable. S. Washington Assoc. v. Flanagan, 859 P.2d 217 (Colo. 1992).

 Court of appeals has jurisdiction to address facial constitutionality challenge to a municipal executive order. Casados v. City & County of Denver, 832 P.2d 1048 (Colo. App. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 862 P.2d 908 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1005, 114 S. Ct. 1372, 128 L. Ed.2d 48 (1994).

 However, where the court of appeals refers a question of its jurisdiction to the supreme court, which then determined the case properly within the court of appeal's jurisdiction, that ruling is conclusive. Barela v. Beye, 916 P.2d 668 (Colo. App. 1996).

 Court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to review an arbitration award; jurisdiction extends only to orders and judgments entered by statutorily specified courts. Thomas v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 857 P.2d 532 (Colo. App. 1993).

 Court of appeals does not possess general powers of supervision over lower courts or attorneys appearing therein. Rather, such powers are vested in the supreme court. People v. Bergen, 883 P.2d 532 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Defendant's assertion that Colorado's homicide statutes violate principles of equal protection brings into question the constitutionality of a statute and is therefore outside the jurisdiction of the court. People v. Seigler, 832 P.2d 980 (Colo. App. 1991), cert. denied, 846 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1993).

 Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the supreme court may retain and review an appeal of a declaratory order of the state personnel board that should have been filed with the court of appeals. The court's authority rests in its power under C.A.R. 50(b) to review cases pending in the court of appeals prior to judgment and under C.A.R. 2 to suspend the rules of appellate procedure. Colo. Ass'n of Pub. Emp. v. Dept. of Hwys., 809 P.2d 988 (Colo. 1991).

 Court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over writs of habeas corpus. All district courts have jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings and one seeking habeas corpus may select his forum. Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1994).

 Crim. P. 35(c) motion is properly vested in the court of appeals. Duran v. Price, 868 P.2d 375 (Colo. 1994).

 Under this section, the court of appeals does not have jurisdiction over an appeal of a district court's decision modifying a county court decision, regardless of whether a district court judgment which modifies a county court judgment is a final judgment of the district court under rule 37 of the Colorado rules of criminal procedure. People v. Smith, 874 P.2d 452 (Colo. App. 1993).

 The final judgment of the district court, following a trial de novo, is subject to review by the court of appeals under both § 13-6-310 and this section. Bovard v. People, 99 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2004).

 The dismissal of a claim without prejudice is generally not appealable unless such dismissal prohibits further proceedings, such as an applicable statute of limitations. Golden Lodge No. 13, I.O.O.F. v. Easley, 916 P.2d 666 (Colo. App. 1996).

 The dismissal of a claim without prejudice for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the laws and regulations of the Sovereign Lodge was not appealable because the defendant Golden Lodge could at any time file an internal appeal protesting the actions of the Grand Lodge with the supreme governing body, the Sovereign Grand Lodge. Golden Lodge No. 13, I.O.O.F v. Easley, 916 P.2d 666 (Colo. App. 1996).

 A denial of a summary judgment motion is not generally considered a final decision that is immediately appealable under this section. City of Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1996).

 An appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss based on tribal sovereign immunity when the issue presented is one of law not of fact. Rush Creek Solutions, Inc. v. Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, 107 P.3d 402 (Colo. App. 2004).

 Trial court's order reserving ruling on a summary judgment motion and allowing full discovery to proceed is a final judgment for purposes of conferring appellate jurisdiction. Furlong v. Gardner, 956 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1998).

 The same rules of finality apply in probate cases as in other civil cases. An order of the probate court is final if it ends the particular action in which it is entered and leaves nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties as to that proceeding. In re Estate of Scott, 119 P.3d 511 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd, 136 P.3d 892 (Colo. 2006).

 C.R.C.P. 54(b) governs the interlocutory appeal of a probate court order. In re Estate of Scott, 119 P.3d 511 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd, 136 P.3d 892 (Colo. 2006).

 Where probate court's order of partial summary judgment adjudicated fewer than all of the parties' claims, it was not a final judgment, and party could not appeal the order without C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification. In re Estate of Scott, 119 P.3d 511 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd, 136 P.3d 892 (Colo. 2006).

 As reenacted, § 22-63-302 authorizes teachers to appeal only school board decisions of dismissal. Under § 22-63-302, the court does not have jurisdiction to consider appeals of school board decisions placing a teacher on probation. Holdridge v. Bd. of Educ., 881 P.2d 448 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Because an order directing a new trial is not a final judgment, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction over such an appeal, even if the defendant assert that a new trial would violate his or her rights. People v. Jones, 942 P.2d 1258 (Colo. App. 1996).

 Trial court retains jurisdiction to determine substantive matters when a party files a premature notice of appeal of a nonfinal judgment. Barring extraordinary circumstances, a judgment subject to C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification must be so certified in order to be considered final and sufficient to transfer jurisdiction to the court of appeals. Musick v. Woznicki, 136 P.3d 244 (Colo. 2006).

 A trial court's ruling on a question of sovereign immunity under the CGIA raised by a public entity or public employee is a final, appealable judgment. However, when a trial court refuses to dismiss on the basis of allegations of willful and wanton conduct that would eliminate the employee's immunity, its order is not immediately appealable. Carothers v. Archuleta County Sheriff, 159 P.3d 647 (Colo. App. 2006).

 The court of appeals has jurisdiction to review a district court decision regarding matters within the water courts' exclusive jurisdiction only insofar as is necessary to determine its own and the district court's jurisdiction. Although the water courts do not, in general, have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the ownership of a water right as opposed to the use of the right under the rule of priority of appropriation, the rule is otherwise when the ownership claims are based on adverse possession and abandonment. In this case, the district court has jurisdiction only with regard to a damages claim, necessitating reversal of the holdings regarding ownership. Archuleta v. Gomez, 140 P.3d 281 (Colo. App. 2006).

 Applied in Evans v. Simpson, 190 Colo. 426, 547 P.2d 931 (1976); In re Petrafeck v. Indus. Comm'n, 191 Colo. 566, 554 P.2d 1097 (1976); Kelce v. Touche Ross & Co., 37 Colo. App. 352, 549 P.2d 415 (1976); Mizel v. Banking Bd., 196 Colo. 98, 581 P.2d 306 (1978); Thomas v. County Court, 198 Colo. 87, 596 P.2d 768 (1979); People v. Malacara, 199 Colo. 243, 606 P.2d 1300 (Colo. 1980); People v. Scott, 630 P.2d 615 (Colo. 1981); In re W.D.A. v. City & County of Denver, 632 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1981); People v. Thatcher, 638 P.2d 760 (Colo. 1981); People v. Abbott, 638 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1981); Riley v. Indus. Comm'n, 628 P.2d 147 (Colo. App. 1981); People v. Boyd, 642 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982); People v. Mason, 642 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1982); In re P.F. v. Walsh, 648 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982); People v. Wieder, 693 P.2d 1006 (Colo. App. 1984), aff'd, 722 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1986); People v. Fields, 697 P.2d 749 (Colo. App. 1984); Leske v. Golder, 124 P.3d 863 (Colo. App. 2005).

13-4-102.1. Interlocutory appeals of determinations of questions of law in civil cases.

Statute text

(1) The court of appeals, under rules promulgated by the Colorado supreme court, may permit an interlocutory appeal of a certified question of law in a civil matter from a district court or the probate court of the city and county of Denver if:

(a) The trial court certifies that immediate review may promote a more orderly disposition or establish a final disposition of the litigation; and

(b) The order involves a controlling and unresolved question of law.

(2) A majority of the judges who are in regular active service on the court of appeals and who are not disqualified may, if approved by rules promulgated by the Colorado supreme court, order that an interlocutory appeal permitted by the court of appeals be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en banc.

History

 Source: L. 2010: Entire section added, (HB 10-1395), ch. 364, p. 1719, § 2, effective August 11.

13-4-103. Number of judges - qualifications.

Statute text

(1) The number of judges of the court of appeals shall be sixteen. Effective July 1, 2006, the number of judges of the court of appeals shall be nineteen. Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges of the court of appeals shall be twenty-two.

(2) Judges of the court of appeals shall have the same qualifications as justices of the Colorado supreme court.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 266, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-3. L. 74: (1) amended, p. 236, § 2, effective July 1. L. 87: (1) amended, p. 560, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2006: (1) amended, p. 22, § 1, effective July 1; (1) amended, p. 142, § 8, effective August 7. L. 2007: (1) amended, p. 1530, § 17, effective May 31.

Annotations

 Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (1) by Senate Bill 06-033 and House Bill 06-1028 were harmonized.

13-4-104. Term of office - selection.

Statute text

(1) The term of office for a judge of the court of appeals is eight years.

(2) Judicial appointments to the court of appeals shall be made pursuant to section 20 of article VI of the state constitution.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 266, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-4. L. 72: p. 592, § 65.

13-4-104.5. Temporary judicial duties.

Statute text

Whenever the chief justice of the supreme court deems assignment of a judge necessary to the prompt disposition of judicial business, the chief justice may assign any judge of the court of appeals, or any retired judge of the court of appeals who consents, to temporarily perform judicial duties in any court of record. For each day of such temporary service a retired judge shall receive compensation as provided by law.

History

 Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 1247, § 2, effective April 5.

13-4-105. Chief judge.

Statute text

The chief justice of the supreme court shall appoint a judge of the court of appeals to serve as chief judge at the pleasure of the chief justice. The chief judge shall exercise such administrative powers as may be delegated to him by the chief justice.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 266, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-5.

13-4-106. Divisions.

Statute text

(1) The court of appeals shall sit in divisions of three judges each to hear and determine all matters before the court.

(2) The chief judge, with the approval of the chief justice, shall assign judges to each division. Such assignments shall be changed from time to time as determined by the chief judge, with the approval of the chief justice.

(3) Cases shall be assigned to the divisions of the court of appeals in rotation according to the order in which they are filed with the clerk of the court of appeals or transferred by the supreme court, except that the chief judge has the authority to transfer cases from one division to another to maintain approximately equal case loads or for any other appropriate reason.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 266, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-6.

13-4-107. Place of court.

Statute text

The court of appeals shall be located in the city and county of Denver, but any division of the court of appeals may sit in any county seat for the purpose of hearing oral argument in cases before the division.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 266, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-7.

13-4-108. Supreme court review.

Statute text

(1) Before application may be made for writ of certiorari, as provided in this section, application shall be made to the court of appeals for a rehearing if required by supreme court rule.

(2) Within thirty days after a rehearing has been refused by the court of appeals, any party in interest who is aggrieved by the judgment of the court of appeals may appeal by application to the supreme court for a writ of certiorari.

(3) Procedures on writs of certiorari, including procedures for rehearings, shall be as prescribed by rule of the supreme court.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 266, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-8. L. 98: Entire section amended, p. 949, § 11, effective May 27.

Annotations

 Cross references: For review on certiorari, see C.A.R. 49.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 This section, § 13-4-110, and § 2(2) of art. VI, Colo. Const., are not in conflict. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 The procedure established in this section and § 13-4-110 and in C.R.C.P. 50-57 clearly provides for appellate review in the supreme court. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 This section establishes certiorari as the form of review from the court of appeals. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 Certiorari is presently recognized as a form of appellate review. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 General assembly may legislate appellate subject matter jurisdiction. The changes brought about by this section, § 13-4-102, and § 13-4-110 pertain to the subject matter, i.e., jurisdiction of the supreme court and court of appeals and, as such, the changes are within the authority of the general assembly. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 Statutes pertaining to the creation of appellate remedies take precedence over judicial rules of procedure. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 Applied in Honey v. Ranchers & Farmers Livestock Auction Co., 191 Colo. 503, 553 P.2d 799 (1976); Wiggins v. People, 199 Colo. 341, 608 P.2d 348 (1980); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Cotter Corp., 665 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1983).

13-4-109. Certification of cases to the supreme court.

Statute text

(1) The court of appeals, prior to final determination, may certify any case before it to the supreme court for its review and final determination, if the court of appeals finds:

(a) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest;

(b) The case involves legal principles of major significance; or

(c) The case load of the court of appeals is such that the expeditious administration of justice requires certification.

(2) The supreme court shall consider such certification and may accept the case for final determination or remand it for determination by the court of appeals.

(3) The supreme court may order the court of appeals to certify any case before the court of appeals to the supreme court for final determination.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 267, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-9.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Applied in Fritz v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 196 Colo. 335, 586 P.2d 23 (1978); Coquina Oil Corp. v. Harry Kourlis Ranch, 643 P.2d 519 (Colo. 1982).

13-4-110. Determination of jurisdiction - transfer of cases.

Statute text

(1) (a) When a party in interest alleges, or the court is of the opinion, that a case before the court of appeals is not properly within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals, the court of appeals shall refer the case to the supreme court. The supreme court shall decide the question of jurisdiction in a summary manner, and its determination shall be conclusive.

(b) A party in interest shall allege that a case is not properly within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals by motion filed with the court of appeals within twenty days after the date the record is filed with the clerk of the court of appeals, failing which any objection to jurisdiction by a party in interest shall be waived.

(2) Any case within the jurisdiction of the court of appeals which is filed erroneously in the supreme court shall be transferred to the court of appeals by the supreme court.

(3) No case filed either in the supreme court or the court of appeals shall be dismissed for having been filed in the wrong court but shall be transferred and considered properly filed in the court which the supreme court determines has jurisdiction.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 267, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-10. L. 71: p. 372, § 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Section is not in conflict with the constitution. This section and § 13-4-108, and § 2(2) of art. VI, Colo. Const., are not in conflict. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 General assembly may legislate appellate subject matter jurisdiction. The changes brought about by this section, § 13-4-102, and § 13-4-108 pertain to the subject matter, i.e., jurisdiction of the supreme court and court of appeals and, as such, the changes are within the authority of the general assembly. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 Statutes pertaining to the creation of appellate remedies take precedence over judicial rules of procedure. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 Procedure is established for final review in the supreme court. The procedure established in this section and § 13-4-108 and in C.A.R. 50-57 clearly provides for appellate review in the supreme court. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 This section permits transfer to the court of appeals of certain cases filed in the supreme court prior to January 1, 1970. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 Because the substance of the complaint addressed primarily the use of water rights rather than their ownership, the complaint related to a water matter and should have been filed in a water court. However, the appeal was properly transferred from the supreme court to the court of appeals because the appeal was from a district court judgment. City of Sterling v. Sterling Irrig. Co., 42 P.3d 72 (Colo. App. 2002).

 Although subsection (3) provides that cases filed in wrong appellate court shall not be dismissed, where appeal will not lie in either court, the only review being by certiorari, the case must be dismissed for failure to comply with the statutory procedure. People v. Meyers, 43 Colo. App. 63, 598 P.2d 526 (1979).

 Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, the supreme court may retain and review an appeal of a declaratory order of the state personnel board that should have been filed with the court of appeals. The court's authority rests in its power under C.A.R. 50(b) to review cases pending in the court of appeals prior to judgment and under C.A.R. 2 to suspend the rules of appellate procedure. Colorado Ass'n of Pub. Emp. v. Dept. of Highways, 809 P.2d 988 (Colo. 1991).

 Court of appeals has jurisdiction over interlocutory ruling in injunction proceeding when the supreme court declined to exercise jurisdiction. Joel L. Schaffer v. C. M. Sullivan, P.C., 844 P.2d 1327 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Trial court had jurisdiction as a matter of law to waive bond requirement for indigent taxpayer and proceed to adjudicate merits of appeal concerning use tax deficiency where undisputed evidence in affidavit form was proffered to the trial court reciting taxpayer's inability to post bond or make deposit required by statute. AF Prop. v. Dept. of Rev., 852 P.2d 1267 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Where the court of appeals refers a question of its jurisdiction to the supreme court, which then determined the case properly within the court of appeal's jurisdiction, that ruling is conclusive. Barela v. Beye, 916 P.2d 668 (Colo. App. 1996).

 Applied in Thomas v. County Court, 198 Colo. 87, 596 P.2d 768 (1979); People v. White, 199 Colo. 82, 606 P.2d 847 (1980); People v. Dooley, 630 P.2d 608 (Colo. 1981); People v. Scott, 630 P.2d 615 (Colo. 1981); People v. Thatcher, 638 P.2d 760 (Colo. 1981); People v. Abbott, 638 P.2d 781 (Colo. 1981); Federal Lumber Co. v. Wheeler, 643 P.2d 31 (Colo. 1981); People v. Mason, 642 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1982); Coquina Oil Corp. v. Harry Kourlis Ranch, 643 P.2d 519 (Colo. 1982); In re P.F. v. Walsh, 648 P.2d 1067 (Colo. 1982).

13-4-111. Employees - compensation.

Statute text

(1) Subject to the rules and regulations of the supreme court, the court of appeals shall appoint a clerk, a reporter of decisions, deputy clerks, and such other assistants as may be necessary.

(2) Each judge of the court of appeals may appoint a law clerk who shall be learned in the law and one secretary or stenographer. The persons so employed may be discharged or removed at the pleasure of the judge employing them.

(3) All employees appointed under subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall be paid such compensation as shall be prescribed by the rules and regulations of the supreme court.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 267, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-11. L. 74: (1) amended, p. 236, § 3, effective July 1.

13-4-112. Fees of the clerk of court of appeals.

Statute text

(1) (a) Within the time allowed or fixed for transmission of the record, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court of appeals a docket fee of two hundred twenty-three dollars.

(b) The docket fee for the appellee shall be one hundred forty-eight dollars to be paid upon the entry of appearance of the appellee.

(2) (a) Each fee collected pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section shall be transmitted to the state treasurer and divided as follows:

(I) One hundred fifty dollars shall be deposited in the supreme court library fund created pursuant to section 13-2-120;

(II) Five dollars shall be deposited in the judicial stabilization cash fund created in section 13-32-101 (6); and

(III) Sixty-eight dollars shall be deposited in the justice center cash fund created in section 13-32-101 (7) (a).

(b) Each fee collected pursuant to paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section shall be transmitted to the state treasurer and divided as follows:

(I) Seventy-five dollars shall be deposited in the supreme court library fund created pursuant to section 13-2-120;

(II) Five dollars shall be deposited in the judicial stabilization cash fund created in section 13-32-101 (6); and

(III) Sixty-eight dollars shall be deposited in the justice center cash fund created in section 13-32-101 (7) (a).

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 268, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-12. L. 82: Entire section R&RE, p. 285, § 3, effective July 1. L. 98: (2) amended, p. 685, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2007: Entire section amended, p. 1530, § 18, effective May 31. L. 2008: Entire section amended, p. 2114, § 6, effective June 4.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2008 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 417, Session Laws of Colorado 2008.

13-4-113. Publication of decisions.

Statute text

(1) Repealed.

(2) Those court of appeals opinions to be published in full shall be selected as prescribed by supreme court rule.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 268, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-21-13. L. 74: (1) repealed, p. 236, § 4, effective July 1.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the duty of reporter to compile and publish decisions, see § 13-2-123.

——————————

ARTICLE 5
JUDICIAL DISTRICTS


Section


PART 1 JUDGES - TERMS 

13-5-101. Judicial districts and terms.

13-5-102. First district.

13-5-103. Second district.

13-5-104. Third district.

13-5-105. Fourth district.

13-5-106. Fifth district.

13-5-107. Sixth district.

13-5-108. Seventh district.

13-5-109. Eighth district.

13-5-110. Ninth district.

13-5-111. Tenth district.

13-5-112. Eleventh district.

13-5-113. Twelfth district.

13-5-114. Thirteenth district.

13-5-115. Fourteenth district.

13-5-116. Fifteenth district.

13-5-117. Sixteenth district.

13-5-118. Seventeenth district.

13-5-119. Eighteenth district.

13-5-120. Nineteenth district.

13-5-121. Twentieth district.

13-5-122. Twenty-first district.

13-5-123. Twenty-second district.

13-5-124. Appointment of clerk and employees.

13-5-125. Clerks to keep records.

13-5-126. Duties of bailiff.

13-5-127. Duties of reporters.

13-5-128. Compensation of reporter.

13-5-129. Reporters' expenses. (Repealed)

13-5-130. Reporters to file verified statements. (Repealed)

13-5-131. Multiple-judge districts.

13-5-132. Powers of judges sitting separately.

13-5-133. Judges may sit en banc - purpose - rules.

13-5-134. Juries.

13-5-135. Time limit on judgment.

13-5-136. Forfeit of salary.

13-5-137. Judges seeking retention in office. (Repealed)

13-5-138. Appeals to district court.

13-5-139. Transfer of information from orders for child support and maintenance to child support enforcement agency - payment of support and maintenance.

13-5-140. Transfer of certain registry functions - cooperation between departments.

13-5-141. Compilation - sentences received upon conviction of felony.

13-5-142. National instant criminal background check system - reporting.

13-5-143. Judge as party to a case - recusal of judge upon motion.

13-5-144. Chief judge - veterans treatment court authority.


PART 2 DISTRICT COURT MAGISTRATES 

13-5-201. District court magistrates.


PART 3 FAMILY LAW MAGISTRATES 

13-5-301 to 13-5-305. (Repealed)

——————————

PART 1
JUDGES - TERMS

13-5-101. Judicial districts and terms.

Statute text

The state is divided into twenty-two judicial districts as prescribed by this part 1. Terms of court shall be fixed by rules adopted by the district court in each district; except that at least one term of court shall be held each calendar year in each county within the district, at the county seat of such county.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 398, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-1. L. 83: Entire section amended, p. 600, § 2, effective May 20.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the constitutional authority for general assembly's changing of boundaries of judicial districts by a two-thirds vote of each house, see § 10(1) of art. VI, Colo. Const.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Colorado's New Court System", see 41 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1964).

 This statute is irreconcilable with § 13-5-119 (2); however, under rules of statutory construction § 13-5-119 (2) controls since it was enacted later. City of Littleton v. County Comm'rs, 787 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1990).

13-5-102. First district.

Statute text

(1) The first judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Gilpin and Jefferson.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the first judicial district shall be eleven.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2004, the number of judges for the first judicial district shall be twelve.

(c) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the first judicial district shall be thirteen.

(d) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2011, (SB 11-028), ch. 21, p. 52, § 1, effective March 11, 2011.)

(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2011, the number of judges for the first judicial district shall be fourteen.

(3) (a) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the district and county judges regularly assigned to Gilpin county may sit and maintain their official chambers at a single location anywhere within such county, and any related office may also be maintained at such location.

(b) As used in this subsection (3), "related office" includes but need not be limited to the offices of the sheriff, county clerk and recorder, county treasurer, clerk of district court, and clerk of county court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 398, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-2. L. 75: (1) amended, p. 559, § 1, effective July 1; (2) amended, p. 557, § 1, effective July 1. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 781, § 1, effective July 1. L. 89, 1st Ex. Sess.: (2) amended, p. 16, § 1, effective January 1, 1991. L. 93: (3) added, p. 91, § 1, effective July 1. L. 99: (2) amended, p. 557, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2001: (1) and (2) amended, p. 141, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1525, § 1, effective May 31. L. 2011: (2) amended, (SB 11-028), ch. 21, p. 52, § 1, effective March 11.

13-5-103. Second district.

Statute text

(1) The second judicial district shall be composed of the city and county of Denver.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the second judicial district shall be nineteen. Effective January 1, 1978, the number of judges shall be twenty.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the second judicial district shall be twenty-one.

(c) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of judges for the second judicial district shall be twenty-three.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 398, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-3. L. 71: p. 368, § 1. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 557, § 2, effective January 1, 1976. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 781, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1525, § 2, effective May 31.

13-5-104. Third district.

Statute text

(1) The third judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Las Animas and Huerfano.

(2) The number of judges for the third judicial district shall be two.

(3) The third judicial district shall be divided into two divisions. The northern division shall consist of the county of Huerfano, and the southern division shall consist of the county of Las Animas. One judge of the district shall maintain his official residence and chambers in the northern division of the district, and one judge shall maintain his official residence and chambers in the southern division of the district. Travel and maintenance expenses shall be allowed a judge of the district only when he is outside the county of his official residence. For all other purposes, the district shall be considered as a single entity. The allocation of judges to the northern and southern divisions shall be made by court rule. In the event that the judges of the district are unable to agree upon an allocation by rule, the matter shall be determined by the chief justice of the supreme court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 398, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-4. L. 81: (3) amended, p. 2024, § 12, effective July 14.

13-5-105. Fourth district.

Statute text

(1) The fourth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of El Paso and Teller.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the fourth judicial district shall be fifteen.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2002, the number of judges for the fourth judicial district shall be sixteen.

(c) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2003, the number of judges for the fourth judicial district shall be seventeen.

(d) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2004, the number of judges for the fourth judicial district shall be nineteen.

(e) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the fourth judicial district shall be twenty.

(f) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of judges for the fourth judicial district shall be twenty-two.

History

 Source: L. 64: pp. 399, 405, 407, §§ 5, 1, 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-5. L. 67: p. 258, § 1. L. 69: p. 261, § 1. L. 71: p. 369, § 1. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 557, § 3, effective January 1, 1976. L. 89, 1st Ex. Sess.: (2) amended, p. 16, § 2, effective January 1, 1991. L. 91: (2) amended, p. 349, § 1, effective July 1. L. 97: (2) amended, p. 939, § 1, effective July 1, 1998. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 71, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 141, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1526, § 3, effective May 31.

13-5-106. Fifth district.

Statute text

(1) The fifth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Clear Creek, Eagle, Lake, and Summit.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the fifth judicial district shall be three.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2002, the number of judges for the fifth judicial district shall be four.

(c) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2004, the number of judges for the fifth judicial district shall be five.

(d) At least one of the judges for the fifth judicial district shall maintain his or her official chambers and residence in the county of Eagle, Lake, or Summit.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 399, § 6. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-6. L. 75: Entire section amended, p. 559, § 2, effective July 1. L. 84: (2) amended, p. 454, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 142, § 3, effective July 1.

13-5-107. Sixth district.

Statute text

(1) The sixth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Archuleta, La Plata, and San Juan.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the sixth judicial district shall be two.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2002, the number of judges for the sixth judicial district shall be three.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 399, § 7. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-7. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 142, § 4, effective July 1.

13-5-108. Seventh district.

Statute text

(1) The seventh judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Delta, Gunnison, Hinsdale, Montrose, Ouray, and San Miguel.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the seventh judicial district shall be three.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2003, the number of judges for the seventh judicial district shall be four.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2), subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2011, the number of judges for the seventh judicial district shall be five.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 400, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-8. L. 84: (2) amended, p. 454, § 2, effective September 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 142, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2011: (2) amended, (SB 11-028), ch. 21, p. 52, § 2, effective March 11.

13-5-109. Eighth district.

Statute text

(1) The eighth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Larimer and Jackson.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the eighth judicial district shall be five.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the eighth judicial district shall be six.

(c) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the eighth judicial district shall be seven.

(d) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of judges for the eighth judicial district shall be eight.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 400, § 9. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-9. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 557, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 142, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1526, § 4, effective May 31.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Applied in Jeffrey v. District Court, 626 P.2d 631 (Colo. 1981); Corr v. District Court, 661 P.2d 668 (Colo. 1983).

13-5-110. Ninth district.

Statute text

(1) The ninth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Garfield, Pitkin, and Rio Blanco.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the ninth judicial district shall be three.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the ninth judicial district shall be four.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 400, § 10. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-10. L. 72: p. 188, § 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1526, § 5, effective May 31.

13-5-111. Tenth district.

Statute text

(1) The tenth judicial district shall be composed of the county of Pueblo.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the tenth judicial district shall be six.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the tenth judicial district shall be seven.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 400, § 11. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-11. L. 73: p. 493, § 1. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 558, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1526, § 6, effective May 31.

13-5-112. Eleventh district.

Statute text

(1) The eleventh judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Chaffee, Custer, Fremont, and Park.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the eleventh judicial district shall be three.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the eleventh judicial district shall be four.

(3) The eleventh judicial district shall be divided into two divisions. The northern division shall consist of the counties of Chaffee and Park, and the southern division shall consist of the counties of Fremont and Custer. One judge of the district shall maintain his official residence and chambers in the northern division of the district, one judge shall maintain his official residence and chambers in the southern division of the district, and one judge shall sit in both divisions as assigned by the chief judge. Travel and maintenance expenses shall be allowed a judge of the district only when he is outside the county of his official residence. For all other purposes the district shall be considered as a single entity. The allocation of judges to the northern and southern divisions shall be made by court rule. In the event that the judges of the district are unable to agree upon an allocation by rule, the matter shall be determined by the chief justice of the supreme court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 400, § 12. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-12. L. 80: (2) and (3) amended, p. 507, § 1, effective July 1. L. 81: (3) amended, p. 2024, § 13, effective July 14. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1527, § 7, effective May 31.

13-5-113. Twelfth district.

Statute text

(1) The twelfth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Alamosa, Conejos, Costilla, Mineral, Rio Grande, and Saguache.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the twelfth judicial district shall be two.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the twelfth judicial district shall be three.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 401, § 13. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-13. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1527, § 8, effective May 31.

13-5-114. Thirteenth district.

Statute text

(1) The thirteenth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Kit Carson, Logan, Morgan, Phillips, Sedgwick, Washington, and Yuma.

(2) The number of judges for the thirteenth judicial district shall be four.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 401, § 14. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-14. L. 69: p. 261, § 2.

13-5-115. Fourteenth district.

Statute text

(1) The fourteenth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Grand, Moffat, and Routt.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the fourteenth judicial district shall be two.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the fourteenth judicial district shall be three.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 401, § 15. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-15. L. 74: (2) amended, p. 235, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1527, § 9, effective May 31.

13-5-116. Fifteenth district.

Statute text

(1) The fifteenth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Baca, Cheyenne, Kiowa, and Prowers.

(2) The number of judges for the fifteenth judicial district shall be two.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 401, § 16. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-16.

13-5-117. Sixteenth district.

Statute text

(1) The sixteenth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Bent, Crowley, and Otero.

(2) The number of judges for the sixteenth judicial district shall be two.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 401, § 17. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-17.

13-5-118. Seventeenth district.

Statute text

(1) The seventeenth judicial district shall be composed of the county of Adams and the city and county of Broomfield.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the seventeenth judicial district shall be eight.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2002, the number of judges for the seventeenth judicial district shall be nine.

(c) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2003, the number of judges for the seventeenth judicial district shall be ten.

(d) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the seventeenth judicial district shall be eleven.

(e) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the seventeenth judicial district shall be thirteen.

(f) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of judges for the seventeenth judicial district shall be fifteen.

(3) The seventeenth judicial district shall have jurisdiction over all causes of action accruing and all crimes committed within the city and county of Broomfield on or after November 15, 2001. Prior to November 15, 2001, the judicial districts for the counties, as they existed prior to November 15, 2001, shall have jurisdiction over all causes of action accruing and crimes committed within such counties.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 401, § 18. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-18. L. 67: p. 229, § 1. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 781, § 3, effective July 1. L. 84: (2) amended, p. 454, § 3, effective September 1. L. 2000: (1) amended and (3) added, p. 251, § 1, effective August 2. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 143, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1527, § 10, effective May 31.

13-5-119. Eighteenth district.

Statute text

(1) The eighteenth judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Arapahoe, Douglas, Elbert, and Lincoln.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be fourteen.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2002, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be fifteen.

(c) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2003, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be sixteen.

(d) (I) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2004, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be seventeen.

(II) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be eighteen.

(III) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be twenty.

(IV) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of judges for the eighteenth judicial district shall be twenty-one.

(e) The district judges regularly assigned to Arapahoe county shall maintain their offices in one location within Arapahoe county.

(3) Repealed.

History

 Source: L. 64: pp. 401, 405, §§ 19, 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-19. L. 67: p. 229, § 2. L. 69: p. 261, § 3. L. 75: (2) amended and (3) added, p. 558, § 6, effective January 1, 1976. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 781, § 4, effective July 1. L. 79: (2) amended, p. 604, § 1, effective June 19. L. 81: (3) repealed, p. 2025, § 14, effective July 14. L. 85: (2) amended, p. 569, § 1, effective November 14, 1986. L. 86: (2) amended, p. 674, § 1, effective November 14. L. 93, 1st Ex. Sess.: (2) amended, p. 33, § 1, effective September 13. L. 97: (2) amended, p. 939, § 2, effective July 1, 1998. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 71, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 143, § 8, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2)(d) amended, p. 1527, § 11, effective May 31.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 This section was intended to be an exception to the county seat requirement in § 13-1-116 and authorizes district judges assigned to Arapahoe county to sit at a single location anywhere in that county. City of Littleton v. County Comm'rs, 787 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1990).

 This statute is irreconcilable with § 13-5-101; however, under rules of statutory construction subsection (2) controls since it was enacted later. City of Littleton v. County Comm'rs, 787 P.2d 158 (Colo. 1990).

13-5-120. Nineteenth district.

Statute text

(1) The nineteenth judicial district shall be composed of the county of Weld.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the nineteenth judicial district shall be four.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2002, the number of judges for the nineteenth judicial district shall be five.

(c) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2003, the number of judges for the nineteenth judicial district shall be six.

(d) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the nineteenth judicial district shall be seven.

(e) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of judges for the nineteenth judicial district shall be eight.

(f) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of judges for the nineteenth judicial district shall be nine.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 402, § 20. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-20. L. 68: p. 48, § 1. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 558, § 7, effective July 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 143, § 9, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1528, § 12, effective May 31.

13-5-121. Twentieth district.

Statute text

(1) The twentieth judicial district shall be composed of the county of Boulder.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the twentieth judicial district shall be six.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2003, the number of judges for the twentieth judicial district shall be seven.

(c) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2004, the number of judges for the twentieth judicial district shall be eight.

(d) Subject to available appropriations, effective June 30, 2010, the number of judges for the twentieth judicial district shall be nine.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 402, § 21. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-21. L. 69: p. 262, § 1. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 782, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 144, § 10, effective July 1. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1528, § 13, effective May 31.

13-5-122. Twenty-first district.

Statute text

(1) The twenty-first judicial district shall be composed of the county of Mesa.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the twenty-first judicial district shall be four.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the twenty-first judicial district shall be five.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 402, § 22. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-22. L. 77: (2) amended, p. 782, § 6, effective July 1. L. 89, 1st Ex. Sess.: (2) amended, p. 16, § 3, effective January 1, 1991. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1528, § 14, effective May 31.

13-5-123. Twenty-second district.

Statute text

(1) The twenty-second judicial district shall be composed of the counties of Dolores and Montezuma.

(2) (a) The number of judges for the twenty-second judicial district shall be one.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2007, the number of judges for the twenty-second judicial district shall be two.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 402, § 23. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-23. L. 2007: (2) amended, p. 1529, § 15, effective May 31.

13-5-124. Appointment of clerk and employees.

Statute text

District court personnel shall be appointed pursuant to the provisions of section 13-3-105.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 403, § 27. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-27. L. 69: p. 249, § 5. L. 79: Entire section R&RE, p. 598, § 11, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For note, "One Year Review of Constitutional Law", see 41 Den. L. Ctr. J. 77 (1964). For article, "Colorado's New Court System", see 41 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1964).

13-5-125. Clerks to keep records.

Statute text

The clerks of district courts shall keep the financial records prescribed by the state court administrator under the provisions of section 13-3-106.

History

 Source: L. 67: p. 454, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-30. L. 73: p. 1402, § 29.

13-5-126. Duties of bailiff.

Statute text

It is the duty of every bailiff to preserve order in the court to which he may be appointed; to attend upon the jury; to open and close the court; and to perform such other duties as may be required of him by the judge of the court.

History

 Source: L. 67: p. 454, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-31.

13-5-127. Duties of reporters.

Statute text

The shorthand reporter, on the direction of the court, shall take down in shorthand all the testimony, rulings of the court, exceptions taken, oral instructions given, and other proceedings had during the trial of any cause, and in such causes as the court may designate.

History

 Source: L. 67: p. 454, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-32.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Annotator's note. Since § 13-5-127 is similar to repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 91, a relevant case construing those provisions has been included in the annotations to this section.

 From whom a defendant can obtain the testimony for his bill of exceptions. The defendant had the right to assume that he would obtain the testimony from the stenographer for his bill of exceptions. He was not called upon to make any other arrangements nor to anticipate that he would be called upon to procure that testimony from any other source, nor compelled to depend upon the uncertain memory of those present as to what the testimony was. King v. People, 54 Colo. 122, 129 P. 235 (1912)(special concurring opinion by J. Musser).

 It has been the invariable custom for district judges to appoint stenographers for their respective districts to appear at every criminal trial, and under the court's direction, take down the testimony and other matters, and when a defendant wanted a bill of exceptions, containing all of the testimony in a case, if desired, it has been the custom invariably to obtain it from the stenographer. King v. People, 54 Colo. 122, 129 P. 235 (1912)(special concurring opinion by J. Musser).

 Court of record has an affirmative duty to contemporaneously record all proceedings. Reconstruction of the record at a later time is not an adequate substitute for a contemporaneous record. Jones v. District Court, 780 P.2d 526 (Colo. 1989).

13-5-128. Compensation of reporter.

Statute text

The shorthand reporter of a court of record shall be compensated for preparation of the original and any copies of the typewritten transcript of his shorthand notes at such rates as from time to time may be established and promulgated by the supreme court of the state of Colorado. Where, in a court of record, no shorthand reporter is employed and trial transcripts are prepared by other court personnel, such personnel shall be similarly compensated for any transcript preparation required to be accomplished in other than normal working hours.

History

 Source: L. 67: p. 455, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-33. L. 69: p. 1085, § 1. L. 73: p. 494, § 1. L. 79: Entire section R&RE, p. 605, § 1, effective May 22.

13-5-129. Reporters' expenses. (Repealed)

History

 Source: L. 67: p. 455, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-34. L. 69: p. 249, § 6. L. 79: Entire section repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1.

13-5-130. Reporters to file verified statements. (Repealed)

History

 Source: L. 67: p. 455, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-35. L. 72: p. 591, § 58. L. 79: Entire section repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1.

13-5-131. Multiple-judge districts.

Statute text

In any district court composed of more than one judge, each of the judges shall sit separately for the trial of causes and the transaction of business and shall have and exercise all the powers and functions, as well in vacation of court as in term time, which he might have and exercise if he were the sole judge of said court.

History

 Source: L. 67: p. 456, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-38.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Expediting Court Procedure", see 10 Dicta 113 (1933).

 Annotator's note. Since § 13-5-131 is similar to repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 107, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

 This section is constitutional. Jordan v. People, 19 Colo. 417, 36 P. 218 (1894).

 Intent of section is to empower each district court judge to rule on matters challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty and procedures for qualifying a jury for a death penalty case only when sitting separately. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).

 District court has no authority to set motions challenging constitutionality of death penalty and procedures for qualifying a jury for a death penalty case for a hearing or for determination by a multi-judge panel. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).

 Each of the judges herein provided for is authorized to exercise the powers of a district court. Jordan v. People, 19 Colo. 417, 36 P. 218 (1894).

 Each judge must exercise all the powers and functions of the court. In the trial of causes, and in the hearing and determination of any matter of purely judicial cognizance pending in the district court, each judge must sit and act alone. He must exercise all the powers and functions of the court and assume the full responsibility in the decision of each and every cause, demurrer, motion, and the like, coming before him for adjudication, as if he were the sole judge of said court. Two or more judges, by sitting together, cannot share or divide such responsibility. They cannot thus jointly hear and determine, and render a valid and binding judgment or order in any cause. People ex rel. Rucker v. District Court, 14 Colo. 396, 24 P. 260 (1890).

 Purposes set forth in § 13-5-133 (3) do not include the hearing or determination of motions or the making of decisions, orders, decrees, or judgments in criminal or civil cases filed in the district court. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).

13-5-132. Powers of judges sitting separately.

Statute text

Each court held by the several judges, while sitting separately, shall be known as the district court in and for the county where such court is held and shall have the same power to vacate or modify its own judgments, decrees, or orders rendered or made while so held as if the said court were composed of a single judge.

History

 Source: L. 67: p. 456, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-39.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Expediting Court Procedure", see 10 Dicta 113 (1933). For article, "Supplementary Rules to Rules of the District Court", see 17 Dicta 107 (1940).

 Section has same meaning as its predecessor statute and therefore the same interpretation for them is adopted. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).

 This section relates to the powers of the several district judges sitting as the district court of a county. Lenich v. Lenich, 138 Colo. 251, 331 P.2d 498 (1958) (decided under repealed § 37-4-18, CRS 53).

 Intent of section is to empower each district court judge to rule on matters challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty and procedures for qualifying a jury for a death penalty case only when sitting separately. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).

 District court has no authority to set motions challenging constitutionality of death penalty and procedures for qualifying a jury for a death penalty case for a hearing or for determination by a multi-judge panel. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).

 A second judge may correct error of a judge no longer on the bench. It makes little sense to hold that if a palpable error were committed by one judge in refusing the continuance, it cannot be corrected by a second judge since the judge first presiding is no longer on the bench. Sunshine v. Robinson, 168 Colo. 409, 451 P.2d 757 (1969).

 Purposes set forth in § 13-5-133 (3) do not include the hearing or determination of motions or the making of decisions, orders, decrees, or judgments in criminal or civil cases filed in the district court. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).

 Applied in K-R Funds, Inc. v. Fox, 640 P.2d 257 (Colo. App. 1981).

13-5-133. Judges may sit en banc - purpose - rules.

Statute text

(1) In any district court composed of more than one judge, the judges may sit en banc at such times as they may determine, for the purpose of making rules of court, the appointment of a clerk and other employees, subject to the provisions of section 13-3-105, and other ministerial duties, subject to the administrative powers delegated to the chief judge by the chief justice of the supreme court pursuant to section 5 (4) of article VI of the state constitution.

(2) Subject to the approval of the chief justice of the supreme court, a district court sitting en banc may make rules:

(a) To facilitate the transaction of business in the courts held by the judges sitting separately; and

(b) To provide for the classification, arrangement, and distribution of the business of the court among the several judges thereof.

(3) Judges of a district court in districts having more than one judge may sit en banc only for the purposes enumerated in this section, and the court so sitting en banc shall have no power to review any order, decision, or proceeding of the court held by any judge sitting separately.

History

 Source: L. 67: p. 456, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-40. L. 69: p. 250, § 9.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Expediting Court Procedure", see 10 Dicta 113 (1933).

 Section has same meaning as its predecessor statute and therefore the same interpretation for them is adopted. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).

 Intent of section is to empower each district court judge to rule on matters challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty and procedures for qualifying a jury for a death penalty case only when sitting separately. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).

 District court has no authority to set motions challenging constitutionality of death penalty and procedures for qualifying a jury for a death penalty case for a hearing or for a determination by a multi-judge panel. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).

 In this state two or more district judges cannot lawfully sit and act together as a district court except as they sit en banc for the purposes specified in this section. People ex rel. Rucker v. District Court, 14 Colo. 396, 24 P. 260 (1890) (decided under repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 109).

 Purposes set forth in subsection (3) do not include the hearing or determination of motions or the making of decisions, orders, decrees, or judgments in criminal or civil cases filed in the district court. Tolerton v. District Court, 625 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1981).

13-5-134. Juries.

Statute text

Jurors may be summoned and empaneled for each of the judges sitting separately as though each were the sole court.

History

 Source: L. 67: p. 457, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-41. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 476, § 1, effective February 6.

13-5-135. Time limit on judgment.

Statute text

Every motion, issue, or other matter arising in any cause pending or to be brought in any district court of this state, and which is submitted to any such court for judgment or decision thereof, shall be determined by the court within ninety days after the adjournment of court. This section shall not be so construed as to prohibit a decision after the expiration of the time limited, but only as working a forfeiture as provided in section 13-5-136.

History

 Source: L. 67: p. 457, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-42.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Neither this section nor § 13-5-136 is an authority for the entry of a judgment in vacation or at chambers. A judgment appearing upon the records of the district court of one county, but which by the same record appears to have been rendered by the judge while at his chambers, in a different county, will be reversed on appeal. Scott v. Stutheit, 21 Colo. App. 28, 121 P. 151 (1912).

 This section does not divest jurisdiction or affect the validity of a judgment. Neither the statute nor the constitution in any way divests the trial court of jurisdiction to render a decision or affects the validity of the judgment rendered solely because of the lengthy delay between trial and judgment. Uptime Corp. v. Colo. Research Corp., 161 Colo. 87, 420 P.2d 232 (1966).

 The bare fact of the delay is not sufficient to warrant reversal of the judgment. Since no transcript of the evidence has been presented to this court, it appears that the findings of fact and conclusions of law are fully supported by the evidence. Uptime Corp. v. Colo. Research Corp., 161 Colo. 87, 420 P.2d 232 (1966).

13-5-136. Forfeit of salary.

Statute text

(1) If any judge of any district court, to whom any motion, issue, or other matter, arising in any cause, is submitted for judgment or decision, fails or neglects to decide or give judgment upon the same within the time limited by section 13-5-135, such judge shall not receive from the state treasury any salary for the quarter in which such failure occurred, when the following requirements are satisfied:

(a) The party aggrieved by the failure of such judge to rule in a timely manner files a complaint demanding the withholding of the salary of such judge with the commission on judicial discipline established in section 23 (3) of article VI of the state constitution;

(b) The commission on judicial discipline, in accordance with rule 4 of the Colorado rules of judicial discipline, investigates the judge's alleged violation of section 13-5-135;

(c) After such investigation the commission on judicial discipline, in accordance with rule 4 of the Colorado rules of judicial discipline, makes a recommendation concerning the allegation to the Colorado supreme court; and

(d) If deemed appropriate, the Colorado supreme court issues an order directing the department of the treasury to withhold the judge's salary.

(2) This section shall not apply in case of the sickness or death of a judge.

History

 Source: L. 67: p. 457, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-12-43. L. 2000: Entire section amended, p. 153, § 1, effective March 17.

13-5-137. Judges seeking retention in office. (Repealed)

History

 Source: L. 79: Entire section added, p, 606, § 1, effective April 25; entire section repealed, p. 606, § 1, effective June 30, 1980.

13-5-138. Appeals to district court.

Statute text

If a statute provides for review of the acts of any court, board, commission, or officer by certiorari or other writ and if no time within which review may be sought is provided by statute, a petition to review such acts shall be filed in the district court not later than thirty days from the final action taken by said court, board, commission, or officer.

History

 Source: L. 81: Entire section added, p. 877, § 1, effective April 24.

13-5-139. Transfer of information from orders for child support and maintenance to child support enforcement agency - payment of support and maintenance.

Statute text

(1) On and after July 1, 1991, and contingent upon the executive director of the department of human services notifying the state court administrator that a particular county or judicial district is ready to implement and participate in the family support registry created in section 26-13-114, C.R.S., the clerk of the court of every judicial district in the state shall transfer the information described in section 26-13-114 (7), C.R.S., to the delegate child support enforcement unit within five working days after entry or modification of a court order or filing of an administrative order in any IV-D case, as defined in section 26-13-102.5 (2), C.R.S.

(2) to (4) Repealed.

History

 Source: L. 85: Entire section added, p. 588, § 3, effective July 1. L. 87: (1) amended, p. 591, § 12, effective July 10. L. 88: (4) amended, p. 635, § 15, effective July 1. L. 90: (1) amended and (2) to (4) repealed, pp. 1412, 1416, §§ 6, 17, effective June 8. L. 94: (1) amended, p. 2640, § 87, effective July 1.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1994 act amending subsection (1), see section 1 of chapter 345, Session Laws of Colorado 1994.

13-5-140. Transfer of certain registry functions - cooperation between departments.

Statute text

The judicial department and the department of human services shall cooperate in the transfer of the functions relating to the collection of child support from the courts to the child support enforcement agency specified in article 13 of title 26, C.R.S. In order to implement such transfer, which shall be completed on or after July 1, 1991, and upon notification to the state court administrator by the executive director of the department of human services that a particular county or judicial district is ready to implement and participate in the family support registry, the judicial department shall transfer to the state child support enforcement agency all necessary data, computer programs, technical written material, and budgetary information and shall provide such technical assistance as may be required. The judicial department shall retain payment records relating to child support orders until the executive director of the department of human services notifies the state court administrator that retention of the records is no longer necessary.

History

 Source: L. 85: Entire section added, p. 588, § 3, effective July 1. L. 88: Entire section amended, p. 636, § 16, effective July 1. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 1412, § 7, effective June 8. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 2640, § 88, effective July 1.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1994 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 345, Session Laws of Colorado 1994.

13-5-141. Compilation - sentences received upon conviction of felony.

Statute text

(1) The state court administrator's office shall, by March 1 and by September 1 of each year, prepare and make available to the public at each district court, for a reasonable charge, a compilation of the sentences imposed in felony cases by each judge in each district court. Such compilation shall include:

(a) The name of each judge;

(b) The name of each offender and a description of the crime for which he was convicted;

(c) The sentence imposed by each such judge for each such felony case; and

(d) A statement that complete information concerning aggravating and mitigating factors, plea and sentence concessions, and other sentencing considerations is available in the court file. As soon as practical, such information shall be included in the compilation.

History

 Source: L. 87: Entire section added, p. 542, § 1, effective July 1.

13-5-142. National instant criminal background check system - reporting.

Statute text

(1) Beginning July 1, 2002, the clerk of the court of every judicial district in the state shall periodically report the following information to the national instant criminal background check system created by the federal "Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act" (Pub.L. 103-159), the relevant portion of which is codified at 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (t):

(a) The name of each person who has been found to be incapacitated by order of the court pursuant to part 3 of article 14 of title 15, C.R.S.;

(b) The name of each person who has been committed by order of the court to the custody of the unit in the department of human services that administers behavioral health programs and services, including those related to mental health and substance abuse, pursuant to section 27-81-112 or 27-82-108, C.R.S.; and

(c) The name of each person with respect to whom the court has entered an order for involuntary certification for short-term treatment of mental illness pursuant to section 27-65-107, C.R.S., for extended certification for treatment of mental illness pursuant to section 27-65-108, C.R.S., or for long-term care and treatment of mental illness pursuant to section 27-65-109, C.R.S.

(2) Any report made by the clerk of the court of every judicial district in the state pursuant to this section shall describe the reason for the report and indicate that the report is made in accordance with 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (g) (4).

(3) The clerk of the court of every judicial district in the state shall take all necessary steps to cancel a record made by that clerk in the national instant criminal background check system if:

(a) The person to whom the record pertains makes a written request to the clerk; and

(b) No less than three years before the date of the written request:

(I) The court entered an order pursuant to section 15-14-318, C.R.S., terminating a guardianship on a finding that the person is no longer an incapacitated person, if the record in the national instant criminal background check system is based on a finding of incapacity;

(II) The period of commitment of the most recent order of commitment or recommitment expired, or the court entered an order terminating the person's incapacity or discharging the person from commitment in the nature of habeas corpus, if the record in the national instant criminal background check system is based on an order of commitment to the custody of the unit in the department of human services that administers behavioral health programs and services, including those related to mental health and substance abuse; except that the clerk shall not cancel any record pertaining to a person with respect to whom two recommitment orders have been entered under section 27-81-112 (7) and (8), C.R.S., or who was discharged from treatment under section 27-81-112 (11), C.R.S., on the grounds that further treatment will not be likely to bring about significant improvement in the person's condition; or

(III) The record in the case was sealed pursuant to section 27-65-107 (7), C.R.S., or the court entered an order discharging the person from commitment in the nature of habeas corpus pursuant to section 27-65-113, C.R.S., if the record in the national instant criminal background check system is based on a court order for involuntary certification for short-term treatment of mental illness.

History

 Source: L. 2002: Entire section added, p. 753, § 1, effective January 1, 2003. L. 2010: (1)(b), (1)(c), (3)(b)(II), and (3)(b)(III) amended, (SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 780, § 15, effective April 29.

13-5-143. Judge as party to a case - recusal of judge upon motion.

Statute text

(1) If a judge or former judge of a district court is a party in his or her individual and private capacity in a case that is to be tried within any district court in the same judicial district in which the judge or former judge is or was a judge of a district court, any party to the case may file a timely motion requesting that the judge who is appointed to preside over the case recuse himself or herself from the case.

(2) If a district court receives a motion filed by a party pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the judge who is appointed to preside over the case shall recuse himself or herself if he or she is a judge of a district court in the same judicial district in which the judge or former judge who is a party to the case in his or her individual and private capacity is or was a judge of a district court.

(3) If a judge recuses himself or herself pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the chief justice of the Colorado supreme court or his or her designee shall appoint a judge from outside the judicial district to preside over the case.

(4) The provisions of this section shall not apply to a water judge or referee when he or she is acting within his or her exclusive jurisdiction over water matters pursuant to section 37-92-203, C.R.S.

History

 Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 435, § 1, effective August 5.

13-5-144. Chief judge - veterans treatment court authority.

Statute text

The chief judge of a judicial district may establish an appropriate program for the treatment of veterans and members of the military.

History

 Source: L. 2010: Entire section added, (HB 10-1104), ch. 139, p. 465, § 3, effective April 16.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act adding this section, see section 1 of chapter 139, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.

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PART 2
DISTRICT COURT MAGISTRATES

13-5-201. District court magistrates.

Statute text

(1) District court magistrates may be appointed, subject to available appropriations, pursuant to section 13-3-105, if approved by the chief justice of the supreme court.

(2) A district court magistrate shall be a qualified attorney-at-law admitted to practice in this state and in good standing. Nothing in this part 2 shall affect the qualifications of water referees appointed pursuant to section 37-92-203 (6), C.R.S.

(2.5) District court magistrates shall have the power to solemnize marriages pursuant to the procedures in section 14-2-109, C.R.S.

(3) District court magistrates may hear such matters as are determined by rule of the supreme court, subject to the provision that no magistrate may preside in any trial by jury.

(3.5) District court magistrates shall have the power to preside over matters specified in section 13-17.5-105.

(4) For purposes of this part 2, the Denver probate court shall be regarded as a district court.

History

 Source: L. 83: Entire part added, p. 600, § 1, effective May 20. L. 89: (2.5) added, p. 781, § 2, effective April 4. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 354, § 2, effective April 9. L. 93: (2) amended, p. 1774, § 30, effective June 6. L. 95: (3.5) added, p. 480, § 2, effective July 1.

Annotations

 Cross references: For magistrates in the small claims division of county courts, see § 13-6-405; for magistrates in county courts, see part 5 of article 6 of this title.

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PART 3
FAMILY LAW MAGISTRATES

13-5-301 to 13-5-305. (Repealed)

History

 Source: L. 2004: Entire part repealed, p. 224, § 1, effective July 1.

Annotations

 Editor's note: This part 3 was added in 1985. For amendments to this part 3 prior to its repeal in 2004, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.

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ARTICLE 5.5
COMMISSIONS ON JUDICIAL
 PERFORMANCE


Section

13-5.5-101. Legislative declaration.

13-5.5-101.5. Office of judicial performance evaluation.

13-5.5-102. State commission on judicial performance - repeal.

13-5.5-103. Powers and duties of the state commission.

13-5.5-104. District commission on judicial performance.

13-5.5-105. Powers and duties of district commissions.

13-5.5-105.5. Judicial performance criteria.

13-5.5-106. Evaluation in retention election years.

13-5.5-106.3. Interim evaluations.

13-5.5-106.4. Recusal.

13-5.5-106.5. Confidentiality.

13-5.5-107. Acceptance of private or federal grants - general appropriations.

13-5.5-108. Implementation of article. (Repealed)

13-5.5-109. Repeal of article.

13-5.5-101. Legislative declaration.

Statute text

(1) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that it is in the public interest to establish a system of evaluating judicial performance to provide persons voting on the retention of justices and judges with fair, responsible, and constructive information about judicial performance and to provide justices and judges with useful information concerning their own performances. The general assembly further finds and declares that the evaluation of judicial performance should be conducted statewide and within each judicial district using uniform criteria and procedures pursuant to the provisions of this article.

(2) The general assembly further finds and declares that it is in the public interest to establish an office of judicial performance evaluation within the judicial department of the state to implement the provisions of this article.

History

 Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 596, § 1, effective May 12. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 1647, § 1, effective June 5. L. 2008: Entire section amended, p. 1271, § 1, effective July 1.

13-5.5-101.5. Office of judicial performance evaluation.

Statute text

(1) There is hereby established in the judicial department the office of judicial performance evaluation, referred to in this article as the "office". The state commission on judicial performance established pursuant to section 13-5.5-102 shall oversee the office.

(2) The state commission shall appoint an executive director of the office who shall serve at the pleasure of the state commission. The compensation of the executive director shall be the same as the general assembly establishes for a judge of the district court. The compensation paid to the executive director shall not be reduced during the time that a person serves as executive director. The executive director shall hire additional staff for the office as necessary and as approved by the state commission.

(3) Subject to the supervision of the state commission, the office shall:

(a) Staff the state and district commissions when directed to do so by the state commission;

(b) Train members of the state and district commissions;

(c) Collect and disseminate data on judicial performance evaluations;

(d) Conduct public education efforts concerning the judicial performance evaluation process and retention recommendations of the state and district commissions;

(e) Measure public awareness of the judicial performance evaluation process through regular polling; and

(f) Complete other duties as assigned by the state commission.

(4) Expenses of the office shall be paid for from the state commission on judicial performance cash fund created pursuant to section 13-5.5-107.

History

 Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 1271, § 2, effective July 1.

13-5.5-102. State commission on judicial performance - repeal.

Statute text

(1) (a) (I) (A) There is hereby established the state commission on judicial performance, referred to in this article as the "state commission". The state commission shall consist of ten members. The speaker of the house of representatives and the president of the senate shall each appoint one attorney and one nonattorney. The governor and the chief justice of the supreme court shall each appoint one attorney and two nonattorneys.

(B) For purposes of this subsection (1), "attorney" means a person admitted to practice law before the courts of this state.

(II) (A) All members of the state commission shall serve terms of four years. The term of each member of the state commission shall expire on November 30 of an odd-numbered year, and the term of a member appointed to replace a member at the end of the member's term shall commence on December 1 of the year in which the previous member's term expires.

(B) The term of each member serving as of January 1, 2009, shall be extended until November 30 of the odd-numbered year following the completion of that member's term. This sub-subparagraph (B) is repealed, effective July 1, 2014.

(b) (I) Any vacancy on the state commission shall be filled by the original appointing authority, but a member shall not serve more than two full terms plus any balance remaining on an unexpired term if the initial appointment was to fill a vacancy. Within five days after a vacancy arises on the state commission, the state commission shall notify the appointing authority of the vacancy, and the appointing authority shall make an appointment within forty-five days after the date of the vacancy. If the original appointing authority fails to make the appointment within forty-five days after the date of the vacancy, the state commission shall make the appointment.

(II) Justices and judges actively performing judicial duties may not be appointed to serve on the state commission. Former justices and judges are eligible to be appointed as attorney members; except that a former justice or judge may not be assigned or appointed to perform judicial duties while serving on the state commission.

(c) The chair of the state commission shall be elected by its members every two years.

(2) Members and employees of the state commission shall be immune from suit in any action, civil or criminal, based upon official acts performed in good faith as members of the state commission.

(3) A member of the state commission shall recuse himself or herself from any evaluation of the person who appointed the member to the commission.

History

 Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 596, § 1, effective May 12. L. 93: (1)(a) and (1)(b) amended, p. 658, § 1, effective April 30. L. 97: (1)(a) and (1)(b) amended, p. 1647, § 2, effective June 5. L. 2008: (1)(a) and (1)(b) amended and (3) added, p. 1272, § 3, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Effect of 1997 amendment was to establish that terms of all members expire on November 30 of even-numbered years. Romanoff v. State Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 126 P.3d 182 (Colo. 2006).

 A member may serve past the expiration of the member's term until a successor is appointed. Romanoff v. State Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 126 P.3d 182 (Colo. 2006).

 Original appointing official may not appoint a successor more than 45 days after the expiration of a member's term. The state commission is authorized to appoint a successor when the original appointing official fails to make the appointment within 45 days after the expiration of a member's term. Romanoff v. State Comm'n on Judicial Performance, 126 P.3d 182 (Colo. 2006).

13-5.5-103. Powers and duties of the state commission.

Statute text

(1) In addition to other powers conferred and duties imposed upon the state commission by this article, the state commission has the following powers and duties:

(a) To appoint and supervise a person to serve as the executive director of the office of judicial performance evaluation;

(b) To assist the executive director in managing the office and providing fiscal oversight of the operating budget of the office;

(c) To develop uniform procedures and techniques for evaluating district and county judges, justices of the Colorado supreme court, and judges of the court of appeals based on performance criteria provided in section 13-5.5-105.5;

(d) To develop guidelines and procedures for the continuous collection of data for use in the evaluation process;

(e) To develop surveys for persons affected by justices and judges, including but not limited to attorneys, jurors, litigants, law enforcement personnel, attorneys within the district attorneys' and public defender's offices, employees of the court, court interpreters, employees of probation offices, employees of local departments of social services, and victims of crimes, as defined in section 24-4.1-302 (5), C.R.S.;

(f) To determine the statistical validity of completed surveys, report to the district commissions on the statistical validity of the surveys for their districts, and specify when and how statistically invalid surveys may be used;

(g) To prepare alternatives to surveys where sample populations are inadequate to produce valid results;

(h) To produce and distribute narratives and survey reports;

(i) To review case management data and statistics for individual appellate justices and judges provided by the state court administrator;

(j) To review written judicial opinions;

(k) To collect information from direct courtroom observation;

(l) To interview justices and appellate judges and other persons and accept information and documentation from interested persons;

(m) To draft narratives that reflect the results of judicial performance evaluations of justices and appellate judges;

(n) To distribute to the public narratives that reflect the results of each judicial performance evaluation of each appellate justice or judge;

(o) (I) Subject to approval by the Colorado supreme court, to promulgate rules necessary to implement and effectuate the provisions of this article, including rules to be followed by the district commissions.

(II) Prior to the final promulgation of any rule pursuant to this paragraph (o), the state commission shall post a notice of the proposed rule, allow for a period for public comment, and give the public an opportunity to address the commission concerning the proposed rule at a public hearing.

(III) The state commission may adopt rules or standards that provide guidance to members of the state commission or members of district commissions regarding the review or interpretation of information obtained as a result of the evaluation process and the criteria contained in section 13-5.5-105.5. Any such rules or standards shall:

(A) Be consistent with paragraphs (e), (f), and (g) of this subsection (1), in that the rules or standards and the application thereof shall take into consideration the statistical reliability of survey data; and

(B) Not divest any member of the state commission or a district commission of his or her ultimate authority to decide whether to vote for or against recommending retention of a justice or judge and be consistent with subsection (2) of this section and section 13-5.5-105 (2).

(p) To develop procedures for the review of the deliberation procedures established by the district commissions. However, the state commission shall not have the power or duty to review actual determinations made by the district commissions.

(q) To gather and maintain statewide statistical data and post a statistical report of the statewide data on its web site no later than thirty days prior to each retention election. The statistical report shall specify:

(I) The total number of justices and judges who were eligible to stand for retention;

(II) The total number of evaluations of justices and judges performed by the state and district commissions;

(III) The total number of justices and judges who were evaluated but did not stand for retention; and

(IV) The total number of justices and judges recommended as "retain", "do not retain", or "no opinion", respectively.

(2) Unless recused pursuant to a provision of this article, each member of the state commission shall have the discretion to vote for or against retention of a justice or judge based upon his or her review of all information before the state commission.

History

 Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 597, § 1, effective May 12. L. 93: (1)(k) amended and (1)(l) added, p. 659, § 2, effective April 30. L. 97: (1)(g) repealed, p. 1482, § 39, effective June 3; (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(e), and (1)(i) amended and (1)(d.5) and (1)(m) added, p. 1648, § 3, effective June 5. L. 2008: Entire section R&RE, p. 1273, § 4, effective July 1.

13-5.5-104. District commission on judicial performance.

Statute text

(1) (a) (I) (A) There is hereby established in each judicial district a district commission on judicial performance, referred to in this article as the "district commission". The district commission shall consist of ten members. The speaker of the house of representatives and the president of the senate shall each appoint one attorney and one nonattorney. The governor and the chief justice of the supreme court shall each appoint one attorney and two nonattorneys.

(B) For purposes of this subsection (1), "attorney" means a person admitted to practice law before the courts of this state.

(II) All members of the district commission shall serve terms of four years. The term of each member of a district commission shall expire on November 30 of an odd-numbered year, and the term of any member appointed to replace a member at the end of the member's term shall commence on December 1 of the year when the previous member's term expires.

(III) The appointing authority may remove members of the district commissions for cause.

(b) (I) Any vacancy on the district commission shall be filled by the original appointing authority, but a member shall not serve more than two full terms plus any balance remaining on an unexpired term if the initial appointment was to fill a vacancy. Within five days after a vacancy arises on a district commission, the district commission shall notify the appointing authority and the state commission of the vacancy, and the appointing authority shall make an appointment within forty-five days after the date of the vacancy. If the original appointing authority fails to make the appointment within forty-five days after the date of the vacancy, the state commission shall make the appointment.

(II) Justices and judges actively performing judicial duties may not be appointed to serve on the district commission. Former justices and judges are eligible to be appointed as attorney members; except that a former justice or judge may not be assigned or appointed to perform judicial duties while serving on the district commission.

(c) The chair of the district commission shall be elected by its members every two years.

(2) The district administrator of each judicial district and his or her staff shall serve as the staff for the district commission.

(3) Members and employees of a district commission shall be immune from suit in any action, civil or criminal, based upon official acts performed in good faith as members of the district commission.

(4) A member of a district commission shall recuse himself or herself from an evaluation of the person who appointed the member to the commission.

History

 Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 598, § 1, effective May 12. L. 93: (1)(a) and (1)(b) amended, p. 659, § 3, effective April 30. L. 97: (1)(a) and (1)(b) amended, p. 1649, § 4, effective June 5. L. 2008: (1)(a), (1)(b), and (2) amended and (4) added, p. 1275, § 5, effective July 1.

13-5.5-105. Powers and duties of district commissions.

Statute text

(1) In addition to other powers conferred and duties imposed upon a district commission by this article, in conformity with the rules, guidelines, and procedures adopted by the state commission pursuant to section 13-5.5-103 (1) (f) and the state commission's review of the deliberation procedures pursuant to section 13-5.5-103 (1) (p), a district commission has the following powers and duties:

(a) To review case management statistics and data for individual district and county court judges provided by the state court administrator;

(b) To review written judicial opinions and orders of district and county court judges within the judicial district;

(c) To collect information from direct courtroom observation of district and county court judges within the judicial district;

(d) To interview district and county court judges and other persons and accept information and documentation from interested persons;

(e) To obtain information from parties and attorneys regarding district and county court judges' handling of domestic relations and family law cases with respect to the judges' fairness, patience with pro se parties, gender neutrality, and handling of emotional parties; and

(f) To draft narratives that reflect the results of judicial performance evaluations of district and county court judges.

(2) Unless recused pursuant to a provision of this article, each member of a district commission shall have the discretion to vote for or against retention of a district or county judge based upon his or her review of all information before the district commission.

(3) Upon completing its required recommendations and narratives, each district commission shall collect all documents and other information, including all copies, received regarding the justices or judges evaluated. Each district commission shall forward the documents and other information, including all copies, to the state commission within thirty days following submission of the district commission's recommendations and narratives to the state commission. The state commission shall adopt rules regarding retention of evaluation information, which shall be made available to district commissions for subsequent evaluations of the justices or judges.

History

 Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 598, § 1, effective May 12. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 660, § 4, effective April 30. L. 97: Entire section amended, p. 1650, § 5, effective June 5. L. 2008: Entire section R&RE, p. 1276, § 6, effective July 1.

13-5.5-105.5. Judicial performance criteria.

Statute text

(1) The state commission shall evaluate each justice of the Colorado supreme court and each judge of the Colorado court of appeals based on the following performance criteria:

(a) Integrity, including but not limited to whether:

(I) The justice or judge avoids impropriety or the appearance of impropriety;

(II) The justice or judge displays fairness and impartiality toward all participants; and

(III) The justice or judge avoids ex parte communications;

(b) Legal knowledge, including but not limited to whether:

(I) The justice's or judge's opinions are well-reasoned and demonstrate an understanding of substantive law and the relevant rules of procedure and evidence;

(II) The justice's or judge's opinions demonstrate attentiveness to factual and legal issues before the court; and

(III) The justice's or judge's opinions adhere to precedent or clearly explain the legal basis for departure from precedent;

(c) Communication skills, including but not limited to whether:

(I) The justice's or judge's opinions are clearly written and understandable; and

(II) The justice's or judge's questions or statements during oral arguments are clearly stated and understandable;

(d) Judicial temperament, including but not limited to whether:

(I) The justice or judge demonstrates courtesy toward attorneys, litigants, court staff, and others in the courtroom; and

(II) The justice or judge maintains appropriate decorum in the courtroom;

(e) Administrative performance, including but not limited to whether:

(I) The justice or judge demonstrates preparation for oral argument, attentiveness, and appropriate control over judicial proceedings;

(II) The justice or judge manages workload effectively;

(III) The justice or judge issues opinions in a timely manner and without unnecessary delay; and

(IV) The justice or judge participates in a proportionate share of the court's workload; and

(f) Service to the legal profession and the public by participating in service-oriented efforts designed to educate the public about the legal system and to improve the legal system.

(2) The district commissions shall evaluate district and county judges based on the following criteria:

(a) Integrity, including but not limited to whether:

(I) The judge avoids impropriety or the appearance of impropriety;

(II) The judge displays fairness and impartiality toward all participants; and

(III) The judge avoids ex parte communications;

(b) Legal knowledge, including but not limited to whether:

(I) The judge demonstrates an understanding of substantive law and relevant rules of procedure and evidence;

(II) The judge demonstrates awareness of and attentiveness to factual and legal issues before the court; and

(III) The judge appropriately applies statutes, judicial precedent, and other sources of legal authority;

(c) Communication skills, including but not limited to whether:

(I) The judge's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders are clearly written and understandable;

(II) The judge's oral presentations are clearly stated and understandable and the judge clearly explains all oral decisions; and

(III) The judge clearly presents information to the jury;

(d) Judicial temperament, including but not limited to whether:

(I) The judge demonstrates courtesy toward attorneys, litigants, court staff, and others in the courtroom;

(II) The judge maintains and requires order, punctuality, and decorum in the courtroom; and

(III) The judge demonstrates appropriate demeanor on the bench;

(e) Administrative performance, including but not limited to whether:

(I) The judge demonstrates preparation for all hearings and trials;

(II) The judge uses court time efficiently;

(III) The judge issues findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders without unnecessary delay;

(IV) The judge effectively manages cases;

(V) The judge takes responsibility for more than his or her own caseload and is willing to assist other judges; and

(VI) The judge understands and complies with directives of the Colorado supreme court; and

(f) Service to the legal profession and the public by participating in service-oriented efforts designed to educate the public about the legal system and to improve the legal system.

History

 Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 1277, § 7, effective July 1.

13-5.5-106. Evaluation in retention election years.

Statute text

(1) (a) (I) The state commission shall conduct an evaluation of each justice of the supreme court and each judge of the court of appeals whose term is to expire and who must stand for retention election. The evaluations shall be referred to in this subsection (1) as "retention year evaluations".

(II) Retention year evaluations shall be completed and the narrative prepared and communicated to the appellate justice or judge no later than forty-five days prior to the last day available for the appellate justice or judge to declare such justice's or judge's intent to stand for retention.

(III) Prior to the completion of the narratives for retention year evaluations, and following at least ten days' notice to the public and the appellate justices and judges, it is highly recommended that the state commission hold a public hearing regarding all appellate justices and judges who are subject to retention year evaluations. The state commission shall arrange to have the public hearing electronically recorded and shall make copies of the recording available to members of the public. The state commission shall supply a copy of the recording at no cost to any justice or judge who is the subject of the hearing.

(IV) The narrative prepared for a retention year evaluation shall include an assessment of the appellate justice's or judge's strengths and weaknesses with respect to the judicial performance criteria contained in section 13-5.5-105.5 (1), a discussion regarding any deficiency identified in the interim evaluation prepared pursuant to section 13-5.5-106.3, and a statement of whether the state commission concludes that any deficiency identified has been satisfactorily addressed by the justice or judge.

(V) Each appellate justice or judge who receives a retention year evaluation shall have the opportunity to meet with the state commission or otherwise respond to the evaluation no later than ten days following the justice's or judge's receipt of the evaluation. If the meeting is held or response is made, the state commission may revise its evaluation.

(b) After the requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) are met, the state commission shall make a recommendation regarding the retention of each appellate justice or judge who declares his or her intent to stand for retention, which recommendation shall be stated as "retain", "do not retain", or "no opinion". A "no opinion" recommendation shall be made only when the state commission concludes that results are not sufficiently clear to make a firm recommendation and shall be accompanied by a detailed explanation. The narrative shall include the number of commission members who voted for and against the recommendation.

(c) The state commission shall release the narrative, the recommendation, and any other relevant information related to a retention year evaluation to the public no later than forty-five days prior to the retention election. The state commission shall arrange to have the narrative and recommendation printed in the ballot information booklet prepared pursuant to section 1-40-124.5, C.R.S., and mailed to electors pursuant to section 1-40-125, C.R.S.

(2) (a) (I) The district commission shall conduct an evaluation of each district and county judge whose term is to expire and who must stand for retention election. The evaluations shall be referred to in this subsection (2) as "retention year evaluations".

(II) Retention year evaluations shall be completed and the narrative communicated to each judge no later than forty-five days prior to the last day available for the judge to declare the judge's intent to stand for retention.

(III) Prior to the completion of narratives for retention year evaluations, and following at least ten days' notice to the public and the district and county judges, it is highly recommended that the district commission conduct a public hearing regarding all district and county judges who are subject to retention year evaluations. The district commission shall arrange to have the public hearing electronically recorded and shall make copies of the recording available to members of the public. The district commission shall supply a copy of the recording at no cost to any judge who is the subject of the hearing.

(IV) The narrative prepared for a retention year evaluation shall include an assessment of the district or county judge's strengths and weaknesses with respect to the judicial performance criteria contained in section 13-5.5-105.5 (2), a discussion regarding any deficiency identified in the interim evaluation prepared pursuant to section 13-5.5-106.3, and a statement of whether the district commission concludes that any deficiency identified has been satisfactorily addressed by the judge.

(V) Each judge who receives a retention year evaluation shall have the opportunity to meet with the district commission or otherwise respond to the evaluation no later than ten days following the judge's receipt of the evaluation. If the meeting is held or response is made, the district commission may revise its evaluation.

(b) After the requirements of paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) are met, the district commission shall make a recommendation regarding the retention of each district or county judge who declares his or her intent to stand for retention, which recommendation shall be stated as "retain", "do not retain", or "no opinion". A "no opinion" recommendation shall be made only when the district commission concludes that results are not sufficiently clear to make a firm recommendation and shall be accompanied by a detailed explanation. The narrative shall include the number of commission members who voted for and against the recommendation.

(c) The state commission shall release the narrative, the recommendation, and any other relevant information to the public no later than forty-five days prior to the retention election. The state commission shall arrange to have a summary of the narrative and recommendation printed in the ballot information booklet prepared pursuant to section 1-40-124.5, C.R.S., and mailed to electors within the judicial district pursuant to section 1-40-125, C.R.S.

(3) Repealed.

History

 Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 598, § 1, effective May 12. L. 93: (1)(a), (1)(c), (2)(a), and (2)(c) amended, p. 660, § 5, effective April 30. L. 97: (1)(c) and (2)(c) amended and (3) added, p. 1650, § 6, effective June 5. L. 2008: (1) and (2) amended and (3) repealed, pp. 1280, 1282, §§ 8, 9, effective July 1.

13-5.5-106.3. Interim evaluations.

Statute text

(1) (a) During each full term of office of each Colorado supreme court justice and each judge of the court of appeals, the state commission shall conduct at least one interim evaluation of each justice and each judge. The evaluations shall be referred to in this subsection (1) as "interim evaluations".

(b) Interim evaluations shall be completed and communicated to the chief justice of the Colorado supreme court or the chief judge of the court of appeals and the appellate justice or judge being evaluated.

(c) Each appellate justice or judge who receives an interim evaluation shall have the opportunity to meet with the state commission or otherwise respond to the evaluation no later than ten days following the justice's or judge's receipt of the evaluation. If the meeting is held or response is made, the state commission may revise its evaluation.

(d) The state commission shall release the survey evaluations related to interim evaluations to the public simultaneously with, and no earlier than, the release of the retention year evaluations pursuant to section 13-5.5-106 (1) (c) prepared for that year.

(2) (a) During each full term of office of each district judge and county judge, the district commission shall conduct at least one interim evaluation of each district judge and county judge. The evaluations shall be referred to in this subsection (2) as "interim evaluations".

(b) Interim evaluations shall be completed and communicated to the chief judge of the district and to the district or county judge being evaluated.

(c) Each district or county judge who receives an interim evaluation shall have the opportunity to meet with the district commission or otherwise respond to the evaluation no later than ten days following the judge's receipt of the evaluation. If the meeting is held or response is made, the district commission may revise its evaluation.

(d) The state commission shall release the survey evaluations related to interim evaluations to the public simultaneously with, and no earlier than, the release of the retention year evaluations prepared for that year.

History

 Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 1282, § 10, effective July 1.

13-5.5-106.4. Recusal.

Statute text

(1) A member of the state commission or a district commission shall disclose to the commission any professional or personal relationship with a justice or judge that may affect an unbiased evaluation of the justice or judge, including involvement with any litigation involving the justice or judge and the member, the member's family, or the member's financial interests. The state commission or a district commission may require the recusal of one of its members on account of a relationship with a justice or judge upon a two-thirds vote of the other members of the commission.

(2) A member of the state commission or a district commission shall recuse himself or herself from participating in the consideration and vote on any matter involving the evaluation of a justice or judge for failure to meet the training, courtroom observation, interview, or opinion review responsibilities provided by rule, unless excused by a two-thirds vote of the other members of the commission.

(3) An attorney serving as a member of the state commission or a district commission shall not request that a justice or judge being evaluated by the commission be recused from hearing a case in which the attorney appears as counsel of record, or request permission to withdraw from a case pending before a justice or judge being evaluated, solely on the basis that the attorney is serving as a member of a commission.

(4) An attorney who appears in a matter where opposing counsel or a witness serves as a member of the state commission or a district commission that is evaluating the justice or judge before whom the matter is set may not seek withdrawal of the attorney, exclusion of the witness, or recusal of the justice or judge solely on the basis that the opposing counsel or witness is serving as a member of a commission.

(5) A justice or judge being evaluated by the state commission or a district commission may not recuse himself or herself from a case solely on the basis that an attorney, party, or witness is a member of the commission, nor should a justice or judge grant an attorney's request to withdraw from a case, solely on the basis that the attorney, party, or witness is serving as a member of a commission.

History

 Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 1283, § 10, effective July 1.

13-5.5-106.5. Confidentiality.

Statute text

(1) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, all comments in survey reports, self-evaluations, personal information protected under section 24-72-204 (3) (a) (II), C.R.S., additional oral or written information, content of improvement plans, and any matter discussed in executive session shall remain confidential except as otherwise specifically provided by rule. Comments in survey reports may be summarized for use in a narrative. A member of a commission shall not publicly discuss the evaluation of any particular justice or judge.

(2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, all recommendations, narratives, and survey reports are confidential until released to the public on the first day following the deadline for justices and judges to declare their intent to stand for retention. Any comments included in the report shall be made available only to members of the commissions, the justice or judge being evaluated, and the chief justice or chief judge.

(3) Information required to be kept confidential pursuant to this article may be released only under the following circumstances:

(a) To the supreme court attorney regulation committee, as provided by rule of the state commission;

(b) To the commission on judicial discipline, as provided by rule of the state commission; or

(c) With the consent of the justice or judge being evaluated.

History

 Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 1284, § 10, effective July 1.

13-5.5-107. Acceptance of private or federal grants - general appropriations.

Statute text

(1) The state commission is authorized to accept any grants of federal or private funds made available for any purpose consistent with the provisions of this article. Any funds received pursuant to this section shall be transmitted to the state treasurer, who shall credit the same to the state commission on judicial performance cash fund, which is hereby created and referred to in this section as the "fund". The fund shall also include the amount of the increases in docket fees collected pursuant to sections 13-32-105 (1) and 42-4-1710 (4) (a), C.R.S. Any interest derived from the deposit and investment of moneys in the fund shall be credited to the fund. Any unexpended and unencumbered moneys remaining in the fund at the end of any fiscal year shall remain in the fund and shall not be credited or transferred to the general fund or another fund. Moneys in the fund may be expended by the state commission, subject to annual appropriation by the general assembly, for the purposes of this article. In addition, the general assembly may make annual appropriations from the general fund for the purposes of this article.

(2) Notwithstanding any provision of subsection (1) of this section to the contrary, on April 20, 2009, the state treasurer shall deduct nine hundred thousand dollars from the fund and transfer such sum to the general fund.

History

 Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 598, § 1, effective May 12. L. 99: Entire section amended, p. 167, § 2, effective March 25. L. 2003: Entire section amended, p. 2672, § 3, effective June 6. L. 2009: Entire section amended, (SB 09-208), ch. 149, p. 620, § 9, effective April 20.

13-5.5-108. Implementation of article. (Repealed)

History

 Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 599, § 1, effective May 12. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 860, § 1, effective May 23. L. 2008: Entire section repealed, p. 1284, § 11, effective July 1.

13-5.5-109. Repeal of article.

Statute text

(1) This article is repealed, effective June 30, 2019.

(2) Repealed.

History

 Source: L. 88: Entire article added, p. 600, § 1, effective May 12. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 661, § 6, effective April 30. L. 97: (2) repealed, p. 1482, § 40, effective June 3. L. 99: (1) amended, p. 167, § 1, effective March 25. L. 2008: (1) amended, p. 1284, § 12, effective July 1.

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ARTICLE 6
COUNTY COURTS

Annotations

 Cross references: For the power of the general assembly to provide simplified procedures in county courts for the trial of misdemeanors, see § 21 of art. VI, Colo. Const.


Section


PART 1 ESTABLISHMENT AND JURISDICTION 

13-6-101. Establishment.

13-6-102. Court of record.

13-6-103. Statewide jurisdiction.

13-6-104. Original civil jurisdiction.

13-6-105. Specific limits on civil jurisdiction.

13-6-106. Original criminal jurisdiction.

13-6-107. Restraining orders to prevent emotional abuse of the elderly. (Repealed)


PART 2 JUDGES AND OTHER PERSONNEL 

13-6-201. Classification of counties.

13-6-202. Number of judges.

13-6-203. Qualifications of judges.

13-6-204. Activities of judges.

13-6-205. Term and appointment of judges.

13-6-206. Vacancies.

13-6-207. Bond. (Repealed)

13-6-208. Special associate, associate, and assistant county judges.

13-6-209. Special associate and associate county judges - designated counties.

13-6-210. Assistant county judges - designated counties. (Repealed)

13-6-211. Appointment of clerk.

13-6-212. Duties of clerk.

13-6-213. Bond of clerk. (Repealed)

13-6-214. Other employees.

13-6-215. Presiding judges.

13-6-216. Judges to sit separately.

13-6-217. Judges may sit en banc.

13-6-218. Assignment of county judges and retired county judges to other courts authorized.

13-6-219. Judge as party to a case - recusal of judge upon motion.


PART 3 GENERAL PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS 

13-6-301. Court rules.

13-6-302. Terms of court.

13-6-303. Place of holding court.

13-6-304. Court facilities.

13-6-305. Maintenance of records.

13-6-306. Seal.

13-6-307. Process.

13-6-308. Juries.

13-6-309. Verbatim record of proceedings.

13-6-309.5. Traffic violations bureau - schedule of traffic offenses and fines or penalties - method of payment - effect of payment. (Repealed)

13-6-310. Appeals from county court.

13-6-311. Appeals from county court - simplified procedure.


PART 4 COUNTY COURT - SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION 

13-6-401. Legislative declaration.

13-6-402. Establishment of small claims division.

13-6-403. Jurisdiction of small claims court - limitations.

13-6-404. Clerk of the small claims court.

13-6-405. Magistrate in small claims court.

13-6-406. Schedule of hearings.

13-6-407. Parties - representation.

13-6-408. Counterclaims exceeding jurisdiction of small claims court - procedures - sanctions for improper assertion.

13-6-409. Trial procedure.

13-6-410. Appeal of a claim.

13-6-411. Limitation on number of claims filed.

13-6-411.5. Place of trial.

13-6-412. Notice to public.

13-6-413. Supreme court shall promulgate rules.

13-6-414. No jury trial.

13-6-415. Service of process.

13-6-416. Facilities.

13-6-417. Execution and proceedings subsequent to judgment.


PART 5 MAGISTRATE ADJUDICATION SYSTEM 

13-6-501. County court magistrates - qualifications - duties.

13-6-502. Jury trials.

13-6-503. Evidence offered by officer.

13-6-504. Appeals procedure.

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PART 1
ESTABLISHMENT AND JURISDICTION

13-6-101. Establishment.

Statute text

Pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of article VI of the Colorado constitution, there is hereby established in each county of the state of Colorado a county court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 409, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-13-1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Colorado's New Court System", see 41 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1964).

 For the general assembly using its constitutional power to create county courts, see Rowland v. Theobald, 159 Colo. 1, 409 P.2d 272 (1965).

13-6-102. Court of record.

Statute text

Each county court shall be a court of record, with such powers as are inherent in constitutionally created courts.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 409, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-13-2.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 County court records are entitled to the same presumptions as those of district courts. The county courts are courts of record, and as to matters within their jurisdiction under the constitution and laws of this state, their records are supported by the same presumptions and intendments of law as the records of district courts. Fletcher v. Stowell, 17 Colo. 94, 28 P. 326 (1891), citing Hughes v. Cummings, 7 Colo. 138, 2 P. 289 (1883); Dusing v. Nelson, 7 Colo. 184, 2 P. 922 (1883); Behymer v. Nordloh, 12 Colo. 352, 21 P. 37 (1888); In re Rogers, 14 Colo. 18, 22 P. 1053 (1890)(cases decided under repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 156).

13-6-103. Statewide jurisdiction.

Statute text

The jurisdiction of the county court shall extend to all cases which arise within the boundaries of this state or are subject to its judicial power and which are within the limitations imposed by this article, but the exercise of this jurisdiction is subject to restrictions of venue as established by this article or, if there are none, by rule of the Colorado supreme court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 409, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-13-3. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 598, § 12, effective July 1.

13-6-104. Original civil jurisdiction.

Statute text

(1) On and after January 1, 1991, the county court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court in civil actions, suits, and proceedings in which the debt, damage, or value of the personal property claimed does not exceed fifteen thousand dollars, including by way of further example, and not limitation, jurisdiction to hear and determine actions in tort and assess damages therein not to exceed fifteen thousand dollars. The county court shall also have jurisdiction of counterclaims in all such actions when the counterclaim does not exceed fifteen thousand dollars.

(2) The county court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court in actions to foreclose liens pursuant to article 20 of title 38, C.R.S., and in cases of forcible entry, forcible detainer, or unlawful detainer, except when such cases involve the boundary or title to real property and except as provided in section 13-40-109. Judgment in the county court for rent, damages on account of unlawful detention, damages for injury to property, and damages incurred under article 20 of title 38, C.R.S., under this subsection (2) shall not exceed a total of fifteen thousand dollars, exclusive of costs and attorney fees, nor shall the county court on and after January 1, 1991, have jurisdiction if the monthly rental value of the property exceeds fifteen thousand dollars.

(3) The county court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court in petitions for change of name.

(4) Repealed.

(5) The county court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court to issue temporary and permanent civil restraining orders as provided in article 14 of this title.

(6) (Deleted by amendment, L. 99, p. 501, § 5, effective July 1, 1999.)

(7) The county court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court to hear actions brought pursuant to section 25-8-607, C.R.S.

(8) The county court shall have original jurisdiction in hearings concerning the impoundment of motor vehicles pursuant to section 42-13-106, C.R.S.

(9) (Deleted by amendment, L. 99, p. 501, § 5, effective July 1, 1999.)

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 409, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-13-4. L. 67: p. 1063, § 2. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 1419, § 8, effective April 24; (1) and (2) amended, p. 561, § 1, effective October 1. L. 78: (5) added, p. 352, § 1, effective April 21. L. 79: (6) added, p. 599, § 13, effective July 1. L. 81: (1) and (2) amended, p. 879, § 1, effective July 1; (7) added, p. 1338, § 2, effective July 1. L. 82: (5) R&RE and (6) amended, p. 301, §§ 2, 3, effective April 23. L. 86: (8) added, p. 924, § 2, effective April 3. L. 87: (2) amended, p. 1576, § 13, effective July 10. L. 90: (1) and (2) amended, p. 848, § 2, effective May 31; (1) and (2) amended, p. 854, § 2, effective July 1. L. 92: (9) added, p. 292, § 2, effective April 23. L. 94: (4) repealed, p. 2031, § 6, effective July 1; (8) amended, p. 2548, § 29, effective January 1, 1995. L. 99: (5), (6), and (9) amended, p. 501, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2001: (1) and (2) amended, p. 1517, § 11, effective September 1.

Annotations

 Cross references: (1) For treatment by county court of restraining orders issued in restraint of persons threatening assaults and bodily harm, see C.R.C.P. 365(b); for civil protection orders, see article 14 of this title; for provisions relating to domestic abuse programs, see article 7.5 of title 26.

 (2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act amending subsections (1) and (2), see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations


Analysis


I. General Consideration.
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
III. Jurisdictional Amount.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

 Law reviews. For comment on Ohmie v. Martinez, appearing below, see 38 Dicta 123 (1961). For note, "Rural Poverty and the Law in Southern Colorado", see 47 Den. L.J. 82 (1970).

 Annotator's note. Since § 13-6-104 is similar to repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 156, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

 The jurisdiction of district and county courts is concurrent with respect to matters which fall within the jurisdiction of both. Ohmie v. Martinez, 141 Colo. 480, 349 P.2d 131 (1960).

 County court may enforce a state agency's imposition of a monetary penalty. Gibbs v. Colo. Mined Land Reclamation Bd., 883 P.2d 592 (Colo. App. 1994).

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.

 County courts have general subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the subject matter is the power to deal with the general abstract question, to hear the particular facts in any case relating to this question, and to determine whether or not they are sufficient to invoke the exercise of that power. Camplin v. Jackson, 34 Colo. 447, 83 P. 1017 (1905).

 County court has jurisdiction in all civil matters, both in law and in equity, except as expressly limited. Flynn v. Casper, 26 Colo. App. 344, 144 P. 1137 (1914), citing Sievers v. Garfield County Court, 11 Colo. App. 147, 52 P. 634 (1898); Arnett v. Berg, 18 Colo. App. 341, 71 P. 636 (1903).

 County court has jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings. Habeas corpus by a parent, demanding the custody of his infant child, is, under this section, within the jurisdiction of the county court. Flynn v. Casper, 26 Colo. App. 344, 144 P. 1137 (1914).

 This section does not apply to proceedings under the eminent domain act. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Poundstone, 74 Colo. 191, 220 P. 234 (1923).

 Nor does it apply in proceedings for injunction against city or town ordinance. County courts have no jurisdiction to control, by injunction, proceedings before police magistrates or justices of the peace acting as such in the enforcement of the ordinances of cities and towns. Hart v. Dana, 12 Colo. App. 499, 55 P. 958 (1889).

III. JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT.

 Annotator's note. The jurisdictional amount in repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 156, was $2,000.

 The purpose behind regulating the jurisdiction of the county court as to the amount in controversy is to expedite the handling of small claims. This purpose must be considered in the light of the policy that a person cannot be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of a court, acquiesce in the decree thus obtained, and later question the validity of the judgment when it is enforced against him. Under the circumstances, the petitioner is estopped by his acquiescence and conduct from asserting the invalidity of the judgment in the county court. In re Estate of Lee v. Graber, 170 Colo. 419, 462 P.2d 492 (1969).

 Jurisdictional allegation is an essential prerequisite. Jurisdictional allegation in the complaint that the relief sought does not exceed the jurisdictional sum is an essential prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court. Myers v. Myers, 110 Colo. 412, 135 P.2d 235 (1943).

 This section does not prescribe a form for the jurisdictional averment. There is nothing in this section that indicates an intention to require the jurisdictional averment to be in a prescribed form. The import of the language employed therein is, that it must affirmatively appear from the complaint that the value of the property in controversy, or the amount involved, for which relief is sought, does not exceed the jurisdictional sum. Hughes v. Brewer, 7 Colo. 583, 4 P. 1115 (1884); Bloomer v. Jones, 22 Colo. App. 404, 125 P. 541 (1912).

 Complaint may be amended to show jurisdiction. A complaint in a county court which is insufficient by reason of the omission of a jurisdictional averment may be amended so as to give the court jurisdiction. Myers v. Myers, 110 Colo. 412, 135 P.2d 235 (1943).

 Amendment may be allowed to include averment. In condemnation proceedings in the county courts under this section the complaint, if lacking the requisite jurisdictional allegations, is not entirely void but amendable, and when a complaint is amended, it stands as though it had originally read as amended. Goodman v. City of Ft. Collins, 164 F. 970 (8th Cir. 1908).

 A defect in this respect may be aided by the answer. A complaint in an action in the county court which did not allege that the value of the property involved was less than $2,000, if defective in that respect, was aided by the answer, which alleged it was not worth $1,500. Petri v. Doughty, 75 Colo. 551, 227 P. 388 (1924).

 In a bill to quiet title to lands, an averment that "the value of the property involved does not exceed or equal two thousand dollars", suffices to support the jurisdiction of the county court. Green v. Gibson, 53 Colo. 346, 127 P. 239 (1912).

 Complaint must indicate value of land. In a complaint, in an action to quiet the title to lands, no money judgment being demanded, an averment that "the amount herein involved and sued for does not equal $2,000", gives no indication of the value of the land, and is not a compliance with this section. A decree given upon such complaint is void, and may be collaterally assailed. Bloomer v. Jones, 22 Colo. App. 404, 125 P. 541 (1912).

 On error defendant will not be heard to question the jurisdiction of the court for want of the averment as to the amount in controversy required by this section. To permit the jurisdiction to be thus questioned for the first time in the court of review would deprive plaintiff of the right to amend granted by the code of civil procedure. Nelson v. Chittenden, 53 Colo. 30, 123 P. 656 (1912).

 Uncertainties in the record will be resolved in favor of the party successful below; e.g., as to whether an averment essential to the jurisdiction of the court below, appearing by interlineation in the complaint, was therein, when it was originally filed. Dunkle v. French, 51 Colo. 170, 116 P. 1039 (1911).

 Determination of jurisdictional amount. The amount fixed as the statutory limitation of the jurisdiction must be taken to mean the amount due the plaintiff, or the value or amount of his claim, or the value of the property sought to be recovered at the time of bringing the action, and in an action for the recovery of money, where the principal sum draws interest, if the amount due at the time of the commencement of the action, including interest, does not exceed the jurisdictional amount, the county court, under the constitution and this section, has jurisdiction, and the accumulation of interest pendente lite will not oust such jurisdiction. Denver Brick Mfg. Co. v. McAllister, 6 Colo. 326 (1882).

 Jurisdictional limit applies to the total amount to be paid, and not to each monthly payment of child support. Mathews v. Urban, 645 P.2d 290 (Colo. App. 1982).

 For when averments are sufficient, see Hughes v. Brewer, 7 Colo. 583, 4 P. 1115 (1884).

 Once a court has jurisdiction over a case because the total sum sought is within the jurisdictional limit, the court does not lose jurisdiction simply because the case is litigated, and attorney fees incurred and awarded exceed the jurisdictional amount. Ferrell v. Glenwood Brokers, Ltd., 848 P.2d 936 (Colo. 1993).

13-6-105. Specific limits on civil jurisdiction.

Statute text

(1) The county court shall have no civil jurisdiction except that specifically conferred upon it by law. In particular, it shall have no jurisdiction over the following matters:

(a) Matters of probate;

(b) Matters of mental health, including commitment, restoration to competence, and the appointment of conservators;

(c) Matters of dissolution of marriage, declaration of invalidity of marriage, and legal separation;

(d) Matters affecting children, including the allocation of parental responsibilities, support, guardianship, adoption, dependency, or delinquency;

(e) Matters affecting boundaries or title to real property;

(f) Original proceedings for the issuance of injunctions, except as provided in section 13-6-104 (5), except as required to enforce restrictive covenants on residential property and to enforce the provisions of section 6-1-702.5, C.R.S., and except as otherwise specifically authorized in this article or, if there is no authorization, by rule of the Colorado supreme court.

(2) Any powers or duties previously placed in the county court by law in connection with any of the matters excluded from the jurisdiction of the county court by this section are transferred to the district court or, if within their jurisdiction, to the probate court of the city and county of Denver or the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver, and the statutes relating thereto shall be so construed.

(3) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent the appointment of county judges as magistrates in juvenile matters or as magistrates in mental health and other matters. Appointments of county judges as magistrates in mental health and other matters are authorized, and, when so appointed by the district judge, the county judge shall serve as a district court officer for the designated purposes.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 410, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-13-5. L. 78: (1)(f) amended, p. 353, § 2, effective April 21. L. 79: (1)(f) amended, p. 599, § 14, effective July 1; (3) amended, p. 963, § 12, effective July 1. L. 88: (1)(f) amended, p. 601, § 1, effective July 1. L. 91: (3) amended, p. 356, § 8, effective April 9. L. 98: (1)(d) amended, p. 1392, § 24, effective February 1, 1999. L. 2000: (1)(f) amended, p. 2034, § 2, effective August 2. L. 2008: (1)(f) amended, p. 596, § 4, effective August 5.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Specific exclusions to county court jurisdiction are found in this section. The jurisdiction of the newly created county courts was defined and specific exclusions were mentioned in this section. Rowland v. Theobald, 159 Colo. 1, 409 P.2d 272 (1965).

 Election disputes are not withdrawn from county court jurisdiction. Six classifications of legal matters are expressly mentioned with reference to which the county court shall have no jurisdiction. Nothing concerning election disputes is withdrawn from consideration by the county courts by these expressed exclusions. Rowland v. Theobald, 159 Colo. 1, 409 P.2d 272 (1965).

 County court forced entry and detainer judgment not dispositive of subsequent property ownership question. Because county courts are specifically precluded from deciding any matters affecting title to real property, judgment entered in a county court forced entry and detainer action cannot be dispositive of the property ownership question in a subsequent quiet title action. Gore Trading Co. v. Alice, 35 Colo. App. 97, 529 P.2d 324 (1974).

 Section not applicable to decrees of specific performance. In interpreting the reference in this section to "injunctions", presumption is that the general assembly was aware of the legal distinction between injunctions and specific performance decrees. Therefore, subsection (1)(f), which limits a county court's power to issue injunctions, does not limit the court's power to issue decrees of specific performance, and C.R.C.P. 370 properly may be read with the understanding that county courts have jurisdiction to issue decrees of specific performance. Snyder v. Sullivan, 705 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1985).

13-6-106. Original criminal jurisdiction.

Statute text

(1) The county court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the district court in the following criminal matters:

(a) Criminal actions for the violation of state laws which constitute misdemeanors or petty offenses, except those actions involving children over which the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver or the district courts of the state, other than in Denver, have exclusive jurisdiction;

(b) The issuance of warrants, the conduct of preliminary examinations, the conduct of dispositional hearings pursuant to section 16-5-301 (1), C.R.S., and section 18-1-404 (1), C.R.S., the issuance of bindover orders, and the admission to bail in felonies and misdemeanors.

(2) The provisions of subsection (1) (b) of this section shall not apply to any child under the age of eighteen years alleged to have committed a felony, except a crime of violence punishable by death or life imprisonment where the accused is sixteen years of age or older.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 411, § 6. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-13-6. L. 67: p. 1051, § 6. L. 79: (1)(a) amended, p. 599, § 15, effective July 1. L. 98: (1)(b) amended, p. 1274, § 4, July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Commitment of Misdemeanants to the Colorado State Reformatory", see 29 Dicta 294 (1952).

 Annotator's note. Since § 13-6-106 is similar to repealed § 37-7-1, CRS 53, relevant cases construing that provision have been included in the annotations to this section.

 Under this section, the jurisdiction of county courts in criminal cases is limited to misdemeanors; hence a conviction of grand larceny in the county court and a sentence to the state penitentiary is void. Latham v. People, 136 Colo. 252, 317 P.2d 894 (1957).

 The jurisdiction conferred by the general assembly in § 42-4-1504 for misdemeanors involving the operation of motor vehicles did not intend to impliedly repeal this section conferring original jurisdiction upon the county courts in misdemeanor cases. People v. Griffith, 130 Colo. 475, 276 P.2d 559 (1954).

 Jurisdiction extends to offenses under § 42-4-1501. Jurisdiction of the county courts includes those offenses reclassified as misdemeanor traffic offenses under § 42-4-1501. Phillips v. County Court, 42 Colo. App. 187, 591 P.2d 600 (1979).

 Since a person under age 18 can only be charged with an offense in the manner permitted by the Children's Code, the county court had no jurisdiction to entertain or to dispose of the merits of the proceeding involving an offense alleged against a juvenile and was without authority to go further than merely dismissing the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. People in Interest of C.O., 870 P.2d 1266 (Colo. App. 1994).

13-6-107. Restraining orders to prevent emotional abuse of the elderly. (Repealed)

History

 Source: L. 92: Entire section added, p. 290, § 1, effective April 23. L. 94: (5), (9), (10), and (11) amended and (13) added, p. 2005, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 98: (1) and (5) amended, p. 244, § 2, effective April 13. L. 99: Entire section repealed, p. 501, § 6, effective July 1.

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PART 2
JUDGES AND OTHER PERSONNEL

13-6-201. Classification of counties.

Statute text

(1) For such organizational and administrative purposes concerning county courts as are specified in this part 2, counties shall be classified as provided in subsection (2) of this section. The classifications established in this section shall not have any effect upon any classifications now provided by law for any other purpose and specifically shall have no effect upon the existing classification of counties for the purpose of fixing judicial salaries for county judges as provided by section 13-30-103.

(2) Classes of counties for this part 2 are:

(a) Class A. Class A shall consist of the city and county of Denver.

(b) Class B. Class B shall consist of the counties of Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Douglas, Eagle, El Paso, Fremont, Jefferson, La Plata, Larimer, Mesa, Montrose, Pueblo, Summit, Weld, and the city and county of Broomfield.

(c) Class C. Class C shall consist of the counties of Alamosa, Delta, Garfield, Las Animas, Logan, Montezuma, Morgan, Otero, Prowers, and Rio Grande.

(d) Class D. Class D shall consist of the counties of Archuleta, Baca, Bent, Chaffee, Cheyenne, Clear Creek, Conejos, Costilla, Crowley, Custer, Dolores, Elbert, Gilpin, Grand, Gunnison, Jackson, Hinsdale, Huerfano, Kiowa, Kit Carson, Lake, Lincoln, Mineral, Moffat, Ouray, Park, Phillips, Pitkin, Saguache, San Juan, San Miguel, Sedgwick, Rio Blanco, Routt, Teller, Washington, and Yuma.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 411, § 7. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-1. L. 72: p. 591, § 59. L. 75: (2)(b) and (2)(d) amended, p. 563, § 1, effective July 1. L. 77: (2)(b) R&RE and (2)(c) amended, p. 783, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1, 1978. L. 81: (1) amended, p. 2025, § 15, effective July 14. L. 92: (2)(b) and (2)(d) amended, p. 274, § 1, effective February 12. L. 93: (2)(b) and (2)(d) amended, p. 1774, § 31, effective June 6. L. 97: (2)(b) and (2)(d) amended, p. 984, § 1, effective July 1, 1998. L. 2001: (2)(b) amended, p. 56, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2007: (1), (2)(b), and (2)(c) amended, p. 363, § 1, effective April 2. L. 2009: (2)(b) and (2)(c) amended, (HB 09-1037), ch. 18, p. 95, § 1, effective March 18.

13-6-202. Number of judges.

Statute text

(1) In each county there shall be one county judge; except that: In the county of El Paso, there shall be eight county judges; in each of the counties of Arapahoe and Jefferson, there shall be seven county judges; in the county of Adams, there shall be six county judges; in the county of Boulder, there shall be five county judges; in each of the counties of Larimer and Weld, there shall be four county judges; in each of the counties of Pueblo, Douglas, and Mesa, there shall be three county judges; and, in the city and county of Denver, there shall be the number of county judges provided by the charter and ordinances thereof. In the city and county of Broomfield, there shall be one county judge. One of the county judges in Boulder county shall maintain a courtroom in the city of Longmont at least three days per week. The judge of the Eagle county court shall conduct court business in that portion of Eagle county lying in the Roaring Fork river drainage area in a manner sufficient to deal with the business before the court.

(2) (a) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of county judges in the county of Jefferson shall be eight.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of county judges in the county of Jefferson shall be nine.

(3) (a) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of county judges in the county of El Paso shall be nine.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of county judges in the county of El Paso shall be ten.

(4) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of county judges in the county of Larimer shall be five.

(5) (a) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of county judges in the county of Adams shall be seven.

(b) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2009, the number of county judges in the county of Adams shall be eight.

(6) Subject to available appropriations, effective July 1, 2008, the number of county judges in the county of Arapahoe shall be eight.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 412, § 8. L. 65: p. 476, §§ 1, 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-2. L. 67: p. 485, § 1. L. 68: p. 38, § 1. L. 72: pp. 189, 592, §§ 1, 60. L. 73: p. 495, § 1. L. 75: Entire section amended, p. 565, § 2, effective October 1. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 785, § 1, effective July 1. L. 80: Entire section amended, p. 509, § 1, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 454, § 4, effective September 1. L. 89: Entire section amended, p. 749, § 1, effective April 1, 1990. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 275, § 2, effective February 12. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 452, § 1, effective May 16. L. 99: Entire section amended, p. 668, § 1, effective May 18. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 56, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2006: Entire section amended, p. 22, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2007: Entire section amended, p. 1529, § 16, effective May 31.

13-6-203. Qualifications of judges.

Statute text

(1) The county judge shall be a qualified elector of the county for which he is elected or appointed and shall reside there so long as he serves as county judge.

(2) In counties of Class A and B, no person shall be eligible for election or appointment to the office of county judge unless he has been admitted to the practice of law in Colorado.

(3) In counties of Class C and Class D, no person shall be eligible for appointment to the office of county judge unless he has graduated from high school or has attained the equivalent of a high school education as indicated by the possession of a certificate of equivalency issued by the department of education, based upon the record made on the general educational development test.

(4) Repealed.

(5) Judges-elect who have not been admitted to the practice of law shall not take office for the first time as county judge until they have attended an institute on the duties and functioning of the county court to be held under the supervision of the supreme court, unless such attendance is waived by the supreme court. Judges who are attorneys and who are taking office for the first time as county judge may attend this institute if they wish. All judges are entitled to their actual and necessary expenses while attending this institute. The supreme court shall establish the institute to which this subsection (5) refers and shall provide that it be held when the appointment of a sufficient number of nonlawyer county judges warrants, as determined by the chief justice.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 412, § 9. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-3. L. 67: p. 457, § 9. L. 69: p. 250, § 10. L. 72: p. 592, § 61. L. 73: p. 1402, § 30. L. 79: (3) amended and (4) repealed, pp. 599, 602, §§ 16, 30, effective July 1.

13-6-204. Activities of judges.

Statute text

(1) In counties of Class A and B, county judges shall devote their full time to judicial duties and shall not engage in the private practice of law. They may also serve as municipal judges in counties of Class A but may not do so in counties of Class B.

(2) In counties of Class C and D, county judges, if admitted to the bar, may engage in the private practice of law in courts other than the county court and in matters which have not and will not come before the county court and may serve as municipal judges.

(3) County judges of any class county may be appointed as magistrates in juvenile matters and as magistrates for the district court in mental health matters and shall receive no additional compensation for such service. County judges may accept appointment as magistrates in any other matter, and for such service a county judge is entitled to such compensation as the appointing district judge may allow, payable from funds provided under sections 13-3-104 and 13-3-106.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 413, § 10. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-4. L. 79: (3) amended, p. 764, § 13, effective July 1. L. 91: (3) amended, p. 356, § 9, effective April 9.

13-6-205. Term and appointment of judges.

Statute text

The term of office of county judges shall be four years. County judge appointments shall be made pursuant to section 20 of article VI of the state constitution. This section shall not apply to the city and county of Denver, and the term of office and manner of selection of county judges therein shall be determined by the charter and ordinances thereof.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 413, § 11. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-5. L. 72: p. 592, § 62.

13-6-206. Vacancies.

Statute text

If the office of a county judge, except in the city and county of Denver, becomes vacant because of death, resignation, failure to be retained in office pursuant to section 25 of article VI of the state constitution, or other cause, the governor, as provided in section 20 of article VI of the state constitution, shall appoint an individual possessing the qualifications specified in section 13-6-203.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 413, § 12. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-6. L. 67: p. 457, § 10.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Vacancy exists if newly elected judge dies before possessing office. People v. Boughton, 5 Colo. 487 (1880) (decided under repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 122).

13-6-207. Bond. (Repealed)

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 413, § 13. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-7. L. 69: p. 250, § 11. L. 79: Entire section repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1.

13-6-208. Special associate, associate, and assistant county judges.

Statute text

(1) In order to provide for the expeditious handling of county court business and for county court sessions in population centers which are not county seats, there may be created in counties designated by law the positions of special associate county judge, associate county judge, and assistant county judge.

(2) Special associate, associate, and assistant county judges, when so provided by law, except in the city and county of Denver, shall be elected or appointed at the same time, in the same manner, and for the same term, and shall possess the same qualifications, as the county judges of their respective counties. Vacancies in positions for special associate, associate, and assistant county judges shall be filled in the same manner as a vacancy in the office of county judge.

(3) The location of the official residence and court chambers for the purpose of holding court of special associate, associate, and assistant county judges shall be as prescribed by law. Travel and maintenance expenses shall be allowed special associate, associate, and assistant county judges only when they are performing official duties outside of their official places of residence.

(4) Special associate, associate, and assistant county judges when actually performing judicial duties shall have all the jurisdiction and power of a county judge, and their orders and judgments shall be those of the county court.

(5) Repealed.

(6) Special associate, associate, and assistant county judges in counties of Classes B, C, and D, if admitted to the bar, may engage in the private practice of law in courts other than the county court and in matters which have not and will not come before the county court, and may serve as municipal judges.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 414, § 14. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-8. L. 67: p. 457, § 11. L. 71: p. 370, § 1. L. 80: (5) repealed, p. 578, § 8, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 This statute does not purport to create a new court. Rather, it creates two new judicial positions, namely, that of associate county judge and assistant county judge. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455, 444 P.2d 645 (1968).

 The only difference between an associate or assistant county judge and a county judge relates to the emoluments which go with the respective judicial offices. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455, 444 P.2d 645 (1968).

 The jurisdiction and power of an associate or an assistant county judge is coequal with that of a full-fledged county judge. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455, 444 P.2d 645 (1968).

 Associate and assistant judges are part-time. Though the statute is silent on the matter, the general assembly must have intended that an associate county judge would perform, volumewise at least, about one-half the amount of work customarily performed by the county judge and the assistant county judge about one-fourth. Associate and assistant county judges are "part-time" -- not "full-time" -- county judges, even though under the statute they have all of the jurisdiction and power of a county judge. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455, 444 P.2d 645 (1968).

 Judge may sit in population centers other than the county seat. One purpose of the statute creating associate county judges is to locate judicial officers with the power and jurisdiction of a county judge in population centers which are not county seats. This is not special or local legislation of the type prohibited by our constitution, which prohibitions relate essentially to the organization, jurisdiction and practice of and in a given court, and not to the number or titles of judicial officers, who are authorized to preside in a particular court. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455, 444 P.2d 645 (1968).

13-6-209. Special associate and associate county judges - designated counties.

Statute text

(1) In the county of Montrose there shall be an associate county judge who shall maintain his official residence in that portion of Montrose county which is included in the southwestern water conservation district as set forth and described in section 37-47-103, C.R.S.

(2) In the county of Garfield there shall be a special associate county judge who shall maintain his official residence and court chambers in the city of Rifle.

(3) In the county of Rio Blanco there shall be an associate county judge who shall maintain his official residence and court chambers in the city of Rangely.

(4) Repealed.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 414, § 15. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-9. L. 67: p. 485, § 2. L. 71: p. 371, § 2. L. 75: (4) repealed, p. 564, § 3, effective January 1, 1979.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Section is constitutional. Subsection (2) of this section does not violate § 25 of art. V, or § 19 of art. VI, Colo. Const., for there is no dispute that the general assembly has the power to determine the number of judges in each district. Sanders v. District Court, 166 Colo. 455, 444 P.2d 645 (1968).

13-6-210. Assistant county judges - designated counties. (Repealed)

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 415, § 16. L. 65: p. 477, §§ 1, 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-10. L. 67: p. 304, § 1. L. 69: p. 263, § 1. L. 72: p. 592, § 63. L. 77: (1) repealed, p. 785, § 2, effective July 1. L. 79: (3) amended, p. 607, § 1, effective May 18. L. 90: (2) repealed, p. 861, § 1, effective March 22. L. 92: (3) repealed, p. 275, § 3, effective February 12.

13-6-211. Appointment of clerk.

Statute text

(1) (a) The position of clerk of the county court is established in counties of Classes A, B, C, and D, except as otherwise provided in this section and in section 13-3-107.

(b) In counties of Class A, the appointment of the clerk shall be made and his salary fixed as prescribed in the charter and ordinances of such county.

(c) In counties of Classes B, C, and D, the appointment and salary of the clerk shall be in accordance with the provisions of section 13-3-105.

(2) In such counties as may be determined by the chief justice, the functions of the office of the clerk of the county court may be performed by a consolidated office serving both the district and county courts, as provided in section 13-3-107.

(3) In any county in which there is no clerk of the county court provided pursuant to the provisions of section 13-3-105, the judge of the county court shall act as ex officio clerk without further compensation and have all the duties and powers of the clerk.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 416, § 20. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-14. L. 69: p. 251, § 14. L. 79: (2) amended, p. 599, § 17, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Annotator's note. Since § 13-6-211 is similar to repealed laws antecedent to CSA, C. 46, § 191, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

 A county judge may elect to perform the duties of clerk of his court and when he does so elect is authorized to issue and sign all processes from his court. But when a clerk has been appointed by a county judge, so long as the appointment is not revoked, the clerk or his deputy alone has power to discharge the clerical duties of the office, and a summons issued and signed by the judge is void notwithstanding the disqualification of the clerk to act on account of absence or sickness. McNevins v. McNevins, 28 Colo. 245, 64 P. 199 (1901).

 A clerk may also be probation officer. There is no statutory inhibition against one person holding the offices of clerk of the county court and probation officer. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Wharton, 82 Colo. 466, 261 P. 4 (1927).

13-6-212. Duties of clerk.

Statute text

(1) The powers and duties of the clerk of the county court shall be similar to the powers and duties of the clerk of the district court exclusive of the powers of the district court clerk in probate and shall include such duties as may be assigned to him by law, by court rules, and by the county judge.

(2) Upon approval by the chief justice of the supreme court, the chief judge of a judicial district may authorize, either generally or in specific cases, the clerk of the county court to do the following:

(a) Issue bench warrants, misdemeanor or felony warrants, and writs of restitution upon written or oral order of a judge;

(b) Advise defendants in criminal cases of their procedural and constitutional rights;

(c) Accept pleas of not guilty in all criminal cases and set dates for hearings or trials in such cases;

(d) Subject to the requirements of the Colorado rules of civil procedure, enter default and default judgments and issue process for the enforcement of said judgments;

(e) Under the direction of a judge, grant continuances, set motions for hearing, and set cases for trial; and

(f) With the consent of the defendant, accept pleas of guilty and admissions of liability and impose penalties pursuant to a schedule approved by the presiding judge in misdemeanor cases involving violations of wildlife and parks and outdoor recreation laws for which the maximum penalty in each case is a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, and in misdemeanor traffic and traffic infraction cases involving the regulation of vehicles and traffic for which the penalty specified in section 42-4-1701, C.R.S., or elsewhere in articles 2 to 4 of title 42, C.R.S., in each case is less than three hundred dollars. A clerk shall not levy a fine of over said amounts nor sentence any person to jail. If, in the judgment of the clerk, a fine of over said amounts or a jail sentence is justified, the case shall be certified to the judge of the county court for rearraignment and trial de novo.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 417, § 21. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-15. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 608, § 1, effective April 25. L. 83: (2)(f) amended, p. 602, § 1, effective July 1. L. 84: (2)(f) amended, p. 921, § 7, effective January 1, 1985. L. 94: (2)(f) amended, p. 2549, § 30, effective January 1, 1995.

Annotations

 Cross references: For court clerk's duties, see article 1 of this title and § 13-5-125; for law enforcement and penalties relating to wildlife and parks and outdoor recreation, see articles 6 and 15 of title 33.

13-6-213. Bond of clerk. (Repealed)

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 417, § 22. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-16. L. 69: p. 251, § 15. L. 79: Entire section repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1.

13-6-214. Other employees.

Statute text

(1) In counties of Class A, such deputy clerks, assistants, reporters, stenographers, and bailiffs as shall be necessary for the transaction of the business of the county court may be appointed and their compensation fixed in the manner provided in the charter and ordinances thereof.

(2) In counties of Classes B, C, and D, there shall be appointed such deputy clerks, assistants, reporters, stenographers, and bailiffs as are necessary, in accordance with the provisions of section 13-3-105.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 417, § 23. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-17. L. 69: p. 252, § 16.

13-6-215. Presiding judges.

Statute text

In each county court which has more than one county judge, the court, by rule, shall provide for the designation of a presiding judge. If there is a failure to select a presiding judge by rule, the chief justice shall designate a presiding judge.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 418, § 24. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-18. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 599, § 18, effective July 1.

13-6-216. Judges to sit separately.

Statute text

In each county court which has more than one county judge, each judge shall sit separately for the trial of cases and the transaction of judicial business, and each court so held shall be known as the county court of the county wherein held. Each judge shall have all of the powers which he might have if he were the sole judge of the court, including the power to vacate his own judgments, decrees, or orders, or those of a predecessor when permitted by law, but not county court orders of another judge of the same county court who is still in office.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 418, § 25. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-19.

13-6-217. Judges may sit en banc.

Statute text

In each county court which has more than one judge, the court may sit en banc for the purpose of making rules of court, the appointment of a clerk and other employees, pursuant to section 13-3-105, and the conduct of other business relating to the administration of the court, as authorized by and subject to the approval of the chief justice of the supreme court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 418, § 26. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-20. L. 67: p. 458, § 14. L. 69: p. 252, § 17.

13-6-218. Assignment of county judges and retired county judges to other courts authorized.

Statute text

Any county judge or retired county judge who has been licensed to practice law in this state for five years may be assigned by the chief justice of the supreme court, pursuant to section 5 (3) of article VI of the state constitution, to perform judicial duties in any district court, the probate court of the city and county of Denver, or the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver.

History

 Source: L. 67: p. 458, § 15. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-14-21. L. 85: Entire section amended, p. 570, § 4, effective November 14, 1986.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Chief justice of supreme court can properly delegate appointment powers to another judicial officer, and appointments by chief district judges are not limited to specific cases. There is no statutory basis for requiring the chief justice of the supreme court to personally make each temporary appointment. Furthermore, reading the statute to preclude delegation would bring it into conflict with art. VI, § 5(4), the constitutional provision expressly allowing the chief justice to delegate administrative powers. People v. McCulloch, 198 P.3d 1264 (Colo. App. 2008).

13-6-219. Judge as party to a case - recusal of judge upon motion.

Statute text

(1) If a judge or former judge of a county court is a party in his or her individual and private capacity in a case that is to be tried within any county court in the same judicial district in which the judge or former judge is or was a judge of a county court, any party to the case may file a timely motion requesting that the judge who is appointed to preside over the case recuse himself or herself from the case.

(2) If a county court receives a motion filed by a party pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the judge who is appointed to preside over the case shall recuse himself or herself if he or she is a judge of a county court in the same judicial district in which the judge or former judge who is a party to the case in his or her individual and private capacity is or was a judge of a county court.

(3) If a judge recuses himself or herself pursuant to subsection (2) of this section, the chief justice of the Colorado supreme court or his or her designee shall appoint a judge from outside the judicial district to preside over the case.

History

 Source: L. 2008: Entire section added, p. 436, § 2, effective August 5.

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PART 3
GENERAL PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS

13-6-301. Court rules.

Statute text

Each county court possesses the power to make rules for the conduct of its business to the extent that such rules are not in conflict with the rules of the supreme court or the laws of the state, but are supplementary thereto. In each county court which has more than one judge, or has an associate judge sitting regularly, the court shall make such rules as it deems necessary for the classification, arrangement, and distribution of the business of the court among the several judges thereof. All county court rules are subject to review by the supreme court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 418, § 27. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-1.

13-6-302. Terms of court.

Statute text

Terms of the county court shall be fixed by rule of the court in each county; except that at least one term shall be held in each county in each year.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 419, § 28. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-2.

13-6-303. Place of holding court.

Statute text

In each county, the county court shall sit at the county seat, and the county court by rule or order also may provide for hearing and trials to be held in locations other than the county seat. In particular, if the corporate limits of a municipality extend into two counties, the county court of either county, for the hearing of matters for which venue is properly laid before them or the requirements thereof are waived, may sit at any place within such municipality without regard to the location of the county line. Where the county court sits regularly at locations other than the county seat, proper venue within the county shall be fixed by court rule.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 419, § 29. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-3.

13-6-304. Court facilities.

Statute text

The county commissioners shall provide court facilities at the county seat and are authorized to do so elsewhere. Such facilities may be provided by arrangement with municipal authorities, by rental, or by other appropriate means.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 419, § 30. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-4.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 A county's duties under this section may not be reduced or ended pursuant to art. X, § 20(9) of the state constitution. State v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Mesa County, 897 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1995).

13-6-305. Maintenance of records.

Statute text

(1) Permanent records of the county court shall be maintained at the office of the clerk of the court at the county seat.

(2) (a) If the county court sits regularly at a location other than the county seat, and the court so provides by rule, cases may be docketed at such locations, and thereafter all pleadings, writs, judgments, and other documents in the case shall be filed at such other location.

(b) Repealed.

(c) In criminal cases, a single copy of items filed is sufficient. A notice of docketing of criminal cases with sufficient information to identify the defendant and the offense charged shall be forwarded forthwith to the clerk of the court at the county seat. After termination of the case, all records on file and a transcript of the judgment shall be forwarded to the county seat.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 419, § 31. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-5. L. 79: (2)(b) repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1.

13-6-306. Seal.

Statute text

The county court of each county shall have an appropriate seal.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 420, § 32. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-6.

13-6-307. Process.

Statute text

(1) Each county court shall have the power to issue process necessary to acquire jurisdiction, to require attendance, and to enforce all orders, decrees, and judgments. Such process runs to any county within the state and, when authorized by the Colorado rules of civil procedure, may be served outside the state. Any sheriff to whom process is directed is authorized and required to execute the same, and he is entitled to the same fees as are allowed for serving like process from the district courts. Persons other than the sheriff or his deputies may also serve process from the county court when permitted by the Colorado rules of civil procedure or by law.

(2) Upon request of the court, the prosecuting county, or the defendant, the clerk of the county court shall issue a subpoena for the appearance, at any and all stages of the court's proceedings, of the parent, guardian, or lawful custodian of any child under eighteen years of age who is charged with the violation of a county ordinance. Whenever a person who is issued a subpoena pursuant to this subsection (2) fails, without good cause, to appear, the court may issue an order for the person to show cause to the court as to why the person should not be held in contempt. Following a show cause hearing, the court may make findings of fact and conclusions of law and may enter an appropriate order, which may include finding the person in contempt.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 420, § 33. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-7. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 908, § 1, effective April 28.

Annotations

 Cross references: For persons authorized to serve process, see C.R.C.P. 4(d); for personal and other service of process outside the state, see C.R.C.P. 4(e) and (g).

13-6-308. Juries.

Statute text

(1) When required, juries shall be selected and summoned as provided for courts of record in articles 71 to 74 of this title, with such exceptions as are provided in this section. With the consent of the district court and the jury commissioners, the county court may, if feasible, use the same panel of jurors summoned for the district court. Jurors selected and summoned for the county court may also be used in municipal court in counties of Class A, as defined in section 13-6-201.

(2) If a county court sits regularly in a location other than the county seat and if jury trials are held at that location as well as at the county seat, the jury commissioner may establish jury districts within the county for the selection of county court jurors. The county shall be divided into as many such districts as there are locations in which the county court regularly holds jury trials, and each district shall include one such location as well as appropriate contiguous territory. In counties so divided, the jury commissioner shall select separate lists of persons from each jury district to serve as county court jurors within their respective districts. Such lists shall contain not less than one hundred names. When jurors are to be summoned for county court service within such districts, names shall be drawn from the list by the jury commissioner. In all other respects, the provisions of articles 71 to 74 of this title shall be followed in selecting, drawing, and summoning jurors in counties divided into county court jury districts.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 420, § 34. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-8. L. 71: p. 875, § 2. L. 81: (2) amended, p. 881, § 1, effective April 24. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1269, § 15, effective June 5.

13-6-309. Verbatim record of proceedings.

Statute text

A verbatim record of the proceedings and evidence at trials in the county court shall be maintained by electronic devices or by stenographic means, as the judge of the court may direct, except when such record may be unnecessary in certain proceedings pursuant to specific provisions of law.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 421, § 35. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-9. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 600, § 19, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Judge's discretion to employ court reporters instead of electronic recording devices is subject to availability of funds in judicial department's consolidated operating budget and approval of chief justice acting as executive head of judicial system. Yeager v. Quinn, 767 P.2d 766 (Colo. App. 1988).

13-6-309.5. Traffic violations bureau - schedule of traffic offenses and fines or penalties - method of payment - effect of payment. (Repealed)

History

 Source: L. 77: Entire section added, p. 787, § 1, effective January 10, 1978. L. 91: Entire section repealed, p. 1404, § 2, effective July 1.

13-6-310. Appeals from county court.

Statute text

(1) Appeals from final judgments and decrees of the county courts shall be taken to the district court for the judicial district in which the county court entering such judgment is located. Appeals shall be based upon the record made in the county court.

(2) The district court shall review the case on the record on appeal and affirm, reverse, remand, or modify the judgment; except that the district court, in its discretion, may remand the case for a new trial with such instructions as it may deem necessary, or it may direct that the case be tried de novo before the district court.

(3) Repealed.

(4) Further appeal to the supreme court from a determination of the district court in a matter appealed to such court from the county court may be made only upon writ of certiorari issued in the discretion of the supreme court and pursuant to such rules as that court may promulgate.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 421, § 36. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-15-10. L. 85: (3) repealed and (4) amended, pp. 572, 570, §§ 12, 5, effective November 14, 1986.

Annotations

 Cross references: For review on certiorari from a county court as authorized by this section, see C.A.R. 49.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations


Analysis


I. General Consideration.
II. Statutory Right of Appeal.
III. Action of the District Court.
IV. Appeals to Supreme Court.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

 Law reviews. For article, "Criminal Law", see 32 Dicta 409 (1955). For article, "One Year Review of Contracts", see 39 Dicta 161 (1962). For article, "One Year Review of Civil Procedure and Appeals", see 40 Den. L. Ctr. J. 66 (1963).

 Annotator's note. Since § 13-6-310 is similar to repealed § 37-15-101, C.R.S. 1963, § 37-6-101, CRS 53, CSA, C. 46, § 165, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those sections have been included in the annotations to this section.

 Although § 13-4-110 (3) provides that cases filed in wrong appellate court shall not be dismissed, where appeal will not lie in either court, the only review being by certiorari, the case must be dismissed for failure to comply with the statutory procedure. People v. Meyers, 43 Colo. App. 63, 598 P.2d 526 (1979).

 Applied in Chavez v. People, 193 Colo. 50, 561 P.2d 1270 (1977); People v. Gonzales, 198 Colo. 546, 603 P.2d 139 (1979); People v. Malacara, 199 Colo. 243, 606 P.2d 1300 (1980); Garcia v. People, 200 Colo. 413, 615 P.2d 698 (1980); People v. Luna, 648 P.2d 624 (Colo. 1982).

II. STATUTORY RIGHT OF APPEAL.

 This section gives a statutory right of appeal. There is no constitutional right to an appeal from the county court to the district court; such right exists only when the general assembly has expressly or by clear implication declared in its favor. Callahan v. Jennings, 16 Colo. 471, 27 P. 1055 (1891); Shapter v. Arapahoe County Court, 13 Colo. App. 484, 59 P. 59 (1892); Andrews v. Lull, 139 Colo. 536, 341 P.2d 475 (1959).

 This section provides that appeals from county courts shall be taken to the district courts. This is a statute general in nature. Russell v. Wheeler, 159 Colo. 588, 413 P.2d 700 (1966).

 Appeals of final judgments. This statute provides that appeals from final judgments and decrees of the county court "shall be" taken to the district court. People ex rel. City of Aurora v. Smith, 162 Colo. 72, 424 P.2d 772 (1967).

 An order vacating a previous order setting aside a judgment is not a final judgment from which an appeal will lie. Hayhurst v. Hayhurst, 91 Colo. 58, 11 P.2d 804 (1932).

 This section applies only to ordinary civil actions. Andrews v. Lull, 139 Colo. 536, 341 P.2d 475 (1959).

 Therefore, no appellate jurisdiction exists in district court in special statutory proceedings. The appellate jurisdiction of district courts from final judgments of county courts applies only to judgments rendered in ordinary civil actions. No such jurisdiction exists in special statutory proceedings. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Poundstone, 74 Colo. 191, 220 P. 234 (1923); Selk v. Ramsey, 110 Colo. 223, 132 P.2d 454 (1942); Andrews v. Lull, 139 Colo. 536, 341 P.2d 475 (1959); Council of City of Englewood v. Nat'l Tea Co., 147 Colo. 96, 362 P.2d 1048 (1961).

 The section does not except from its operation those cases which are commenced in the municipal court and thereafter appealed to the county court. Appeal from all final judgments of the county court is now to be made to the district court. People ex rel. City of Aurora v. Smith, 162 Colo. 72, 424 P.2d 772 (1967); People v. Anderson, 177 Colo. 84, 492 P.2d 844 (1972).

 Allowance of appeal from judgment by default. An appeal is allowable from the county court to the district court from a judgment by default on two conditions: First, that the party aggrieved make application to have the judgment by default set aside within 10 days after its rendition; and, second, that the appeal be taken within 10 days, or the time allowed by the court, after the refusal of the court to set aside the default. Johnson v. Lawson, 9 Colo. App. 128, 50 P. 1087 (1897); County Court v. Eagle Rock Gold Mining & Reduction Co., 50 Colo. 365, 115 P. 706 (1911).

 Appeal from part of judgment permissible. Where a personal judgment was rendered in the county court against the lessees of a mining claim which was declared to be a lien against the mine, the owners of the mine could appeal to the district court from that part of the judgment declaring the lien without appealing from the entire judgment and without making the defendants, against whom personal judgment was rendered, parties to the appeal. Davidson v. Jennings, 27 Colo. 187, 60 P. 354 (1900).

 Objection to jurisdiction of district court on appeal may be waived. Plaintiff was nonsuited in the county court, and, without making a motion to set aside the nonsuit according to this section, he appealed to the district court. The defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal being there denied, he appeared as though there were no irregularities in the proceedings, and, without taking an exception to the ruling, renewing his objection or standing upon his motion, introduced witnesses, etc. It was held that he waived objection to the jurisdiction of the district court. Norton v. Young, 6 Colo. App. 187, 40 P. 156 (1895).

III. ACTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT.

 Under the statute, the district court, upon appeal of the case to it, has three threshold alternatives: (1) It may review the case on the record; (2) it may remand the case for a new trial with instructions to the court from which appealed, or (3) it may direct that the case be tried de novo before it. People v. Williams, 172 Colo. 434, 473 P.2d 982 (1970).

 The general assembly, having provided for both review on the record and for trial de novo, recognized the historical differences between the two both procedurally and in substance, so it is incumbent on the courts to make the same differentiation in carrying out their functions under the statute. People v. Williams, 172 Colo. 434, 473 P.2d 982 (1970).

 A trial de novo conducted by the district court is not a review of the county court judgment; it is an entirely new proceeding. Bovard v. People, 99 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2004).

 A trial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction, in the absence of statutory language restricting its scope, means a trial in the commonly accepted sense of that term in such court. Any court conducting such a trial may make its own findings and judgment. People v. Williams, 172 Colo. 434, 473 P.2d 982 (1970).

 The district court would have the power to make new and independent findings of fact if it were acting as a trial court. The statute provides a procedure whereby the district court can act as a trial court rather than as a court of review, if it directs the case be tried de novo before it. People v. Williams, 172 Colo. 434, 473 P.2d 982 (1970).

 Only in cases tried de novo by the district court will the district court judgment be subject to direct appeal. Justifiably, then, the defendant may seek direct appeal when the district court enters its judgment from a de novo trial. Bovard v. People, 99 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2004).

 The final judgment of the district court, following a trial de novo, thus, is subject to review by the court of appeals under both § 13-4-102 and this section. Bovard v. People, 99 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2004).

 Where the district court does not direct that the case be tried de novo before the district court, as it might do pursuant to subsection (2), the appeal is limited to review of the record on appeal and a consideration of the accompanying briefs and arguments. People v. Brown, 174 Colo. 513, 485 P.2d 500 (1971).

 It is bound by the findings of the trial court. The district court is reviewing the record on appeal from the county court and is bound by the findings of the trial court which have been determined on disputed evidence. People v. Brown, 174 Colo. 513, 485 P.2d 500 (1971).

 The function of the reviewing court is to correct any errors of law committed by the trial court and not to try, nor retry, issues of fact. The lack of sufficient competent evidence to support a finding of a material fact, however, would be a matter of law and fall within the court's powers on review. People v. Williams. 172 Colo. 434, 473 P.2d 982 (1970).

 It cannot act as a fact finder. Where the district court is exercising its powers of review rather than conducting a trial de novo, it cannot act as a fact finder. People v. Williams, 172 Colo. 434, 473 P.2d 982 (1970).

 Proper appeal from district court action is by writ of certiorari to the supreme court, and not by appeal to the court of appeals. Gallagher v. Ingram, 32 P.3d 50 (Colo. App. 2001).

IV. APPEALS TO SUPREME COURT.

 Certiorari review does not suffice as an appellate review from a final judgment of the district court. Bovard v. People, 99 P.3d 585 (Colo. 2004).

 Subsequent appeal to the supreme court only on certiorari. Appeal to the supreme court from a determination of the district court in a matter appealed to such court from the county court may be made only on a writ of certiorari issued in the discretion of the supreme court. People ex rel. City of Aurora v. Smith, 162 Colo. 72, 424 P.2d 772 (1967); People ex rel. Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 175 Colo. 391, 488 P.2d 66 (1971).

 It must be distinguished from constitutional certiorari. The writ of certiorari mentioned in § 3 of art. VI, Colo. Const., is to be distinguished from, and not to be confused with, the statutory writ of certiorari provided for in this section. Bill Dreiling Motor Co. v. Court of Appeals, 171 Colo. 448, 468 P.2d 37 (1970).

 "Further appeal" not limited to review of affirmances. The legislative authorization for "further appeal" is not limited to cases where the superior court's determination would otherwise end the matter, as in an affirmance of the trial court's judgment. People v. Dee, 638 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1981).

 Review of superior court's reversal permitted. The state supreme court may review by certiorari a superior court's reversal of a county court judgment. People v. Dee, 638 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1981) (decided prior to abolition of superior courts in 1986).

 For the supreme court granting certiorari, see Eyrich v. People, 161 Colo. 554, 423 P.2d 582 (1967).

 Applied in Lucero v. Goldberger, 804 P.2d 206 (Colo. App. 1990); Byrd v. People, 58 P.3d 50 (Colo. 2002).

13-6-311. Appeals from county court - simplified procedure.

Statute text

(1) (a) If either party in a civil action believes that the judgment of the county court is in error, he may appeal to the district court by filing notice of appeal in the county court within fifteen days after the date of entry of judgment and by filing within the said fifteen days an appeal bond with the clerk of the county court. The bond shall be furnished by a corporate surety authorized and licensed to do business in this state as surety, or one or more sufficient private sureties, or may be a cash deposit by the appellant and, if the appeal is taken by the plaintiff, shall be conditioned to pay the costs of the appeal and the counterclaim, if any, and, if the appeal is taken by the defendant, shall be conditioned to pay the costs and judgment if the appealing party fails. The bond shall be approved by the judge or the clerk.

(b) Upon filing of the notice of appeal, the posting and approval of the bond, and the deposit by the appellant of an estimated fee in advance for preparing the record, the county court shall discontinue all further proceedings and recall any execution issued. The appellant shall then docket his appeal in the district court. A motion for new trial is not required as a condition of appeal. If a motion for new trial is made within fifteen days, the time for appeal shall be extended until fifteen days after disposition of the motion, but only matters raised on the motion for new trial shall be considered on an appeal thereafter.

(2) (a) Upon the deposit of the estimated record fee, the clerk of the court shall prepare and issue as soon as possible a record of the proceedings in the county court, including the summons, the complaint, proof of service, and the judgment. The record shall also include a transcription of such part of the actual evidence and other proceedings as the parties may designate or, in lieu of transcription, to which they may stipulate. If a stenographic record has been maintained or the parties agree to stipulate, the party appealing shall lodge with the clerk of the court the reporter's transcript of the designated evidence or proceedings or a stipulation covering such items within forty days after judgment. If the proceedings have been electrically recorded, the transcription of designated evidence and proceedings shall be prepared in the office of the clerk of the county court, either by him or under his supervision, within forty days after judgment.

(b) The clerk shall notify, in writing, the opposing parties of the completion of the record, and the parties have fifteen days within which to file objections. If none are received, the record shall be certified forthwith by the judge. If objections are made, the parties shall be called for hearing and the objections settled by the county judge as soon as possible and the record then certified.

(3) When the record has been duly certified and any additional fees therefor paid, it shall be filed with the clerk of the district court by the clerk of the county court, and the opposing parties shall be notified of such filing by the clerk of the county court.

(4) A written brief setting out matters relied upon as constituting error and outlining any arguments to be made shall be filed in the district court by the appellant within twenty days after filing of the record therein. A copy of the brief shall be served on the appellee. The appellee may file an answering brief within twenty days after such service. In the discretion of the district court, time for filing of briefs and answers may be extended.

(5) Unless there is further review by the supreme court upon writ of certiorari and pursuant to the rules of that court, after final disposition of the appeal by the district court, the judgment on appeal therein shall be certified to the county court for action as directed by the district court, except upon trials de novo held in the district court or in cases in which the judgment is modified, in which cases the judgment shall be that of the district court and enforced therefrom.

(6) Repealed.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 428, § 54. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-16-18. L. 80: (1) and (2)(b) amended, p. 511, § 1, effective April 6. L. 85: (6) repealed, p. 572, § 12, effective November 14, 1986.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations


Analysis


I. General Consideration.
II. Appeal Bond.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

 Law reviews. For comment on Miller v. Miller, appearing below, see 31 Dicta 160 (1954).

 Annotator's note. Since § 13-6-311 is similar to repealed § 37-6-11, CRS 53, CSA, C. 46, §§ 167, 168, and laws antecedent thereto, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

 This section is mandatory; and, although appellant, after the expiration of the prescribed time, dockets his appeal by paying his docket fee, the transcript should be remitted to the lower court on appellee's motion, so that the latter might proceed as though no appeal had been taken. Tierney v. Campbell, 7 Colo. App. 299, 44 P. 948 (1896); Thomas v. Beattie, 42 Colo. 235, 93 P. 1093 (1908).

 Good faith and reasonable promptness are sufficient. On appeal from county to district court, when appellant has acted in good faith, with reasonable promptness, and no one has suffered, this section ought not to be so strictly construed as to deny the right of appeal. Markey v. People, 73 Colo. 466, 216 P. 526 (1923).

 This section requires that after taking an appeal there shall be filed in the district court the record, including original process, pleadings, and other papers relating to the suit, and filed in the county court. Miller v. Miller, 129 Colo. 462, 271 P.2d 411 (1954).

 If appeal is not filed in time, district court lacks jurisdiction. Where a party does not lodge her appeal in a district court within the time required by this section, the court acquires no jurisdiction in the matter and has no authority to proceed in any manner in that action. McKelvey v. District Court, 140 Colo. 557, 345 P.2d 726 (1959).

 A motion to dismiss will be sustained after that time. Where an appeal from the county to the district court was not made within 10 days after the judgment, and no order extending the time in which to perfect an appeal was obtained, a motion to dismiss it should be sustained. Grove v. Foutch, 6 Colo. App. 357, 40 P. 852 (1895); Slattery v. Robinson, 7 Colo. App. 22, 42 P. 179 (1895).

 This section provides for the filing of the original process, pleadings, and other papers with the clerk of a district court and for the docketing of the action in that court in appeals. Andrews v. Lull, 139 Colo. 536, 341 P.2d 475 (1959).

 A motion for new trial filed in apt time suspends a judgment so that it becomes final only when the motion is overruled. Kinney v. Yoelin Bros. Mercantile Co., 74 Colo. 295, 220 P. 998 (1923); Charles v. Sprott, 75 Colo. 90, 224 P. 222 (1924), citing Bates v. Woodward, 66 Colo. 555, 185 P. 351 (1919).

 Time for docketing. Subsection (1)(b) and rule 411(a)(1) of the county court rules clearly provide that the docketing must take place no later than the time allowed for completing and lodging the record. Tumbarello v. Superior Court, 195 Colo. 83, 575 P.2d 431 (1978).

 Section applies only to civil actions. Where an information filed against defendant charges him with misdemeanors, the action is not a civil suit; hence is not governed by this section. Naranjo v. People, 130 Colo. 236, 274 P.2d 607 (1954).

 Appeal to superior court. The district court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the appeal process between the county and superior courts. Petry v. County Court, 666 P.2d 1125 (Colo. App. 1983) (decided prior to abolition of superior courts in 1986).

 Fact that district court may enforce its order in the event that there is no appeal does not impact the appellate process: Proper appeal from district court action is by writ of certiorari to the supreme court. Gallagher v. Ingram, 32 P.3d 50 (Colo. App. 2001).

II. APPEAL BOND.

 The essential step in the perfection of an appeal is the filing of a bond; even though the party had given a notice of appeal, or had in some other manner manifested intent to appeal, the judicial requirement of a bond filed within 10 days would still remain. Wellmuth v. Rogers, 25 Colo. App. 386, 138 P. 69 (1914); Swingle v. Estate of Pollo, 145 Colo. 591, 360 P.2d 808 (1961).

 The filing of bond is a condition precedent to appeal. The filing of the bond required by this section, in the county court, "and its approval by the judge or clerk of said court", is a condition precedent to the appeal, and unless such steps are taken the district court is without jurisdiction. Fuller v. Fuller's Estate, 7 Colo. App. 555, 44 P. 72 (1896).

 An appeal is not made until the bond is approved. This clause requires appeals to the district court to be "made" within 10 days after judgment is rendered. An appeal is not "made" until the appeal bond is approved. Zimmerman v. Combs, 91 Colo. 313, 14 P.2d 693 (1932).

 Giving appeal bond is not equivalent to a general appearance in the district court. This section clearly contemplates that in an appeal from the county to the district court, the appellant, if he has not entered his appearance in the county court, may be heard upon his appeal to object to the form of the summons, or the manner of serving the same, if he made that objection in the county court. Necessarily, therefore, giving of the appeal bond is not equivalent to a general appearance in the district court. White House Mt. Gold Mining Co. v. Powell, 30 Colo. 397, 70 P. 679 (1902).

 Section does not prescribe any particular manner or form in which the appeal bond on appeal from a county court to a district court must be approved. Stephens v. Wheeler, 60 Colo. 351, 153 P. 444 (1915); Zimmerman v. Combs, 91 Colo. 313, 14 P.2d 693 (1932), citing Adams v. Decker, 50 Colo. 326, 114 P. 654 (1911).

 A county court party found to be indigent and allowed to proceed in forma pauperis is not required to post a judgment bond before appealing to district court. O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 186 P.3d 46 (Colo. 2008).

 However, as with appeals from the district court to the court of appeals, the prevailing party in the county court would be able to execute the judgment while the appeal is still pending because the judgment would not have been stayed by a judgment bond. O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 186 P.3d 46 (Colo. 2008).

 Judgment against sureties on appeal bond. On an appeal from the county to the district court from a judgment against the appellant where judgment in the district court is in favor of appellee, the court in entering up an absolute and unconditional judgment against the sureties on the appeal bond does simply what it is required to do by this section. By serving a scire facias upon the sureties they are given an opportunity to show cause why the judgment should not be enforced against them. Gutheil Suburban Inv. Co. v. Fahey, 12 Colo. App. 487, 55 P. 946 (1899).

 Bond not containing proper statutory conditions. Where on appeal from the county court to the district court the appeal bond was conditioned to pay all costs and damages adjudged to the appellee on appeal and to satisfy the judgment appealed from instead of the statutory condition to pay any judgment the district court should render, and the district court rendered a judgment against appellant in a greater amount than that of the county court, the measure of the liability of the sureties on the appeal bond was the original judgment of the county court with interest and costs. Barela v. Tootle, 29 Colo. 52, 66 P. 899 (1901).

 This section is not to be regarded as providing another mode of commencing civil actions; it does not provide for introducing a new cause of action into the suit in which the undertaking is given; but the true construction of the section is that by executing the undertaking the sureties are deemed to consent that they shall, under the contingencies specified in the undertaking, be considered parties to the original suit, and liable to judgment for the original cause of action against their principal. Shannon v. Dodge, 18 Colo. 164, 32 P. 61 (1893).

 For the sufficiency of the bond, see Swingle v. Estate of Pollo, 145 Colo. 591, 360 P.2d 808 (1961).

——————————

PART 4
COUNTY COURT - SMALL CLAIMS DIVISION

Annotations

 Law reviews: For article, "Changes to the Statutes and Rules Governing Procedures in Colorado Small Claims Courts", see 31 Colo. Law. 29 (February 2002).

13-6-401. Legislative declaration.

Statute text

The general assembly hereby finds and declares that individuals, partnerships, corporations, and associations frequently do not pursue meritorious small civil claims because of the disproportion between the expense and time of counsel and litigation and the amount of money or property involved; that the law and procedures of civil litigation are technical and frequently unknown to persons who are representing themselves; that procedures for the inexpensive, speedy, and informal resolution of small claims in a forum where the rules of substantive law apply, but the rules of procedure and pleading and the technical rules of evidence do not apply, are desirable; that such procedures should be conducted at times convenient to the persons using them, including evening and Saturday sessions; that the personnel implementing and conducting such procedures should be trained and equipped to assist anyone with a small claim in a friendly, efficient, and courteous manner; and that, therefore, the establishment of a small claims division of the county court as provided in this part 4 is in the public interest.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 517, § 1, effective October 1. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 789, § 1, effective June 19. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1512, § 1, effective September 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 The rules of substantive law apply in small claims actions. Hamilton v. Thompson, 23 P.3d 114 (Colo. 2001).

13-6-402. Establishment of small claims division.

Statute text

There is hereby established in each county court a division designated as the small claims court.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 517, § 1, effective October 1.

13-6-403. Jurisdiction of small claims court - limitations.

Statute text

(1) On and after January 1, 1996, the small claims court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction with the county and district courts in all civil actions in which the debt, damage, or value of the personal property claimed by either the plaintiff or the defendant, exclusive of interest and cost, does not exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars, including such civil penalties as may be provided by law. By way of further example, and not limitation, the small claims court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine actions in tort and assess damages therein not to exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars. The small claims court division shall also have concurrent original jurisdiction with the county and district courts in actions where a party seeks to enforce a restrictive covenant on residential property and the amount required to comply with the covenant does not exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars, exclusive of interest and costs, in actions where a party seeks replevin if the value of the property sought does not exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars, and in actions where a party seeks to enforce a contract by specific performance or to disaffirm, avoid, or rescind a contract and the amount at issue does not exceed seven thousand five hundred dollars.

(2) The small claims court shall have no jurisdiction except that specifically conferred upon it by law. In particular, it shall have no jurisdiction over the following matters:

(a) Those matters excluded from county court jurisdiction under section 13-6-105 (1);

(b) Actions involving claims of defamation by libel or slander;

(c) Actions of forcible entry, forcible detainer, or unlawful detainer;

(d) and (e) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2001, p. 1512, § 2, effective September 1, 2001.)

(f) Actions brought or defended on behalf of a class;

(g) Actions requesting or involving prejudgment remedies;

(h) Actions involving injunctive relief, except as required to:

(I) Enforce restrictive covenants on residential property;

(II) Enforce the provisions of section 6-1-702.5, C.R.S.;

(III) Accomplish replevin; and

(IV) Enter judgments in actions where a party seeks to enforce a contract by specific performance or to disaffirm, avoid, or rescind a contract;

(i) Traffic violations and other criminal matters;

(j) Awards of body executions.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 518, § 1, effective October 1. L. 81: (1) amended, p. 879, § 2, effective July 1. L. 87: (1) amended, p. 544, § 1, effective July 1. L. 88: (1), (2)(e), and (2)(h) amended, p. 601, § 2, effective July 1. L. 90: (1) amended, p. 849, § 4, effective May 31; (1) amended, p. 855, § 4, effective July 1. L. 95: (1) amended, p. 728, § 1, effective January 1, 1996. L. 2000: (2)(h) amended, p. 2034, § 3, effective August 2. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1512, § 2, effective September 1. L. 2008: (2)(h)(II) amended, p. 596, § 5, effective August 5.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act amending subsection (1), see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Small claims court actions for monetary damages do not bar on the basis of res judicata subsequent 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for equitable relief in federal court. Ortiz v. Costilla County Bd. of Comm'rs, 11 F. Supp.2d 1254 (D. Colo. 1998).

13-6-404. Clerk of the small claims court.

Statute text

The clerk of the county court or a deputy designated by said clerk shall act as the clerk of the small claims court. The clerk of the small claims court shall provide such assistance as may be requested by any person regarding the jurisdiction, operations, and procedures of the small claims court; however, the clerk shall not engage in the practice of law. All necessary forms shall be available from the clerk.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 518, § 1, effective October 1.

13-6-405. Magistrate in small claims court.

Statute text

(1) In the following circumstances, a magistrate may hear and decide claims in a small claims court:

(a) In Class A counties, as defined in section 13-6-201, magistrates for small claims may be appointed by the presiding judge.

(b) In Class B counties, as defined in section 13-6-201, magistrates for small claims may be appointed, pursuant to section 13-3-105, if approved by the chief justice.

(2) A magistrate shall be a qualified attorney-at-law admitted to practice in the state of Colorado or a nonattorney if the nonattorney is serving as a county judge pursuant to section 13-6-203.

(3) While acting as a magistrate for small claims, a magistrate shall have the same powers as a judge.

(3.5) A magistrate shall have the power to solemnize marriages pursuant to the procedures in section 14-2-109, C.R.S.

(4) If any party files a timely written objection, pursuant to rule of the supreme court, with the magistrate conducting the hearing, that party's case shall be rereferred to a judge.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 518, § 1, effective October 1. L. 84: (2) amended, p. 459, § 1, effective April 5. L. 89: (3.5) added, p. 782, § 4, effective April 4. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 356, § 10, effective April 9. L. 2001: (2) and (4) amended, p. 1513, § 3, effective September 1.

Annotations

 Cross references: For magistrates in county courts, see part 5 of this article; for magistrates in district courts, see § 13-5-201.

13-6-406. Schedule of hearings.

Statute text

The small claims court shall conduct hearings at such times as the judge or magistrate may determine or as the supreme court may order.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 518, § 1, effective October 1. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 356, § 11, effective April 9.

13-6-407. Parties - representation.

Statute text

(1) Any natural person, corporation, partnership, association, or other organization may commence or defend an action in the small claims court, but no assignee or other person not a real party to the transaction which is the subject of the action may commence an action therein, except as a court-appointed personal representative, conservator, or guardian of the real party in interest.

(2) (a) (I) Notwithstanding the provisions of article 5 of title 12, C.R.S., in the small claims court, an individual shall represent himself or herself; a partnership shall be represented by an active general partner or an authorized full-time employee; a union shall be represented by an authorized active union member or full-time employee; a for-profit corporation shall be represented by one of its full-time officers or full-time employees; an association shall be represented by one of its active members or by a full-time employee of the association; and any other kind of organization or entity shall be represented by one of its active members or full-time employees or, in the case of a nonprofit corporation, a duly elected nonattorney officer or an employee.

(II) It is the intent of this section that no attorney, except pro se or as an authorized full-time employee or active general partner of a partnership, an authorized active member or full-time employee of a union, a full-time officer or full-time employee of a for-profit corporation, or a full-time employee or active member of an association, which partnership, union, corporation, or association is a party, shall appear or take any part in the filing or prosecution or defense of any matter in the small claims court, except as permitted by supreme court rule.

(b) In actions arising under part 1 of article 12 of title 38, C.R.S., including, but not limited to, actions involving claims for the recovery of a security deposit or for damage to property arising from a landlord-tenant relationship, a property manager who has received security deposits, rents, or both, or who has signed a lease agreement on behalf of the owner of the real property that is the subject of the small claims action, shall be permitted to represent the owner of the property in such action.

(3) In any action to which the federal "Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940", as amended, 50 App. U.S.C. sec. 521, is applicable, the court may enter a default against a defendant who is in the military without entering judgment, and the court shall appoint an attorney to represent the interests of the defendant prior to the entry of judgment against the defendant.

(4) If an attorney appears, as permitted in subsection (2) or (3) of this section, the other party or parties in the case may be represented by counsel, if such party or parties so choose.

(5) Nothing contained in this section is intended to limit or otherwise interfere with a party's right to assign, or to employ counsel to pursue that party's rights and remedies subsequent to the entry of judgment by a small claims court.

(6) Any small claims court action in which an attorney appears shall be processed and tried pursuant to the statutes and court rules governing small claims court actions.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 519, § 1, effective October 1. L. 88: (2) amended, pp. 602, 1438, §§ 3, 43, effective July 1. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1514, § 4, effective September 1. L. 2007: (3) amended, p. 2024, § 23, effective June 1.

Annotations

 Cross references: For representation of closely held corporations before courts or administrative agencies, see § 13-1-127.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "What Is a Lawyer Doing in Small Claims Court?", see 13 Colo. Law. 430 (1984).

 This section contains the only exception to the principle that a partnership is an entity separate and apart from its general partners and may be represented in court only by a licensed attorney. E & A Assoc. v. First Nat. Bank of Denver, 899 P.2d 243 (Colo. App. 1994).

13-6-408. Counterclaims exceeding jurisdiction of small claims court - procedures - sanctions for improper assertion.

Statute text

Counterclaims exceeding the jurisdiction of the small claims court shall be removed to the county or district court of appropriate jurisdiction pursuant to rule of the supreme court. If a county or district court determines that a plaintiff who originally filed a claim in the small claims court is entitled to judgment and also that a counterclaim against the same plaintiff in the small claims action was filed solely to defeat the jurisdiction of the small claims court and was without merit, the county or district court may also award the plaintiff costs, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred in prosecuting the action in the county or district court.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 519, § 1, effective October 1. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 1576, § 14, effective July 10. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1515, § 5, effective September 1.

13-6-409. Trial procedure.

Statute text

The judge or magistrate shall conduct the trial in such manner as to do justice between the parties and shall not be bound by formal rules or statutes of procedure or pleading or the technical rules of evidence, except for rules promulgated by the supreme court controlling the conduct of proceedings in the small claims court.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 519, § 1, effective October 1. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 789, § 2, effective June 19. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 356, § 12, effective April 9.

13-6-410. Appeal of a claim.

Statute text

A record shall be made of all small claims court proceedings, and either the plaintiff or the defendant may appeal pursuant to county court rules. Upon appeal, all provisions of law and rules concerning appeals from the county court shall apply, including right to counsel. A tape recording of the trial proceedings shall satisfy any requirements of a transcript for appeal, upon the payment of a nominal fee by the appellant.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 519, § 1, effective October 1. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 1775, § 32, effective June 6. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1515, § 6, effective September 1.

13-6-411. Limitation on number of claims filed.

Statute text

(1) No plaintiff may file more than two claims per month, eighteen claims per year, in the small claims court of any county. Each claim filed in any small claims court shall contain a certification by the plaintiff that the plaintiff has not filed any more than two claims during that month and eighteen claims in that year in the small claims court of that county.

(2) The limitation imposed by subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a state-supported institution of higher education which files claims to recover loans or other outstanding obligations due to such institution; except that no such state-supported institution of higher education shall file more than a total of thirty such claims per month in all small claims courts in Colorado.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 520, § 1, effective October 1. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 880, § 3, effective July 1. L. 83: Entire section amended, p. 792, § 1, effective June 3. L. 87: (1) amended, p. 544, § 2, effective July 1. L. 92: Entire section amended, p. 289, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2001: (1) amended, p. 1515, § 7, effective September 1.

13-6-411.5. Place of trial.

Statute text

(1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, all actions in the small claims court shall be brought in the county in which any defendant at the time of filing of the claim resides, is regularly employed, is a student at an institution of higher education, or has an office for the transaction of business.

(2) Actions to enforce restrictive covenants and actions arising under part 1 of article 12 of title 38, C.R.S., including, but not limited to, actions involving claims for the recovery of a security deposit or for damage to property arising from a landlord-tenant relationship, may be brought in the county in which the defendant's property that is the subject of the action is situated.

(3) If a defendant appears and defends a small claims action on the merits at trial, such defendant shall be deemed to have waived any objection to the place of trial permitted under this section.

History

 Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 850, § 5, effective May 31. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1515, § 8, effective September 1.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act enacting this section, see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990.

13-6-412. Notice to public.

Statute text

The clerk of the small claims court shall publicize in an appropriate manner the existence of the small claims court, its procedures, and its hours of operation. Such publication shall be made so as to bring the court's existence to the attention of the entire community. The state court administrator shall publish a small claims court handbook outlining the procedures of the court in layman's language.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 520, § 1, effective October 1.

13-6-413. Supreme court shall promulgate rules.

Statute text

The supreme court shall implement this part 4 by appropriate rules of procedure for the small claims court.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 520, § 1, effective October 1.

13-6-414. No jury trial.

Statute text

There shall be no right to a trial by jury in the small claims court.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 520, § 1, effective October 1.

13-6-415. Service of process.

Statute text

Every defendant shall be notified that an action has been filed against that defendant in the small claims court either by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by personal service of process, as provided by the rules of procedure for the small claims court. The clerk of the small claims court shall collect, in advance, the fee provided for in section 13-32-104 (1) (i) for each service of process attempted by certified mail.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 520, § 1, effective October 1. L. 90: Entire section amended, p. 850, § 7, effective May 31. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1516, § 9, effective September 1.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act amending this section, see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990.

13-6-416. Facilities.

Statute text

No county shall be required to furnish new facilities pursuant to this part 4.

History

 Source: L. 76: Entire part added, p. 520, § 3, effective October 1.

13-6-417. Execution and proceedings subsequent to judgment.

Statute text

Execution and proceedings subsequent to judgment entered in the small claims division may be processed in the small claims division and shall be the same as in a civil action in the county court as provided by law.

History

 Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 850, § 5, effective May 31.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act enacting this section, see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990.

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PART 5
MAGISTRATE ADJUDICATION SYSTEM

Annotations

 Cross references: For magistrates in the small claims division of county courts, see § 13-6-405; for magistrates in district courts, see § 13-5-201.

13-6-501. County court magistrates - qualifications - duties.

Statute text

(1) In Class A counties, as defined in section 13-6-201, county court magistrates may be appointed by the presiding judge.

(2) In Class B counties, as defined in section 13-6-201, county court magistrates may be appointed pursuant to section 13-3-105, if approved by the chief justice.

(3) Any county court magistrate shall be a qualified attorney-at-law admitted to practice in the state of Colorado and in good standing; except that a county court magistrate who hears only class A and class B traffic infraction matters need not be an attorney-at-law and except that any duly appointed county judge may act as a traffic magistrate regardless of whether he is an attorney-at-law.

(4) Subject to the provision that no magistrate may preside in any trial by jury, county court magistrates shall have power to hear the following matters:

(a) Class 2 misdemeanor traffic offenses and class A and class B traffic infractions, as defined in section 42-4-1701, C.R.S.;

(b) Such other matters as determined by rule of the supreme court.

(4.5) County court magistrates shall have the power to solemnize marriages pursuant to the procedures in section 14-2-109, C.R.S.

(4.7) County court magistrates shall have the power to preside over matters specified in section 13-17.5-105.

(5) Except in class A and class B traffic infraction matters, before a county court magistrate may hear any matter, all parties thereto shall have waived, on the record, their right to proceed before a county judge. If any party fails to waive such right, or objects to the magistrate, that party's case shall be rereferred to a county judge.

(6) Magistrates, when handling county court matters and class A and class B traffic infraction matters and where the parties to such proceedings, other than traffic infraction matters, shall have waived their right to proceed before a county judge, shall have all the jurisdiction and power of a county judge, and their orders and judgments shall be those of the county court.

(7) Procedure in matters heard by a county court magistrate shall be determined by statute and by rules promulgated by the supreme court and by local rules.

(8) The duties, qualifications, compensation, conditions of employment, and other administrative details concerning magistrates who hear traffic infraction matters not set forth in this part 5 shall be established in accordance with the provisions of section 13-3-105.

(9) The supreme court shall adopt such rules and regulations as it deems necessary or proper to carry out the provisions of this part 5 relating to traffic infraction matters, including, but not limited to, procedural matters.

(10) Existing space provided by a county, including already existing courtroom and administrative space, shall be used to the maximum extent possible for hearings on traffic infraction matters.

(11) Before any county court magistrate is appointed pursuant to the provisions of this part 5, the judicial department shall consult with the board of county commissioners of the affected county or counties regarding any additional space or facilities that may be required. All feasible alternatives shall be considered and the least costly alternative shall be accepted by the department whenever practicable.

History

 Source: L. 77: Entire part added, p. 791, § 1, effective January 1, 1978. L. 82: (3), (4)(a), (5), and (6) amended and (8) to (11) added, p. 653, § 1, effective January 1, 1983. L. 83: (3) amended, p. 602, § 2, effective July 1. L. 87: (4)(a) amended, p. 1495, § 1, effective July 1. L. 89: (4.5) added, p. 782, § 5, effective April 4. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 357, § 13, effective April 9. L. 94: (4)(a) amended, p. 2549, § 31, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: (4.7) added, p. 480, § 3, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Salutary purposes of informal traffic infraction hearings would be frustrated if collateral estoppel were to be applied so as to limit a full and fair consideration of the issue in a criminal trial. Williamsen v. People, 735 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1987).

 Magistrates exercise authority only at the discretion of the judges who appoint them. Therefore no impropriety in the provision of a court memorandum prohibiting magistrates from conducting bond hearings. Wiegand v. Larimer County Court Magistrate, 937 P.2d 880 (Colo. App. 1996).

13-6-502. Jury trials.

Statute text

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 16-10-109, C.R.S., or any other provision of law, the right to a jury trial shall not be available at a hearing before a magistrate where the cited person is charged with a class A or a class B traffic infraction.

History

 Source: L. 82: Entire section added, p. 654, § 2, effective January 1, 1983. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 1775, § 33, effective June 6.

13-6-503. Evidence offered by officer.

Statute text

At any hearing on a class A or class B traffic infraction, the officer who issued the citation shall offer evidence of the facts concerning the alleged infraction either in person or by affidavit, as such affidavit may be established by rules adopted by the supreme court pursuant to section 13-6-501 (9). If such officer appears personally, the magistrate and the cited person may then examine such officer. The cited party shall have the right to call the officer by subpoena as in the case of other civil matters.

History

 Source: L. 82: Entire section added, p. 654, § 2, effective January 1, 1983. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 358, § 14, effective April 9.

13-6-504. Appeals procedure.

Statute text

(1) Any appeal, either by the state or the cited person, from a judgment entered pursuant to this part 5 shall be processed as an appeal from the county court.

(2) The district attorney or deputy district attorney shall represent the state on the appeal.

(3) The state may appeal only a ruling by a magistrate that declares a state statute unconstitutional or unenforceable. Whether or not to appeal shall be in the discretion of the district attorney.

History

 Source: L. 82: Entire section added, p. 654, § 2, effective January 1, 1983. L. 91: (3) amended, p. 358, § 15, effective April 9.

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ARTICLE 7
SUPERIOR COURTS

13-7-101 to 13-7-112. (Repealed)

History

 Source: L. 85: Entire article repealed, p. 572, § 12, effective November 14, 1986.

Annotations

 Editor's note: (1) This article was numbered as article 10 of chapter 37, C.R.S. 1963. For amendments to this article prior to its repeal in 1986, consult the Colorado statutory research explanatory note and the table itemizing the replacement volumes and supplements to the original volume of C.R.S. 1973 beginning on page vii in the front of this volume.

 (2) Section 13 of the act that eliminated the superior courts, House Bill No. 1074, L. 85, p. 572, § 13, provided the following: "All cases and matters pending in superior courts on November 14, 1986, shall be transferred to the district court in the county or in the city and county in which the superior court is located. No bond or obligation given in any case or matter transferred to the district court shall be affected by the transfer of jurisdiction."

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ARTICLE 8
JUVENILE COURT OF DENVER


Section

13-8-101. Establishment.

13-8-102. Court of record - powers.

13-8-103. Jurisdiction.

13-8-104. Number of judges.

13-8-105. Qualifications of judges.

13-8-106. Activities of judge.

13-8-107. Term of office.

13-8-108. Vacancies.

13-8-109. Magistrates.

13-8-110. Clerk.

13-8-111. Other employees.

13-8-112. Judges may sit en banc - presiding judge.

13-8-113. Judges to sit separately.

13-8-114. Practice and procedure.

13-8-115. Rules of court.

13-8-116. Terms.

13-8-117. Seal.

13-8-118. Process.

13-8-119. Venue.

13-8-120. Sheriff to attend.

13-8-121. Appearance by district attorney and city attorney.

13-8-122. Juries.

13-8-123. Judgments.

13-8-124. Appellate review.

13-8-125. Fees.

13-8-126. Supervision by supreme court.

13-8-101. Establishment.

Statute text

Pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of article VI of the Colorado constitution, there is hereby established the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 437, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "The Denver Juvenile Court", see Den. B. Ass'n R. 1 (May 1928). For article, "Colorado's New Court System", see 41 Den. L. Ctr. J. 140 (1964).

13-8-102. Court of record - powers.

Statute text

The juvenile court shall be a court of record with such powers as are inherent in constitutionally created courts and with such legal and equitable powers to effectuate its jurisdiction and carry out its orders, judgments, and decrees as are possessed by the district courts.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 437, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-2.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Jurisdiction to enter money judgment against Denver department of social services. It is within the jurisdiction of the Denver juvenile court to enter a money judgment against the Denver department of social services to require payment for the costs of the care and maintenance of a minor found to be a child in need of supervision. City & County of Denver v. Brockhurst Boys Ranch, Inc., 195 Colo. 22, 575 P.2d 843 (1978).

 Enforcement of a money judgment against the Denver department of social services for payments that should have gone to party is within the juvenile court's jurisdiction. People in Interest of D.C., 797 P.2d 840 (Colo. App. 1990).

 Applied in People in Interest of R.J.G., 38 Colo. App. 148, 557 P.2d 1214 (1976).

13-8-103. Jurisdiction.

Statute text

The jurisdiction of the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver is as set forth in sections 19-1-104, 19-2-104, and 19-4-109, C.R.S., for juvenile courts, as defined in section 19-1-103 (70), C.R.S.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 437, § 3. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-3. L. 67: p. 1051, § 7. L. 78: (1)(h) amended, p. 262, § 44, effective May 23; (1)(b) amended, p. 367, § 13, effective July 1, 1979. L. 84: (2) amended, p. 560, § 8, effective April 5. L. 85: (1)(d)(I) amended, p. 688, § 7, effective March 1; entire section R&RE, p. 690, § 1, effective July 1. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 813, § 6, effective October 1. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1688, § 14, effective January 1, 1997.

Annotations

 Editor's note: Subsection (1)(d)(I) was amended in House Bill 85-1005. Those amendments were superseded by the repeal and reenactment of the section in House Bill 85-1272.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 The juvenile court is a statutory court with no jurisdiction beyond that expressly given by statute. Maniatis v. Karakitsios, 161 Colo. 378, 422 P.2d 52 (1967) (decided under repealed § 37-9-2, C.R.S. 1963).

 No general jurisdiction to litigate controversies arising outside jurisdictional areas encompassed within this section. City & County of Denver v. Brockhurst Boys Ranch, Inc., 195 Colo. 22, 575 P.2d 843 (1978).

 Order to Denver department of welfare within court's jurisdiction. The juvenile court did not exceed its jurisdiction, or lack jurisdiction, to order the Denver department of welfare to return a child who was adjudicated in need of supervision to a group care facility. City & County of Denver v. Juvenile Court, 182 Colo. 157, 511 P.2d 898 (1973).

 Denver juvenile court was within its jurisdiction in ordering the Denver department of social services to refund respondent's federal tax refund which had been obtained through a federal income tax refund intercept program designed to collect delinquent child support payment. People in Interest of G.S., 678 P.2d 1033 (Colo. App. 1983).

 The juvenile court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition to determine the paternity of an unborn child. The juvenile court may, in its discretion in a proper case, issue temporary orders providing for protection, support, or medical or surgical treatment as it deems in the best interest of the child prior to adjudication or disposition of the petition to determine paternity. People in Interest of an Unborn Child v. Estergard, 169 Colo. 445, 457 P.2d 698 (1969).

13-8-104. Number of judges.

Statute text

There shall be three judges of the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 438, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-4. L. 73: p. 496, § 1.

13-8-105. Qualifications of judges.

Statute text

A judge of the juvenile court shall be a qualified elector of the city and county of Denver at the time of his election or selection and shall have been licensed to practice law in the state of Colorado for five years at such time. He shall be a resident of the city and county of Denver during his term of office.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 438, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-5.

13-8-106. Activities of judge.

Statute text

A judge of the juvenile court shall devote his full time to judicial duties and shall not engage in the private practice of law while serving in office.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 438, § 6. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-6.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 License of attorney revoked for violating this section. An attorney who, while occupying the position of juvenile judge, practiced his profession for compensation in violation of this section, held guilty of unprofessional conduct, his license revoked, and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors at law in this state. People ex rel. Colo. Bar Ass'n v. Lindsey, 86 Colo. 458, 283 P. 539 (1929) (decided under repealed CSA, C. 46, § 205).

13-8-107. Term of office.

Statute text

The term of office of a judge of the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver shall be six years.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 439, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-8. L. 67: p.459, § 16. L. 73: p. 496, § 2.

13-8-108. Vacancies.

Statute text

If the office of juvenile court judge becomes vacant because of death, resignation, failure to be retained in office pursuant to section 25 of article VI of the state constitution, or other cause, the vacancy shall be filled by the governor as provided in section 20 of article VI of the state constitution.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 439, § 9. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-9. L. 67: p. 459, § 17.

13-8-109. Magistrates.

Statute text

The judges of the juvenile court of the city and county of Denver may appoint magistrates, as provided in section 19-1-108, C.R.S.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 440, § 11. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-11. L. 67: p. 1052, § 8. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 764, § 14, effective July 1. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 813, § 7, effective October 1. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 1109, § 60, effective May 31.

13-8-110. Clerk.

Statute text

(1) The judges of the juvenile court shall appoint a clerk of the juvenile court pursuant to the provisions of section 13-3-105.

(2) Repealed.

(3) The powers and duties of the clerk of the juvenile court shall be similar to the powers and duties of the clerk of the district court. The duties of the clerk of the juvenile court shall also include such matters as may be assigned to him by law, by court rules, and by the juvenile judges.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 440, § 12. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-12. L. 69: p. 252, § 20. L. 79: (2) amended, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1; (2) repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1.

Annotations

 Editor's note: Subsection (2) was amended in Senate Bill 79-274. Those amendments were superseded by the repeal of subsection (2) in House Bill 79-1206.

13-8-111. Other employees.

Statute text

The judges of the juvenile court shall also appoint, pursuant to the provisions of section 13-3-105, probation officers and such other employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions and duties of the juvenile court, including the clerk's office thereof.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 441, § 13. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-13. L. 69: p. 252, § 21. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 600, § 20, effective July 1.

13-8-112. Judges may sit en banc - presiding judge.

Statute text

The judges of the juvenile court may sit en banc for the purpose of making rules of court, the appointment of a clerk and other employees pursuant to section 13-3-105, and the conduct of other business relating to the administration of the court, including the selection of a presiding judge, as authorized by and subject to the approval of the chief justice of the supreme court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 441, § 14. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-14. L. 67: p. 460, § 19. L. 69: p. 253, § 22.

13-8-113. Judges to sit separately.

Statute text

In the juvenile court, each of the judges shall sit separately for the trial of cases and the transaction of judicial business, and each of the courts so held shall be known as the juvenile court. Each judge shall have all of the powers which he might have if he were the sole judge of the court, including the power to vacate his own judgments, decrees, or orders, or those of a predecessor when permitted by law, but not juvenile court orders of another judge of the juvenile court who is still in office.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 441, § 15. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-15.

13-8-114. Practice and procedure.

Statute text

Practice and procedure in the juvenile court shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this article and title 19, C.R.S.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 441, § 16. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-16. L. 67: p. 1052, § 9.

13-8-115. Rules of court.

Statute text

The juvenile court has the power to make rules for the conduct of its business to the extent that such rules are not in conflict with the rules of the supreme court or the laws of the state but are supplementary thereto. Juvenile court rules are subject to review by the supreme court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 17. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-17.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 A local rule of court is reviewable pursuant to this statute. In re Rules by Juvenile Court, 178 Colo. 268, 496 P.2d 1014 (1972).

 A memorandum opinion is not reviewable under this section. To the extent that a memorandum opinion is or may be construed by some as a local rule, it is not, in the manner and under the circumstances under which it is rendered, reviewable under this section. In re Rules by Juvenile Court, 178 Colo. 268, 496 P.2d 1014 (1972).

13-8-116. Terms.

Statute text

Terms of the juvenile court shall be fixed by rule of court; but at least one term shall be held each year.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 18. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-18.

13-8-117. Seal.

Statute text

The juvenile court shall have a seal, bearing upon the face thereof the words "The Juvenile Court of the City and County of Denver, Colorado".

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 19. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-19.

13-8-118. Process.

Statute text

The juvenile court has the power to issue process necessary to acquire jurisdiction, to require attendance, and to enforce all orders, decrees, and judgments. Such process runs to any county within the state and, when authorized by law in special proceedings or, in the absence thereof, by the Colorado rules of civil procedure in civil cases, or the Colorado rules of criminal procedure in criminal cases, may be served outside of the state. Any sheriff to whom process is directed is authorized and required to execute the same and shall be entitled to the same fees as are allowed by law for serving like process from the district court. Persons other than the sheriff or his deputies also may serve process from the juvenile court when permitted by law in special proceedings or, in the absence thereof, by the Colorado rules of civil procedure in civil cases or the Colorado rules of criminal procedure in criminal cases.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 20. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-20.

13-8-119. Venue.

Statute text

Venue in the juvenile court shall be as provided in sections 19-2-105, 19-3-201, 19-4-109, 19-5-102, 19-5-204, and 19-6-102, C.R.S.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 21. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-21. L. 67: p. 1053, § 10. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 813, § 8, effective October 1. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1688, § 15, effective January 1, 1997.

13-8-120. Sheriff to attend.

Statute text

It is the duty of the sheriff of the city and county of Denver to attend in the juvenile court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 22. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-22.

13-8-121. Appearance by district attorney and city attorney.

Statute text

Upon the request of the court, the district attorney shall represent the state in the interest of the child in any proceedings brought under section 19-1-104 (1) (a), C.R.S., and the city attorney shall represent the state in the interest of the child in any other proceedings.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 23. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-23. L. 67: p. 1053, § 11.

13-8-122. Juries.

Statute text

When required, juries may be selected and summoned as provided for courts of record in articles 71 to 74 of this title. With the permission of the district court, the juvenile court may use the panel of jurors summoned for the district court of the second judicial district.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 442, § 24. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-24. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1270, § 16, effective June 5.

13-8-123. Judgments.

Statute text

The judgments of the juvenile court shall be enforceable in the same manner as judgments of the district court and, when appropriate, may be made liens upon real estate or other property in the manner provided by law for judgments of the district court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 443, § 25. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-25.

Annotations

 Cross references: For procedures for attachment and duration of a judgment lien, see § 13-52-102.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Jurisdiction to enter money judgment against Denver department of social services. It is within the jurisdiction of the Denver juvenile court to enter a money judgment against the Denver department of social services to require payment for the costs of the care and maintenance of a minor found to be a child in need of supervision. City & County of Denver v. Brockhurst Boys Ranch, Inc., 195 Colo. 22, 575 P.2d 843 (1978).

 Applied in People in Interest of R.J.G., 38 Colo. App. 148, 557 P.2d 1214 (1976).

13-8-124. Appellate review.

Statute text

Appellate review of any order, decree, or judgment may be taken to the supreme court or the court of appeals, as provided by law and the Colorado appellate rules. Initials shall appear on the record on appeal in place of the name of the child. Appeals from orders or decrees concerning legal custody, the allocation of parental responsibilities, termination of parent-child legal relationships, and adoptions shall be advanced upon the calendar of the supreme court or of the court of appeals and shall be decided at the earliest practicable time.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 443, § 26. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-26. L. 67: p.1053, § 12. L. 69: p. 270, § 9. L. 77: Entire section amended, p. 1029, § 2, effective July 1. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 813, § 9, effective October 1. L. 98: Entire section amended, p. 1392, § 25, effective February 1, 1999.

13-8-125. Fees.

Statute text

The fees charged by the juvenile court and the clerk thereof shall be those provided in article 32 of this title.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 443, § 27. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-27.

13-8-126. Supervision by supreme court.

Statute text

The supervisory powers of the supreme court established by article 3 of this title shall extend to the juvenile court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 444, § 30. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-19-30.

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ARTICLE 9
PROBATE COURT OF DENVER

Annotations

 Cross references: For the Colorado rules of probate procedure, see chapter 27 of the Colorado court rules.


Section

13-9-101. Establishment.

13-9-102. Court of record - powers.

13-9-103. Jurisdiction.

13-9-104. Number of judges.

13-9-105. Qualifications of judges.

13-9-106. Compensation of judges.

13-9-107. Appointment and term of office.

13-9-108. Vacancies.

13-9-109. Clerk.

13-9-110. Other employees.

13-9-111. Practice and procedure.

13-9-112. Rules of court.

13-9-113. Terms.

13-9-114. Seal.

13-9-115. Process.

13-9-116. Venue.

13-9-117. Juries.

13-9-118. Judgments.

13-9-119. Appeals.

13-9-120. Fees.

13-9-121. Funds.

13-9-122. Supervision by supreme court.

13-9-123. National instant criminal background check system - reporting.

13-9-101. Establishment.

Statute text

Pursuant to the provisions of section 1 of article VI of the Colorado constitution, there is hereby established the probate court of the city and county of Denver.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 445, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-1.

13-9-102. Court of record - powers.

Statute text

The probate court shall be a court of record with such powers as are inherent in constitutionally created courts and with such legal and equitable powers to effectuate its jurisdiction and carry out its orders, judgments, and decrees as are possessed by the district courts.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 445, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-2.

13-9-103. Jurisdiction.

Statute text

(1) The probate court of the city and county of Denver has original and exclusive jurisdiction in said city and county of:

(a) The administration, settlement, and distribution of estates of decedents, wards, and absentees;

(b) Property vested in any person under a legal disability but paid to or held by another for such person's use or benefit as authorized by court order or as authorized by a power contained in a will or trust instrument;

(c) Property vested in any minor pursuant to the "Colorado Uniform Transfers to Minors Act", or any predecessor act thereto, or any act having a substantially similar legal effect;

(d) The probate of wills;

(e) The granting of letters testamentary, of administration, of guardianship, and of conservatorship;

(f) The administration of guardianships of minors and of mentally competent persons and of conservatorships of persons with mental illness or mentally deficient persons and of absentees;

(g) Proceedings under article 23 of title 17 and articles 10 to 15 of title 27, C.R.S.;

(h) The determination of heirship in probate proceedings and the devolution of title to property in probate proceedings;

(i) Actions on the official bonds of fiduciaries appointed by it;

(j) The construction of wills;

(k) The administration of testamentary trusts, except as provided in subsection (2) of this section; and

(l) All other probate matters.

(2) If a testamentary trust is established by the will of the decedent and if it appears that it was not the intention of the testator that the court should continue the administration of the estate after the payment in full of all debts and legacies except the trust property, the court shall proceed to final settlement of such estate as in other cases, order the trust fund or property to be turned over to the trustee as such, and shall not require the filing of inventories and accounts, or supervise the administration of the trust; except that any party in interest of such trust, including the trustee thereof, may invoke the jurisdiction of the probate court with respect to any matters pertaining to the administration or distribution of such trust or to construe the will under which it was established.

(3) The court has jurisdiction to determine every legal and equitable question arising in connection with decedents', wards', and absentees' estates, so far as the question concerns any person who is before the court by reason of any asserted right in any of the property of the estate or by reason of any asserted obligation to the estate, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the jurisdiction:

(a) To give full and complete legal and equitable relief in any case in which it is alleged that the decedent breached an agreement to make or not to make a will;

(b) In any case in which a district court could grant such relief in a separate action brought therein, to impose or raise a trust with respect to any of the property of the decedent or any property in the name of the decedent, individually or in any other capacity, in any case in which the demand for such relief arises in connection with the administration of the estate of a decedent;

(c) To partition any of the real or personal property of any estate in connection with the settlement thereof.

(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent any district court sitting in law or equity from construing a will which is not before the probate court or from determining questions arising in connection with trusts which are not under the jurisdiction of the probate court.

(5) The court has jurisdiction to determine every legal and equitable question arising out of or in connection with express trusts.

(6) The provisions of articles 10 to 20 of title 15, article 23 of title 17, and articles 10 to 15 of title 27, C.R.S., shall govern the issuance and service and proof of service of any process, notice, citation, writ, or order of court and shall govern all other proceedings had pursuant to the powers of the court recited in subsections (1) and (2) of this section. The Colorado rules of civil procedure shall govern such matters when the proceedings are had pursuant to the powers granted to the court under any of the other provisions of this section.

(7) With respect to any trust established by or for an individual with his or her assets, income, or property of any kind, notwithstanding any statutory provision to the contrary, the court shall not authorize, direct, or ratify any trust that either has the effect of qualifying or purports to qualify the trust beneficiary for federal supplemental security income, or public or medical assistance pursuant to title 26, C.R.S., unless the trust meets the criteria set forth in sections 15-14-412.6 to 15-14-412.9, C.R.S., and any rule adopted by the medical services board pursuant to section 25.5-6-103, C.R.S.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 445, § 3. L. 65: pp. 483, 484, §§ 1, 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-3. L. 67: p. 103, § 1. L. 79: (1)(g) and (6) amended, p. 1634, § 22, effective July 19. L. 84: (1)(c) amended, p. 394, § 4, effective July 1. L. 94: (7) added, p. 1604, § 13, effective July 1. L. 2000: (7) amended, p. 1832, § 3, effective January 1, 2001. L. 2006: (7) amended, p. 2001, § 46, effective July 1; (1)(f) amended, p. 1395, § 35, effective August 7.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the "Colorado Uniform Transfers to Minors Act", see article 50 of title 11.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in the Denver Probate Court", see 46 Den. L.J. 496 (1969). For article, "Will Contests -- Some Procedural Aspects", see 15 Colo. Law. 787 (1986). For article, "Probate Jurisdiction for Creditors' Claims", see 29 Colo. Law. 57 (May 2000).

 Specific enumeration of court's subject-matter jurisdiction is applicable to all district courts sitting in probate matters since all probate courts may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction vested by this title. Lembach v. Lembach, 622 P.2d 606 (Colo. App. 1980).

 In determining proper jurisdiction as between district court and probate court, the court must look at the facts alleged, the claims asserted, and the relief requested. Here, where the complaints were premised upon defendant's alleged legal malpractice in the drafting of the estate instruments, the estate planning, and the implementation of the estate plan, the complaints were not considered probate claims, and, therefore, jurisdiction lay with the district court not the probate court. Levine v. Katz, 192 P.3d 1008 (Colo. App. 2006).

 Probate court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims of legal malpractice where plaintiff does not seek to recover assets of the estate. Levine v. Katz, 167 P.3d 141 (Colo. App. 2006).

 The phrase "in connection with" in subsection (3)(a) is a grant of authority to resolve disputes logically relating to an estate. This grant of jurisdiction presupposes, by necessary implication, the possibility that a person may have a valid claim to property claimed by an estate, and therefore contemplates that such property, while claimed by the estate, does not belong to the estate. In re Estate of Murphy, 195 P.3d 1147 (Colo. App. 2008).

 In evaluating the child's best interests, the probate court did not exceed its jurisdiction by directing the GAL to find a permanent guardian or by considering the potential for a future adoption. Nothing in this section deprives the district court of the authority to appoint a guardian for a child. In re J.C.T., 176 P.3d 726 (Colo. 2007).

 When extrinsic fraud is shown to exist, a judgment may be collaterally attacked, for such fraud renders the judgment not merely irregular, but void. As such, the judgment has neither life nor incipience and as a nullity it may be attacked directly or collaterally at any time. In re Estate of Bonfils, 190 Colo. 70, 543 P.2d 701 (1975).

 Intrinsic frauds, however, cannot give rise to collateral attack, though they may create voidable judgments, be the basis of a successful direct appeal, or be the subject of a motion for relief from judgment. In re Estate of Bonfils, 190 Colo. 70, 543 P.2d 701 (1975).

 Probate court had jurisdiction to order cancellation of bonds and release of security held by trustee pursuant to municipal revenue bond trust indenture. Petition of First Interstate Bank, 767 P.2d 792 (Colo. App. 1988).

 The probate court has the authority, in the appropriate circumstances, to instruct trustee to act or not act to carry out the court's goal in the administration of such trust without relying on C.R.C.P. 65. When a trustee's administration of a trust is challenged, the probate court has the authority to issue an injunction against the trustee without establishing grounds for a preliminary injunction to prevent further depletion of the trust while proper distribution of the trust is determined. In re Estate of Scott, 77 P.3d 906 (Colo. App. 2003).

13-9-104. Number of judges.

Statute text

There shall be one judge of the probate court of the city and county of Denver.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 446, § 4. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-4.

13-9-105. Qualifications of judges.

Statute text

A judge of the probate court shall be a qualified elector of the city and county of Denver at the time of his selection and shall have been licensed to practice law in the state of Colorado for five years at such time. He shall be a resident of the city and county of Denver during his term of office. He shall not engage in the private practice of law while serving in office.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 446, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-5.

13-9-106. Compensation of judges.

Statute text

A probate judge shall receive an annual salary as provided by law.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 446, § 6. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-6.

Annotations

 Cross references: For salaries of probate judges, see § 13-30-103.

13-9-107. Appointment and term of office.

Statute text

(1) The term of office of a probate judge shall be six years.

(2) A probate judge shall be appointed for the probate court of the city and county of Denver in the same manner provided for the appointment of district judges.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 446, § 7. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-7. L. 67: p. 460, § 20.

13-9-108. Vacancies.

Statute text

If the office of probate court judge becomes vacant because of death, resignation, failure to be retained in office pursuant to section 25 of article VI of the state constitution, or other cause, the vacancy shall be filled by the governor as provided in section 20 of article VI of the state constitution.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 446, § 8. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-8. L. 67: p. 460, § 21.

13-9-109. Clerk.

Statute text

(1) The judge of the probate court shall appoint a clerk of the probate court pursuant to section 13-3-105.

(2) Repealed.

(3) The powers and duties of the clerk of the probate court shall be similar to the powers and duties of the clerk of the district court including such powers as may be delegated to the clerk of the district court in probate matters. The duties of the clerk of the probate court shall also include such matters as may be assigned to him by law, by court rules, and by the probate judge.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 448, § 10. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-10. L. 69: p. 253, § 25. L. 79: (2) amended, p. 424, § 15, effective July 1; (2) repealed, p. 602, § 30, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 No authority to set aside divorce decree. Constitutional and statutory provisions vest in the probate court the authority to decide, inter alia, matters relating to the probate of wills. They do not, however, confer authority upon the probate court to disregard the rules relating to collateral attacks on judgments and to set aside a divorce decree of a district court which has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter. In re Estate of Bonfils, 190 Colo. 70, 543 P.2d 701 (1975).

13-9-110. Other employees.

Statute text

The judge of the probate court shall appoint pursuant to section 13-3-105 such deputy clerks, assistants, reporters, stenographers, and bailiffs as may be necessary for the transaction of the business of the court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 448, § 11. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-11. L. 69: p. 253, § 26.

13-9-111. Practice and procedure.

Statute text

Practice and procedure in the probate court shall be conducted in accordance with laws providing special proceedings for matters within its jurisdiction and with the Colorado rules of civil procedure.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 448, § 12. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-12.

13-9-112. Rules of court.

Statute text

The probate court has the power to make rules for the conduct of its business to the extent that such rules are not in conflict with the rules of the supreme court or the laws of the state but are supplementary thereto. Probate court rules are subject to review by the supreme court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 448, § 13. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-13.

13-9-113. Terms.

Statute text

Terms of the probate court shall be fixed by rule of court, but at least one term shall be held each year.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 448, § 14. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-14.

13-9-114. Seal.

Statute text

The probate court shall have a seal, bearing upon the face thereof the words: "The Probate Court of the City and County of Denver, Colorado".

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 448, § 15. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-15.

13-9-115. Process.

Statute text

The probate court has the power to issue process necessary to acquire jurisdiction, to require attendance, and to enforce all its orders, decrees, and judgments. Such process runs to any county within the state and, when authorized by law in special proceedings or, in the absence thereof, by the Colorado rules of civil procedure, may be served outside the state. Any sheriff to whom process is directed is authorized and required to execute the same and shall be entitled to the same fees as are allowed by law for serving like process from the district court. Persons other than the sheriff or his deputies also may serve process from the probate court when permitted by law in special proceedings or, in the absence thereof, by the Colorado rules of civil procedure.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 448, § 16. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-16.

Annotations

 Cross references: For procedures and persons authorized to serve process of the district court, see C.R.C.P. 4.

13-9-116. Venue.

Statute text

Venue in the probate court shall be determined as provided in articles 10 to 20 of title 15, C.R.S., or by other applicable statutes prescribing special proceedings or, in the absence thereof, by the Colorado rules of civil procedure.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 449, § 17. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-17.

13-9-117. Juries.

Statute text

When required, juries may be selected and summoned as provided for courts of record in articles 71 to 74 of this title. With the permission of the district court, the probate court may use the panel of jurors summoned for the district court of the second judicial district.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 449, § 18. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-18. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 1270, § 17, effective June 5.

13-9-118. Judgments.

Statute text

The judgments of the probate court shall be enforceable in the same manner as judgments of the district court and may be made liens upon real estate or other property in the manner provided by law for judgments of the district court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 449, § 19. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-19.

Annotations

 Cross references: For procedures for attachment and duration of a judgment lien, see § 13-52-102.

13-9-119. Appeals.

Statute text

Appellate review of final judgments of the probate court shall be by the supreme court or by the court of appeals, as provided by law, and shall be conducted in the same manner as prescribed by the Colorado appellate rules for review by the court of appeals and the supreme court of final judgments of the district courts.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 449, § 20. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-20. L. 69: p. 270, § 10.

13-9-120. Fees.

Statute text

The fees charged by the probate court and the clerk thereof shall be those provided in article 32 of this title.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 449, § 21. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-21.

13-9-121. Funds.

Statute text

Funds for the operation of the probate court, including the salaries of the employees thereof, shall be provided in the same manner as funds are provided for the establishment and operation of the district courts for the second judicial district.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 449, § 22. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-22. L. 69: p. 254, § 27.

13-9-122. Supervision by supreme court.

Statute text

The supervisory powers of the supreme court established by article 3 of this title extend to the probate court.

History

 Source: L. 64: p. 450, § 23. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-20-23.

13-9-123. National instant criminal background check system - reporting.

Statute text

(1) Beginning July 1, 2002, the clerk of the probate court shall periodically report the following information to the national instant criminal background check system created by the federal "Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act", Pub.L. 103-159, the relevant portion of which is codified at 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (t):

(a) The name of each person who has been found to be incapacitated by order of the court pursuant to part 3 of article 14 of title 15, C.R.S.;

(b) The name of each person who has been committed by order of the court to the custody of the unit in the department of human services that administers behavioral health programs and services, including those related to mental health and substance abuse, pursuant to section 27-81-112 or 27-82-108, C.R.S.; and

(c) The name of each person with respect to whom the court has entered an order for involuntary certification for short-term treatment of mental illness pursuant to section 27-65-107, C.R.S., for extended certification for treatment of mental illness pursuant to section 27-65-108, C.R.S., or for long-term care and treatment of mental illness pursuant to section 27-65-109, C.R.S.

(2) Any report made by the clerk of the probate court pursuant to this section shall describe the reason for the report and indicate that the report is made in accordance with 18 U.S.C. sec. 922 (g) (4).

(3) The clerk of the probate court shall take all necessary steps to cancel a record made by that clerk in the national instant criminal background check system if:

(a) The person to whom the record pertains makes a written request to the clerk; and

(b) No less than three years before the date of the written request:

(I) The court entered an order pursuant to section 15-14-318, C.R.S., terminating a guardianship on a finding that the person is no longer an incapacitated person, if the record in the national instant criminal background check system is based on a finding of incapacity;

(II) The period of commitment of the most recent order of commitment or recommitment expired, or the court entered an order terminating the person's incapacity or discharging the person from commitment in the nature of habeas corpus, if the record in the national instant criminal background check system is based on an order of commitment to the custody of the unit in the department of human services that administers behavioral health programs and services, including those related to mental health and substance abuse; except that the clerk shall not cancel any record pertaining to a person with respect to whom two recommitment orders have been entered under section 27-81-112 (7) and (8), C.R.S., or who was discharged from treatment under section 27-81-112 (11), C.R.S., on the grounds that further treatment will not be likely to bring about significant improvement in the person's condition; or

(III) The record in the case was sealed pursuant to section 27-65-107 (7), C.R.S., or the court entered an order discharging the person from commitment in the nature of habeas corpus pursuant to section 27-65-113, C.R.S., if the record in the national instant criminal background check system is based on a court order for involuntary certification for short-term treatment of mental illness.

History

 Source: L. 2002: Entire section added, p. 754, § 2, effective January 1, 2003. L. 2010: (1)(b), (1)(c), (3)(b)(II), and (3)(b)(III) amended, (SB 10-175), ch. 188, p. 781, § 16, effective April 29.

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MUNICIPAL COURTS

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ARTICLE 10
MUNICIPAL COURTS

Annotations

 Law reviews: For article, "Colorado's Municipal System", see 30 Colo. Law. 33 (December 2001).


Section

13-10-101. Legislative declaration.

13-10-102. Definitions.

13-10-103. Applicability.

13-10-104. Municipal court created - jurisdiction.

13-10-105. Municipal judge - appointment - removal.

13-10-106. Qualifications of municipal judges.

13-10-107. Compensation of municipal judges.

13-10-108. Clerk of the municipal court.

13-10-109. Bond.

13-10-110. Court facilities and supplies.

13-10-111. Commencement of actions - process.

13-10-112. Powers and procedures.

13-10-113. Fines and penalties.

13-10-114. Trial by jury.

13-10-115. Fines and costs.

13-10-116. Appeals.

13-10-117. Time - docket fee - bond.

13-10-118. Notice - scope.

13-10-119. Certification to appellate court.

13-10-120. Bond - approval of sureties - forfeitures.

13-10-121. Conditions of bond - forfeiture - release.

13-10-122. Docket fee - dismissal.

13-10-123. Procedendo on dismissal.

13-10-124. Action on bond in name of municipality.

13-10-125. Judgment.

13-10-126. Prostitution offender program authorized - reports.

13-10-101. Legislative declaration.

Statute text

The general assembly finds that the right to a trial by jury for petty offenses, as defined in section 16-10-109, C.R.S., is of vital concern to all of the people of the state of Colorado and that the interests of the state as a whole are so great that the general assembly shall retain sole legislative jurisdiction over the matter, which is hereby declared to be of statewide concern.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 273, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-1. L. 70: p. 150, § 2. L. 72: p. 266, § 2. L. 82: Entire section amended, p. 654, § 3, effective January 1, 1983.

13-10-102. Definitions.

Statute text

As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Municipal court" includes police courts and police magistrate courts created or existing under previous laws or under a municipal charter and ordinances.

(2) "Municipal judges" includes police magistrates as defined and used in previous laws.

(3) "Qualified municipal court of record" means a municipal court established by, and operating in conformity with, either local charter or ordinances containing provisions requiring the keeping of a verbatim record of the proceedings and evidence at trials by either electric devices or stenographic means, and requiring as a qualification for the office of judge of such court that he has been admitted to, and is currently licensed in, the practice of law in Colorado.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 273, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-1. L. 70: p. 150, § 2. L. 72: p. 266, § 2.

13-10-103. Applicability.

Statute text

This article shall apply to and govern the operation of municipal courts in the cities and towns of this state. Except for the provisions relating to the method of salary payment for municipal judges, the incarceration of children provided for in sections 19-2-402 and 19-2-508, C.R.S., the appearance of the parent, guardian, or lawful custodian of any child under eighteen years of age who is charged with a municipal offense as required by section 13-10-111, the right to a trial by jury for petty offenses provided for in section 16-10-109, C.R.S., rules of procedure promulgated by the supreme court, and appellate procedure, this article may be superseded by charter or ordinance enacted by a home rule city.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 273, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-1. L. 70: p. 150, § 2. L. 72: p. 266, § 2. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 1041, § 1, effective July 1. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 813, § 10, effective October 1. L. 94: Entire section amended, p. 909, § 2, effective April 28. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1688, § 16, effective January 1, 1997.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Right to trial by jury even if city charter denies it. In cases involving petty offenses, there is a right to a jury trial, even in a municipal court of a home rule city whose city charter has expressly denied such right. Hardamon v. Municipal Court, 178 Colo. 271, 497 P.2d 1000 (1972).

 Right to jury trial not abridged by forum for trial. The statutory right to a jury trial cannot be abridged on account of the forum in which the petty offense is tried. City of Aurora ex rel. People v. Erwin, 706 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1983).

 Courts of home-rule cities are not excepted from the purview of municipal court rules of procedure issued by the supreme court. Alessi v. Municipal Court, 38 Colo. App. 153, 556 P.2d 87 (1976); Christie v. People, 837 P.2d 1237 (Colo. 1992).

 The general assembly has made it clear that the power of home-rule cities over the operation of their municipal courts has some limitations, specifically in relation to rules of procedure. Alessi v. Municipal Court, 38 Colo. App. 153, 556 P.2d 87 (1976).

 There is no violation of the due process clause in a trial before a nontenured judge. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144, 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed.2d 1061 (1977).

 There is nothing to show that a trial before a nontenured judge in and of itself is sufficient to taint the fairness of the trial, thereby denying due process or equal protection. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144, 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed.2d 1061 (1977).

 Tenure decision lies in hands of citizens of home-rule cities. The fact that the term of office for municipal judges is not included in the exceptions in this section clearly indicates the general assembly's recognition that the tenure decision lies in the hands of the citizens of home-rule cities. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144, 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed.2d 1061 (1977); Artes-Roy v. City of Aspen, 856 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1993).

13-10-104. Municipal court created - jurisdiction.

Statute text

The municipal governing body of each city or town shall create a municipal court to hear and try all alleged violations of ordinance provisions of such city or town.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 273, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-2.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Limitation on power of courts. This section does not give municipal courts the power to provide relief similar to that provided by remedial or original writs. City of Englewood v. Parkinson, 703 P.2d 626 (Colo. App. 1985).

 Prerequisites of a written demand and $25 fee for a jury trial pursuant to C.R.M.P. 223 and this section do not violate defendant's right to a jury trial or deprive him of equal protection of the laws under the federal constitution. Christie v. People, 837 P.2d 1237 (Colo. 1992).

13-10-105. Municipal judge - appointment - removal.

Statute text

(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided in the charter of a home rule city, the municipal court shall be presided over by a municipal judge who shall be appointed by the municipal governing body for a specified term of not less than two years and who may be reappointed for a subsequent term; except that the initial appointment under this section may be for a term of office which expires on the date of the next election of the municipal governing body. Any vacancy in the office of municipal judge shall be filled by appointment of the municipal governing body for the remainder of the unexpired term.

(b) The municipal governing body may appoint such assistant judges as may be necessary to act or such substitute judges as circumstances may require in case of temporary absence, sickness, disqualification, or other inability of the presiding or assistant municipal judges to act.

(c) In the event that more than one municipal judge is appointed, the municipal governing body shall designate a presiding municipal judge, who shall serve in this capacity during the term for which he was appointed.

(2) A municipal judge may be removed during his term of office only for cause. A judge may be removed for cause if:

(a) He is found guilty of a felony or any other crime involving moral turpitude;

(b) He has a disability which interferes with the performance of his duties and which is or is likely to become of a permanent character;

(c) He has willfully or persistently failed to perform his duties;

(d) He is habitually intemperate; or

(e) The municipality required the judge, at the time of appointment, to be a resident of the municipality, or county in which the municipality is located, and he subsequently becomes a nonresident of the municipality or the county during his term of office.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 273, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-3. L. 77: (2)(c) and (2)(d) amended and (2)(e) added, p. 793, § 1, effective June 3. L. 91: (1)(b) amended, p. 742, § 1, effective April 4.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 There is no violation of the due process clause in a trial before a nontenured judge. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144, 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed.2d 1061 (1977).

 There is nothing to show that a trial before a nontenured judge in and of itself is sufficient to taint the fairness of the trial, thereby denying due process or equal protection. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144, 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed.2d 1061 (1977).

 The fact that the term of office for municipal judges is not included in the exceptions in § 13-10-103 clearly indicates the general assembly's recognition that the tenure decision lies in the hands of the citizens of home-rule cities. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144, 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed.2d 1061 (1977).

 Home-rule cities to specify terms of tenure. Subsection (1)(a), read in context with § 6 of art. XX, Colo. Const., makes it clear that the statute's unambiguous language offers home-rule cities the opportunity to specify the terms under which a municipal judge holds his office. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144, 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed.2d 1061 (1977).

 The decision of a home-rule city to appoint judges removable at the will of the city council is consistent with this section. People ex rel. People of City of Thornton v. Horan, 192 Colo. 144, 556 P.2d 1217 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S. Ct. 2922, 53 L. Ed.2d 1061 (1977).

 Likewise, a city charter that provides for the appointment of a municipal judge by the city council for a fixed term and that limits the removal of a judge only for cause does not violate this section. Artes-Roy v. City of Aspen, 856 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1993).

13-10-106. Qualifications of municipal judges.

Statute text

(1) A municipal judge shall have the same qualifications as a county judge in a Class D county, as set forth in section 13-6-203 (3).

(2) Preference shall be given by the municipal governing body, when possible, to the appointment of a municipal judge who is licensed to practice law in Colorado or who is trained in the law.

(3) The municipal governing body may appoint a county judge in a Class C or D county, as defined in section 13-6-203, to serve as a municipal judge.

(4) The municipal governing body may require that the municipal judge be a qualified elector of the municipality or the county in which the municipality is located.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 274, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-4. L. 77: (1) amended and (4) added, p. 793, § 2, effective June 3.

13-10-107. Compensation of municipal judges.

Statute text

(1) The municipal governing body shall provide by ordinance for the salary of the municipal and assistant judges. Such salary shall be a fixed annual compensation and payable on a monthly or other periodic basis. The municipal governing body may pay any substitute judge appointed pursuant to section 13-10-105 (1) (b) based upon the number of court sessions served by such judge.

(2) (Deleted by amendment, L. 91, p. 742, § 2, effective April 4, 1991.)

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 274, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-5. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 742, § 2, effective April 4.

13-10-108. Clerk of the municipal court.

Statute text

(1) The municipal governing body shall establish the position of clerk of the municipal court, except that the municipal judge shall serve as ex officio clerk if the business of the court is insufficient to warrant a separate full-time or part-time clerk.

(2) The clerk of the municipal court shall be appointed by the presiding municipal judge and shall have such duties as are delegated to him by law, court rule, or the presiding municipal judge.

(3) The municipal governing body shall provide for the salary of the clerk of the municipal court in the same manner as specified in section 13-10-107; except that if the municipal judge serves as ex officio clerk, he shall not receive any additional compensation.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 274, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-6.

13-10-109. Bond.

Statute text

(1) The clerk of the municipal court shall give a performance bond in the sum of two thousand dollars, or in such amount as may be set by ordinance, to the city or town for which he is appointed.

(2) The performance bond shall be approved by the municipal governing body and be conditioned upon the faithful performance of his duties, and for the faithful accounting for, and payment of, all funds deposited with or received by the court.

(3) When the municipal judge serves as clerk of the municipal court, as provided in section 13-10-108 (3), he shall execute the performance bond required by this section.

(4) The governing body of the city or town may waive the bond required by this section.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 275, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-7. L. 89: (4) added, p. 1287, § 1, effective April 6.

13-10-110. Court facilities and supplies.

Statute text

(1) The municipal governing body shall furnish the municipal court with suitable courtroom facilities and sufficient funds for the acquisition of all necessary books, supplies, and furniture for the proper conduct of the business of the court.

(2) In order to carry out the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the municipal governing body may locate court facilities outside of the municipality or county in which the municipality is located, if such facilities are in reasonable proximity to the municipality and the governing body determines that suitable facilities cannot be provided within the municipality.

(3) Any two or more governments may cooperate or contract, pursuant to part 2 of article 1 of title 29, C.R.S., to provide joint court facilities and supplies. Such joint facilities may be located outside of any or all of the cooperating or contracting governments but shall be located within reasonable proximity to each of the cooperating or contracting governments.

(4) Where, pursuant to this section, a municipality locates its court facilities outside of its boundaries, any reference in this article to the municipality in which the court is located shall mean the municipality creating the municipal court, and any reference in this article to the county in which the municipal court is located shall mean the county in which the municipality creating the court is located.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 275, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-8. L. 75: Entire section amended, p. 567, § 1, effective June 13.

13-10-111. Commencement of actions - process.

Statute text

(1) Any action or summons brought in any municipal court to recover any fine or enforce any penalty or forfeiture under any ordinance shall be filed in the corporate name of the municipality in which the court is located by and on behalf of the people of the state of Colorado.

(2) Any process issued from a municipal court runs in the corporate name of the municipality by and on behalf of the people of the state of Colorado. Processes from any municipal court shall be executed by any authorized law enforcement officer from the municipality in which the court is located.

(3) Any authorized law enforcement officer may execute within such officer's jurisdiction any summons, process, writ, or warrant issued by a municipal court from another jurisdiction arising under the ordinances of such municipality for an offense which is criminal or quasi-criminal. For the purposes of this subsection (3), traffic offenses shall not be considered criminal or quasi-criminal offenses unless penalty points may be assessed under section 42-2-127 (5) (a) to (5) (cc), C.R.S. The issuing municipality shall be liable for and pay all costs, including costs of service or incarceration incurred in connection with such service or execution.

(4) The clerk of the municipal court shall issue a subpoena for the appearance of any witness in municipal court upon the request of either the prosecuting municipality or the defendant. The subpoena may be served upon any person within the jurisdiction of the court in the manner prescribed by the rules of procedure applicable to municipal courts. Any person subpoenaed to appear as a witness in municipal court shall be paid a witness fee in the amount of five dollars.

(5) Upon the request of the municipal court, the prosecuting municipality, or the defendant, the clerk of the municipal court shall issue a subpoena for the appearance, at any and all stages of the court's proceedings, of the parent, guardian, or lawful custodian of any child under eighteen years of age who is charged with a municipal offense. Whenever a person who is issued a subpoena pursuant to this subsection (5) fails, without good cause, to appear, the court may issue an order for the person to show cause to the court as to why the person should not be held in contempt. Following a show cause hearing, the court may make findings of fact and conclusions of law and may enter an appropriate order, which may include finding the person in contempt.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 275, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-9. L. 77: (3) amended, p. 793, § 3, effective June 3. L. 78: (3) amended, p. 262, § 45, effective May 23. L. 81: (5) added, p. 882, § 1, effective April 30. L. 94: (5) amended, p. 909, § 3, effective April 28; (3) amended, p. 2549, § 32, effective January 1, 1995.

13-10-112. Powers and procedures.

Statute text

(1) The municipal judge of any municipal court has all judicial powers relating to the operation of his court, subject to any rules of procedure governing the operation and conduct of municipal courts promulgated by the Colorado supreme court. The presiding municipal judge of any municipal court has authority to issue local rules of procedure consistent with any rules of procedure adopted by the Colorado supreme court.

(2) The judicial powers of any municipal judge shall include the power to enforce subpoenas issued by any board, commission, hearing officer, or other body or officer of the municipality authorized by law or ordinance to issue subpoenas.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 275, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-10. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 742, § 3, effective April 4.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Contempt power is implied by need to maintain order and decorum indispensable to judicial proceedings. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341, 558 P.2d 576 (1977).

 Determination whether or not certain conduct constitutes contempt is within the trial court's sound discretion, and it is not reviewable on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Tipton v. City of Lakewood ex rel. People, 198 Colo. 18, 595 P.2d 689 (1979).

 It is not designed to protect judge's dignity or person. A judge's power to punish contempt committed in his presence is not designed to protect his own dignity or person, but to protect the rights of litigants and the public by ensuring that the administration of justice shall not be thwarted or obstructed. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341, 558 P.2d 576 (1977).

 Contempt power must be exercised with self-restraint. Like other inherent judicial powers, the contempt power must be exercised with patience and self-restraint. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341, 558 P.2d 576 (1977).

 While a court may have inherent power to perform its judicial functions effectively, the method a court chooses to use in exercising its inherent power must be one which the court has jurisdiction to utilize. City of Englewood v. Parkinson, 703 P.2d 626 (Colo. App. 1985).

 Judges must be cautious to avoid overreacting when persons not familiar with court procedures, through ignorance or frustration, unintentionally cause minor commotions. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341, 558 P.2d 576 (1977).

 When contempt power should be invoked. Since the contempt power is rooted in the necessity to maintain the respectful atmosphere appropriate to efficient administration of justice, it should be invoked only when the judicial process has been seriously affronted or disrupted. Only then is there a need to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court or to reestablish the respect owed to it. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341, 558 P.2d 576 (1977).

 One cannot be convicted of contempt for respectfully declining to comply with an order which is beyond the court's authority. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341, 558 P.2d 576 (1977).

 Invocation of contempt power to punish valid exercise of constitutional right is an abuse of discretion by the court. Tipton v. City of Lakewood ex rel. People, 198 Colo. 18, 595 P.2d 689 (1979).

 Ordering husband to reveal remarks to wife. A municipal judge had no authority, without the consent of the defendant or his wife, to order him to reveal what he had told her. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341, 558 P.2d 576 (1977).

 Evidence insufficient to support contempt conviction. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341, 558 P.2d 576 (1977).

 Where the record indicates that the only substantial delay or disruption in court proceedings occurred after the judge required the defendant to return to the courtroom, sought to force him to divulge his prior remarks to his wife, and had him handcuffed in open court, that disruption cannot be attributed to the defendant's conduct. Thrap v. People, 192 Colo. 341, 558 P.2d 576 (1977).

13-10-113. Fines and penalties.

Statute text

(1) Any person convicted of violating a municipal ordinance in a municipal court of record may be incarcerated for a period not to exceed one year or fined an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars, or both.

(1.5) Any person convicted of violating a municipal ordinance in a municipal court which is not of record may be incarcerated for a period not to exceed ninety days or fined an amount not to exceed three hundred dollars, or both.

(2) In sentencing or fining a violator, the municipal judge shall not exceed the sentence or fine limitations established by ordinance. Any other provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, the municipal judge may suspend the sentence or fine of any violator and place him on probation for a period not to exceed one year.

(3) The municipal judge is empowered in his discretion to assess costs, as established by the municipal governing body by ordinance, against any defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere or who enters into a plea agreement or who, after trial, is found guilty of an ordinance violation.

(4) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a municipal court has the authority to order a child under eighteen years of age confined in a juvenile detention facility operated or contracted by the department of human services or a temporary holding facility operated by or under contract with a municipal government for failure to comply with a lawful order of the court, including an order to pay a fine. Any confinement of a child for contempt of municipal court shall not exceed forty-eight hours.

(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a child, as defined in section 19-1-103 (18), C.R.S., arrested for an alleged violation of a municipal ordinance, convicted of violating a municipal ordinance or probation conditions imposed by a municipal court, or found in contempt of court in connection with a violation or alleged violation of a municipal ordinance shall not be confined in a jail, lockup, or other place used for the confinement of adult offenders but may be held in a juvenile detention facility operated by or under contract with the department of human services or a temporary holding facility operated by or under contract with a municipal government that shall receive and provide care for such child. A municipal court imposing penalties for violation of probation conditions imposed by such court or for contempt of court in connection with a violation or alleged violation of a municipal ordinance may confine a child pursuant to section 19-2-508, C.R.S., for up to forty-eight hours in a juvenile detention facility operated by or under contract with the department of human services. In imposing any jail sentence upon a juvenile for violating any municipal ordinance when the municipal court has jurisdiction over the juvenile pursuant to section 19-2-104 (1) (a) (II), C.R.S., a municipal court does not have the authority to order a child under eighteen years of age to a juvenile detention facility operated or contracted by the department of human services.

(6) Whenever the judge in a municipal court of record imposes a fine for a nonviolent municipal ordinance or code offense, if the person who committed the offense is unable to pay the fine at the time of the court hearing or if he or she fails to pay any fine imposed for the commission of such offense, in order to guarantee the payment of such fine, the municipal judge may compel collection of the fine in the manner provided in section 18-1.3-506, C.R.S. For purposes of this subsection (6), "nonviolent municipal ordinance or code offense" means a municipal ordinance or code offense which does not involve the use or threat of physical force on or to a person in the commission of the offense.

(7) Notwithstanding subsections (1) and (1.5) of this section, the municipal judge of each municipality which implements an industrial wastewater pretreatment program pursuant to the federal act, as defined in section 25-8-103 (8), C.R.S., may provide such relief and impose such penalties as are required by such federal act and its implementing regulations for such programs.

(8) If, as a condition of or in connection with any sentence imposed pursuant to this section, a municipal court judge requires a juvenile who is younger than eighteen years of age to attend school, the municipal court shall notify the school district in which the juvenile is enrolled of such requirement.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 275, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-11. L. 81: (4) added, p. 882, § 2, effective April 30; (5) added, p. 1041, § 2, effective July 1. L. 87: (2) and (3) amended, p. 546, § 1, effective April 23; (4) and (5) amended, p. 814, § 11, effective October 1. L. 89: (6) added, p. 887, § 3, effective April 6. L. 90: (4) and (5) amended, p. 1016, § 1, effective April 20; (7) added, p. 1345, § 6, effective July 1. L. 91: (1) and (3) amended and (1.5) added, p. 743, § 4, effective April 4. L. 92: (7) amended, p. 2183, § 59, effective June 2. L. 94: (4) and (5) amended, pp. 2641, 2615, §§ 90, 23, effective July 1; (5) amended, p. 1462, § 1, effective July 1. L. 96: (5) amended, p. 1679, § 2, effective January 1, 1997. L. 2000: (8) added, p. 320, § 8, effective April 7. L. 2002: (6) amended, p. 1487, § 121, effective October 1.

Annotations

 Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (5) by Senate Bill 94-089 and House Bill 94-1029 were harmonized.

Annotations

 Cross references: (1) For municipal ordinances and penalties relating thereto, see §§ 31-15-103 and 31-16-101.

 (2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 1994 act amending subsections (4) and (5), see section 1 of chapter 345, Session Laws of Colorado 1994. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (6), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.

13-10-114. Trial by jury.

Statute text

(1) In any action before municipal court in which the defendant is entitled to a jury trial by the constitution or the general laws of the state, such party shall have a jury upon request. The jury shall consist of three jurors unless, in the case of a trial for a petty offense, a greater number, not to exceed six, is requested by the defendant.

(2) In municipalities having less than five thousand population, juries may be summoned by the issuance of venire to a police officer or marshal. In municipalities having a population of five thousand or more, juries shall be selected from a jury list as is provided for courts of record.

(3) Jurors shall be paid the sum of six dollars per day for actual jury service and three dollars for each day of service on the jury panel alone; except that the governing body of a municipality may, by resolution or ordinance, set higher or lower fees for attending its municipal court.

(4) For the purposes of this section, a defendant waives his right to a jury trial under subsection (1) of this section unless, within twenty days after entry of a plea, the defendant makes a request to the court for a jury trial, in writing, and tenders to the court a fee of twenty-five dollars, unless the fee is waived by the judge because of the indigence of the defendant. If the action is dismissed or the defendant is acquitted of the charge, or if the defendant having paid the jury fee files with the court at least ten days before the scheduled trial date a written waiver of jury trial, the jury fee shall be refunded.

(5) At the time of arraignment for any petty offense in this state, the judge shall advise any defendant not represented by counsel of the defendant's right to trial by jury; of the requirement that the defendant, if he desires to invoke his right to trial by jury, request such trial by jury within twenty days after entry of a plea, in writing; of the number of jurors allowed by law; and of the requirement that the defendant, if he desires to invoke his right to trial by jury, tender to the court within twenty days after entry of a plea a jury fee of twenty-five dollars, unless the fee is waived by the judge because of the indigence of the defendant.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 276, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-12. L. 70: p. 150, § 3. L. 83: (4) amended, p. 615, § 1, effective July 1. L. 88: (3) amended, p. 1124, § 1, effective April 4. L. 2005: (4) and (5) amended, p. 428, § 10, effective July 28.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Applicability of the Uniform Jury Selection and Service Act. Although the act is not applicable to municipal courts, the statutory disqualifications in § 13-71-109 (2) should be applied to trials in municipal courts of record. City of Aurora v. Rhodes, 689 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1984).

 For purposes of § 13-71-109, a prospective juror summoned to a municipal court qualifies as a "resident of the county" as long as he resides in that part of the county located within the territorial limits of the municipality. City of Aurora v. Rhodes, 689 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1984).

 A defendant has the right to a jury in municipal court if charged with the commission of a petty offense, as defined under §16-10-109, C.R.S. Bradford v. Longmont Mun. Court, 830 P.2d 1135 (Colo. App. 1992).

 The rule proscribing a child's right to a jury trial is limited to delinquency proceedings. Bradford v. Longmont Mun. Court, 830 P.2d 1135 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Prerequisites of a written demand and $25 fee for a jury trial pursuant to C.R.M.P. 223 and this section do not violate defendant's right to a jury trial or deprive him of equal protection of the laws under the federal constitution. Christie v. People, 837 P.2d 1237 (Colo. 1992).

 Applied in Lininger v. City of Sheridan, 648 P.2d 1097 (Colo. App. 1982).

13-10-115. Fines and costs.

Statute text

All fines and costs collected or received by the municipal court shall be reported and paid monthly, or at such other intervals as may be provided by an ordinance of the municipality, to the treasurer of the municipality and deposited in the general fund of the municipality.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 276, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-13.

13-10-116. Appeals.

Statute text

(1) Appeals may be taken by any defendant from any judgment of a municipal court which is not a qualified municipal court of record to the county court of the county in which such municipal court is located, and the cause shall be tried de novo in the appellate court.

(2) Appeals taken from judgments of a qualified municipal court of record shall be made to the district court of the county in which the qualified municipal court of record is located. The practice and procedure in such case shall be the same as provided by section 13-6-310 and applicable rules of procedure for the appeal of misdemeanor convictions from the county court to the district court, and the appeal procedures set forth in this article shall not apply to such case.

(3) No municipality shall have any right to appeal from any judgment of a municipal court, not of record, concerning a violation of any charter provision or ordinance, but this subsection (3) shall not be construed to prevent a municipality from maintaining any action to construe, interpret, or determine the validity of any ordinance or charter provision involved in such proceeding. Nothing in this subsection (3) shall be construed to prevent a municipality from appealing any question of law arising from a proceeding in a qualified municipal court of record.

(4) If, in any municipal court, a defendant is denied a jury trial to which he is entitled under section 13-10-114, he is entitled to a trial by jury under section 16-10-109, C.R.S., and to a trial de novo upon application therefor on appeal.

(5) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, if confinement of a child is ordered pursuant to a contempt conviction as set forth in section 13-10-113 (4), appeal shall be to the juvenile court for the county in which the municipal court is located. Such appeals shall be advanced on the juvenile court's docket to the earliest possible date. Procedures applicable to such appeals shall be in the same manner as provided in subsections (1) and (2) of this section for appeals to the county court.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 276, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-14. L. 70: p. 151, § 4. L. 72: p. 267, § 3. L. 77: (3) amended, p. 794, § 4, effective June 3. L. 81: (5) added, p. 882, § 3, effective July 1. L. 85: (1), (2), and (5) amended, p. 570, § 6, effective November 14, 1986.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations


Analysis


I. General Consideration.
II. Appeals From Municipal Courts.
III. Appeals From Municipal Courts of Record.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

 Law reviews. For note, "Colorado Appellate Procedure", see 40 U. Colo. L. Rev. 551 (1968).

 Annotator's note. Since § 13-10-116 is similar to repealed § 139-36-2, CRS 53 and § 139-36-2, C.R.S. 1963, relevant cases construing those provisions have been included in the annotations to this section.

 Municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances that fall within their jurisdiction. City of Pueblo v. Murphy, 189 Colo. 559, 542 P.2d 1288 (1975).

 A court which assumes the trial duties of the municipal court in a trial de novo appeal may take judicial notice of the same ordinances which the lower court does. City of Pueblo v. Murphy, 189 Colo. 559, 542 P.2d 1288 (1975).

 A county court may take judicial notice of municipal ordinances when an appeal is taken from the municipal court to the county court for a trial de novo. City of Pueblo v. Murphy, 189 Colo. 559, 542 P.2d 1288 (1975).

 The appellate court in such a circumstance stands in the same position and has the same duties as the trial court. As a result, the county court may take judicial notice of the ordinances which were before the municipal court. City of Pueblo v. Murphy, 189 Colo. 559, 542 P.2d 1288 (1975).

 Courts of general jurisdiction may not take judicial notice of the ordinances of municipal corporations in civil or criminal cases. City of Pueblo v. Murphy, 189 Colo. 559, 542 P.2d 1288 (1975).

 When district court may take judicial notice of municipal ordinance. Where a municipal ordinance was properly the subject of judicial notice in the municipal court, and the case is then before a district court on appeal on the record, the district court may also take judicial notice of the municipal ordinance. Chavez v. People, 193 Colo. 50, 561 P.2d 1270 (1977).

 An executed sentence in municipal court does not necessarily constitute a waiver of the right of review to have the taint cleared on the name of the person. Where he has involuntarily complied with the sanction imposed by the trial court, he nevertheless has the opportunity to have undone the dishonor and discredit of a conviction. City of Pueblo v. Clemmer, 150 Colo. 546, 375 P.2d 99 (1962).

 A municipality cannot appeal acquittal of a violation of an ordinance. Under this section a judgment finding accused not guilty of a traffic violation is a judgment on the merits and concludes the litigation between the parties, there being no right in the municipality to appeal from such judgment. People ex rel Town of Cherry Hills Vill. v. Cervi, 144 Colo. 338, 356 P.2d 241 (1960).

 Appellate procedure must be followed before defendant can seek habeas corpus. Defendant, a 14 year old, who was found guilty of reckless driving and sentenced to 90 days in jail, was not entitled to habeas corpus relief on the ground of alleged violation of his right to counsel where he did not appeal to county court where adequate remedy of trial de novo was available, but instead proceeded immediately by way of habeas corpus. Garrett v. Knight, 173 Colo. 419, 480 P.2d 569 (1971).

 Applied in Fuller v. Colo. Dept. of Rev., 43 Colo. App. 404, 610 P.2d 1078 (1979); People v. Malacara, 199 Colo. 243, 606 P.2d 1300 (1980).

II. APPEALS FROM MUNICIPAL COURTS.

 This section provides that appeals from a municipal or police court may be taken to the county court of the county where the municipal or police court is located. City of Central v. Axton, 159 Colo. 69, 410 P.2d 173 (1966).

 County court sitting as appellate court in trial de novo has same duties as trial court. Rainwater v. County Court, 43 Colo. App. 477, 604 P.2d 1195 (1979).

 Trial de novo is not an entirely new trial, but is, instead, a continuation of the original trial in the form of an appeal. Rainwater v. County Court, 43 Colo. App. 477, 604 P.2d 1195 (1979).

 "Any defendant" may appeal "any judgment". When he does appeal in compliance with the procedure set forth in this article, he is entitled to a trial de novo. City of Pueblo v. Trujillo, 150 Colo. 549, 374 P.2d 863 (1962).

 This section means that a defendant starts afresh in the county court, i.e, if he resolves to contest the charge against him in the county court, he may have a trial de novo there without regard to what took place in the municipal court. City of Pueblo v. Trujillo, 150 Colo. 549, 374 P.2d 863 (1962).

 Generally, municipal judges are untrained in the law. The general assembly and the courts recognize the fact that the judges and magistrates who preside over inferior tribunals are frequently untrained and unskilled in the law, and that they conduct courts not of record, in which the proceedings are apt to be summary in nature. They also recognize that, because of frequent shortcomings in training in the law, safeguards afforded defendants may be curtailed and, by reason thereof, defendants may not be properly advised of their rights in the premises or adequately warned of the consequences of a plea. City of Pueblo v. Trujillo, 150 Colo. 549, 374 P.2d 863 (1962).

III. APPEALS FROM MUNICIPAL COURTS OF RECORD.

 If a municipal court is a court of record, the cause is heard on the record, and the practice and procedure is to be the same as provided for in regard to the appeal of misdemeanor convictions from county courts. Hylton v. City of Colo. Springs, 32 Colo. App. 9, 505 P.2d 26 (1973).

 Remanded or tried de novo by the district court. These sections require a district court either to review a decision of a municipal court of record on the record, to remand the case for a new trial with instructions, or to direct that trial de novo be had before the district court. In the instant case, the district court adopted the first alternative, and therefore, the question is whether the court properly exercised the appellate jurisdiction granted to it under the sections noted above. People v. Anderson, 177 Colo. 84, 492 P.2d 844 (1972).

 The function of a district court in acting as an appellate court is the same whether the case originates in a municipal court of record or a county court. People v. Anderson, 177 Colo. 84, 492 P.2d 844 (1972).

 Party seeking review of a municipal court judgment is entitled to file a petition for rehearing unless the district court by express order dispenses with the filing of the petition. City of Aurora v. Rhodes, 689 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1984).

 Because appellant's conviction originated in a municipal court of record, appellant had 30 days following the judgment of conviction to file the notice of appeal pursuant to this section and its implementing rules. Normandin v. Town of Parachute, 91 P.3d 383 (Colo. 2004).

13-10-117. Time - docket fee - bond.

Statute text

Appeals may be taken within ten days after entry of any judgment of a municipal court. No appeal shall be allowed until the appellant has paid to the clerk of the municipal court one dollar and fifty cents as a fee for preparing the transcript of record on appeal. If the municipal court is a court of record, the clerk of the municipal court is entitled to the same additional fees for preparing the record, or portions thereof designated, as is the clerk of the county court on the appeal of misdemeanors, but said fees shall be refunded to the defendant if the judgment is set aside on appeal. No stay of execution shall be granted until the appellant has executed an approved bond as provided in sections 13-10-120 and 13-10-121.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 276, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-15.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 One appealing from a judgment of a municipal court must file an appeal bond as directed by this section. City of Pueblo v. Trujillo, 150 Colo. 549, 374 P.2d 863 (1962) (decided under repealed § 139-36-4, CRS 53).

13-10-118. Notice - scope.

Statute text

(1) Appeals may be taken by filing with the clerk of the municipal court a notice of appeal, in duplicate. The notice of appeal shall set forth the title of the case; the name and address of the appellant and appellant's attorney, if any; identification of the offense or violation of which the appellant was convicted; a statement of the judgment, including its date and any fines or sentences imposed; and a statement that the appellant appeals from the judgment. The notice of appeal shall be signed by the appellant or his attorney.

(2) The taking of an appeal shall not permit the retrial of any matter of which the appellant has been acquitted, or any conjoined charge from the conviction of which he does not seek to appeal.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 277, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-16.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Substantial compliance is appropriate standard for notice of appeal. Pueblo v. County Court, 761 P.2d 275 (Colo. App. 1988).

13-10-119. Certification to appellate court.

Statute text

Upon payment of the fee provided in section 13-10-117, and filing of notice as provided in section 13-10-118, the original papers in the municipal court file, together with a transcript of the record of the municipal court, and a duplicate notice of appeal shall be certified to the appropriate appellate court pursuant to section 13-10-116 by the municipal court.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 277, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-17. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 883, § 4, effective July 1.

13-10-120. Bond - approval of sureties - forfeitures.

Statute text

(1) When an appellant desires to stay the judgment of the municipal court, he shall execute a bond to the municipality in which the municipal court is located, in such penal sum as may be fixed by the municipal court, and in such form and with sureties qualified as the municipality may, by ordinance, designate.

(2) Sureties shall be approved by a judge of the municipal court from which the appeal is taken.

(3) The amount of bond shall not exceed double the amount of the judgment for fines and costs, plus an amount commensurate with any jail sentence, which latter amount shall be not less than fifty dollars nor more than a sum equal to two dollars for each day of jail sentence imposed.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 277, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-18.

13-10-121. Conditions of bond - forfeiture - release.

Statute text

(1) The bond shall be conditioned that the appellant will duly prosecute such appeal and satisfy any judgment that may be rendered upon trial of the case in the appropriate appellate court to which appeal is taken pursuant to section 13-10-116 and that the appellant will surrender himself in satisfaction of such judgment if that is required.

(2) If the bond is forfeited, the appellate court, upon motion of the municipality, shall enter judgment against the appellant and sureties on the bond for the amount of such bond. The appellate court, with the consent of the municipality, shall enter judgment against the appellant and sureties on the bond for the amount of such bond. The appellate court, with the consent of the municipality, may set aside or modify the judgment.

(3) Any municipality may provide by ordinance such other bond terms and conditions as are not inconsistent with the provisions of this article. The filing of such bond or any notice thereof of record shall not constitute any lien against any property of the sureties.

(4) When the condition of the bond has been satisfied or the forfeiture thereof set aside or remitted, the municipal court shall exonerate the obligors and release the bond. At any time before final judgment in the appellate court, a surety may be exonerated by a deposit of cash in the amount of the bond or by timely surrender of the appellant into custody.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 277, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-19. L. 81: (1), (2), and (4) amended, p. 883, § 5, effective July 1.

13-10-122. Docket fee - dismissal.

Statute text

The appellant shall pay a docket fee as provided by law to the clerk of the appellate court, within ten days from the date he ordered the transcript of record. If he does not do so, his appeal may be dismissed on motion of the municipality.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 278, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-20. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 883, § 6, effective July 1.

13-10-123. Procedendo on dismissal.

Statute text

Upon dismissal of an appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall at once issue a procedendo to the municipal court from the judgment on which appeal was taken, to the amount of the judgment and all costs incurred before the municipal court.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 278, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-21. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 883, § 7, effective July 1.

13-10-124. Action on bond in name of municipality.

Statute text

Action may be instituted upon any bond under this article in the name of the municipality in whose favor it is executed.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 278, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-22.

13-10-125. Judgment.

Statute text

Upon trial de novo of the case on appeal to the appellate court, if a jury has been demanded, the duties of the jurors shall be to determine only whether the appellant has violated the ordinance charged. Upon a verdict of guilty, the judge shall then hear and consider any material facts in mitigation or aggravation of the offense and shall impose a penalty as provided by ordinance.

History

 Source: L. 69: p. 278, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 37-22-23. L. 81: Entire section amended, p. 884, § 8, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 County judge imposes penalty as required by law. Since on appeal to county court, if a jury sits, this section requires that the jury determine only whether the ordinance has been violated, the trial judge has the responsibility of imposing "a penalty as provided by law". Hylton v. City of Colo. Springs, 32 Colo. App. 9, 505 P.2d 26 (1973) (decided under repealed § 139-36-17, C.R.S. 1963).

 Under this section, "law" can be none other than municipal ordinance. Hylton v. City of Colo. Springs, 32 Colo. App. 9, 505 P.2d 26 (1973).

 Judgment is a county court judgment. Whether action and penalties are characterized as criminal, quasi-criminal, or civil, a county court is empowered by statute to impose a sentence within the limits provided by the municipal ordinance, but it is nevertheless a county court judgment. Hylton v. City of Colo. Springs, 32 Colo. App. 9, 505 P.2d 26 (1973).

 Municipal court has no power to issue execution on a county court judgment, as the county court must issue execution on its own judgment. Hylton v. City of Colo. Springs, 32 Colo. App. 9, 505 P.2d 26 (1973).

13-10-126. Prostitution offender program authorized - reports.

Statute text

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a municipal or county court, or multiple municipal or county courts, may create and administer a program for certain persons who are charged with soliciting for prostitution, as described in section 18-7-202, C.R.S., patronizing a prostitute, as described in section 18-7-205, C.R.S., or any corresponding municipal code or ordinance.

(2) A program created and administered by a municipal or county court or multiple municipal or county courts pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall:

(a) Permit enrollment in the program only by an offender who either:

(I) (A) Has no prior convictions or any charges pending for any felony; for any offense described in section 18-3-305, 18-3-306, or 18-13-128, C.R.S., in part 4 or 5 of article 3 of title 18, C.R.S., in part 3, 4, 6, 7, or 8 of article 6 of title 18, C.R.S., in section 18-7-201.7, 18-7-203, 18-7-205.7, or 18-7-206, C.R.S., or in part 3, 4, or 5 of article 7 of title 18, C.R.S.; or for any offense committed in another state that would constitute such an offense if committed in this state; and

(B) Has been offered and has agreed to a deferred sentencing arrangement as described in subsection (3) of this section; or

(II) (A) Has at least one prior conviction for any offense described in section 18-7-201, 18-7-202, 18-7-204, 18-7-205, 18-7-207, or 18-7-208, C.R.S.; or for any offense committed in another state that would constitute such an offense if committed in this state; and

(B) Has been sentenced by a court to complete the program as part of the penalty imposed for a subsequent conviction for soliciting for prostitution, as described in section 18-7-202, C.R.S., patronizing a prostitute, as described in section 18-7-205, C.R.S., or any corresponding municipal code or ordinance.

(b) Permit the court or courts to require each offender who enrolls in the program to pay an administration fee, which fee the court or courts shall use to pay the costs of administering the program;

(c) To the extent practicable, be available to offenders, courts, and prosecutors of other jurisdictions; and

(d) Be administered by the court or courts with assistance from one or more municipal prosecutor's offices, one or more district attorney's offices, one or more state or local law enforcement agencies, and one or more nonprofit corporations, as defined in section 7-121-401, C.R.S., which nonprofit corporations have a stated mission to reduce human trafficking or prostitution. The court or courts are encouraged to consult, in addition to the aforementioned entities, recognized criminology experts and mental health professionals.

(3) (a) Enrollment in the program shall be offered to each offender at the sole discretion of the prosecuting attorney in each offender's case.

(b) If the prosecuting attorney offers enrollment in the program to an offender as a condition of a plea bargain agreement as described in subparagraph (I) of paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section, the agreement shall include at a minimum the following stipulations:

(I) The offender shall enter a plea of guilty to the prostitution-related offense or offenses with which he or she is charged;

(II) The court shall defer judgment and sentencing of the offender for a period not to exceed two years, as described in section 18-1.3-102 (1), C.R.S., during which time the offender shall enroll in and complete the program and may be required to pay an administration fee, as described in paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section;

(III) Upon the offender's satisfactory completion of the program, the court shall dismiss with prejudice the prostitution-related charge or charges;

(IV) The offender shall waive his or her right to a speedy trial; and

(V) If the offender fails to complete the program or fails to satisfy any other condition of the plea bargain agreement, he or she shall be sentenced for the offenses to which he or she has pleaded guilty and shall be required to pay a fine of not less than two thousand five hundred dollars and not more than five thousand dollars, or the maximum amount available to a municipal or county court, in the discretion of the court, in addition to any other sentence imposed by the court.

(c) If the prosecuting attorney offers enrollment in the program to an offender pursuant to subparagraph (II) of paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section and the offender fails to complete the program, the offender shall be required to pay a fine of not less than two thousand five hundred dollars and not more than five thousand dollars, or the maximum amount available to the municipal or county court, in the discretion of the court, in addition to any other sentence imposed by the court.

(4) If a municipal or county court or multiple municipal or county courts create and administer a program pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, the court or courts shall prepare and submit a report to the judiciary committees of the house of representatives and senate, or any successor committees, concerning the effectiveness of the program. The court or courts shall submit the report not less than two years nor more than three years after the creation of the program. The report shall include information concerning:

(a) The cost of the program and the extent to which the cost is mitigated by the imposition of the fees described in paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section; and

(b) The effectiveness of the program in reducing recidivism among persons who commit prostitution-related offenses.

History

 Source: L. 2011: Entire section added, (SB 11-085), ch. 257, p. 1126, § 2, effective August 10.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2011 act adding this section, see section 1 of chapter 257, Session Laws of Colorado 2011.

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CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS

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ARTICLE 14
CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS


Section

13-14-101. Definitions.

13-14-102. Civil protection orders - legislative declaration.

13-14-103. Emergency protection orders.

13-14-104. Foreign protection orders.

13-14-101. Definitions.

Statute text

For purposes of this article, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Abuse of the elderly or of an at-risk adult" means mistreatment of a person who is sixty years of age or older or who is an at-risk adult as defined in section 26-3.1-101 (1), C.R.S., including but not limited to repeated acts that:

(a) Constitute verbal threats or assaults;

(b) Constitute verbal harassment;

(c) Result in the inappropriate use or the threat of inappropriate use of medications;

(d) Result in the inappropriate use of physical or chemical restraints;

(e) Result in the misuse of power or authority granted to a person through a power of attorney or by a court in a guardianship or conservatorship proceeding that results in unreasonable confinement or restriction of liberty; or

(f) Constitute threats or acts of violence against, or the taking, transferring, concealing, harming, or disposing of, an animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by the elderly or at-risk adult, which threats or acts are intended to coerce, control, punish, intimidate, or exact revenge upon the elderly or at-risk adult.

(1.5) "Adult" means a person eighteen years of age or older.

(2) "Domestic abuse" means any act or threatened act of violence that is committed by any person against another person to whom the actor is currently or was formerly related, or with whom the actor is living or has lived in the same domicile, or with whom the actor is involved or has been involved in an intimate relationship. "Domestic abuse" may also include any act or threatened act of violence against:

(a) The minor children of either of the parties; or

(b) An animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by either of the parties or by a minor child of either of the parties, which threat or act is intended to coerce, control, punish, intimidate, or exact revenge upon either of the parties or a minor child of either of the parties.

(2.2) "Minor child" means a person under eighteen years of age.

(2.3) "Protected person" means the person or persons identified in a protection order as the person or persons for whose benefit the protection order was issued.

(2.4) (a) "Protection order" means any order that prohibits the restrained person from contacting, harassing, injuring, intimidating, molesting, threatening, or touching any protected person, or from threatening, taking, transferring, concealing, harming, or disposing of an animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by a protected person, or from entering or remaining on premises, or from coming within a specified distance of a protected person or premises or any other provision to protect the protected person from imminent danger to life or health that is issued by a court of this state or a municipal court and that is issued pursuant to:

(I) This article, section 18-1-1001, C.R.S., section 19-2-707, C.R.S., section 19-4-111, C.R.S., or rule 365 of the Colorado rules of county court civil procedure;

(II) Sections 14-4-101 to 14-4-105, C.R.S., section 14-10-107, C.R.S., section 14-10-108, C.R.S., or section 19-3-316, C.R.S., as those sections existed prior to July 1, 2004;

(III) An order issued as part of the proceedings concerning a criminal municipal ordinance violation; or

(IV) Any other order of a court that prohibits a person from contacting, harassing, injuring, intimidating, molesting, threatening, or touching a person, or from threatening, taking, transferring, concealing, harming, or disposing of an animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by a person, or from entering or remaining on premises, or from coming within a specified distance of a protected person or premises.

(b) For purposes of this article only, "protection order" includes any order that amends, modifies, supplements, or supersedes the initial protection order. "Protection order" also includes any restraining order entered prior to July 1, 2003, and any foreign protection order as defined in section 13-14-104.

(2.8) "Restrained person" means a person identified in a protection order as a person prohibited from doing a specified act or acts.

(3) "Stalking" means the crime of stalking as described in section 18-3-602, C.R.S.

History

 Source: L. 99: Entire article added, p. 495, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2000: (3) amended, p. 1012, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2003: IP(1) amended and (2.3), (2.4), and (2.8) added, p. 995, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2004: (1.5) and (2.2) added and (2.4) amended, p. 544, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2010: (1)(e), (2), IP(2.4)(a), and (2.4)(a)(IV) amended and (1)(f) added, (SB 10-080), ch. 78, p. 264, § 1, effective July 1; (3) amended, (HB 10-1233), ch. 88, p. 295, § 3, effective August 11.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Statutes Consolidate Civil Restraining Orders", see 28 Colo. Law. 39 (October 1999). For article, "Crisis Intervention to Prevent Elder Abuse: Emergency Guardianships and Other Legal Procedures" see 33 Colo. Law. 91 (July 2004).

13-14-102. Civil protection orders - legislative declaration.

Statute text

(1) (a) The general assembly hereby finds that the issuance and enforcement of protection orders are of paramount importance in the state of Colorado because protection orders promote safety, reduce violence, and prevent serious harm and death. In order to improve the public's access to protection orders and to assure careful judicial consideration of requests and effective law enforcement, there shall be two processes for obtaining protection orders within the state of Colorado, a simplified civil process and a mandatory criminal process.

(b) The general assembly further finds and declares that:

(I) Domestic violence is not limited to physical threats of violence and harm but includes financial control, document control, property control, and other types of control that make a victim more likely to return to an abuser due to fear of retaliation or inability to meet basic needs;

(II) Victims of domestic violence in many cases are unable to access resources to seek lasting safety options;

(III) These victims need the assistance of additional court orders to meet their immediate needs for food, shelter, transportation, medical care, and child care at the time they go to court for a civil protection order; and

(IV) These additional court orders are needed not only in cases that end in dissolution of marriage but also in cases in which reconciliation is appropriate, as well as in other cases.

(1.5) Any municipal court of record, if authorized by the municipal governing body; any county court; and any district, probate, or juvenile court shall have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a temporary or permanent civil protection order against an adult or against a juvenile who is ten years of age or older for any of the following purposes:

(a) To prevent assaults and threatened bodily harm;

(b) To prevent domestic abuse;

(c) To prevent emotional abuse of the elderly or of an at-risk adult;

(d) To prevent stalking.

(2) Any civil protection order issued pursuant to this section shall be issued using the standardized set of forms developed by the state court administrator pursuant to section 13-1-136.

(2.5) Venue for filing a motion or complaint pursuant to this section is proper in any county where the acts that are the subject of the motion or complaint occur, in any county where one of the parties resides, or in any county where one of the parties is employed. This requirement for venue does not prohibit the change of venue to any other county appropriate under applicable law.

(3) A motion for a temporary civil protection order shall be set for hearing, which hearing may be ex parte, at the earliest possible time and shall take precedence over all matters, except those matters of the same character that have been on the court docket for a longer period of time. The court shall hear all such motions as expeditiously as possible.

(3.3) Any district court, in an action commenced under the "Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act", article 10 of title 14, C.R.S., shall have authority to issue temporary and permanent protection orders pursuant to the provisions of subsection (1.5) of this section. Such protection order may be as a part of a motion for a protection order accompanied by an affidavit filed in an action brought under article 10 of title 14, C.R.S. Either party may request the court to issue a protection order consistent with any other provision of this article.

(3.7) At the time a protection order is requested pursuant to this section, the court shall inquire about, and the requesting party and such party's attorney shall have an independent duty to disclose, knowledge such party and such party's attorney may have concerning the existence of any prior protection or restraining order of any court addressing in whole or in part the subject matter of the requested protection order. In the event there are conflicting restraining or protection orders, the court shall consider, as its first priority, issues of public safety. An order that prevents assaults, threats of assault, or other bodily harm shall be given precedence over an order that deals with the disposition of property or other tangible assets. Every effort shall be made by judicial officers to clarify conflicting orders.

(4) (a) A temporary civil protection order may be issued if the issuing judge or magistrate finds that an imminent danger exists to the person or persons seeking protection under the civil protection order. In determining whether an imminent danger exists to the life or health of one or more persons, the court shall consider when the most recent incident of abuse or threat of harm occurred as well as all other relevant evidence concerning the safety and protection of the persons seeking the protection order. However, the court shall not deny a petitioner the relief requested solely because of a lapse of time between an act of abuse or threat of harm and filing of the petition for a protection order.

(b) If the judge or magistrate finds that an imminent danger exists to the employees of a business entity, he or she may issue a civil protection order in the name of the business for the protection of the employees. An employer shall not be liable for failing to obtain a civil protection order in the name of the business for the protection of the employees and patrons.

(5) Upon the filing of a complaint duly verified, alleging that the defendant has committed acts that would constitute grounds for a civil protection order, any judge or magistrate, after hearing the evidence and being fully satisfied therein that sufficient cause exists, may issue a temporary civil protection order to prevent the actions complained of and a citation directed to the defendant commanding the defendant to appear before the court at a specific time and date and to show cause, if any, why said temporary civil protection order should not be made permanent. In addition, the court may order any other relief that the court deems appropriate. Complaints may be filed by persons seeking protection for themselves or for others as provided in section 26-3.1-102 (1) (b) and (1) (c), C.R.S.

(6) A copy of the complaint together with a copy of the temporary civil protection order and a copy of the citation shall be served upon the defendant and upon the person to be protected, if the complaint was filed by another person, in accordance with the rules for service of process as provided in rule 304 of the rules of county court civil procedure or rule 4 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure. The citation shall inform the defendant that, if the defendant fails to appear in court in accordance with the terms of the citation, a bench warrant may be issued for the arrest of the defendant and the temporary protection order previously entered by the court shall be made permanent without further notice or service upon the defendant.

(7) The return date of the citation shall be set not more than fourteen days after the issuance of the temporary civil protection order and citation. If the petitioner is unable to serve the defendant in that period, the court shall extend the temporary protection order previously issued, continue the show of cause hearing, and issue an alias citation stating the date and time to which the hearing is continued. The petitioner may thereafter request, and the court may grant, additional continuances as needed if the petitioner has still been unable to serve the defendant.

(8) (a) Any person against whom a temporary protection order is issued pursuant to this section, which temporary protection order excludes such person from a shared residence, shall be permitted to return to such shared residence one time to obtain sufficient undisputed personal effects as are necessary for such person to maintain a normal standard of living during any period prior to a hearing concerning such order. Such person against whom a temporary protection order is issued shall be permitted to return to such shared residence only if such person is accompanied at all times while the person is at or in such shared residence by a peace officer.

(b) When any person is served with a temporary protection order issued against such person excluding such person from a shared residence, such temporary protection order shall contain a notification in writing to such person of such person's ability to return to such shared residence pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (8). Such written notification shall be in bold print and conspicuously placed in such temporary protection order. No judge, magistrate, or other judicial officer shall issue a temporary protection order that does not comply with this subsection (8).

(c) Any person against whom a temporary protection order is issued pursuant to this section, which temporary protection order excludes such person from a shared residence, shall be entitled to avail himself or herself of the forcible entry and detainer remedies available pursuant to article 40 of this title. However, such person shall not be entitled to return to the residence until such time as a valid writ of restitution is executed, filed with the court issuing the protection order, and, if necessary, the protection order is modified accordingly. A landlord whose lessee has been excluded from a residence pursuant to the terms of a protection order is also entitled to avail himself or herself of the remedies available pursuant to article 40 of this title.

(9) (a) On the return date of the citation, or on the day to which the hearing has been continued, the judge or magistrate shall examine the record and the evidence. If upon such examination the judge or magistrate is of the opinion that the defendant has committed acts constituting grounds for issuance of a civil protection order and that unless restrained will continue to commit such acts, the judge or magistrate shall order the temporary civil protection order to be made permanent or order a permanent civil protection order with different provisions from the temporary civil protection order. The judge or magistrate shall inform said defendant that a violation of the civil protection order shall constitute a criminal offense pursuant to section 18-6-803.5, C.R.S., or shall constitute contempt of court and subject the defendant to such punishment as may be provided by law. If the defendant fails to appear before the court for the show cause hearing at the time and on the date identified in the citation issued by the court and the court finds that the defendant was properly served with the temporary protection order and such citation, it shall not be necessary to re-serve the defendant to make the protection order permanent. However, if the court modifies the protection order on the motion of the protected party, the modified protection order shall be served upon the defendant.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (9), the judge or magistrate, after examining the record and the evidence, for good cause shown, may continue the temporary protection order and the show cause hearing to a date certain not to exceed one hundred twenty days after the date of the hearing if he or she determines such continuance would be in the best interests of the parties and if both parties are present at the hearing and agree to the continuance. In addition, each party may request one continuance for a period not to exceed fourteen days which the judge or magistrate, after examining the record and the evidence, may grant upon a finding of good cause. The judge or magistrate shall inform the defendant that a violation of the temporary civil protection order shall constitute a criminal offense pursuant to section 18-6-803.5, C.R.S., or shall constitute contempt of court and subject the defendant to such punishment as may be provided by law.

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (b) of this subsection (9), for a protection order filed in a proceeding commenced under the "Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act", article 10 of title 14, C.R.S., the court may, on the motion of either party if both parties agree to the continuance, continue the temporary protection order until the time of the final decree or final disposition of the action.

(10) The court shall electronically transfer into the central registry of protection orders established pursuant to section 18-6-803.7, C.R.S., a copy of any order issued pursuant to this section and shall deliver a copy of such order to the protected party.

(11) If the order has not been personally served, the peace officer responding to a call for assistance shall serve a copy of said order on the person named defendant therein and shall write the time, date, and manner of service on the protected person's copy of such order and shall sign such statement.

(12) The duties of peace officers enforcing the civil protection order shall be in accordance with section 18-6-803.5, C.R.S., and any rules adopted by the Colorado supreme court pursuant to said section.

(13) A person failing to comply with any order of the court issued pursuant to this section shall be found in contempt of court or may be prosecuted for violation of a civil protection order pursuant to section 18-6-803.5, C.R.S.

(14) At the time a civil protection order is requested, the court shall inquire about, and the requesting party and such party's attorney shall have an independent duty to disclose, any knowledge such party and such party's attorney may have concerning the existence of any prior protection orders of any court addressing in whole or in part the subject matter of the requested civil protection order.

(15) A municipal court of record that is authorized by its municipal governing body to issue protection or restraining orders and any county court, in connection with issuing a civil protection order, shall have original concurrent jurisdiction with the district court to issue such additional orders as the municipal or county court deems necessary for the protection of persons. Such additional orders may include, but are not limited to:

(a) Restraining a party from threatening, molesting, or injuring any other party or the minor child of either of the parties;

(b) Restraining a party from contacting any other party or the minor child of either of the parties;

(c) Excluding a party from the family home upon a showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result;

(d) Excluding a party from the home of another party upon a showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result;

(e) (I) Awarding temporary care and control of any minor children of either party involved for a period of not more than one hundred twenty days.

(II) If temporary care and control is awarded, the order may include parenting time rights for the other party involved and any conditions of such parenting time, including the supervision of such parenting time by a third party who agrees on the record to the terms of the supervised parenting time and any costs associated with supervised parenting time, if necessary. If the restrained party is unable to pay the ordered costs, the court shall not place such responsibility with publicly funded agencies. If the court finds that the safety of any child or the protected party cannot be ensured with any form of parenting time reasonably available, the court may deny parenting time.

(II.5) The court may award interim decision-making responsibility of a child to a person entitled to bring an action for the allocation of parental responsibilities under section 14-10-123, C.R.S., when such award is reasonably related to preventing domestic abuse as defined in section 13-14-101 (2), or preventing the child from witnessing domestic abuse.

(III) The standard for the award of temporary care and control or interim decision-making responsibility shall be in accordance with section 14-10-124, C.R.S.

(f) Such other relief as the court deems appropriate;

(f.2) Restraining a party from threatening, molesting, injuring, killing, taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, or disposing of an animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by any other party, a minor child of any other party, or an elderly or at-risk adult;

(f.4) Specifying arrangements for possession and care of an animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by any other party, a minor child of any other party, or an elderly or at-risk adult;

(g) (I) A temporary injunction that may be issued by the court that, upon personal service or upon waiver and acceptance of service by the defendant, is to be in effect against the defendant for a period determined to be appropriate by the court and restrains the defendant from ceasing to make payments for mortgage or rent, insurance, utilities or related services, transportation, medical care, or child care when the defendant has a prior existing duty or legal obligation or from transferring, encumbering, concealing, or in any way disposing of personal effects or real property, except in the usual course of business or for the necessities of life. The restrained party shall be required to account to the court for all extraordinary expenditures made after the injunction is in effect. Any injunction issued shall not exceed one hundred twenty days after the issuance of the permanent civil protection order.

(II) The provisions of the injunction shall be printed on the summons, and the petition and the injunction shall become an order of the court upon fulfillment of the requirements of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (g).

(III) Nothing in this paragraph (g) shall preclude either party from applying to the district court for further temporary orders, an expanded temporary injunction, or modification or revocation. Any subsequent order issued by the district court as part of a domestic matter involving the parties shall supersede an injunction made pursuant to this paragraph (g).

(16) Any order for temporary care and control issued pursuant to subsection (15) of this section shall be governed by the "Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act", article 13 of title 14, C.R.S.

(17) Any order granted pursuant to paragraph (c) or (e) of subsection (15) of this section shall terminate whenever a subsequent order regarding the same subject matter is granted pursuant to the "Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act", article 10 of title 14, C.R.S., or the "Uniform Child-custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act", article 13 of title 14, C.R.S., or the "Colorado Children's Code", title 19, C.R.S.

(17.5) (a) Nothing in this section shall preclude the protected party from applying to the court at any time for modification, including but not limited to a modification of the duration of a protection order, or dismissal of a temporary or permanent protection order issued pursuant to this section. The restrained party may apply to the court for modification, including but not limited to a modification of the duration of the protection order, or dismissal of a permanent protection order pursuant to this section. However, if a permanent protection order has been issued or if a motion for modification or dismissal of a permanent protection order has been filed by the restrained party, whether or not it was granted, no motion to modify or dismiss may be filed by the restrained party within four years after issuance of the permanent order or after disposition of the prior motion.

(b) (I) (A) Notwithstanding any provision of paragraph (a) of this subsection (17.5) to the contrary, after issuance of the permanent protection order, if the restrained party is convicted of any misdemeanor other than the original misdemeanor that formed the basis for the issuance of the protection order, the underlying factual basis of which has been found by a court on the record to include an act of domestic violence, as that term is defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), C.R.S., or of any felony, then the protection order shall remain permanent and shall not be modified or dismissed by the court.

(B) Notwithstanding the prohibition in sub-subparagraph (A) of this subparagraph (I), a protection order may be modified or dismissed on the motion of the protected person, or the person's attorney, parent or legal guardian if a minor, or conservator of legal guardian if one has been appointed; except that this sub-subparagraph (B) shall not apply if the parent, legal guardian, or conservator is the restrained person.

(II) A court shall not consider a motion to modify a protection order filed by a restrained party pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (17.5) unless the court receives the results of a fingerprint-based criminal history record check of the restrained party that is conducted within ninety days prior to the filing of the motion. The fingerprint-based criminal history record check shall include a review of the state and federal criminal history records maintained by the Colorado bureau of investigation and federal bureau of investigation. The restrained party shall be responsible for supplying fingerprints to the Colorado bureau of investigation and to the federal bureau of investigation and paying the costs of the record checks. The restrained party may be required by the court to provide certified copies of any criminal dispositions that are not reflected in the state or federal records and any other dispositions that are unknown.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the issuing court shall retain jurisdiction to enforce, modify, or dismiss a temporary or permanent protection order.

(d) Any motion filed pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (17.5) shall be heard by the court. The party moving for a modification or dismissal of a temporary or permanent protection order pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (17.5) shall affect personal service on the other party with a copy of the motion and notice of the hearing on the motion, as provided by rule 4 (e) of the Colorado rules of civil procedure. The moving party shall bear the burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the modification is appropriate or that a dismissal is appropriate because the protection order is no longer necessary. If the protected party has requested that his or her address be kept confidential, the court shall not disclose such information to the restrained party or any other person, except as otherwise authorized by law.

(e) In considering whether to modify or dismiss a protection order issued pursuant to this section, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to:

(I) Whether the restrained party has complied with the terms of the protection order;

(II) Whether the restrained party has met the conditions associated with the protection order, if any;

(III) Whether the restrained party has been ordered to participate in and complete a domestic violence treatment program provided by an entity approved pursuant to section 16-11.8-103 (4) (a) (III) (C), C.R.S., and whether the restrained party has completed the program;

(IV) Whether the restrained party has voluntarily participated in any domestic violence treatment program or other counseling addressing domestic violence or anger management issues;

(V) The time that has lapsed since the protection order was issued;

(VI) When the last incident of abuse or threat of harm occurred or other relevant information concerning the safety and protection of the protected person;

(VII) Whether, since the issuance of the protection order, the restrained person has been convicted of or pled guilty to a crime, the underlying factual basis of which has been found by a court on the record to include an act of domestic violence, as that term is defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), C.R.S., other than the original offense, if any, that formed the basis for the issuance of the protection order;

(VIII) Whether any other restraining orders or protective orders or protection orders have been subsequently issued against the restrained person pursuant to this section or any other law of this state or any other state; and

(IX) The circumstances of the parties, including the relative proximity of the parties' residences and work places and whether the parties have minor children together.

(18) A court shall not grant a mutual protection order to prevent domestic abuse for the protection of opposing parties unless each party has met his or her burden of proof as described in subsection (4) of this section and the court makes separate and sufficient findings of fact to support the issuance of the mutual protection order to prevent domestic abuse for the protection of opposing parties. No party may waive the requirements set forth in this subsection (18).

(19) Repealed.

(20) Enactment of this section shall not affect the effectiveness of any civil protection or restraining order issued prior to July 1, 1999.

(21) (a) The court may assess a filing fee against a petitioner seeking relief under this section; except that the court may not assess a filing fee against a petitioner if the court determines the petitioner is seeking the protection order as a victim of domestic abuse as defined by section 13-14-101 (2); domestic violence as defined by section 18-6-800.3 (1), C.R.S.; stalking as described in section 18-3-602, C.R.S.; sexual assault as defined by section 18-3-402, C.R.S.; or unlawful sexual contact as defined by section 18-3-404, C.R.S. Petitioners shall be provided the necessary number of certified copies at no cost.

(b) Fees for service of process may not be assessed by a state agency or public agency against petitioners seeking relief under this section as a victim of conduct consistent with the following: Domestic abuse as defined by section 13-14-101 (2); domestic violence as defined by section 18-6-800.3 (1), C.R.S.; stalking as described in section 18-3-602, C.R.S.; sexual assault as defined by section 18-3-402, C.R.S.; or unlawful sexual contact as defined by section 18-3-404, C.R.S.

(c) At the permanent protection order hearing, the court may require the respondent to pay the filing fee and service-of-process fees, as established by the state agency, political subdivision, or public agency pursuant to a fee schedule, and to reimburse the petitioner for costs incurred in bringing the action.

History

 Source: L. 99: Entire article added, p. 496, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2000: IP(1), (5), and (6) amended, (2.5) added, and (19) repealed, pp. 1012, 1013, §§ 4, 5, 6, effective July 1; (16) and (17) amended, p. 1538, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2002: (4) amended, p. 323, § 1, effective April 19; (9)(b) amended and (17.5) added, p. 491, § 1, effective July 1; (11) amended and (21) added, p. 1143, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2003: IP(1), (1)(c), (2), (3) to (9), (12), (13), (14), IP(15), (17.5), (18), and (21) amended, p. 996, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2004: (1), (5), (7), (8)(b), (8)(c), (9), (10), IP(15), (15)(e), and (20) amended and (1.5), (3.3), and (3.7) added, p. 545, § 2, effective July 1; (17.5)(b)(II) amended, p. 74, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2007: (1) amended and (15)(g) added, pp. 940, 941, §§ 1, 2, effective July 1. L. 2010: (15)(f.2) and (15)(f.4) added, (SB 10-080), ch. 78, p. 265, § 2, effective July 1; (17.5)(e)(III) amended, (HB 10-1422), ch. 419, p. 2068, § 22, effective August 11; (21)(a) and (21)(b) amended, (HB 10-1233), ch. 88, p. 296, § 4, effective August 11.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Statutes Consolidate Civil Restraining Orders", see 28 Colo. Law. 39 (October 1999). For article, "Overview of Colorado's New Domestic Violence Leave Law", see 31 Colo. Law. 69 (December 2002). For article, "Crisis Intervention to Prevent Elder Abuse: Emergency Guardianships and Other Legal Procedures" see 33 Colo. Law. 91 (July 2004). For article, "Protecting Clients From Abuse and Identity Theft", see 34 Colo. Law. 43 (October 2005). For article, "Domestic Violence Intervention: 2010 Update", see 39 Colo. Law. 83 (September 2010).

 Based on the plain language of the statute, the finding of imminent danger is a prerequisite only to the issuance of a temporary protection order. In re Fiffe, 140 P.3d 160 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Procedural due process does not require a finding of imminent danger when the parties are accorded the requisite constitutional safeguards of notice and an opportunity to be heard. In re Fiffe, 140 P.3d 160 (Colo. App. 2005).

13-14-103. Emergency protection orders.

Statute text

(1) (a) Any county or district court shall have the authority to enter an emergency protection order pursuant to the provisions of this subsection (1).

(b) An emergency protection order issued pursuant to this subsection (1) may include:

(I) Restraining a party from threatening, molesting, injuring, or contacting any other party, a minor child of either of the parties, or a minor child who is in danger in the reasonably foreseeable future of being a victim of an unlawful sexual offense or domestic abuse;

(II) Excluding a party from the family home or from the home of another party upon a showing that physical or emotional harm would otherwise result;

(III) Awarding temporary care and control of any minor child of a party involved;

(IV) Enjoining an individual from contacting a minor child at school, at work, or wherever he or she may be found;

(V) Restraining a party from threatening, molesting, injuring, killing, taking, transferring, encumbering, concealing, or disposing of an animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by any other party, a minor child of either of the parties, or an elderly or at-risk adult; or

(VI) Specifying arrangements for possession and care of an animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by any other party, a minor child of either of the parties, or an elderly or at-risk adult.

(c) In cases involving a minor child, the juvenile court and the district court shall have the authority to issue emergency protection orders to prevent an unlawful sexual offense, as defined in section 18-3-411 (1), C.R.S., or to prevent domestic abuse, as defined in section 13-14-101 (2), when requested by the local law enforcement agency, the county department of social services, or a responsible person who asserts, in a verified petition supported by affidavit, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that a minor child is in danger in the reasonably foreseeable future of being the victim of an unlawful sexual offense or domestic abuse, based upon an allegation of a recent actual unlawful sexual offense or domestic abuse or threat of the same. Any emergency protection order issued pursuant to this subsection (1) shall be on a standardized form prescribed by the judicial department and a copy shall be provided to the protected person.

(d) The chief judge in each judicial district shall be responsible for making available in each judicial district a judge to issue, by telephone, emergency protection orders at all times when the county and district courts are otherwise closed for judicial business. Such judge may be a district court or county court judge or a special associate, an associate, an assistant county judge, or a magistrate.

(e) When the county, district, and juvenile courts are unavailable from the close of business at the end of the day or week to the resumption of business at the beginning of the day or week and a peace officer asserts reasonable grounds to believe that an adult is in immediate and present danger of domestic abuse, based upon an allegation of a recent incident of actual domestic abuse or threat of domestic abuse, or that a minor child is in immediate and present danger of an unlawful sexual offense, as defined in section 18-3-411 (1), C.R.S., or of domestic abuse, as defined in section 13-14-101 (2), a judge made available pursuant to paragraph (d) of this subsection (1) may issue a written or verbal ex parte emergency protection order. Any written emergency protection order issued pursuant to this subsection (1) shall be on a standardized form prescribed by the judicial department and a copy shall be provided to the protected person.

(f) An emergency protection order issued pursuant to this subsection (1) shall expire not later than the close of judicial business on the next day of judicial business following the day of issue, unless otherwise continued by the court. The court may continue an emergency protection order filed to prevent domestic abuse pursuant to this subsection (1) only if the judge is unable to set a hearing on plaintiff's request for a temporary protection order on the day the complaint was filed pursuant to section 13-14-102; except that this limitation on a court's power to continue an emergency protection order shall not apply to an emergency protection order filed to protect a minor child from an unlawful sexual offense or domestic abuse. For any emergency protection order continued pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph (f), following two days' notice to the party who obtained the emergency protection order or on such shorter notice to said party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may appear and move its dissolution or modification. The motion to dissolve or modify the emergency protection order shall be set down for hearing at the earliest possible time and shall take precedence over all matters except older matters of the same character, and the court shall determine such motions as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.

(2) (a) A verbal emergency protection order may be issued pursuant to subsection (1) of this section only if the issuing judge finds that an imminent danger in close proximity exists to the life or health of one or more persons or that a danger exists to the life or health of the minor child in the reasonably foreseeable future.

(b) Any verbal emergency protection order shall be reduced to writing and signed by the officer or other person asserting the grounds for the order and shall include a statement of the grounds for the order asserted by the officer or person. The officer or person shall not be subject to civil liability for any statement made or act performed in good faith. The emergency protection order shall be served upon the respondent with a copy given to the protected party and filed with the county or district court as soon as practicable after issuance. Any written emergency protection order issued pursuant to this subsection (2) shall be on a standardized form prescribed by the judicial department, and a copy shall be provided to the protected person.

(3) The court shall electronically transfer into the central registry of protection orders established pursuant to section 18-6-803.7, C.R.S., a copy of any order issued pursuant to this section and shall deliver a copy of such order to the protected party or his or her parent or an individual acting in the place of a parent who is not the respondent.

(4) If any person named in an order issued pursuant to this section has not been served personally with such order but has received actual notice of the existence and substance of such order from any person, any act in violation of such order may be deemed sufficient to subject the person named in such order to any penalty for such violation.

(5) Venue for filing a complaint pursuant to this section is proper in any county where the acts constituting unlawful sexual assault or domestic abuse that are the subject of the complaint occur, in any county where one of the parties resides, or in any county where one of the parties is employed. This requirement for venue does not prohibit the change of venue to any other county appropriate under applicable law.

(6) A person failing to comply with any order of the court issued pursuant to this section shall be found in contempt of court and, in addition, may be punished as provided in section 18-6-803.5, C.R.S.

(7) At any time that the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction to enforce the emergency protection order has cause to believe that a violation of the order has occurred, it shall enforce the order. If the order is written and has not been personally served, a member of the law enforcement agency shall serve a copy of said order on the person named respondent therein. If the order is verbal, a member of the law enforcement agency shall notify the respondent of the existence and substance thereof.

(8) The availability of an emergency protection order shall not be affected by the subject of domestic abuse leaving his or her residence to avoid such abuse.

(9) The issuance of an emergency protection order shall not be considered evidence of any wrongdoing.

(10) If three emergency protection orders are issued within a one-year period involving the same parties within the same jurisdiction, the court shall summon the parties to appear before the court at a hearing to review the circumstances giving rise to such emergency protection orders.

(11) The duties of peace officers enforcing orders issued pursuant to this section shall be in accordance with section 18-6-803.5, C.R.S., and any rules adopted by the Colorado supreme court pursuant to said section.

History

 Source: L. 2004: Entire section added, p. 549, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2010: (1)(b)(III) amended and (1)(b)(V) and (1)(b)(VI) added, (SB 10-080), ch. 78, p. 266, § 3, effective July 1.

13-14-104. Foreign protection orders.

Statute text

(1) Definitions. As used in this section, "foreign protection order" means any protection or restraining order, injunction, or other order issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts or harassment against, or contact or communication with or physical proximity to, another person, including temporary or final orders, other than child support or custody orders, issued by a civil or criminal court of another state, an Indian tribe, or a U.S. territory or commonwealth.

(2) Full faith and credit. A foreign protection order shall be accorded full faith and credit by the courts of this state as if the order were an order of this state, notwithstanding section 14-11-101, C.R.S., and article 53 of this title, if the order meets all of the following conditions:

(a) The foreign protection order was obtained after providing the person against whom the protection order was sought reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard sufficient to protect his or her due process rights. If the foreign protection order is an ex parte injunction or order, the person against whom it was obtained shall have been given notice and an opportunity to be heard within a reasonable time after the order was issued sufficient to protect his or her due process rights.

(b) The court that issued the order had jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter;

(c) The order complies with section 13-14-102 (18).

(3) Process. A person entitled to protection under a foreign protection order may, but shall not be required to, file such order in the district or county court by filing with such court a certified copy of such order, which shall be entered into the central registry of protection orders created in section 18-6-803.7, C.R.S. The certified order shall be accompanied by an affidavit in which the protected person affirms to the best of his or her knowledge that the order has not been changed or modified since it was issued. There shall be no filing fee charged. It is the responsibility of the protected person to notify the court if the protection order is subsequently modified.

(4) Enforcement. Filing of the foreign protection order in the central registry or otherwise domesticating or registering the order pursuant to article 53 of this title or section 14-11-101, C.R.S., is not a prerequisite to enforcement of the foreign protection order. A peace officer shall presume the validity of, and enforce in accordance with the provisions of this article, a foreign protection order that appears to be an authentic court order that has been provided to the peace officer by any source. If the protected party does not have a copy of the foreign protection order on his or her person and the peace officer determines that a protection order exists through the central registry, the national crime information center as described in 28 U.S.C. sec. 534, or communication with appropriate authorities, the peace officer shall enforce the order. A peace officer may rely upon the statement of any person protected by a foreign protection order that it remains in effect. A peace officer who is acting in good faith when enforcing a foreign protection order shall not be civilly or criminally liable pursuant to section 18-6-803.5 (5), C.R.S.

History

 Source: L. 2004: Entire section added, p. 549, § 3, effective July 1.

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CHANGE OF NAME

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ARTICLE 15
CHANGE OF NAME


Section

13-15-101. Petition - proceedings.

13-15-102. Publication of change.

13-15-101. Petition - proceedings.

Statute text

(1) (a) (I) Every person desiring to change his or her name may present a petition to that effect, verified by affidavit, to the district or county court in the county of the petitioner's residence, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (a.5) of this subsection (1). The petition shall include:

(A) The petitioner's full name;

(B) The new name desired; and

(C) A concise statement of the reason for the name change.

(II) If the petitioner is over fourteen years of age, the petition shall also include the results of a certified, fingerprint-based criminal history record check conducted pursuant to paragraph (c) of this subsection (1) within ninety days prior to the date of the filing of the petition.

(III) If the petitioner is under nineteen years of age, the petition shall also include the caption of any proceeding in which a court has ordered child support, allocation of parental responsibilities, or parenting time regarding the petitioner.

(a.5) If the petitioner is under nineteen years of age and is the subject of an action concerning child support, allocation of parental responsibilities, or parenting time, then the petition for name change shall be filed in the court having jurisdiction over the action concerning child support, allocation of parental responsibilities, or parenting time.

(b) The fingerprint-based criminal history check shall include arrests, conviction records, any criminal dispositions reflected in the Colorado bureau of investigation and federal bureau of investigation records, and fingerprint processing by the federal bureau of investigation and the Colorado bureau of investigation. The petitioner shall be responsible for providing certified copies of any criminal dispositions that are not reflected in the Colorado bureau of investigation or federal bureau of investigation records and any other dispositions which are unknown.

(c) The petitioner shall be responsible for supplying fingerprints to the Colorado bureau of investigation and to the federal bureau of investigation and for obtaining the fingerprint-based criminal history record checks. The petitioner shall also be responsible for the cost of such checks.

(1.5) Unless the petitioner has shown good cause why the publication provisions of section 13-15-102 should not apply, the court shall order the petitioner to publish notice as provided in section 13-15-102 and file proof of the publication with the court.

(2) (a) Upon receipt of proof of publication or upon an order of the court stating that publication is not required, the court, except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subsection (2), shall order the name change to be made and spread upon the records of the court in proper form if the court is satisfied that the desired change would be proper and not detrimental to the interests of any other person.

(b) The court shall not grant a petition for a name change if the court finds the petitioner was previously convicted of a felony or adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for an offense that would constitute a felony if committed by an adult in this state or any other state or under federal law. If the certified, fingerprint-based criminal history check filed with the petition reflects a criminal charge for which there is no disposition shown, the court may grant the name change after affirmation in open court by the petitioner, or submission of a signed affidavit by the petitioner, stating he or she has not been convicted of a felony in this state or any other state or under federal law.

(c) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2005, p. 20, § 1, effective February 23, 2005.)

(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of this section, the court may grant a petition for a change of name of a petitioner who was previously convicted of a felony in this state or any other state or adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for an offense that would constitute a felony if committed by an adult in this state or any other state or under federal law if the court finds that the petitioner must have a legal name change in order to be issued in that name a driver's license or identification card from the department of revenue and if all of the following requirements are met:

(a) The petitioner meets all of the requirements of subsections (1) and (1.5) of this section and paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section;

(b) The proposed name change is to a name under which the petitioner was convicted or adjudicated; except that, for good cause, the court may allow a change to a name other than a name under which the petitioner was convicted or adjudicated;

(c) Prior to filing the petition, the name change applicant:

(I) (A) Submits his or her fingerprints to the Colorado bureau of investigation and the federal bureau of investigation for purposes of obtaining a fingerprint-based criminal history records check along with a written request to add his or her proposed name as an alias to the name change applicant's criminal history record.

(B) The Colorado bureau of investigation is authorized to add an alias to a name change applicant's criminal history record upon request.

(II) (A) Notifies the district attorney's office in any district in which the applicant was convicted of a felony that he or she is requesting a name change pursuant to this subsection (3).

(B) If the district attorney's office has a record of any victim of the applicant's crime, the district attorney's office shall send notice of the proposed name change to the victim.

(III) If, at the time the petition is filed, the applicant is in custody of the department of corrections, under an order for probation or community corrections, or incarcerated in a county jail, the applicant provides written notice to the supervising agency that he or she is requesting a change of name under this section; and

(IV) Provides the court with a copy of his or her criminal history record from both the Colorado bureau of investigation and the federal bureau of investigation and the criminal history report from the Colorado bureau of investigation reflects the addition of the proposed changed name as an alias; and

(d) The court finds that:

(I) The name change is not for the purpose of fraud, to avoid the consequences of a criminal conviction, or to facilitate a criminal activity; and

(II) The desired name change would be proper and not detrimental to the interests of any other person.

(4) The department of revenue shall not issue a driver's license or an identification card in the new name of a name change applicant unless the name change applicant submits a court order changing the applicant's name pursuant to this section.

History

 Source: G.L. § 1850. G.S. § 2452. R.S. 08: § 4348. C.L. § 6484. CSA: C. 30, § 1. CRS 53: § 19-1-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 20-1-1. L. 65: p. 425, § 1. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 1576, § 15, effective July 10. L. 2002: Entire section amended, p. 1141, § 1, effective June 3. L. 2004: (1)(a) and (1)(c) amended, p. 75, § 2, effective September 1; (1)(a) and (2) amended and (1.5) added, p. 119, § 1, effective September 1. L. 2005: (1)(a) and (2)(c) amended and (1)(a.5) added, p. 20, § 1, effective February 23. L. 2010: (3) and (4) added, (SB 10-006), ch. 341, p. 1579, § 5, effective June 5.

Annotations

 Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (1)(a) by House Bill 04-1052 and House Bill 04-1195 were harmonized.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration in the 2010 act adding subsections (3) and (4), see section 1 of chapter 341, Session Laws of Colorado 2010.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 At common law a person could adopt another name at will. In re Knight, 36 Colo. App. 187, 537 P.2d 1085 (1975).

 Statutes setting forth procedures to be followed in changing a name merely provide an additional method beyond the common law for making the change. In re Knight, 36 Colo. App. 187, 537 P.2d 1085 (1975); In re Nguyen, 684 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108, 105 S. Ct. 785, 83 L. Ed.2d 779 (1985).

 Trial court has the power, founded in common law, to order a change of name of a minor child in a dissolution of marriage action but court should consider those factors applicable to a statutory name change in determining whether to grant a parent's request. In re Nguyen, 684 P.2d 258 (Colo. App. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108, 105 S. Ct. 785, 83 L. Ed.2d 779 (1985).

 Statutory change encouraged. It is more advantageous to the state to have a statutory method of changing names followed, and for that reason applications under the statute should be encouraged, and generally should be granted unless made for a wrongful or fraudulent purpose. In re Knight, 36 Colo. App. 187, 537 P.2d 1085 (1975).

 Basis for denial. While a court has wide discretion in matters of a name change, it should not deny the application for a change of name as being improper unless special circumstances or facts are found to exist. Included in these would be unworthy motive, the possibility of fraud on the public, the choice of a name that is bizarre, unduly lengthy, ridiculous, or offensive to common decency and good taste, or if the interests of a wife or child of the applicant would be adversely affected thereby. In re Knight, 36 Colo. App. 187, 537 P.2d 1085 (1975).

 Hearing prior to denial. Before a court denies a request for a change of name under the statute, it should conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if good and sufficient cause exists to deny the application. In re Knight, 36 Colo. App. 187, 537 P.2d 1085 (1975).

 When a child was given the noncustodial parent's surname prior to the dissolution of the parent's marriage, the noncustodial parent has a continuing interest in the minor child's use of that surname. Hamman v. County Court, 753 P.2d 743 (Colo. 1988).

 But, the noncustodial parent does not necessarily have the power to prevent a name change merely by making known his objections. Hamman v. County Court, 753 P.2d 743 (Colo. 1988).

 Notice requirement. Noncustodial parent, as an interested party, is entitled to reasonable notice of the filing of a petition requesting name change by the custodial parent. Hamman v. County Court, 753 P.2d 743 (Colo. 1988).

 Such notice should be reasonably calculated to notify the noncustodial parent of the pending action in a time and manner which allows participation in the proceeding if the noncustodial parent wishes. Hamman v. County Court, 753 P.2d 743 (Colo. 1988).

13-15-102. Publication of change.

Statute text

(1) Public notice of a change of name shall be given at least three times within twenty-one days after the court orders publication pursuant to section 13-15-101 (1.5). The person changing his or her name shall cause such public notice to be given in a newspaper published in the county in which the person resides. If no newspaper is published in that county, such notice shall be published in a newspaper in such county as the court directs.

(2) Public notice of such name change through publication as required in subsection (1) of this section shall not be required if the petitioner has been:

(a) The victim of a crime, the underlying factual basis of which has been found by the court on the record to include an act of domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), C.R.S.;

(b) The victim of child abuse, as defined in section 18-6-401, C.R.S.; or

(c) The victim of domestic abuse as that term is defined in section 13-14-101 (2).

History

 Source: G.L. § 1851. G.S. § 2453. R.S. 08: § 4349. C.L. § 6485. CSA: C. 30, § 2. CRS 53: § 19-1-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 20-1-2. L. 99: Entire section amended, p. 1178, § 4, effective June 2. L. 2004: (2)(c) amended, p. 554, § 7, effective July 1; (1) amended, p. 120, § 2, effective September 1. L. 2005: (1) amended, p. 21, § 2, effective February 23.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the number of publications required, see § 24-70-106.

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COSTS

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ARTICLE 16
COSTS - CIVIL ACTIONS

Annotations

 Cross references: For costs generally, see C.R.C.P. 41(d), 54(d), 58, 65(c), 69(b), 70, 80(a), and 102 and C.A.R. 10(b), 35(d), and 39; for docket fees and clerks' fees, see article 32 of this title; for witness fees, see §§ 13-33-102 and 13-33-103; for special fees in probate proceedings, see § 13-32-102; for fees of jurors, see § 13-33-101; for assessment of costs in criminal actions, see Crim. P. 32; for awarding of attorney fees in civil actions generally, see § 13-17-102.

Annotations

 Law reviews: For article, "Obtaining Costs of Clients -- Part 1", see 14 Colo. Law. 1974 (1985).


Section

13-16-101. Security for costs.

13-16-102. Motion to require cost bond.

13-16-103. Costs of poor person.

13-16-104. When plaintiff recovers costs.

13-16-105. When defendant recovers costs.

13-16-106. Costs in replevin.

13-16-107. Costs on motion to dismiss.

13-16-108. When several matters pleaded.

13-16-109. Costs on several counts.

13-16-110. When several defendants.

13-16-111. Recovery of costs of suit.

13-16-112. Number of witness fees taxed.

13-16-113. Costs upon dismissal or summary judgment.

13-16-114. Costs in equity.

13-16-115. In suit for use of another.

13-16-116. Costs in adverse suit.

13-16-117. On appeal from decisions in probate.

13-16-118. Clerk to tax costs.

13-16-119. Costs retaxed - forfeit by clerk.

13-16-120. Fee bill - precept - levy and return.

13-16-121. Costs allowed to defendants who prevail against public entities. (Repealed)

13-16-122. Items includable as costs.

13-16-123. Award of fees and costs to garnishee.

13-16-124. Sheriff's fees charged to judicial department.

13-16-125. Limit on supersedeas bond.

13-16-101. Security for costs.

Statute text

(1) In all actions on official bonds for the use of any persons, actions on the bonds of executors, administrators, or guardians, and qui tam actions on any penal statute, the person or plaintiff for whose use the action is to be commenced, before he or she institutes such suit, shall file or cause to be filed with the clerk of the court in which the action is to be commenced an instrument in writing as described in subsection (3) of this section for security for the payment of costs of suit.

(2) In all cases in law and equity where the plaintiff, or the person for whose use an action is to be commenced, is not a resident of this state, upon motion of the defendant or any officer of the court pursuant to section 13-16-102, the court may require the nonresident plaintiff to give an instrument in writing for the payment of costs of suit as described in subsection (3) of this section; except that, to ensure that access to the courts is not unreasonably denied, a court shall not require an instrument in writing for the payment of costs of suit in excess of five thousand dollars.

(3) As used in this section and section 13-16-102, "instrument in writing" means an instrument in writing of some responsible person, being a resident of this state, to be approved by the clerk, whereby such person shall acknowledge himself or herself bound to pay, or cause to be paid, all costs which may accrue in such action either to the opposite party or to any of the officers of such courts, which instrument may be in form as follows:


  A. B.  )
vs.  ) .......... Court.
  C. D.  )
  I do hereby enter myself security for costs in this case, and acknowledge myself bound to pay, or cause to be paid, all costs which may accrue in this action, either to the opposite party or to any of the officers of this court pursuant to the laws of this state.
..............................................................
Dated this ........ day of ........, 20.. .

History

 Source: R.S. p. 153, § 1. G.L. § 323. G.S. § 397. R.S. 08: § 1064. C.L. § 6580. CSA: C. 43, § 10. CRS 53: § 33-1-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-1. L. 2009: Entire section amended, (HB 09-1305), ch. 311, p. 1690, § 1, effective September 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Bonds in Colorado Courts: A Primer for Practitioners", see 34 Colo. Law. 59 (March 2005).

 Nonresident plaintiff in suing out a writ of error must file cost bond. A writ of error is a new suit, and before it can be prosecuted, if the plaintiff in error is a nonresident, he must file a cost bond. If he fails to do so, he has no standing in court; his case cannot be heard on the merits, if objection be made. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Graham, 1 Colo. 182 (1870); Talpey v. Doane, 2 Colo. 298 (1874).

 The filing of a bond for a supersedeas cannot accomplish that purpose, or in any sense waive the necessity of filing security for costs. Filley v. Cody, 3 Colo. 221 (1877); Fifer v. Fifer, 120 Colo. 10, 206 P.2d 336 (1949).

 Despite plaintiff's non-citizen status, the proper determination of her residence, which is necessary for purposes of this section, was not dependent on her immigration status but, instead, on the evaluation of her place of domicile and her subjective intent to remain in the state. Munoz-Hoyos v. de Cortez, 207 P.3d 951 (Colo. App. 2009).

 Trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff's non-citizen status alone precluded her from qualifying as a resident for purposes of this section and in requiring her to post a cost bond on that basis. Munoz-Hoyos v. de Cortez, 207 P.3d 951 (Colo. App. 2009).

 In absence of judgment for costs, surety would not be liable. The payment of all costs occasioned by the plaintiff in error without regard to the ultimate judgment of the court is secured by the cost bond. The officers of the court are protected. If there were no cost bond and the officers of the court had to rely upon the supersedeas bond for the costs made by the plaintiff in error, then in the absence of a judgment against him for cost, his security would not be liable for any. Filley v. Cody, 3 Colo. 221 (1877).

 Court may order that cost bond be filed within thirty days. Ferrara v. Auric Mining Co, 20 Colo. App. 411, 79 P. 302 (1905).

 Where a writ was dismissed for want of a cost bond, a new writ may be prosecuted in the same cause. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Graham, 1 Colo. 182 (1870).

 A bond of a corporation which is executed by an attorney in fact, appointed by the president, is well executed. W. Union Tel. Co. v. Graham, 1 Colo. 182 (1870).

 There is no statutory authority to enter a summary judgment against the surety upon a cost bond, and in the absence of such statutory authority, before any judgment could be taken against a surety upon such a bond, an opportunity must be provided said surety to assert any defense which he might have to an action seeking to enforce his liability as surety. Fifer v. Fifer, 120 Colo. 10, 206 P.2d 336 (1949).

 Section does not apply to actions brought in federal court. In an action in the United States district court, defendant's motion, grounded upon this section, that plaintiff, a nonresident, be required to furnish a cost bond was denied, for the federal rules of civil procedure have repealed the conformity act, and state practice in this connection may no longer be invoked under its terms. Nat'l Distillers Prods. Corp. v. Hindech, 10 F.R.D. 229 (D. Colo. 1950).

 Court has no discretion under this section, but must require security from a nonresident plaintiff. Lewis v. Keim, 883 P.2d 610 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Section 13-16-103 provides judges with the authority to waive cost requirements under this section and § 13-16-102 and, therefore, provides sufficient authority to permit a plaintiff to proceed when the plaintiff is a poor person and unable to pay costs and expenses. Walcott v. District Ct., 2nd Jud. Dist., 924 P.2d 163 (Colo. 1996).

 Husband who sought modification of prior dissolution decree was person for whose use the action was commenced and, because he was a nonresident, trial court properly required him to post bond. In re Kronbach, 757 P.2d 175 (Colo. App. 1988).

 Applied in Glickman v. Mesigh, 200 Colo. 320, 615 P.2d 23 (1980).

13-16-102. Motion to require cost bond.

Statute text

If an action described in section 13-16-101 (2) is commenced by a nonresident of this state without filing an instrument in writing, or if at any time after the commencement of any suit by a resident of this state he or she shall become nonresident, and the court is satisfied that the nonresident plaintiff is unable to pay the costs of suit, the court may, on motion of the defendant or any officer of the court, order the nonresident plaintiff, on or before the day in such order named, to give an instrument in writing for the payment of costs in the suit. To ensure that access to the courts is not unreasonably denied, a court shall not require an instrument in writing for the payment of costs of suit in excess of five thousand dollars. If the nonresident plaintiff neglects or refuses, on or before the day in such rule named, to file such instrument, the court, on motion, shall dismiss the suit.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 154, § 2. G.L. § 324. G.S. § 398. L. 1885: p. 156, § 1. R.S. 08: § 1065. C.L. § 6581. CSA: C. 43, § 11. CRS 53: § 33-1-2. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-2. L. 2009: Entire section amended, (HB 09-1305), ch. 311, p. 1691, § 2, effective September 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Bonds in Colorado Courts: A Primer for Practitioners", see 34 Colo. Law. 59 (March 2005).

 Dismissals under this section are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Hytken v. Wake, 68 P.3d 508 (Colo. App. 2002).

 The filing of a motion for a cost bond preserves defendant's rights to answer and prevents plaintiff from seeking default judgment. McDermett v. Rosenbaum, 13 Colo. App. 444, 58 P. 880 (1899).

 Requirement of cost bond is a matter of judicial discretion as to residents. Whether or not a resident plaintiff shall be required to give security for costs is a matter in the sound discretion of the court. Knight v. Fisher, 15 Colo. 176, 25 P. 78 (1890); Ward v. Williams, 16 Colo. 86, 27 P. 247 (1891); Fleming v. Breitner, 73 Colo. 250, 215 P. 133 (1923).

 Court has no discretion as to nonresidents. If any action shall be commenced by a nonresident without filing the cost bond required by § 13-6-101, the court, on motion, shall dismiss the same. This court has repeatedly held that this language is unequivocal and leaves nothing to the discretion of the court. Edgar Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Taylor, 10 Colo. 110, 14 P. 113 (1887); Lewis v. Keim, 883 P.2d 610 (Colo. App. 1994).

 The filing of a bond by a nonresident, after commencement of suit comes too late. Filing the bond subsequently to the commencement of the suit, and whether before or after the motion to dismiss is interposed, cannot avail the nonresident plaintiff. Sutro v. Simpson, 14 F. 370 (D. Colo. 1882); Edgar Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Taylor, 10 Colo. 110, 14 P. 113 (1887).

 Defendant waives right to cost bond when no motion made in trial court. When no motion for a cost bond is made in the trial court, the defendant's right to a cost bond is waived. Payton v. Spiesberger & Son Co., 40 Colo. 289, 90 P. 605 (1907).

 For the lack of authority for clerk to demand a bond for accrued costs, see Teller v. Sievers, 20 Colo. App. 109, 77 P. 261 (1904).

 Security required under this section may not be excused or deferred under § 13-16-103. Lewis v. Keim, 883 P.2d 610 (Colo. App. 1994) (disapproved of by supreme court in Walcott v. District Ct., 2nd Jud. Dist., 924 P.2d 163 (Colo. 1996)).

 Inability to obtain cost bond does not equate to the neglect or refusal to pay such a bond. Lewis v. Keim, 883 P.2d 610 (Colo. App. 1994); Walcott v. District Ct., 2nd Jud. Dist., 924 P.2d 163 (Colo. 1996).

 The burden is on the plaintiff to file a cost bond and failure to do so for any reason other than indigency or defendant's waiver mandates dismissal. Hytken v. Wake, 68 P.3d 508 (Colo. App. 2002).

 Section 13-16-103 provides judges with the authority to waive cost requirements under this section and § 13-16-101 and, therefore, provides sufficient authority to permit a plaintiff to proceed when the plaintiff is a poor person and unable to pay costs and expenses. Walcott v. District Ct., 2nd Jud. Dist., 924 P.2d 163 (Colo. 1996).

 Although court improperly denied defendant's motion for filing of cost bond, order appointing receiver need not be vacated. Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Denver Hotel Ass'n Ltd. P'ship, 830 P.2d 1138 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Although district court erred in denying cost bond for nonresident plaintiff, such error did not require that an order for appointment of receiver be vacated; under such circumstances, remand of cause with directions to set date for the filing of cost bond was appropriate remedy. Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Denver Hotel Ass'n Ltd. P'ship, 830 P.2d 1138 (Colo. App. 1992).

13-16-103. Costs of poor person.

Statute text

(1) If the judge or justice of any court, including the supreme court, is at any time satisfied that any person is unable to prosecute or defend any civil action or special proceeding because he is a poor person and unable to pay the costs and expenses thereof, the judge or justice, in his discretion, may permit such person to commence and prosecute or defend an action or proceeding without the payment of costs; but, in the event such person prosecutes or defends an action or proceeding successfully, there shall be a judgment entered in his favor for the amount of court costs which he would have incurred except for the provision of this section, and this judgment shall be first satisfied out of any money paid into court, and such costs shall be paid to the court before any such judgment is satisfied of record.

(2) In determining whether a plaintiff in an action brought pursuant to article 4 of title 14, C.R.S., may be permitted to proceed without the payment of costs, the court shall take into account only those assets to which the plaintiff has direct access. The court shall not consider assets which the plaintiff is unable to directly access even though the plaintiff may have an ownership interest in those assets.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 154, § 3. G.L. § 325. G.S. § 399. R.S. 08: § 1076. C.L. § 6592. CSA: C. 43, § 22. L. 47: p. 458, § 5. CRS 53: § 33-1-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-3. L. 64: p. 220, § 44. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 600, § 21, effective July 1. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 239, § 3, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations


Analysis


I. General Consideration.
II. Habeas Corpus Proceedings.
III. Reporter's Transcript.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

 Law reviews. For article, "Motions in Forma Pauperis: The First Step in Access to Justice", see 28 Colo. Law. 29 (April 1999).

 This section requires a judicial officer of any court, trial or appellate, to permit an indigent plaintiff to exercise the statutory right to appeal without the payment of costs. Bell v. Simpson, 918 P.2d 1123 (Colo. 1996).

 The plain language of subsection (1) requires a judicial officer of any court, trial or appellate, to permit an indigent plaintiff to exercise the right of appeal without payment of costs, and district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's appeal for failure to post an appeal bond in the amount of $250 ordered by the county court at the same time it found that he was indigent. Rodden v. Colo. State Penitentiary, 52 P.3d 223 (Colo. 2002).

 The sole and only purpose of this section is to aid the indigent litigant in getting into court in effect, opening the courts of justice to the poor person. Almarez v. Carpenter, 173 Colo. 284, 477 P.2d 792 (1970).

 This section aids in administering justice "without sale". Almarez v. Carpenter, 173 Colo. 284, 477 P.2d 792 (1970).

 To be entitled to a waiver of "costs", the litigant must not only be "a poor person" who is not able to pay the costs, but also is unable to pay the expenses of the civil action or proceeding. Almarez v. Carpenter, 173 Colo. 284, 477 P.2d 792 (1970).

 The inability to pay expenses is, in effect, a test of indigency under this section. Almarez v. Carpenter, 173 Colo. 284, 477 P.2d 792 (1970).

 "In forma pauperis". Although this section does not use the term "in forma pauperis", this phrase is commonly employed to describe the petition for waiver of costs authorized by this section. Cook v. District Court ex rel. County of Weld, 670 P.2d 758 (Colo. 1983).

 Whether payment of costs may be deferred is a matter of judicial discretion. From an analysis of this section it appears that, in the first instance, whether a litigant may commence or defend an action or proceeding without the payment of costs rests within the sound judicial discretion of the judge. Almarez v. Carpenter, 173 Colo. 284, 477 P.2d 792 (1970); Medina v. District Court, 177 Colo. 185, 493 P.2d 367 (1972); Collins v. Jaquez, 15 P.3d 299 (Colo. App. 2000).

 Judge's discretion in reviewing petition to commence without payment of costs. In the absence of factors such as bad faith or a plainly frivolous claim, the general assembly intended that the judge's discretion in reviewing a petition to commence and prosecute an action without payment of costs be limited to determining whether the petitioning party has the financial resources to pay the costs and expenses incident to the litigation. Cook v. District Court ex rel. County of Weld, 670 P.2d 758 (Colo. 1983).

 Where plaintiff acted promptly to submit his amended in forma pauperis (IFP) motion, the granting of the amended motion should relate back to the filing of the original IFP motion. Fraser v. Colo. Bd. of Parole, 931 P.2d 560 (Colo. App. 1996).

 In determining whether a prisoner may proceed under this section without payment of costs, the court may consider the person's complete financial condition, including the timing and nature of the prisoner's spending in the weeks immediately preceding commencement of the action. Vance v. District Ct. of Fremont County, 908 P.2d 1189 (Colo. App. 1995).

 But a prisoner need not be destitute to proceed without payment of costs, nor must a prisoner develop a savings plan to provide for the possibility that he or she may want to file an action while incarcerated. Prisoners need not deprive themselves of the small amenities that they are allowed to acquire in order to qualify to proceed without payment of costs. Vance v. District Ct. of Fremont County, 908 P.2d 1189 (Colo. App. 1995).

 Court must abuse discretion to reverse its order. To reverse an order denying such a request to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must have "abused its discretion". Medina v. District Court, 177 Colo. 185, 493 P.2d 367 (1972).

 Finding by trial court of nonindigency not supported by record. Medina v. District Court, 177 Colo. 185, 493 P.2d 367 (1972).

 This section does not apply to appeals from justice to county courts. Spain v. Murry, 77 Colo. 197, 235 P. 338 (1925).

 Nor does it apply to the prosecution of writs of error. In Ferrara v. Auric Mining Co. (20 Colo. App. 411, 79 P. 302 (1905)) it is stated that the rulings of the supreme court are to the effect that this section does not apply to the prosecution of writs of error. Spain v. Murry, 77 Colo. 197, 235 P. 338 (1925).

 The court is not confined to any particular stage in the progress of a case, after it is instituted, either before or after the trial is begun, in granting this permission; and certainly in the absence of any showing of an abuse by the trial court of its discretion under this section, or of injury or prejudice to the defendant, neither of which is made to appear in this case, a court of review will not interfere. Peck v. Farnham, 24 Colo. 141, 49 P. 364 (1897).

 Security required under § 13-16-102 may not be excused or deferred under this section. Lewis v. Keim, 883 P.2d 610 (Colo. App. 1994) (disapproved of by supreme court in Walcott v. District Ct., 2nd Jud. Dist., 924 P.2d 163 (Colo. 1996)).

 This section provides judges with the authority to waive cost requirements under §§ 13-16-101 and 13-16-102 and, therefore, provides sufficient authority to permit a plaintiff to proceed when the plaintiff is a poor person and unable to pay costs and expenses. Walcott v. District Ct., 2nd Jud. Dist., 924 P.2d 163 (Colo. 1996).

II. HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS.

 While habeas corpus may, of course, be found to be a civil action for procedural purposes, it does not follow that its availability in testing the state's right to detain any indigent prisoner may be subject to the payment of a filing fee. Williams v. District Court, 160 Colo. 348, 417 P.2d 496 (1966).

 This section guarantees it to poor persons. The legal device existing in the state which provides this equal protection in the postconviction civil remedy of habeas corpus is contained in and governed by this section, which allows a poor person to proceed without the payment of costs in a civil action on his making a showing of poverty. Williams v. District Court, 160 Colo. 348, 417 P.2d 496 (1966).

 In the administration of criminal justice the indigent must be afforded access to established channels of appellate review in such manner that he is freed from the "invidious discriminations" which attach when proceeding in penury. Williams v. District Court, 160 Colo. 348, 417 P.2d 496 (1966).

 There is no higher duty than to maintain the federal writ of habeas corpus unimpaired and unsuspended save only in the cases specified in the federal constitution. When an equivalent right is granted by a state, financial hurdles must not be permitted to condition its exercise. Williams v. District Court, 160 Colo. 348, 417 P.2d 496 (1966).

 Judges have restricted discretion when habeas corpus is sought. Federal constitutional standards require consideration of the "freedom writ" in a quasi-criminal light when state procedures are tested for equal protection, and the discretion normally allowed the court under this section is restricted by very tangible federal limitations. Williams v. District Court, 160 Colo. 348, 417 P.2d 496 (1966).

 Courts cannot saddle defendant with costs even when habeas petition is denied. The supreme court sees no difference of substance save subtlety between the "invidious discrimination" worked by a fee imposed upon an indigent before he is allowed to petition, which he cannot pay, and a fee saddled upon him after dismissal, which he also cannot pay. Both practices are effective deterrents. Williams v. District Court, 160 Colo. 348, 417 P.2d 496 (1966).

 Invidious discrimination. To fasten a financial burden only upon those unsuccessful appellants who are confined in state institutions is to make an invidious discrimination. Williams v. District Court, 160 Colo. 348, 417 P.2d 496 (1966).

III. REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT.

 Section does not give a right to a free transcript. This section does not give an individual, found to be a pauper within the meaning of the statute, a right to a trial transcript without cost in order to prosecute an appeal. Almarez v. Carpenter, 173 Colo. 284, 477 P.2d 792 (1970).

 Transcript is not, by definition, a writ, process, or proceeding. Almarez v. Carpenter, 173 Colo. 284, 477 P.2d 792 (1970).

 The fees for the preparation of a transcript by a reporter are not payable to the court and the court cannot waive them. Almarez v. Carpenter, 173 Colo. 284, 477 P.2d 792 (1970).

 This section only permits the waiver by the judge of costs chargeable by the court. Almarez v. Carpenter, 173 Colo. 284, 477 P.2d 792 (1970).

 The supreme court may find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants than through a reporter's transcript. Almarez v. Carpenter, 173 Colo. 284, 477 P.2d 792 (1970).

 Section does not violate § 6 of art. II, Colo. Const. Although this section does not require that a trial transcript without cost be provided, § 13-16-103 is not violative of § 6 of art. II, Colo. Const. Almarez v. Carpenter, 173 Colo. 284, 477 P.2d 792 (1970).

 A transcript is not an absolute necessity in the reviewing court. Almarez v. Carpenter, 173 Colo. 284, 477 P.2d 792 (1970).

 Colorado, under its rule-making power, has augmented the waiver of costs by simplifying the requirements for a record. The supreme court, consonant with the spirit of this section to ease the burden on litigants, adopted C.A.R. 10. A discussion of this rule should dispel any implications that Colorado denies an effective review of trial court judgments by not providing free reporters' transcripts. Almarez v. Carpenter, 173 Colo. 284, 477 P.2d 792 (1970).

13-16-104. When plaintiff recovers costs.

Statute text

If any person sues in any court of this state in any action, real, personal, or mixed, or upon any statute for any offense or wrong immediately personal to the plaintiff and recovers any debt or damages in such action, then the plaintiff or demandant shall have judgment to recover against the defendant his costs to be taxed; and the same shall be recovered, together with the debt or damages, by execution, except in the cases mentioned in this article.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 154, § 4. G.L. § 326. G.S. § 400. R.S. 08: § 1055. C.L. § 6571. CSA: C. 43, § 1. CRS 53: § 33-1-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-4.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 The successful plaintiff is entitled to recover all costs. Wallace Plumbing Co. v. Dillon, 73 Colo. 10, 213 P. 130 (1922).

 The party to be taxed must be interested in suit and before court. This section does not authorize the court to render judgment against one not interested in the litigation or the subject matter thereof, not a party to the suit and not before the court. Downs v. Reno, 53 Colo. 217, 124 P. 582 (1912).

 A party who challenges the necessity and reasonableness of expert witness fees and expenses is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 961 P.2d 511 (Colo. App. 1997).

 A party is entitled to have the trial court make findings sufficient to disclose the basis for its decision to award costs and to support the amount awarded. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 961 P.2d 511 (Colo. App. 1997).

 Where there is more than one trial, he is entitled to recover costs for all the trials. Wallace Plumbing Co. v. Dillon, 73 Colo. 10, 213 P. 130 (1922).

 Costs of a prior mistrial. The provisions of this section, that the prevailing party shall recover his costs to be taxed, authorize him to recover all his costs in the action, including those of a prior mistrial, as well as those of the last trial; and a defeated party who would obtain a new trial must first pay the costs of the prevailing party at a mistrial, as well as all other necessary costs he has incurred in the action. Shreve v. Cheesman, 69 F. 785 (8th Cir. 1895).

 If the defendant prevails, costs in one court may be set off against those in the other. Where a judgment is reversed on review and the cause remanded for a new trial, the plaintiff in error is entitled to costs in the appellate court; and where the defendant in error thereafter prevails in the trial court, the costs in one court may be set off against those in the other. Wallace Plumbing Co. v. Dillon, 73 Colo. 10, 213 P. 130 (1922).

 Plaintiff properly charged with costs where cross-complainant recovers judgment. Where a complaint was dismissed and the plaintiff objected to the dismissal of the case, but insisted on a trial on the defendant's cross-complaint and the replication, and the cross-complainant recovered judgment, the plaintiff was properly charged with the costs. Cone v. Montgomery, 25 Colo. 277, 53 P. 1052 (1898).

 Successful plaintiff in error may recover cost of transcript of record. The long practice of the supreme court should not lightly be changed, and amounts to a construction of the statutes, and that thereunder the successful plaintiff in error may recover any costs properly taxable. It is claimed that the transcript of record is not a proper matter to be taxed, but what has been said above shows that we must regard it as proper. It has always been customary to tax it. Antero & Lost Park Reservoir Co. v. Lowe, 70 Colo. 467, 203 P. 265 (1921).

 The bill of exceptions. For some years the bill of exceptions was not separately taxed but was included with the transcript of record, and in Phillips v. Corbin (25 Colo. 567, 56 P. 180 (1898)) a bill of costs including the costs for the transcript of the bill of exceptions, the original of which bill and not a transcript was sent to this court, was expressly approved. We cannot sustain this practice, since it is supported by no statute or rule and cannot, therefore, allow the costs of the bill of exceptions. Antero & Lost Park Reservoir Co. v. Lowe, 70 Colo. 467, 203 P. 265 (1921).

 Costs in annexation proceedings in the lower court are not allowed under this section. Phillips v. Corbin, 25 Colo. 567, 56 P. 180 (1898).

 This section is expressly limited to costs arising out of court actions, and it has no application to special proceedings before any boards, bureaus, or commissions unless expressly authorized by the creative act. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 116 Colo. 58, 178 P.2d 426 (1947).

 Costs rarely taxed against a public officer. In the discharge of a duty imposed upon him by law, costs are rarely, if ever, taxed against a public officer. Witter v. Whipple, 26 Colo. 1, 55 P. 1081 (1899).

 No costs can be taxed in the lower court against the secretary of state in a proceeding to require him to publish a list of nominees on the official ballot, and the same applies to the cost of proceeding in the supreme court where the secretary of state acted in good faith. Witter v. Whipple, 26 Colo. 1, 55 P. 1081 (1899).

 An award of costs is proper against a municipal corporation. Kussman v. City & County of Denver, 671 P.2d 1000 (Colo. App. 1983).

 Right of a plaintiff to select the forum for a claim less than $5,000 is not conditioned by constitution or by statute; rather, the general assembly has seen fit to permit a claimant to file such actions in district court unconstrained by considerations of whether the county court is an adequate forum for just resolution of the complaint and of any increased costs to the public incident to the district court adjudicative process. Cook v. District Court ex rel. County of Weld, 670 P.2d 758 (Colo. 1983).

 Expert witness fees are recoverable as costs to prevailing parties. Graefe & Graefe v. Beaver Mesa Exploration, 695 P.2d 767 (Colo. App. 1984).

 Plaintiff not entitled to costs against state pursuant to this section because there is no express authorization allowing costs to be assessed against the state. McFarland v. Gunter, 829 P.2d 510 (Colo. App. 1992); Smith v. Furlong, 976 P.2d 889 (Colo. App. 1999); Rocky Mtn. Animal Def. v. Div. of Wildlife, 100 P.3d 508 (Colo. App. 2004).

 The language of § 13-16-122 describing allowable costs does not negate the mandatory provisions of this section by allowing the court to refuse all costs. Nat'l Canada Corp. v. Dikeou, 868 P.2d 1131 (Colo. App. 1993).

 A prevailing party entitled to costs should be identified by focusing on the countervailing claims and defenses asserted by the litigants and not on incidental independent factors that may affect the ultimate monetary judgement. The trial court erred by considering non-collateral source receipts in determining if real estate purchasers were prevailing parties entitled to costs. Frost v. Schroeder & Co., Inc., 876 P.2d 126 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Determining a plaintiff to be a prevailing party on the basis of nominal damages when the defendant recovers more in damages than the nominal damages would be abuse of discretion. Plaintiff sought nominal damages and subsequent determination as the prevailing party, which carries with it an entitlement to costs. However, such determination on the basis of nominal damages would be an abuse of discretion by the court, since the nominal damages of one dollar would have been less than the $966,178 awarded to the defendant on a counterclaim, and thus the defendant would be determined the prevailing party using a "net judgment" analysis. City of Westminster v. Centric-Jones Constructors, 100 P.3d 472 (Colo. App. 2003).

 The trial court's right to allocate costs between defendants is discretionary. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the award of costs against the defendants joint and several where one of the defendants is an individual and the other is a conference of churches. Winkler v. Rocky Mountain Conference, 923 P.2d 152 (Colo. App. 1995).

 Even though the imposition of costs is required by this section, the apportionment of costs among multiple defendants is not prescribed. It remains at the discretion of the court. Bohrer v. DeHart, 943 P.2d 1220 (Colo. App. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 961 P.2d 472 (Colo. 1998).

 An award of costs is not prohibited under C.R.C.P. 54 (d), even if a plaintiff is not entitled to costs under this section. Weeks v. City of Colo. Springs, 928 P.2d 1346 (Colo. App. 1996).

 This statute and C.R.C.P. 54(d) are modified by § 13-17-202 (1)(a)(II), which does not allow a party who rejects a settlement offer and recovers less at trial to recover his or her costs, even though that party is determined to be the prevailing party. Bennett v. Hickman, 992 P.2d 670 (Colo. App. 1999).

 Plaintiff entitled to recover costs for settlement conference and trial transcript if the court made either necessary for litigation. Parker v. USAA, 216 P.3d 7 (Colo. App. 2007), aff'd on other grounds, 200 P.3d 350 (Colo. 2009).

 Offer of settlement as to "all claims" unambiguously includes attorney fees and costs if the only claim for attorney fees and costs appears in the complaint. The offer of settlement need not explicitly reference attorney fees or costs. Bumbal v. Smith, 165 P.3d 844 (Colo. App. 2007).

13-16-105. When defendant recovers costs.

Statute text

If any person sues in any court of record in this state in any action wherein the plaintiff or demandant might have costs in case judgment is given for him and he is nonprossed, suffers a discontinuance, is nonsuited after appearance of the defendant, or a verdict is passed against him, then the defendant shall have judgment to recover his costs against the plaintiff, except against executors or administrators prosecuting in the right of their testator or intestate, or demandant, to be taxed; and the same shall be recovered of the plaintiff or demandant, by like process as the plaintiff or demandant might have had against the defendant, in case judgment has been given for the plaintiff or demandant.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 154, § 5. G.L. § 327. G.S. § 401. R.S. 08: § 1058. C.L. § 6574. CSA: C. 43, § 4. CRS 53: § 33-1-5. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-5.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Section 13-64-205 (1)(b) does not preclude or affect a prevailing defendant's right to recover costs and does not imply a repeal of this section. Mullins v. Kessler, 83 P.3d 1203 (Colo. App. 2003).

 A party challenging the reasonableness of expert fees is entitled to a hearing on the issue. Dunlap v. Long, 902 P.2d 446 (Colo. App. 1995).

 Whether to award costs and what amount to award are decisions within the sound discretion of the trial court. Its ruling will not be reversed on appeal without clear abuse of discretion. Wark v. McClellan, 68 P.3d 574 (Colo. App. 2003).

 Costs of third-party defendant properly divided between plaintiff and defendant or borne by two defendants when both had claims against third-party defendant since dismissal of the claims made third-party defendant the prevailing party against both. Cobai v. Young, 679 P.2d 121 (Colo. App. 1984); Poole v. Estate of Collins, 728 P.2d 741 (Colo. App. 1986).

 Court construed the Health Care Availability Act in harmony with this section and C.R.C.P. 54(d) to allow a prevailing defendant to recover costs in a medical negligence action. Mullins v. Kessler, 83 P.3d 1203 (Colo. App. 2003).

 Applied in Survey Eng'rs, Inc. v. Zoline Found., 193 Colo. 488, 568 P.2d 436 (1977); Romero v. Rossmiller, 43 Colo. App. 215, 603 P.2d 964 (1979); Gilmore v. Rubeck, 708 P.2d 486 (Colo. App. 1985); Bowers v. Loveland Pub. Co., 773 P.2d 595 (Colo. App. 1988).

13-16-106. Costs in replevin.

Statute text

Any person making justification or cognizance in replevin, if the same is found for him, or the plaintiff is nonsuited or nonprossed, suffers discontinuance, or is otherwise barred, then such person shall recover his damages and costs against the plaintiff.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 155, § 6. G.L. § 328. G.S. § 402. R.S. 08: § 1066. C.L. § 6582. CSA: C. 43, § 12. CRS 53: § 33-1-6. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-6.

13-16-107. Costs on motion to dismiss.

Statute text

If, in any action, judgment upon motion to dismiss by either party to the action is given against the plaintiff, the defendant shall recover costs against the plaintiff; if such judgment is given for the plaintiff, he shall recover costs against the defendant.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 155, § 7. G.L. § 329. G.S. § 403. R.S. 08: § 1056. C.L. § 6572. CSA: C. 43, § 2. CRS 53: § 33-1-7. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-7.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Where a case is remanded for further proceedings by the Colorado Court of Appeals, an award of costs pursuant to this section is inappropriate. Dalton v. Miller, 984 P.2d 666 (Colo. App. 1999).

 A court that grants a motion to dismiss but does not enter judgment thereon lacks authority to award costs under this section. Sotelo v. Hutchens Trucking Co., 166 P.3d 285 (Colo. App. 2007).

13-16-108. When several matters pleaded.

Statute text

When any defendant in any action, or plaintiff in replevin, pleads several matters, and any of such matters upon demurrer joined are adjudged insufficient, or if a verdict is found in any issue of the cause for the plaintiff, costs shall be given at the discretion of the court.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 155, § 8. G.L. § 330. G.S. § 404. R.S. 08: § 1067. C.L. § 6583. CSA: C. 43, § 13. CRS 53: § 33-1-8. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-8.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 For trial court's ruling that each party pay his own cost not being an abuse of discretion, see Livingston v. Utah-Colorado Land & Live Stock Co., 106 Colo. 278, 103 P.2d 684 (1940); W. H. Woolley & Co. v. Bear Creek Manor, 735 P.2d 910 (Colo. App. 1986).

 Where each party prevails in part an award of costs is committed to sole discretion of trial court and court's discretion remains unaffected by fact that judgment awarded to one party is larger than judgment awarded to the other. Husband v. Colo. Mountain Cellars, 867 P.2d 57 (Colo. App. 1993); Archer v. Farmer Bros., 70 P.3d 495 (Colo. App. 2002), aff'd, 90 P.3d 228 (Colo. 2004).

 When a case involves many claims, some of which are successful and some of which are not, it is left to the sole discretion of the trial court to determine which party, if any, is the prevailing party and whether costs should be awarded. Archer v. Farmer Bros. Co., 90 P.3d 228 (Colo. 2004).

13-16-109. Costs on several counts.

Statute text

Where there are several counts in any declaration, and any of them are adjudged insufficient, or a verdict on any issue joined thereon is found for the defendant, costs shall be awarded in the discretion of the court.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 155, § 9. G.L. § 331. G.S. § 405. R.S. 08: § 1063. C.L. § 6579. CSA: C. 43, § 9. CRS 53: § 33-1-9. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-9.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Where each party prevails in part an award of costs is committed to sole discretion of trial court and court's discretion remains unaffected by fact that judgment awarded to one party is larger than judgment awarded to the other. Husband v. Colo. Mountain Cellars, 867 P.2d 57 (Colo. App. 1993).

 When a case involves many claims, some of which are successful and some of which are not, it is left to the sole discretion of the trial court to determine which party, if any, is the prevailing party and whether costs should be awarded. Archer v. Farmer Bros. Co., 90 P.3d 228 (Colo. 2004).

13-16-110. When several defendants.

Statute text

Where several persons are made defendants to any action of trespass, assault, false imprisonment, detinue, replevin, trover, or ejectment, and any one or more of them are upon trial acquitted by verdict, every person so acquitted shall recover his costs of suit in like manner as if such verdict or acquittal had been given in favor of the defendant.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 155, § 10. G.L. § 332. G.S. § 406. R.S. 08: § 1068. C.L. § 6584. CSA: C. 43, § 14. CRS 53: § 33-1-10. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-10.

13-16-111. Recovery of costs of suit.

Statute text

A plaintiff who obtains judgment or an award of execution in an action brought under subsection (4) or (5) of rule 106 (a), C.R.C.P., shall recover his costs of suit. The defendant shall recover his costs if the action brought under subsection (4) or (5) of rule 106 (a), C.R.C.P., is dismissed pursuant to rule 41, C.R.C.P.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 155, § 11. G.L. § 333. G.S. § 407. R.S. 08: § 1069. C.L. § 6585. CSA: C. 43, § 15. CRS 53: § 33-1-11. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-11.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 The word "shall" in this section evinces a legislative intent that the prevailing party in a C.R.C.P. 106 (a)(4) action must be awarded reasonable costs. Carney v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 30 P.3d 861 (Colo. App. 2001).

 Section allows a prevailing plaintiff in a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) action to recover costs against the state, its officers, or agencies. Branch v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 89 P.3d 496 (Colo. App. 2003).

 This section does not require an award of costs if a party achieves mixed success in a C.R.C.P. 106 (a)(4) action involving multiple claims or issues. Any other reading would require a court to ignore §§ 13-16-108 and 13-16-109 and established case law that provides the court discretion to award costs if a party achieves some success when several matters are pleaded. Phillips v. Watkins, 166 P.3d 197 (Colo. App. 2007).

 Applied in Romero v. Rossmiller, 43 Colo. App. 215, 603 P.2d 964 (1979); Rossmiller v. Romero, 625 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1981).

13-16-112. Number of witness fees taxed.

Statute text

In no case in the district court shall the fees of more than four witnesses be taxed against the party against whom judgment is given for costs, unless the court certifies on its minutes that more than four witnesses were really necessary, in which case the clerk shall tax the costs of as many witnesses as the court so certifies.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 155, § 12. G.L. § 334. G.S. § 408. R.S. 08: § 1062. C.L. § 6578. CSA: C. 43, § 8. CRS 53: § 33-1-12. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-12.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 The section is confined to civil cases, and it is not the intention of the general assembly to extend it to criminal proceedings. Had it been thought necessary and proper, it would have been embraced in the criminal code. Parker v. People, 7 Colo. App. 56, 42 P. 172 (1895).

 Hearing upon remand considered separate hearing. Under this section, a hearing held after remand was a separate hearing, and plaintiff would be entitled to use such witnesses as may be considered necessary by him to present his evidence, subject to the restriction contained in this section. Yeager Garden Acres, Inc. v. Summit Constr. Co., 32 Colo. App. 242, 513 P.2d 458 (1973).

 Award for fees of eight witnesses without specific finding for their necessity held to be error in child custody hearing. Weber v. Wallace, 789 P.2d 427 (Colo. App. 1989).

 Record of trial court was not sufficient to determine which costs were allowed and whether they were reasonable and permitted by statute, thereby requiring a remand to the trial court to make findings under this section and § 13-16-112. Fenton v. Fibreboard Corp., 827 P.2d 564 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Applied in Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Hayutin, 40 Colo. App. 559, 583 P.2d 296 (1978).

13-16-113. Costs upon dismissal or summary judgment.

Statute text

(1) In all cases where any action is dismissed for irregularity, or is nonprossed or nonsuited by reason that the plaintiff neglects to prosecute the same, the defendant shall have judgment for his costs.

(2) In all actions brought as a result of a death or an injury to person or property occasioned by the tort of any other person, where any such action is dismissed prior to trial under rule 12 (b) of the Colorado rules of civil procedure, the defendant shall have judgment for his costs. This subsection (2) shall not apply if a motion under rule 12 (b) (5) of the Colorado rules of civil procedure is treated as a motion for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in rule 56 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 155, § 13. G.L. § 335. G.S. § 409. R.S. 08: § 1059. C.L. § 6575. CSA: C. 43, § 5. CRS 53: § 33-1-13. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-13. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 547, § 1, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "1988 Update on Colorado Tort Reform Legislation -- Part II", see 17 Colo. Law. 1949 (1988).

 Award of costs for claims dismissed because of failure to prosecute is mandatory. Munoz v. Measner, 214 P.3d 510 (Colo. App. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 247 P.3d 1031 (Colo. 2011).

 The specific limitation in the second sentence of subsection (2) cannot reasonably be interpreted as a general prohibition extending to all motions for summary judgment brought under C.R.C.P. 56, and the defendant's entitlement to an award of costs was properly considered under C.R.C.P. 54(d). Spencer v. United Mortg. Co., 857 P.2d 1342 (Colo. App. 1993).

 This section and § 13-17-201 mandate awards of attorney fees and costs and do not permit a reduction for work that may be used in companion litigation. Crandall v. City & County of Denver, 238 P.3d 659 (Colo. 2010).

13-16-114. Costs in equity.

Statute text

Upon the complainant dismissing his bill in equity or the defendant dismissing the same for want of prosecution, the defendant shall recover against the complainant full costs; and, in all other cases in equity not otherwise directed by law, it is in the discretion of the court to award costs or not.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 155, § 14. G.L. § 336. G.S. § 410. R.S. 08: § 1060. C.L. § 6576. CSA: C. 43, § 6. CRS 53: § 33-1-14. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-14.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 In an equity case the taxation of costs ordinarily rests in the sound discretion of the court, and its action in assessing the fees of expert witnesses as a part of the costs will not be disturbed on review where no abuse of discretion appears. Union Exploration Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Imp. Dist., 104 Colo. 109, 89 P.2d 257 (1939).

 For a court of equity charging costs of surveyor to losing party, see Moore v. Burritt, 106 Colo. 413, 105 P.2d 1084 (1940).

 C.R.C.P. 68 applies only to actions at law which seek a money judgment. Court held to be correct in refusing to apply said rule to dissolution of marriage proceeding which is an action in equity that does not seek a money judgment at law. Such cases are governed by this section which authorizes court to award costs or not. In re Marshall, 781 P.2d 177 (Colo. App. 1989), cert. denied, 794 P.2d 1011 (Colo. 1990).

13-16-115. In suit for use of another.

Statute text

When any suit is commenced in the name of one person to the use of another, the person to whose use the action is brought shall be held liable and bound for the payment of all costs which the plaintiff may be adjudged or bound to pay, to be recovered by civil action.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 156, § 15. G.L. § 337. G.S. § 411. R.S. 08: § 1057. C.L. § 6573. CSA: C. 43, § 3. CRS 53: § 33-1-15. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-15.

13-16-116. Costs in adverse suit.

Statute text

In all cases where any person makes an application for a patent to any lode, claim, placer claim, millsite, or other mining property under the mining laws of the United States, and any other person claiming adversely to such applicant files an adverse claim in the proper land office or brings a suit for the purpose of determining the title, or right of possession, to such mining property, or any part thereof, if such adverse claimant, being plaintiff in such suit, prevails, so as to recover costs therein, he shall also recover and be entitled to tax as a part of his said costs all disbursements and expense necessarily incurred and paid by him for plats, abstracts, and copies of papers filed in said land office with his adverse claim, and also a reasonable counsel fee, not exceeding fifty dollars in any case, for the expense of preparing his said adverse claim.

History

 Source: L. 1876: p. 54, § 1. G.L. § 349. G.S. § 423. R.S. 08: § 1061. C.L. § 6577. CSA: C. 43, § 7. CRS 53: § 33-1-16. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-16.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Attorney fees are not recoverable as costs under this section. In an adverse suit between the owners of two conflicting mining claims, where after judgment was entered it was on motion of the successful party amended so as to include an attorney fee and the expense of adverse, in accordance with a stipulation between the parties made before trial, the sums thus included in the judgment were a part of the judgment and not costs. Hiwassee Gold Mining Co. v. Hotchkiss Mt. Mining & Reduction Co., 16 Colo. App. 22, 63 P. 708 (1901).

13-16-117. On appeal from decisions in probate.

Statute text

In all cases of appeal from the decision of a court of probate, the assessment of costs shall be in the discretion of the court in which such appeal is heard.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 156, § 17. G.L. § 339. G.S. § 413. R.S. 08: § 1070. C.L. § 6586. CSA: C. 43, § 16. CRS 53: § 33-1-17. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-17.

13-16-118. Clerk to tax costs.

Statute text

The clerk of any court in the state is authorized and required to tax and subscribe all bills of costs arising in any cause or proceeding in the court of which he is clerk, agreeable to the rates which are allowed or specified by law.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 156, § 19. G.L. § 341. G.S. § 415. R.S. 08: § 1073. C.L. § 6589. CSA: C. 43, § 19. CRS 53: § 33-1-18. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-18.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the fees of the clerk of court, see article 32 of this title.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 No discretionary authority in clerk to determine attorney fees and expert witness fees. Discretion is a judicial function not properly delegable to the clerk of court. Davis v. Bruton, 797 P.2d 830 (Colo. App. 1990).

13-16-119. Costs retaxed - forfeit by clerk.

Statute text

If any person feels aggrieved by the taxation of any bill of costs, he may apply to the court to have the same retaxed, and, if it appears that the party aggrieved has paid any higher charge than by law is allowed, the court may order that the clerk forfeit all fees allowed to him for taxation and pay to the party aggrieved the whole amount which he has paid by reason of the allowing of any unlawful charge.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 156, § 20. G.L. § 342. G.S. § 416. R.S. 08: § 1074. C.L. § 6590. CSA: C. 43, § 20. CRS 53: § 33-1-19. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-19.

13-16-120. Fee bill - precept - levy and return.

Statute text

The clerk shall make out a bill of costs as the same have been taxed in any cause against the party liable to pay the same and his security for costs, if any, together with his precept, directed to the sheriff of the proper county, commanding that, if the costs in the said bill of costs mentioned are not paid within thirty days after demand made therefor, he shall cause the same to be levied on the goods and chattels, lands and tenements, of the party so liable therefor, and his security, if any, named therein. Every such fee bill shall run in the name of the people, shall be under the seal of the court, and shall be returnable within ninety days from the date thereof, and the sheriff shall proceed to collect the same.

History

 Source: R.S. p. 156, § 21. G.L. § 343. G.S. § 417. R.S. 08: § 1075. C.L. § 6591. CSA: C. 43, § 21. CRS 53: § 33-1-20. C.R.S. 1963: § 33-1-20.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 A fee bill for costs runs against the party liable to pay the same and his security for costs. Shannon v. Dodge, 18 Colo. 164, 32 P. 61 (1893); Staples v. Barclay, 30 Colo. 428, 71 P. 374 (1902).

 Any review must be an appeal from the judgment. The liability of the sureties was fixed by the judgment against their principal and any review of such liability must be had by an appeal from or error to such judgment, and could not be had by a motion to quash the fee bill and retax the costs and an appeal from the order denying the motion. Staples v. Barclay, 30 Colo. 428, 71 P. 374 (1902).

13-16-121. Costs allowed to defendants who prevail against public entities. (Repealed)

History

 Source: L. 77: Entire section added, p. 796, § 1, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section repealed, p. 462, § 6, effective July 1.

13-16-122. Items includable as costs.

Statute text

(1) Whenever any court of this state assesses costs pursuant to any provision of this article, such costs may include:

(a) Any docket fee required by article 32 of this title or any other fee or tax required by statute to be paid to the clerk of the court;

(b) The jury fees and expenses provided for in article 71 of this title;

(c) Any fees required to be paid to sheriffs pursuant to section 30-1-104, C.R.S.;

(d) Any fees of the court reporter for all or any part of a transcript necessarily obtained for use in this case;

(e) The witness fees, including subsistence payments, mileage at the rate authorized by section 13-33-103, and charges for expert witnesses approved pursuant to section 13-33-102 (4);

(f) Any fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case;

(g) Any costs of taking depositions for the perpetuation of testimony, including reporters' fees, witness fees, expert witness fees, mileage for witnesses, and sheriff fees for service of subpoenas;

(h) Any attorney fees, when authorized by statute or court rule;

(i) Any fees for service of process or fees for any required publications;

(j) Any item specifically authorized by statute to be included as part of the costs.

History

 Source: L. 81: Entire section added, p. 947, § 2, effective July 1. L. 2001: (1)(b) amended, p. 1270, § 18, effective June 5.

Annotations

 Cross references: For items includable as costs in criminal actions, see § 18-1.3-701.

Annotations


RECENT ANNOTATIONS

Annotations

 District court abused its discretion in awarding full in-house photocopying expenses, all costs billed by mediator and special master, and mileage and meal expenses. There was no evidence supporting the reasonableness or necessity of the in-house photocopying or the mileage expenses; the award of the mediator's and the special master's costs contravened an agreement between the parties; and the cost of counsel's meals was not attributable to litigation -- counsel would need to eat regardless of any litigation. Valentine v. Mtn. States Mut. Cas. Co., 252 P.3d 1182 (Colo. App. 2011).

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "The Bill of Costs", see 25 Colo. Law. 71 (November 1996).

 The awarding of costs is at the discretion of the trial court. Mem'l Gardens, Inc. v. Olympian Sales & Mgt. Consultants, Inc., 661 P.2d 296 (Colo. App. 1982).

 An award of costs lies within the discretion of the trial court, subject to the parameters of this section; however, the awarding of expert witness fees is not without limits but is circumscribed by the rule of reason, viz., sound judicial discretion. Fenton v. Fibreboard Corp., 827 P.2d 564 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Whether to award expert witness fees and the amount, if any, to be awarded are matters within the sound discretion of the trial court. Only reasonable expert witness fees may be awarded. Steele v. Law, 78 P.3d 1124 (Colo. App. 2003).

 Subject to the limitations set forth in this section, an award of costs lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Rossmiller v. Romero, 625 P.2d 1029 (Colo. 1981); Spencer v. United Mortg. Co., 857 P.2d 1342 (Colo. App. 1993).

 As long as the costs incurred are incurred solely for the benefit of the litigation and are not commingled with any of the general costs of doing business or the costs of other litigation, they cannot properly be termed overhead and may be included as costs under this section. Harvey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 983 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1998), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d 280 (Colo. 2000).

 Trial court abused its discretion in awarding plaintiff costs for a client fee related to contempt order because the affidavit submitted for recovery of the fee failed to establish that it was incurred solely for the related litigation. At least some portion of the fee was for general business costs; therefore, the fee is not recoverable. Madison Capital Co., LLC v. Star Acquisition VIII, 214 P.3d 557 (Colo. App. 2009).

 Cost of preparing trial transcript recoverable under subsection (1)(d) where transcript was obtained for use in the case. By stipulating that the court determine liability based upon the trial transcripts, the parties reduced the costs of litigation by avoiding a retrial. The court needed the trial transcript, however, to consider all the testimony. Parker v. USAA, 216 P.3d 7 (Colo. App. 2007), aff'd on other grounds, 200 P.3d 350 (Colo. 2009).

 Although the expenses of taking a deposition are generally not allowed as items of costs, subsection (1)(g) permits the award of the "costs of taking depositions for the perpetuation of testimony". Since the deposition transcript was used in lieu of testimony at trial to resolve the disputed claims, there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion in its inclusion of the costs of the deposition in defendant's bill of costs. Spencer v. United Mortg. Co., 857 P.2d 1342 (Colo. App. 1993).

 Record of trial court was not sufficient to determine which costs were allowed and whether they were reasonable and permitted by statute, thereby requiring a remand to the trial court to make findings under this section and § 13-16-112. Fenton v. Fibreboard Corp., 827 P.2d 564 (Colo. App. 1991).

 The determination of whether attorney fees are costs or damages in a particular case is, by its very nature, a fact- and context-sensitive one, which rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Ferrell v. Glenwood Brokers, Ltd., 848 P.2d 936 (Colo. 1993); Double Oak Constr., L.L.C. v. Cornerstone Dev. Int'l, L.L.C., 97 P.3d 140 (Colo. App. 2003).

 The list of items awardable as costs in this section is illustrative rather than exclusive. The use of the word "includes" rather than the word "means" in a regulatory definition indicates a nonexclusive list which may be enlarged upon. Cherry Creek Sch. Dist. v. Voelker, 859 P.2d 805 (Colo. 1993); Am. Water Development, Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1994).

 While deposition costs for ordinary discovery purposes are not allowable, if witness dies and his deposition is listed on the trial data certificate in lieu of his testimony, this constitutes perpetuation of testimony, and costs are allowable. Schultz v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 734 P.2d 146 (Colo. App. 1986); Frontier Exploration v. Am. Nat., 849 P.2d 887 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Allowance of expenses in taking discovery deposition proper where the taking of the deposition and its general content are reasonably necessary for the development of the case in light of facts known to counsel at the time it was taken. Cherry Creek Sch. Dist. v. Voelker, 859 P.2d 805 (Colo. 1993); Harvey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 983 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1998), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d 280 (Colo. 2000).

 Including costs of medical reports was not abuse of discretion. Absent specific prohibition, trial court has discretion in awarding costs since the list of expenses that may be awarded as costs under this section is not exclusive. Church v. Am. Standard Insurance Co., 764 P.2d 405 (Colo. App. 1988).

 Accrued interest on loans taken out by prevailing parties to finance their cases is not a recoverable cost as a matter of law. Catlin v. Tormey Bewley Corp., 219 P.3d 407 (Colo. App. 2009).

 Denial of costs for videotaping deposition was not abuse of discretion by court. Dorrance v. Family Athletic Club, 772 P.2d 667 (Colo. App. 1989).

 No abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of plaintiff's request for expert witness fees when plaintiff failed to provide sufficient documentation and itemization to establish her entitlement to expert witness fees since the court was under no obligation to order a costs hearing and plaintiff expressly requested the court not hold such a hearing. Steele v. Law, 78 P.3d 1124 (Colo. App. 2003).

 Trial court has discretion to award costs, subject to this section, and award of deposition costs is within the court's discretion. Terry v. Sullivan, 58 P.3d 1098 (Colo. App. 2002).

 C.R.C.P. 103 (8)(b)(5) provides authority to make an award of attorney fees. United Bank v. State Treasurer, 797 P.2d 851 (Colo. App. 1990).

 Witness fees incurred for expert whose testimony on steps taken by reasonably prudent applicant in Torrens action on which court relied in reaching its conclusions on due process issues properly included in cost award under subsection (1)(g). Lobato v. Taylor, 13 P.3d 821 (Colo. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 71 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2002).

 Costs attributable to expert witness fees for expert witnesses that did not testify at trial were properly awarded. These costs were valuation expenses necessarily incurred by reason of the litigation and were necessary for the proper preparation for trial. Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 992 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 17 P.3d 797 (Colo. 2001).

 When an expert witness for the prevailing party does not testify because his or her testimony is ruled unnecessary, and such ruling does not change the posture of the case, the prevailing party is not entitled to costs for the expert witness's fees. Catlin v. Tormey Bewley Corp., 219 P.3d 407 (Colo. App. 2009).

 Costs were properly awarded for an engineer despite the fact that the engineer's license had expired, because litigation consultation and testimony do not require a license. In re Water Rights of Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, 105 P.3d 595 (Colo. 2005).

 Costs of deposition not permitted where deposition taken for purposes of ordinary discovery and not to perpetuate testimony. Weber v. Wallace, 789 P.2d 427 (Colo. App. 1989).

 This section was not intended to repeal the requirement of § 13-33-103 that mileage fees may be awarded only to subpoenaed witnesses. Welch v. George, 19 P.3d 675 (Colo. 2000).

 The language of this section describing allowable costs does not negate the mandatory nature of § 13-16-104 which requires the court to award costs to a successful plaintiff. Nat'l Canada Corp. v. Dikeou, 868 P.2d 1131 (Colo. App. 1993).

 This section does not prohibit an award of costs that includes the expenses associated with computerized legal research, but the costs must be billed separately from attorney fees, such research must have been necessary for trial preparation, and the costs requested for such research must be reasonable. Roget v. Grand Pontiac, Inc., 5 P.3d 341 (Colo. App. 1999).

 While a mandatory settlement conference is not specifically enumerated as an awardable cost in this section, plaintiff was entitled to recover the costs of the conference because the court made the cost necessary for the litigation of the case. The court required the parties to participate in a settlement conference prior to proceeding to trial. Parker v. USAA, 216 P.3d 7 (Colo. App. 2007), aff'd on other grounds, 200 P.3d 350 (Colo. 2009).

 Applied in Songer v. Bowman, 804 P.2d 261 (Colo. App. 1990); Barnes v. Winford, 833 P.2d 756 (Colo. App. 1992); Carruthers v. Carrier Access Corp., __ P.3d __ (Colo. App. 2010).

13-16-123. Award of fees and costs to garnishee.

Statute text

In any action before the court in which a garnishee incurs attorney fees in excess of the cost of preparing and filing his answer, the court may order that the costs of the proceeding, mileage fees as a witness, and reasonable attorney fees be paid to the garnishee when the court finds that the bringing, maintaining, or defense of the action involving the garnishee was frivolous, groundless, or without reasonable basis. The award of costs and fees may be allocated among the parties as the court deems just.

History

 Source: L. 83: Entire section added, p. 616, § 1, effective May 20.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Attorney fees may be awarded under either this section or C.R.C.P. 103 or C.R.C.P. 8 without a finding that the actions of the party against whom the award is entered were frivolous or groundless. Law Offices of Quiat v. Ellithorpe, 917 P.2d 300 (Colo. App. 1995).

13-16-124. Sheriff's fees charged to judicial department.

Statute text

Except as provided for by section 13-16-103, in any civil action in which civil process is delivered to a county or city and county sheriff by the judicial department for service of process, the court in which the civil action is pending shall assess as costs against the party or parties requesting such service to be paid to the court the fees charged by the sheriff pursuant to section 30-1-104 (1), C.R.S. No civil action may be dismissed until such costs have been paid to the court.

History

 Source: L. 96: Entire section added, p. 751, § 2, effective July 1.

13-16-125. Limit on supersedeas bond.

Statute text

(1) In any civil action brought under any legal theory, the amount of a supersedeas bond necessary to stay execution of a judgment granting legal, equitable, or any other relief during the entire course of all appeals or discretionary reviews of the judgment by all appellate courts shall be set in accordance with applicable law; except that the total amount of the supersedeas bonds that are required collectively of all appellants during the appeal of a civil action may not exceed twenty-five million dollars in the aggregate, regardless of the amount of the judgment that is appealed.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, if an appellee proves by a preponderance of the evidence that an appellant who has posted a supersedeas bond is intentionally dissipating or diverting assets outside the ordinary course of its business for the purpose of avoiding payment of the judgment, a court may enter orders that are necessary to protect the appellee or that require the appellant to post a supersedeas bond in an amount up to and including the total amount of the judgment that is appealed.

History

 Source: L. 2003: Entire section added, p. 1871, § 1, effective May 20.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Bonds in Colorado Courts: A Primer for Practitioners", see 34 Colo. Law. 59 (March 2005).

——————————

ARTICLE 17
ATTORNEY FEES

Annotations

 Law reviews: For article, "Attorneys' Fees Against Parties and Attorneys", see 13 Colo. Law. 1202 (1984); for article, "Attorney Fees: The English Rule in Colorado", see 13 Colo. Law. 1642 (1984); for comment, "Attorney Fee Assessments for Frivolous Litigation in Colorado", see 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 663 (1985); for article, "Civil Rights", which discusses Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with attorney fees in civil rights litigation, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 71 (1985); for article, "Federal Practice and Procedure", which discusses a Tenth Circuit decision dealing with attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 215 (1985); for article, "Managing and Streamlining the Small Lawsuit", see 15 Colo. Law. 1389 (1986); for article, "Revisiting the Recovery of Attorney Fees and Costs in Colorado", see 33 Colo. Law 11 (April 2004).


Section


PART 1 FRIVOLOUS, GROUNDLESS, OR VEXATIOUS ACTIONS 

13-17-101. Legislative declaration.

13-17-102. Attorney fees - definitions.

13-17-103. Procedure for determining reasonable fee - judicial discretion.

13-17-104. Fee arrangements between attorney and client.

13-17-105. Stipulation as to fees.

13-17-106. Applicability.


PART 2 ATTORNEY FEES IN CIVIL ACTIONS IN GENERAL 

13-17-201. Award of reasonable attorney fees in certain cases.

13-17-202. Award of actual costs and fees when offer of settlement was made.

13-17-203. Limitation on attorney fees in class action litigation against public entities.


PART 3 RETENTION OF ATTORNEYS BY GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES - LIMITATION ON CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACTS 

13-17-301. Short title.

13-17-302. Legislative declaration.

13-17-303. Definitions.

13-17-304. Limitation on contingent fees - applicability.

——————————

PART 1
FRIVOLOUS, GROUNDLESS, OR VEXATIOUS ACTIONS

13-17-101. Legislative declaration.

Statute text

The general assembly recognizes that courts of record of this state have become increasingly burdened with litigation which is straining the judicial system and interfering with the effective administration of civil justice. In response to this problem, the general assembly hereby sets forth provisions for the recovery of attorney fees in courts of record when the bringing or defense of an action, or part thereof (including any claim for exemplary damages), is determined to have been substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious. All courts shall liberally construe the provisions of this article to effectuate substantial justice and comply with the intent set forth in this section.

History

 Source: L. 77: Entire article added, p. 796, § 2, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section R&RE, p. 460, § 1, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Recovery of Attorney Fees and Costs in Colorado", see 23 Colo. Law. 2041 (1994). For comment, "Dazed and Confused in Colorado: The Relationship Among Malicious Prosecution, Abuse of Process, and the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine", see 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 675 (1996).

 Suit involving money damages. Although the primary relief sought by the plaintiff was for specific performance of a contract of purchase, the defendant's counterclaim sought damages for breach of contract. Thus, even though the plaintiff's claim alone would not have supported an award for attorney fees, the defendant's counterclaim for damages clearly brought the suit within the ambit of the statute. Ault Aerial Applicators, Inc. v. Irvine, 684 P.2d 949 (Colo. App. 1984).

 Post-dissolution decree proceedings were groundless for lack of jurisdiction. It would be inequitable to require divorced husband to pay wife's fees for legal services when such services should not have been performed for lack of jurisdiction over the defendants against whom relief was sought. In re Noon, 735 P.2d 884 (Colo. App. 1986).

 A trial court retains jurisdiction over a motion for sanctions, even if jurisdiction has not been reserved in a stipulated motion for dismissal, because such jurisdiction is incorporated by statute in this section. Buckhannon v. U.S. West Commc'ns, 928 P.2d 1331 (Colo. App. 1996).

 A good faith presentation of a legal theory which is arguably meritorious is sufficient to avoid an award of attorney fees. SaBell's, Inc. v. City of Golden, 832 P.2d 974 (Colo. App. 1991), cert. denied, 846 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1993).

 Applied in Am. Web Press, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 596 F.Supp. 1089 (D. Colo. 1983); Cooper v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co., 725 P.2d 78 (Colo. App. 1986); In re Custody of C.J.S., 37 P.3d 479 (Colo. App. 2001).

13-17-102. Attorney fees - definitions.

Statute text

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, in any civil action of any nature commenced or appealed in any court of record in this state, the court may award, except as this article otherwise provides, as part of its judgment and in addition to any costs otherwise assessed, reasonable attorney fees.

(2) Subject to the limitations set forth elsewhere in this article, in any civil action of any nature commenced or appealed in any court of record in this state, the court shall award, by way of judgment or separate order, reasonable attorney fees against any attorney or party who has brought or defended a civil action, either in whole or in part, that the court determines lacked substantial justification.

(2.1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part 1, the filing of a certificate of review pursuant to section 13-20-602 related to any licensed health care professional shall create a rebuttable presumption that the claim or action is not frivolous or groundless, but it shall not relieve the plaintiff or his attorney from ongoing obligations under rule 11 of Colorado rules of civil procedure.

(3) When a court determines that reasonable attorney fees should be assessed, it shall allocate the payment thereof among the offending attorneys and parties, jointly or severally, as it deems most just, and may charge such amount, or portion thereof, to any offending attorney or party.

(4) The court shall assess attorney fees if, upon the motion of any party or the court itself, it finds that an attorney or party brought or defended an action, or any part thereof, that lacked substantial justification or that the action, or any part thereof, was interposed for delay or harassment or if it finds that an attorney or party unnecessarily expanded the proceeding by other improper conduct, including, but not limited to, abuses of discovery procedures available under the Colorado rules of civil procedure or a designation by a defending party under section 13-21-111.5 (3) that lacked substantial justification. As used in this article, "lacked substantial justification" means substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.

(5) No attorney fees shall be assessed if, after filing suit, a voluntary dismissal is filed as to any claim or action within a reasonable time after the attorney or party filing the dismissal knew, or reasonably should have known, that he would not prevail on said claim or action.

(6) No party who is appearing without an attorney shall be assessed attorney fees unless the court finds that the party clearly knew or reasonably should have known that his action or defense, or any part thereof, was substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious; except that this subsection (6) shall not apply to situations in which an attorney licensed to practice law in this state is appearing without an attorney, in which case, he shall be held to the standards established for attorneys elsewhere in this article.

(7) No attorney or party shall be assessed attorney fees as to any claim or defense which the court determines was asserted by said attorney or party in a good faith attempt to establish a new theory of law in Colorado.

(8) This section shall not apply to traffic offenses, matters brought under the provisions of the "Colorado Children's Code", title 19, C.R.S., or related juvenile matters, or matters involving violations of municipal ordinances.

History

 Source: L. 77: Entire article added, p. 797, § 2, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section R&RE, p. 460, § 2, effective July 1. L. 86: (4) amended, p. 681, § 4, effective July 1. L. 90: (2.1) added, p. 862, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2006: (8) amended, p. 237, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2009: (8) amended, (HB 09-1248), ch. 252, p. 1136, § 24, effective May 14.

Annotations

 Cross references: For award of attorney fees and other costs in actions involving garnishees, see § 13-16-123.

Annotations


RECENT ANNOTATIONS

Annotations

 A claim is not frivolous, groundless, or vexatious simply because it fails to survive summary judgment. The plaintiffs attempted to present evidence in good faith in support of their claims, but simply fell short of what was required to create an issue of material fact. Court did not abuse its discretion by failing to award fees. Munoz v. Measner, 247 P.3d 1031 (Colo. 2011).

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Malicious Prosecution of Civil Proceedings", see 11 Colo. Law. 2388 (1982). For article, "Attorneys' Fees Awarded to the Prevailing Party: The Ghost of S.B. 258 Revisited", see 11 Colo. Law 3003 (1982). For article, "Rule 11, C.R.C.P. as a Litigation Tool", see 12 Colo. Law. 1242 (1983). For article, "Lawyers' Liability for Attorney's Fees Awarded Against Clients", see 12 Colo. Law. 1638 (1983). For article "Attorney Fees: The English Rule in Colorado", see 13 Colo. Law. 1642 (1984). For article, "Civil Rights", which discusses the attorney fees in Ramos v. Lamm, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 71 (1985). For article, "1986 Colorado Tort Reform Legislation", see 15 Colo. Law. 1363 (1986). For article, "New Role for Nonparties in Tort Actions -- The Empty Chair", see 15 Colo. Law. 1650 (1986). For article, "A Trial Lawyer's View of Attorney's Fees Awards", see 17 Colo. Law. 465 (1988). For article, "1988 Update on Colorado Tort Reform Legislation -- Part I", see 17 Colo. Law. 1790 (1988). For article, "The Final Judgement Rule And Attorney Fees", see 17 Colo. Law. 2139 (1988). For a discussion of Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with attorney fees, see 66 Den. U. L. Rev. 677 (1989). For a discussion of Tenth Circuit decisions dealing with attorney fees, see 67 Den. U. L. Rev. 625 (1990). For article, "1990 Update on Colorado Tort Reform Legislation", see 19 Colo. Law. 1529 (1990).

 Annotator's note. Annotations appearing below from cases decided through 1985 were decided under former § 13-17-101 relating to frivolous or groundless suits involving money damages claims.

 "Frivolous" defined. A claim or defense is frivolous if the proponent can present no rational argument based on the evidence or law in support of that claim or defense. W. United Realty, Inc. v. Isaacs, 679 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1984); Hart & Trinen v. Surplus Elecs. Corp., 712 P.2d 491 (Colo. App. 1985); Merrill Chadwick Co. v. October Oil Co., 725 P.2d 17 (Colo. App. 1986); Fox v. Div. Eng. For Water Div. 5, 810 P.2d 644 (Colo. 1991); SaBell's, Inc. v. City of Golden, 832 P.2d 974 (Colo. App. 1991), cert. denied, 846 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1993); Little v. Fellman, 837 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1991); Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 992 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 17 P.3d 797 (Colo. 2001); E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth. v. Jagow, 30 P.3d 798 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd on other grounds, 49 P.3d 1151 (Colo. 2002); Collins v. Colo. Mountain Coll., 56 P.3d 1132 (Colo. App. 2002); Wheeler v. T.L. Roofing, Inc., 74 P.3d 499 (Colo. App. 2003); Double Oak Constr., L.L.C. v. Cornerstone Dev. Int'l, L.L.C., 97 P.3d 140 (Colo. App. 2003).

 But this test does not apply to meritorious actions that prove unsuccessful, legitimate attempts to establish a new theory of law, or good-faith efforts to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. W. United Realty, Inc. v. Isaacs, 679 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1984); Covert v. Allen Group, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Colo. 1984); Hart & Trinen v. Surplus Elecs. Corp., 712 P.2d 491 (Colo. App. 1985); Buttermore v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 721 P.2d 701 (Colo. App. 1986); Norton v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 807 P.2d 1160 (Colo. App. 1990); Wheeler v. T.L. Roofing, Inc., 74 P.3d 499 (Colo. App. 2003).

 "Groundless" defined. A claim or defense is groundless if the allegations of the complaint, while sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, are not supported by any credible evidence at trial. W. United Realty, Inc. v. Isaacs, 679 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1984); Alt Aerial Applicators, Inc. v. Irvine, 684 P.2d 949 (Colo. App. 1984); Merrill Chadwick Co. v. October Oil Co., 725 P.2d 17 (Colo. App. 1986); In re Marshall, 781 P.2d 177 (Colo. App. 1989), cert. denied, 794 P.2d 1011 (Colo. 1990); Little v. Fellman, 837 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1991); Zick v. Krob, 872 P.2d 1290 (Colo. App. 1993); Travers v. Rainey, 888 P.2d 372 (Colo. App. 1994); Engel v. Engel, 902 P.2d 442 (Colo. App. 1995); Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 992 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 17 P.3d 797 (Colo. 2001); E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth. v. Jagow, 30 P.3d 798 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd on other grounds, 49 P.3d 1151 (Colo. 2002); Collins v. Colo. Mountain Coll., 56 P.3d 1132 (Colo. App. 2002); Wheeler v. T.L. Roofing, Inc., 74 P.3d 499 (Colo. App. 2003).

 Test for "groundlessness" assumes that the proponent has a valid legal theory but can offer little or nothing in the way of evidence to support the claim. Bilawsky v. Faseehudin, 916 P.2d 586 (Colo. App. 1995).

 "Groundless and frivolous" is applied in Int'l Tech. Instruments, Inc. v. Eng'g Measurements, Inc., 678 P.2d 558 (Colo. App. 1983); Chappele v. Bonds, 677 P.2d 955 (Colo. App. 1983); E.B. Jones Constr. Co. v. City & County of Denver, 717 P.2d 1009 (Colo. App. 1986); Merrill Chadwick Co. v. October Oil Co., 725 P.2d 17 (Colo. App. 1986); Ace Title Co. v. Carson Const. Co. Inc., 755 P.2d 457 (Colo. App. 1988); People in Interest of Lamb v. Large, 761 P.2d 294 (Colo. App. 1988); Foley v. Phase One Dev. of Colo., 775 P.2d 86 (Colo. App. 1989); Haney v. City Court for City of Empire, 779 P.2d 1312 (Colo. 1989); Harrison v. Luse, 760 F. Supp. 1394 (D. Colo. 1991); Platte Valley Sav. v. Crall, 821 P.2d 305 (Colo. App. 1991); Nienke v. Naiman Group, Ltd., 857 P.2d 446 (Colo. App. 1992); Sundheim v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Douglas County, 904 P.2d 1337 (Colo. App. 1995), aff'd, 926 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1996); Lobato v. Taylor, 13 P.3d 821 (Colo. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 71 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2002); E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth. v. Jagow, 30 P.3d 798 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd on other grounds 49 P.3d 1151 (Colo. 2002); Remote Switch Sys., Inc. v. Delangis, 126 P.3d 269 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Where there is a rational basis grounded in law and evidence for plaintiff's claim, the trial court's finding that these claims were frivolous is not sustainable. Hart & Trinen v. Surplus Elecs. Corp., 712 P.2d 491 (Colo. App. 1985).

 Where plaintiffs admit they have no administrative remedy because they are not taxpayers and only taxpayers have available to them the remedies provided by the tax code, they demonstrate knowledge that the bringing of the action and appeal have no rational basis in fact or law and, thus, are groundless and frivolous. Fair v. Wise, 753 P.2d 780 (Colo. App. 1987).

 "Vexatious" claim is one brought or maintained in bad faith to annoy or harass and may include conduct that is arbitrary, abusive, stubbornly litigious or disrespectful of truth. Bockar v. Patterson, 899 P.2d 233 (Colo. App. 1994); Engel v. Engel, 902 P.2d 442 (Colo. App. 1995); O'Neill v. Simpson, 958 P.2d 1121 (Colo. 1998); Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 992 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 17 P.3d 797 (Colo. 2001); City of Holyoke v. Schlachter Farms R.L.L.P., 22 P.3d 960 (Colo. App. 2001); E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth. v. Jagow, 30 P.3d 798 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd on other grounds 49 P.3d 1151 (Colo. 2002); Mitchell v. Ryder, 104 P.3d 316 (Colo. App. 2004).

 An appeal "lacks substantial justification" and is "substantially frivolous" when the appellant's brief fails to set forth, in a manner consistent with C.A.R. 28, a coherent assertion of error supported by legal authority. As a result, it is appropriate to assess attorney fees against the attorney prosecuting the appeal in this case. Castillo v. Koppes-Conway, 148 P.3d 289 (Colo. App. 2006).

 Determination that an award of attorney fees based upon bringing and maintaining a frivolous or groundless claim is warranted is discretionary with the trial court, and such decision shall be upheld upon appeal if supported by the evidence. Schoonover v. Hedlund Abstract Co., Inc., 727 P.2d 408 (Colo. App. 1986); Romberg v. Slemon, 778 P.2d 315 (Colo. App. 1989); City of Littleton v. State, 832 P.2d 985 (Colo. App. 1991); Behr v. Burge, 940 P.2d 1084 (Colo. App. 1996); M Life Ins. Co. v. Sapers & Wallack Ins. Agency, Inc., 962 P.2d 335 (Colo. App. 1998); Lockett v. Garrett, 1 P.3d 206 (Colo. App. 1999); Crissey Fowler Lumber v. FCIB, 8 P.3d 531 (Colo. App. 2000); Nielson v. Scott, 53 P.3d 777 (Colo. App. 2002); Wheeler v. T.L. Roofing, Inc., 74 P.3d 499 (Colo. App. 2003).

 Losing argument not necessarily groundless. A treble damages action under § 38-12-103(3)(a) could not be characterized as "frivolous" or "groundless", as used in subsection (3) of former § 13-17-101, merely because the landlord prevailed on the merits of his defense. Torres v. Portillos, 638 P.2d 274 (Colo. 1981).

 Although attorney fees may be awarded in the discretion of the court, they should not be awarded merely because a party does not prevail. Torres v. Portillos, 638 P.2d 274 (Colo. 1981); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Sanditen, 701 P.2d 876 (Colo. App. 1985); Romberg v. Slemon, 778 P.2d 315 (Colo. App. 1989).

 Mere fact that appeal was taken as a matter of right, or that appellees found it necessary to cite legal authority in their answer brief, did not save an otherwise frivolous and groundless appeal. Flexisystems, Inc. v. Am. Standards Testing Bureau, Inc., 847 P.2d 207 (Colo. App. 1992).

 A determination that plaintiffs are not entitled to relief does not make their claims frivolous. Lobato v. Taylor, 13 P.3d 821 (Colo. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 71 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2002); Remote Switch Sys., Inc. v. Delangis, 126 P.3d 269 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Losing position is not necessarily groundless. Fed. Land Bank of Wichita v. Jost, 761 P.2d 270 (Colo. App. 1988).

 Bad faith may include conduct which is arbitrary, vexatious, abusive, or stubbornly litigious and conduct aimed at unwarranted delay or disrespectful of truth and accuracy. W. United Realty, Inc. v. Isaacs, 679 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1984); Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 992 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 17 P.3d 797 (Colo. 2001).

 Section is a fee-shifting statute that authorizes the recovery of attorney fees from an opposing party when that party has pursued a substantially frivolous claim, defense, or position. E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth. v. Revenig, 140 P.3d 227 (Colo. App. 2006).

 It is well established that a federal court may consider collateral issues after an action is no longer pending, including an award of attorney fees. Although party voluntarily dismissed its case, federal district court still had jurisdiction to consider collateral issues, including an award of counsel fees. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Engida, 611 F.3d 1209 (10th Cir. 2010).

 Award of attorney fees not mandated. Because the statute, while allowing an award of attorney fees upon a finding of frivolous claims, also grants the trial court discretion in determining whether such fees are to be awarded, the statute cannot be said to mandate an award of attorney fees. Hart & Trinen v. Surplus Elecs. Corp., 712 P.2d 491 (Colo. App. 1985).

 Award of attorney fees in criminal cases not provided for. Neither former § 13-17-101 nor § 13-16-121 provides for an award of attorney fees in a criminal case. People v. Freeman, 196 Colo. 238, 583 P.2d 921 (1978).

 Nor in garnishment. Neither former § 13-17-101 nor any other section or rule permits award of attorney fees for the garnishee in a garnishment. Commercial Claims, Ltd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 649 P.2d 736 (Colo. App. 1982).

 Attorney fee requests with contingent fee arrangements should not be denied merely because such an arrangement is used. Rather, plaintiff must demonstrate the reasonableness of the fee requested, and the contingent fee arrangement is but one factor to consider in that determination. Bakehouse & Assocs., Inc. v. Wilkins, 689 P.2d 1166 (Colo. App. 1984).

 Defendant entitled to attorney fees incurred in appealing denial of attorney fees by trial court where defendant had prevailed in trial court against plaintiff who asserted frivolous and groundless claim. Carnal v. Dan Coleman, Inc., 727 P.2d 412 (Colo. App. 1986).

 Failure to appeal denial of fees. Where the appellee, in the trial court, moved for and was denied an award of his attorney fees, but he did not file a notice of cross-appeal, the appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider his application for affirmative relief in excess of that afforded him by the trial court. Rocky Mt. Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Havana RV, Inc., 635 P.2d 935 (Colo. App. 1981).

 Timeliness of request for attorney fees. A request is best presented to the trial court before judgment, but the request should not be denied merely because presented after judgment. Bakehouse & Assocs., Inc. v. Wilkins, 689 P.2d 1166 (Colo. App. 1984).

 Duty of trial court. When a party places a claim for attorney fees in issue, the trial court has a duty to conduct a hearing upon that claim. Zarlengo v. Farrer, 683 P.2d 1208 (Colo. App. 1984); Alessi v. Hogue, 689 P.2d 649 (Colo. App. 1984).

 Defendant in legal malpractice action entitled to hearing on his or her claim for sanctions under this section and C.R.C.P. 11. When a party requests a hearing regarding the award of attorney fees and costs under this section, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. Because the trial court denied the motion without conducting a hearing on defendant's motion for sanctions, remand is required for a hearing. Brown v. Silvern, 141 P.3d 871 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Determination of entitlement to attorney fees cannot be made without adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue by the trial court. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Auslaender, 745 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1987); Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1989).

 But a court need not conduct a hearing sua sponte if a hearing is not timely requested by a party. In re Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1997).

 This section does not require redundant hearings. It simply prohibits a trial court from awarding attorney fees in the absence of a hearing, if requested, and detailed findings of fact. Padilla v. Ghuman, 183 P.3d 653 (Colo. App. 2007).

 When a trial court is requested to evaluate each claim or defense individually as substantially frivolous or groundless, it is required to do so. It cannot deny the claim "under the totality of the circumstances". Munoz v. Measner, 214 P.3d 510 (Colo. App. 2009), rev'd on other grounds, 247 P.3d 1031 (Colo. 2011).

 Interrelationship of claims or defenses alone will not suffice to deny an award of attorney fees incurred relative to defense of a frivolous or groundless claim. Alessi v. Hogue, 689 P.2d 649 (Colo. App. 1984); Fountain v. Mojo, 687 P.2d 496 (Colo. App. 1984); Carnal v. Dan Coleman, Inc., 727 P.2d 412 (Colo. App. 1986).

 For discussion of amount of attorney fee award, see Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F. Supp. 730 (D. Colo. 1982).

 Trial court was without authority to award attorney fees for plaintiff's initial appeal, absent direction to do so by the appellate court, since subsection (1), consistent with C.A.R. 38(d), indicates that attorney fees incurred in an appeal may be awarded only by the court in which the appeal is brought. Sullivan v. Lutz, 827 P.2d 626 (Colo. App. 1992).

 In appeals of groundless-frivolous attorney fee awards under subsection (4), the appropriate standard is to award appellate attorney fees only if that aspect of the appeal itself is frivolous. Front Range Home Enhancements, Inc. v. Stowell, 172 P.3d 973 (Colo. App. 2007); Padilla v. Ghuman, 183 P.3d 653 (Colo. App. 2007).

 Under subsection (4), no award of attorney fees may be made based upon the motion of a nonparty. Roberts-Henry v. Richter, 802 P.2d 1159 (Colo. App. 1990).

 Subsection (4) provides for an assessment of attorney fees in favor of an improperly subpoenaed nonparty where the court finds that, with respect to the nonparty, the attorney or party had unnecessarily expanded the proceedings by abusing discovery procedures. In re Ensminger, 209 P.3d 1163 (Colo. App. 2008).

 Subsection (4) does not require a party to invoke the statute on behalf of a non-party. An improperly subpoenaed nonparty may be awarded attorney fees pursuant to this section. In re Ensminger, 209 P.3d 1163 (Colo. App. 2008) (holding contrary to Roberts-Henry v. Richter annotated above).

 A request for attorney fees as a sanction for assertion of a frivolous claim may be requested by motion following entry of judgment and may even be awarded on the court's own motion. Colo. City Metro. Dist. v. Graber & Son's, Inc., 897 P.2d 874 (Colo. App. 1995).

 In light of holding that the trial court erred in dismissing stepfather's petition and to the extent the award of fees was entered as a sanction, it must be set aside. In re K.M.B., 80 P.3d 914 (Colo. App. 2003).

 To justify an award of attorney fees under subsection (4), a trial court must make a finding that a claim "lacked substantial justification", i.e., was substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious, and must state its reason for the finding. In re Gomez, 728 P.2d 747 (Colo. App. 1986); In re Estate of Finkelstein, 817 P.2d 617 (Colo. App. 1991); Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 992 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 17 P.3d 797 (Colo. 2001); Double Oak Constr., L.L.C. v. Cornerstone Dev. Int'l, L.L.C., 97 P.3d 140 (Colo. App. 2003).

 "Substantially frivolous" or "substantially groundless" are no more demanding standards than "groundless" or "frivolous". In re Application of Talco, Ltd., 769 P.2d 468 (Colo. 1989); Little v. Fellman, 837 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1991).

 The "no rational argument" test of W. Realty (679 P.2d 1063 (Colo. 1984)) will be followed in determining whether the standard has been met. Little v. Fellman, 837 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1991).

 A vexatious claim is one brought or maintained in bad faith to annoy or harass. A vexatious claim includes conduct that is arbitrary, stubbornly litigious, or disrespectful of truth. Bockar v. Patterson, 899 P.2d 233 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff was stubbornly litigious merely because plaintiff disagreed with trial court's earlier rulings as to plaintiff's claims against two of three defendants in the case and where plaintiff refused to voluntarily dismiss similarly premised claims against third defendant. Plaintiff cannot be faulted for attempting to convince court to reconsider its view of the applicable law. Hamon Contractors, Inc. v. Carter & Burgess, Inc., 229 P.3d 282 (Colo. App. 2009).

 The exclusion of an expert's testimony due to lack of reliability does not subject a party to attorney fees for a groundless claim if the party reasonably relied on the expert; courts must allow parties to reasonably rely on their experts without fear of punishment for the experts' errors in judgment. In re Water Rights of Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, 105 P.3d 595 (Colo. 2005).

 Aquifer storage and augmentation claims based on the natural percolation of irrigation run-off and precipitation are frivolous under § 37-92-103, because the water has not been placed in the aquifer by other than natural means. In re Water Rights of Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, 105 P.3d 595 (Colo. 2005).

 The purpose of awarding attorney fees is to deter egregious conduct, and not to discourage legal theories that, while having no support in case law, nevertheless may be persuasive because of the unique character of the case. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Howard, 862 P.2d 925 (Colo. 1993); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Colo., 888 P.2d 352 (Colo. App. 1994).

 When a party consistently ignored the court's admonition to not relitigate settled matters, the court was justified in finding that the party's attorney was being stubbornly litigious and the action thus lacked substantial justification. Spring Creek Ranchers Ass'n v. McNichols, 165 P.3d 244 (Colo. 2007).

 Trial court may determine action was "brought or defended" in a substantially groundless manner even if dismissed on the morning of trial before the trial actually commences. Engel v. Engel, 902 P.2d 442 (Colo. App. 1995).

 Claims involving novel questions of law for which no determinative authority existed at time complaint was filed were not frivolous, groundless, or vexatious. Montoya by Montoya v. Bebensee, 761 P.2d 285 (Colo. App. 1988); Colo. Supply Co., Inc. v. Stewart, 797 P.2d 1303 (Colo. App. 1990); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Colo., 888 P.2d 352 (Colo. App. 1994); Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 992 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 17 P.3d 797 (Colo. 2001).

 Trial court erred in awarding attorney fees where municipality's defense to takings claim involved a novel question of law and municipality's conduct presented factual issues upon which reasonable triers of fact might have drawn differing inferences. The fact that the municipality did not prevail in its assertions did not make them frivolous. Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 992 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 17 P.3d 797 (Colo. 2001).

 Trial court erred in awarding attorney fees where plaintiff's claims were based largely upon federal case law and involved novel questions of law upon which there was no determinative law in this state and where the evidence presented by the plaintiff arguably supported the plaintiff's claims. Kemp v. State Bd. of Agric., 790 P.2d 870 (Colo. App. 1989), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1205, 111 S. Ct. 2798, 115 L. Ed.2d 972 (1990); Pedlow v. Stamp, 819 P.2d 1110 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Issue of what constitutes receipt of a demand notice under § 7-113-209 (2) was a question of first impression; therefore the plaintiff's action was not "frivolous and without merit". M Life Ins. Co. v. S & W, 962 P.2d 335 (Colo. App. 1998).

 A good faith presentation of a legal theory which is arguably meritorious is sufficient to avoid an award of attorney fees. SaBell's, Inc. v. City of Golden, 832 P.2d 974 (Colo. App. 1991), cert. denied, 846 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1993).

 In a condemnation action, good faith negotiations do not necessarily require the condemning authority to increase its offer whenever the land owner makes a counteroffer. Therefore, plaintiff failed to show bad faith and vexatious conduct on the part of the defendant and was not entitled to an award of fees under this section. City of Holyoke v. Schlachter Farms R.L.L.P., 22 P.3d 960 (Colo. App. 2001).

 To the extent the provisions of subsection (7) are in conflict with the provisions of § 13-17-201 concerning a good faith tort action that is dismissed under C.R.C.P. 12(b), mandatory attorney fees award provision of § 13-17-201 controls as it is specific to such action and was enacted later in time than this section. Houdek v. Mobil Oil Corp., 879 P.2d 417 (Colo. App. 1994).

 A party seeking attorney fees bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, his entitlement to the award. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Auslaender, 745 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1987); Little v. Fellman, 837 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1991); Am. Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1994); City of Holyoke v. Schlachter Farms R.L.L.P., 22 P.3d 960 (Colo. App. 2001).

 Award of attorney fees must be made after trial court determines that all factors prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a defense was frivolous or groundless. Marinez v. Indus. Comm'n, 746 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1987).

 In deciding whether to award attorney fees, a court must consider the factors set forth in § 13-117-103 (1). In re Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1997); Remote Switch Sys., Inc. v. Delangis, 126 P.3d 269 (Colo. App. 2005).

 In deciding whether to award attorney fees, a court must consider the factors set forth in § 13-17-103 (1). In re Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1997).

 When awarding attorney fees, a court must make findings explaining why a party's conduct was unjustified and discussing the means by which the court determined the amount of the award. Conclusory statements that a claim is frivolous, groundless, or vexatious are insufficient. In re Aldrich, 945 P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1997).

 Award of attorney fees discretionary with trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by the evidence. Weber v. Wallace, 789 P.2d 427 (Colo. App. 1989); Lobato v. Taylor, 13 P.3d 821 (Colo. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 71 P.3d 938 (Colo. 2002); Remote Switch Sys., Inc. v. Delangis, 126 P.3d 269 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Award upheld where evidence presented to trial court with respect to father's defense against motion to change custody included findings that the mother had misled expert witnesses, that such witnesses had failed to investigate the child's circumstances with the father, that the mother had not properly assisted the child to recover from the impact of the dissolution, and that she had a scheme for obtaining custody of the child which involved actions not in the best interest of the child. Weber v. Wallace, 789 P.2d 427 (Colo. App. 1989).

 Award upheld where there was record support for the trial court's determination that plaintiff's silence or refusal to properly clarify and communicate its position was "without substantial justification" and needlessly caused defendant to incur attorney fees. Front Range Home Enhancements, Inc. v. Stowell, 172 P.3d 973 (Colo. App. 2007).

 Whether to award attorneys fees under this section is a matter ultimately committed to the discretion of the trial court. City of Holyoke v. Schlachter Farms R.L.L.P., 22 P.3d 960 (Colo. App. 2001).

 Trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying award of attorney fees where claims made by the county did not lack substantial justification in law or in fact and were based on a rational legal argument. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Colo., 888 P.2d 352 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Findings of trial court that the plaintiff bank's claims of fraud were not groundless or frivolous were supported by the record, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for sanctions. First Interstate Bank v. Berenbaum, 872 P.2d 1297 (Colo. App. 1993); Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 992 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 17 P.3d 797 (Colo. 2001).

 Findings of trial court that issues had been "fairly and vigorously litigated", together with record demonstrating at least some evidence to support the challenged defenses, supported trial court's denial of motion for sanctions under this section. Webster v. Boone, 992 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1999).

 The plaintiff's unsuccessful claim that it was not time barred from filing a claim relied on language from the statutes as well as prior cases, and the trial court considered and denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment three times before trial. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant attorney fees. Pat's Constr. Serv., Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the W., 141 P.3d 885 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Plaintiff's action was not substantially frivolous, and the record provided support for trial court's implicit determination that the action was not maintained in bad faith, therefore, the trial court's order denying attorney fees was upheld. Berenergy Corp. v. Zab, Inc., 94 P.3d 1232 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd on other grounds, 136 P.3d 252 (Colo. 2006).

 Trial court abused discretion in finding plaintiff's claims frivolous where plaintiff was not successful on claims but claims were based on rational arguments. Hamon Contractors, Inc. v. Carter & Burgess, Inc., 229 P.3d 282 (Colo. App. 2009).

 The party requesting attorney fees under this section must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the claim was without substantial justification. Bd. of Comm'rs, County of Boulder v. Eason, 976 P.2d 271 (Colo. App. 1998); Remote Switch Sys., Inc. v. Delangis, 126 P.3d 269 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Decision to award attorney fees on the ground that a claim lacks substantial justification is soundly within the discretion of the trial court. Engel v. Engel, 902 P.2d 442 (Colo. App. 1995); Bd. of Comm'rs, County of Boulder v. Eason, 976 P.2d 271 (Colo. App. 1998); Fowler Irrevocable Trust 1992-1 v. City of Boulder, 992 P.2d 1188 (Colo. App. 1999), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 17 P.3d 797 (Colo. 2001).

 If a trial court's award of attorney fees is supported by the evidence, it will not be disturbed on review. Lyons v. Teamsters Local Union No. 961, 903 P.2d 1214 (Colo. App. 1995); Bd. of Comm'rs, County of Boulder v. Eason, 976 P.2d 271 (Colo. App. 1998); In re Eggert, 53 P.3d 794 (Colo. App. 2002).

 Trial court finding that union pursued its claims "because [union president] agreed to testify", that there was "animosity" between the parties, and that the union's claims were "vexatious" was sufficient to award attorney fees. Lyons v. Teamsters Local Union No. 961, 903 P.2d 1214 (Colo. App. 1995).

 An award of attorney fees is supported by the record when the attorneys reviewed their records and testified, subject to cross examination, that the claimed allocations of time were fair and reasonable. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. City of Golden, 113 P.3d 119 (Colo. 2005).

 Trial court's award of attorney fees cannot stand where the court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing after a party made a claim for attorney fees and a hearing was requested, because a determination of entitlement to attorney fees cannot be made without adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co., 986 P.2d 967 (Colo. App. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001).

 The court "shall" assess attorney fees if a claim lacks substantial justification. Montrose Valley Funeral Home v. Crippin, 835 P.2d 596 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Limitations on award of attorney fee. A trial court has the discretion to limit its award based on a finding that a party did not take all reasonable measures to extricate himself from a frivolous or groundless lawsuit at the earliest possible time. Ruffing v. Lincicome, 737 P.2d 440 (Colo. App. 1987).

 Victim of a frivolous lawsuit has a duty to mitigate attorney fees incurred in defending the lawsuit by taking reasonable measures to extricate himself or herself from the lawsuit at the earliest possible time. Consequently, trial court should not have awarded attorney fees incurred in pursuing defendant's counterclaims after plaintiff dismissed its original complaint against defendants. Boulder County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Kraft Bldg. Contractors, 122 P.3d 1019 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Award of attorney fees and costs held excessive where court found that use of two attorneys was justifiable but that the trial court had awarded fees based on hours in excess of those reported in their affidavits and where court had awarded costs for depositions taken for ordinary discovery purposes rather than perpetuation of testimony. Weber v. Wallace, 789 P.2d 427 (Colo. App. 1989); Schmidt Const. Co. v. Becker-Johnson Corp., 817 P.2d 625 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Trial court properly concluded that claim lacked substantial justification where court's detailed findings established that it considered the factors set forth in this section and § 13-17-103, and where court found the constitution, statutes, and case law clearly established the claims lacked "any legal foundation", that a good faith argument had not been advanced, and that the same arguments had been advanced and rejected in prior case. City of Littleton v. State, 832 P.2d 985 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Award of attorney fees to the plaintiff was appropriate where the court found that the defense employed by the defendant lacked substantial merit and was used to delay and harass the plaintiff. Metro Nat. Bank v. Parker, 773 P.2d 633 (Colo. App. 1989).

 Plaintiff's argument was not frivolous where she alleged the existence of an agency relationship based on a business relationship between the defendant, who was a private mortgage investor, and certain mortgage brokers. However, the argument was groundless where the only evidence of the agency was a number of similar transactions between the defendant and the brokers. Nienke v. Naiman Group, Ltd., 857 P.2d 446 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Plaintiff's argument that her loan was a consumer loan was frivolous where a consumer loan must be incurred for a personal debt and the loan was incurred to pay taxes and expenses on an auto repair garage. Plaintiff's argument that the loan was personal because it was necessary to preserve the business for her son lacked a rational basis. Nienke v. Naiman Group, Ltd., 857 P.2d 446 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Award of attorney fees proper where defendant has opportunity to challenge reasonableness of the amount of award. Trial court may not base award on affidavit submitted after trial. Kinsey v. Preeson, 746 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1987).

 Probate court order that administrative expenses and attorney fees be paid from petitioner's distributive share upheld. The court so held because of petitioner's "relentless pursuit" of the same issues in three separate trial courts and in three appeals to this court. In re Estate of Leslie, 886 P.2d 284 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Award of attorney fees based upon a groundless claim was appropriate where there was a lack of credible evidence presented on the essential issues of damages in negligent misrepresentation claim. Harrison v. Smith, 821 P.2d 832 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Award of attorney fees appropriate where trial court properly determined that counterclaim for deficiency under a foreclosure lacked substantial justification because a review of the plain language of the contract would have revealed lack of support for the claim. Bernhardt v. Hemphill, 878 P.2d 107 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Attorney fees and costs associated with motion to enforce injunction proper. Where injunction was no longer binding, motion to enforce injunction was substantially frivolous. Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2010).

 Record supported trial court's award of attorney fees where the court found the defenses were substantially frivolous, groundless, and vexatious, that certain defenses were interposed for the sole purposes of delay, harassment, and to cause plaintiffs to incur legal expenses, and where defendant, even when proceeding without an attorney, clearly knew or should have known that the defenses asserted were substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious. Behr v. Burge, 940 P.2d 1084 (Colo. App. 1996).

 Colorado Governmental Immunity Act does not shield public entities from an award for attorney fees for the filing of a frivolous claim by such entities. Colo. City Metro. Dist. v. Graber & Son's, Inc., 897 P.2d 874 (Colo. App. 1995).

 County attorney is entitled to absolute immunity when filing guardianship petitions. It is illogical that an attorney could be immune from suit if brought separately under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but not immune when fees are required in the same action under this section. In re Matter of Stepanek, 924 P.2d 1142 (Colo. App. 1996), aff'd, 940 P.2d 364 (Colo. 1997).

 The constitution, statutes, and case law clearly establish that the City of Littleton's claims lacked any legal foundation, therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that the City had not advanced a good faith argument. City of Littleton v. State, 832 P.2d 985 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Where city discovered mining waste on property during eminent domain proceeding but failed to disclose the presence of the waste or the potential remediation cost, court did not abuse discretion by finding bad faith and awarding respondent attorney fees incurred after city learned of the mining waste. City of Black Hawk v. Ficke, 215 P.3d 1129 (Colo. App. 2008).

 The denial of an award of attorney fees may be grounded upon the evidence admitted at trial upon the merits absent a specific request by one of the parties for the opportunity to present further evidence on the issue. No fees may be awarded, however, without providing the party against whom such an award is sought an opportunity to present such further evidence upon the issue as such party desires. Christian v. Westmoreland, 809 P.2d 1105 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Award of attorney fees is not authorized unless the claim or defense was substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious. Although this restriction is not explicitly provided for in the statute, the title, purpose, and subsequent provisions of the statute indicate the intent that it apply only to frivolous, groundless, or vexatious actions. Shaw v. Baesemann, 773 P.2d 609 (Colo. App. 1988).

 Arbitrary, vexatious, abusive, or stubbornly litigious conduct by a pro se litigant may serve as the basis for awarding attorney fees although the action or defense is not itself frivolous or groundless. Bockar v. Patterson, 899 P.2d 233 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Filing of certificate of review does not preclude an attorney fee award for a vexatious claim. Mitchell v. Ryder, 104 P.3d 316 (Colo. App. 2004).

 Where trial court awarded attorney fees solely because party prevailed, the award was without a proper basis, and, since the legal issues involved had not been previously determined by binding precedent, the claims were not frivolous. Cohen v. Empire Cas. Co., 771 P.2d 29 (Colo. App. 1989).

 The prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney fees when a claim exists for a violation of a contractual obligation is the party in whose favor the decision or verdict on liability is rendered. Travers v. Rainey, 888 P.2d 372 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Trial court erred in awarding fees against surety for assertion of its claim that bonds were void where such contention was a good faith presentation of a legal theory which was arguably meritorious. SaBell's, Inc. v. City of Golden, 832 P.2d 974 (Colo. App. 1991), cert. denied, 846 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1993).

 Pro se litigants are entitled to protection of subsection (6) unless trial court makes an express finding that such litigants knew or reasonably should have known that their claims lacked substantial justification. Failure to respond to a motion for fees does not obviate the need for such a finding. Artes-Roy v. Lyman, 833 P.2d 62 (Colo. App. 1992).

 A party who successfully seeks summary judgment is not necessarily entitled to attorney fees. Little v. Fellman, 837 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1991).

 The fact that a claim is dismissed on summary judgment does not preclude a finding that it was substantially groundless. A claim is groundless if there is no credible evidence to support it. Hamon Contractors, Inc. v. Carter & Burgess, Inc., 229 P.3d 282 (Colo. App. 2009).

 Where dismissal is reversed on appeal, award of attorney fees under this section is not appropriate. Bear Creek Dev. Corp. v. Dyer, 790 P.2d 897 (Colo. App. 1990).

 Trial court determination of attorney fees will not be disturbed on appeal if the ruling is supported by the evidence. Nagy v. Landau, 807 P.2d 1227 (Colo. App. 1990).

 The determination whether a claim or defense is groundless under this section is within the discretion of the trial court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by the record. Travers v. Rainey, 888 P.2d 372 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Trial court must make sufficient findings to permit meaningful appellate review of the attorney fees award. Bilawsky v. Faseehudin, 916 P.2d 586 (Colo. App. 1995).

 Award of attorney fees is appropriate after the trial court renders a decision on the merits of the case. Forness v. Blum, 796 P.2d 496 (Colo. App. 1990).

 Fees may be awarded even when the case is dismissed shortly before trial. Bilawsky v. Faseehudin, 916 P.2d 586 (Colo. App. 1995).

 Fees may be awarded even when the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Here, the plaintiff not only lacked standing but also persisted in pursuing the claim despite knowing that it lacked admissible evidence to support the claim. Consumer Crusade, Inc. v. Clarion Mortgage Capital, Inc., 197 P.3d 285 (Colo. App. 2008).

 Section effective in civil action commenced prior to effective date. Though dissolution of marriage proceeding was filed prior to effective date of this section, a subsequent motion to change custody of a child filed after such date which raised separate and distinct issues will be interpreted as a new civil action for the purposes of implementing the legislative intent of this section, and an award of attorney fees for costs incurred in defending the motion is proper. Weber v. Wallace, 789 P.2d 427 (Colo. App. 1989).

 Section effective in any "part" of a civil action, including garnishment proceedings. Anderson Boneless Beef, Inc. v. Sunshine Health Care Ctr., Inc., 878 P.2d 98 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Court should allocate sanctions between attorney and client according to their relative degrees of responsibility. Where attorney accepted "full responsibility" for decision to proceed with second writ of garnishment, after hearing on first such writ established the absence of a legal basis to do so, award against party jointly with attorney was erroneous. Anderson Boneless Beef, Inc. v. Sunshine Health Care Ctr., Inc., 878 P.2d 98 (Colo. App. 1994).

 A principal may be liable for attorney fees based on its agent's litigation of a frivolous claim pursuant to the express terms of a contract. In re Water Rights of Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, 105 P.3d 595 (Colo. 2005).

 Award of attorney fees was proper where party's attorney was on notice that garnishee did not hold any property of judgment debtor, although clerical error had made it appear so in a prior attempt to garnish the same account. Anderson Boneless Beef, Inc. v. Sunshine Health Care Ctr., Inc., 878 P.2d 98 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Award of attorney fees improper where rational argument in support of the contention that exemplary damages may be awarded for bad faith breach of contract was made. William H. White Co. v. B&A Mfg. Co., 794 P.2d 1099 (Colo. App. 1990).

 Where plaintiffs' counsel offered substantial legal arguments in favor of application of "discovery rule" to overcome statutory limitation of claims of sexual abuse of minors and where some of defendant's alleged acts of abuse occurred within the applicable limitation period, award of fees improper. Cassidy v. Smith, 817 P.2d 555 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Award of attorney fees improper in abuse of process action where plaintiffs were not represented by an attorney and trial court did not make a finding that the plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known that filing of the suit lacked substantial justification. Artes-Roy v. Lyman, 833 P.2d 62 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Where defendant made rational arguments on the law in support of its position, trial court noted that legal issue was one of first impression in Colorado, and defendant was able to cite legal authority from other jurisdictions in support of its position, award of attorney fees was improper. Eurpac Serv., Inc. v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 37 P.3d 447 (Colo. App. 2000).

 Trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees based largely on evidence presented in a hearing to determine whether a governmental agency or employee had immunity. Such a hearing is not a substitute trial on the merits and the claimant is not required to prove the merits of its claim at such a hearing. Hamon Contractors, Inc. v. Carter & Burgess, Inc., 229 P.3d 282 (Colo. App. 2009).

 Award of attorney fees incurred in pursuing motions for sanctions improper where the defense to the motions, while ultimately unsuccessful, had a rational basis in fact and law and did not lack substantial justification. Boulder County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Kraft Bldg. Contractors, 122 P.3d 1019 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Award of attorney fees and costs incurred in defending abandoned appeal of motion to enforce injunction improper. Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2010).

 Award of attorney fees was an abuse of the trial court's discretion where the plaintiff's issue was one of first impression in Colorado, the plaintiff made a legitimate and reasoned attempt to extend the law, and the plaintiff presented some credible evidence to support her argument, even though the trial court found it was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Nienke v. Naiman Group, Ltd., 857 P.2d 446 (Colo. App. 1992).

 An award of attorney fees under this section cannot be held to be confessed by failure to respond to a motion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 121. Artes-Roy v. Lyman, 833 P.2d 62 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Trial court is not duty-bound to conduct a separate hearing on the issue of attorney fees before it may deny a request therefor. Hunter v. Colo. Mountain Jr. Coll., 804 P.2d 277 (Colo. App. 1990).

 Active relitigation of settled issue that was clearly the law of the case is presumed to be frivolous and, thus, plaintiffs were entitled to attorney fees for frivolous second appeal of statute of limitations issue. Howard v. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc., 835 P.2d 556 (Colo. App. 1992).

 When fees are awarded, the court is required to make evidentiary findings and must provide the opportunity for a hearing. Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1989); Little v. Fellman, 837 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1991).

 If plaintiff's only reference to attorney fees is in the prayer, he or she has not alleged a claim for such fees under § 13-17-101. At most, the language provides notice that such fees may be requested. Township Homeowners Ass'n v. Arapahoe Roofing, 844 P.2d 1316 (Colo. App. 1992).

 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that residents' claims against a charter city were frivolous and in awarding attorney fees to the city. The trial court properly awarded attorney fees for a frivolous action where residents had no basis for a claim that the charter city's method for appointing municipal judges violated the state constitution and state statutes and no basis for a claim that the charter city violated state statutes in adopting ordinances that were of purely local concern. Artes-Roy v. City of Aspen, 856 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1993).

 Trial court did not err in failing to apportion some of the fault to the attorney's clients where motion requested that sanctions be imposed only against the attorney, the attorney raised the defense that his clients should bear some of the responsibility for the plaintiffs' attorney fees, and the court implicitly rejected this argument by concluding that the attorney should be held fully accountable for his decision to ignore his obligations to opposing counsel. Parker v. Davis, 888 P.2d 324 (Colo. App. 1994).

 A party is not automatically entitled to recover the expenses incurred in successfully pursuing a motion for sanctions since such fees may be awarded only if the trial court determines that the defense to the motion lacked substantial justification; however, the need for any further proof on that issue was dispensed with by defendant's judicial admissions. Parker v. Davis, 888 P.2d 324 (Colo. App. 1994).

 To have standing to appeal an award of attorney fees only against a party's attorney, the attorney must file a separate appeal or be added as an appellant to the party's appeal. Anglum v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 166 P.3d 191 (Colo. App. 2007).

 The absence of a cash outlay is insufficient cause for denying fees to an attorney simply because there has been self-representation. Reversing such an award would frustrate the intent of the general assembly in enacting this law to address the problem of increasing litigation which burdens the judicial system and interferes with the effective administration of justice and would reward plaintiffs who have filed frivolous or groundless actions. Zick v. Krob, 872 P.2d 1290 (Colo. App. 1993).

 It is not appropriate for a court to award a grant of attorney fees to a pro se litigant. While there is an exception for pro se litigants who are attorneys under the appropriate circumstances, a pro se litigant who is not a licensed attorney has no "attorney fees". Smith v. Furlong, 976 P.2d 889 (Colo. App. 1999).

 A pro se attorney litigant is not necessarily precluded from an attorney fee award under either this section or C.R.C.P. 107 (d)(2) in a contempt proceeding. Thus, a pro se attorney litigant may be entitled to attorney fees in a contempt proceeding if the trial court determines that an opposing party's conduct meets the requirements of the statutes in this part 1. Wimmershoff v. Finger, 74 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2003).

 A pro se attorney may recover attorney fees. Giguere v. SJS Family Enters., 155 P.3d 462 (Colo. App. 2006).

 The court is required to award attorney fees only if it finds that an attorney or party brought or defended an action that lacked substantial justification. United Guar. Residential Ins. Co. v. Dimmick, 916 P.2d 638 (Colo. App. 1996).

 Absent a finding that the defense to a motion for fees lacks substantial justification, fees and costs may not be awarded for challenging that defense. Foxley v. Foxley, 939 P.2d 455 (Colo. App. 1996); Boulder County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Kraft Bldg. Contractors, 122 P.3d 1019 (Colo. App. 2005).

 To the extent § 13-17-101 et seq. is inconsistent with the procedural safe-harbor provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, it is preempted. McCoy v. West, 965 F. Supp. 34 (D. Colo. 1997).

 This section is preempted in a § 1983 claim brought in state court. A claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court is governed by the federal standards contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1988. State v. Golden's Concrete Co., 962 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1998).

 Where plaintiff seeks attorney fees under this section and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in a declaratory judgment action the trial court's findings of due process violations as a matter of fact and as a matter of law are an insufficient basis to trigger a 42 U.S.C. § 1988 award of fees because the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was not properly raised or litigated during the declaratory judgment action. Bd. of Comm'rs, County of Boulder v. Eason, 976 P.2d 271 (Colo. App. 1998).

 If a frivolous lawsuit includes both state law claims heard in state court proceedings and federal claims removed for federal court proceedings, a state court may award attorney fees incurred in producing work product for the federal court proceedings only to the extent that the work product was also used in the state court proceedings. Boulder County Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Kraft Bldg. Contractors, 122 P.3d 1019 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Lack of an express grant of authority in the Colorado Rules for Magistrates to award attorney fees on review does not divest or otherwise curtail the district court's already existing authority to make such an award under this section. In re Naekel, 181 P.3d 1177 (Colo. App. 2008).

 Applied in Moore v. DeBruine, 631 P.2d 1194 (Colo. App. 1981); Gaddis v. McDonald, 633 P.2d 1102 (Colo. App. 1981); Herman v. Steamboat Springs Super 8 Motel, Inc., 634 P.2d 1005 (Colo. App. 1981); Hargreaves v. Skrbina, 635 P.2d 221 (Colo. App. 1981); Wyatt v. United Airlines, 638 P.2d 812 (Colo. App. 1981); Turley v. Ball Assocs., 641 P.2d 286 (Colo. App. 1981); People in Interest of W.M., 643 P.2d 794 (Colo. App. 1982); Schlosky v. Mobile Premix Concrete, Inc., 656 P.2d 1321 (Colo. App. 1982); Ortega v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 657 P.2d 989 (Colo. App. 1982); Walters v. Linhof, 559 F. Supp. 1231 (D. Colo. 1983); Mission Denver Co. v. Pierson, 674 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1984); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State, Dept of Rev., 675 P.2d 318 (Colo. App. 1983); Citizens Bank v. Kruse, 691 P.2d 1143 (Colo. App. 1984); Meyer v. Landmark Universal, Inc., 692 P.2d 1129 (Colo. App. 1984); Bill Manning, Inc. v. Denver West Bank and Trust, 697 P.2d 403 (Colo. App. 1984); Schoonover v. Hedlund Abstract Co., Inc., 727 P.2d 408 (Colo. App. 1986); Seismic Int'l Research Corp. v. South Ranch Oil Co., Inc., 793 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089, 107 S. Ct. 1297, 94 L.Ed 2d 153 (1987); Tripp v. Shelter Research Inc., 729 P.2d 1024 (Colo. App. 1986); Martinez v. Cont'l Enter., 730 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1986); Anderson v. Rosebrook, 737 P.2d 417 (Colo. 1987); Pietrafeso v. D.P.I., Inc., 757 P.2d 1113 (Colo. App. 1988); Swanson v. Precision Sales & Serv., 832 P.2d 1109 (Colo. App. 1992); Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210 (Colo. 1994); Langseth v. County of Elbert, 916 P.2d 655 (Colo. App. 1996); Van Steenhouse v. Jacor Broad., 935 P.2d 49 (Colo. App. 1996), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 958 P.2d 464 (Colo. 1998); Giguere v. SJS Family Enters., 155 P.3d 462 (Colo. App. 2006); In re Ward, 183 P.3d 707 (Colo. App. 2008); Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2010).

13-17-103. Procedure for determining reasonable fee - judicial discretion.

Statute text

(1) In determining the amount of an attorney fee award, the court shall exercise its sound discretion. When granting an award of attorney fees, the court shall specifically set forth the reasons for said award and shall consider the following factors, among others, in determining whether to assess attorney fees and the amount of attorney fees to be assessed against any offending attorney or party:

(a) The extent of any effort made to determine the validity of any action or claim before said action or claim was asserted;

(b) The extent of any effort made after the commencement of an action to reduce the number of claims or defenses being asserted or to dismiss claims or defenses found not to be valid within an action;

(c) The availability of facts to assist a party in determining the validity of a claim or defense;

(d) The relative financial positions of the parties involved;

(e) Whether or not the action was prosecuted or defended, in whole or in part, in bad faith;

(f) Whether or not issues of fact determinative of the validity of a party's claim or defense were reasonably in conflict;

(g) The extent to which the party prevailed with respect to the amount of and number of claims in controversy;

(h) The amount and conditions of any offer of judgment or settlement as related to the amount and conditions of the ultimate relief granted by the court.

History

 Source: L. 77: Entire article added, p. 797, § 2, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section R&RE, p. 461, § 3, effective July 1.

Annotations


RECENT ANNOTATIONS

Annotations

 Specific factual findings on enumerated factors required only when granting an award of fees, not when denying an award. Munoz v. Measner, 247 P.3d 1031 (Colo. 2011).

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Civil Rights", which discusses the attorney fees in Ramos v. Lamm, see 62 Den. U. L. Rev. 71 (1985).

 For discussion of amount of attorney fee award, see Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F. Supp. 730 (D. Colo. 1982) (decided under similar provisions of former § 13-17-102).

 Trial court properly concluded that claim lacked substantial justification where court's detailed findings established that it considered the factors set forth in this section and § 13-17-102, and where court found the constitution, statutes, and case law clearly established the claims lacked "any legal foundation", that a good faith argument had not been advanced, and that the same arguments had been advanced and rejected in prior case. City of Littleton v. State, 832 P.2d 985 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Attorney fees awarded from assertion of affirmative defense. Attorney fees cannot be assessed against attorney from the beginning of action solely because attorney filed the action after the expiration of the statute of limitations because statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which attorney is not required to anticipate. MacMillian v. Bruce, 900 P.2d 131 (Colo. 1995).

 The requirement of this section that the court consider specified factors in determining whether to award attorney fees necessarily requires that a hearing be provided for the parties to address such factors and for the court to make an informed decision. Irwin v. Elam Const., Inc., 793 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1990).

 The court is not required to make specific findings as to the factors to be determined in an order denying, rather than awarding, attorney fees. E-470 Pub. Hwy. Auth. v. Jagow, 30 P.3d 798 (Colo. App. 2001), aff'd on other grounds, 49 P.3d 1151 (Colo. 2002).

 Findings not necessary when request for fees is denied. Webster v. Boone, 992 P.2d 1183 (Colo. App. 1999).

 Although this section does not require a court to make a finding of fact when attorney fees are denied under § 13-17-102, C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-22 does. Stearns Mgmt. Co. v. Mo. River Servs., Inc., 70 P.3d 629 (Colo. App. 2003).

 Reference in subsection (7) to "a good faith attempt to establish a new theory of law" presumes that, in addition to filing a novel claim, the party will attempt to advance a plausible theory and argument for the adoption of the new legal principle; however, if a party fails to present plausible arguments in support of a novel claim, sanctions may be imposed under the statute, irrespective of the subjective state of mind of the party or the attorney at the time the claim was asserted. Sullivan v. Lutz, 827 P.2d 626 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Trial court did not err in imposing sanctions under this section for fees incurred in defending plaintiff's claim where there was no legal or equitable principle that would rationally support plaintiff's claim that the law of constructive trusts should be extended to incorporate his claim. Sullivan v. Lutz, 827 P.2d 626 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Award of attorney fees without a hearing is not proper if the reasonableness of the attorney fee award is placed in issue. City of Littleton v. State, 832 P.2d 985 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Award of attorney fees under § 13-17-102 is discretionary with trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by the evidence. Award upheld where evidence presented to trial court with respect to father's defense against motion to change custody included findings that the mother had misled expert witnesses, that they had failed to investigate the child's circumstances with the father, that the mother had not properly assisted the child to recover from the impact of the dissolution, and that she had a scheme for obtaining custody of the child which involved actions not in the best interest of the child. Weber v. Wallace, 789 P.2d 427 (Colo. App. 1989).

 Where credible evidence existed to support plaintiff's claims but was not presented due to counsel's failure to obtain and designate witnesses upon issue of damages, court erred in including in attorney fee award those amounts attributable to the time when evidence could have been presented through proper designation of witnesses because during this interval plaintiff's claims were not groundless. Harrison v. Smith, 821 P.2d 832 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Trial court's findings were adequate where order indicated it properly considered evidence as to the pertinent factors under this section and findings were sufficiently explicit to permit review of its determination. Sullivan v. Lutz, 827 P.2d 626 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Court's statement that injunction was no longer valid was sufficient for a finding that motion to enforce it was without merit and to meet requirements of this section. Anderson v. Pursell, 244 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2010).

 Attorney fee award reversed when the requisite findings required by the statute were not made. In addition, a hearing was not conducted despite the objections of the plaintiffs to the fee award. Maul v. Shaw, 843 P.2d 139 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Award of reasonable attorney fees under "no fault" law. Since § 10-4-708 (1) does not provide a specific definition of "reasonable", such compensation should be determined in light of all circumstances for the time and effort reasonably expended by the prevailing party's attorney. If trial court does not make initial determination as to reasonableness of hours expended by plaintiff's counsel, the record will be insufficient for reviewing court to resolve issue of reasonableness of fees on appeal. Spensieri v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins., 804 P.2d 268 (Colo. App. 1990).

 In determining whether a claim or defense is substantially frivolous or groundless, a trial court must consider the factors set forth in subsection (1) and it must specify the reasons for the award. Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1989); Haney v. City Court, 779 P.2d 1312 (Colo. 1989); Sullivan v. Lutz, 827 P.2d 626 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Order imposing sanctions was not deficient for failure to address the factors set forth in subsection (1) and to specify the reasons for the award since none of the factors listed were placed in issue during the sanctions hearing and, consequently, the trial court was under no obligation to issue specific findings and since the order was sufficiently explicit to permit appellate review of the justification for the award. Parker v. Davis, 888 P.2d 324 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be used to avoid the requirements of this section, at least when there is no evidence or inference that the defendant had any control over the instrumentality causing the injury. Bilawsky v. Faseehudin, 916 P.2d 586 (Colo. App. 1995).

 Effectively abandoning a claim by not pursuing it through trial is insufficient to constitute an effort to reduce the number of claims being asserted under subsection (1)(b). Ranta Constr., Inc. v. Anderson, 190 P.3d 835 (Colo. App. 2008).

 Plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge an award of attorney fees entered pursuant to this section against plaintiffs' counsel. Appeal properly dismissed where counsel had not filed a separate notice of appeal or added his name as an appellant to the appeal. Henderson v. Bear, 968 P.2d 144 (Colo. App. 1998).

 Applied in Application of Talco, Ltd., 769 P.2d 468 (Colo. 1989); In re Ward, 183 P.3d 707 (Colo. App. 2008).

13-17-104. Fee arrangements between attorney and client.

Statute text

The attorney and his client shall remain free to negotiate in private the actual fee which the client is to pay his attorney.

History

 Source: L. 77: Entire article added, p. 798, § 2, effective July 1.

13-17-105. Stipulation as to fees.

Statute text

With the approval of the court, two or more parties to an action may agree, by written stipulation filed with the court or by oral stipulation in open court, to no award of attorney fees or an award of attorney fees in a manner different from that provided in this article.

History

 Source: L. 77: Entire article added, p. 798, § 2, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section R&RE, p. 462, § 4, effective July 1.

13-17-106. Applicability.

Statute text

This article shall apply in all cases covered by this article unless attorney fees are otherwise specifically provided by statute, in which case the provision allowing the greater award shall prevail.

History

 Source: L. 77: Entire article added, p. 798, § 2, effective July 1. L. 84: Entire section amended, p. 462, § 5, effective July 1.

——————————

PART 2
ATTORNEY FEES IN CIVIL ACTIONS IN GENERAL

13-17-201. Award of reasonable attorney fees in certain cases.

Statute text

In all actions brought as a result of a death or an injury to person or property occasioned by the tort of any other person, where any such action is dismissed on motion of the defendant prior to trial under rule 12 (b) of the Colorado rules of civil procedure, such defendant shall have judgment for his reasonable attorney fees in defending the action. This section shall not apply if a motion under rule 12 (b) of the Colorado rules of civil procedure is treated as a motion for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in rule 56 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure.

History

 Source: L. 87: Entire part added, p. 547, § 2, effective July 1.

Annotations


RECENT ANNOTATIONS

Annotations

  Section applies not only to "baseless" tort claims that are dismissed under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), but also to any tort claim dismissed under the auspices of any provision of C.R.C.P. 12. Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 262 P.3d 991 (Colo. App. 2011).

 The exception to this section's general applicability is applicable only in the case of a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion and not in the case of a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion challenging the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 262 P.3d 991 (Colo. App. 2011).

 In determining whether section applies, the court should focus on the manner in which claims are pled. Where plaintiff pled four contract claims and four tort claims, which all arose from the same nucleus of facts, and plaintiff chose to include the tort claims to obtain relief beyond what was available solely under a breach of contract theory, court did not err in determining that the section applied. Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 262 P.3d 991 (Colo. App. 2011).

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "1988 Update on Colorado Tort Reform Legislation -- Part II", see 17 Colo. Law. 1949 (1988). For article, "Recent Developments in Governmental Immunity: Post-Trinity Broadcasting", see 25 Colo. Law. 43 (June 1996).

 Purpose of section. In enacting this section, the general assembly sought to discourage and deter the institution or maintenance of unnecessary litigation involving tort claims. Employers Ins. v. RREEF USA FUND-II, 805 P.2d 1186 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Section applies only to dismissal of an entire tort action, not to dismissal of a single claim. First Interstate Bank v. Berenbaum, 872 P.2d 1297 (Colo. App. 1993); Holland v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 883 P.2d 500 (Colo. App. 1994); Jaffe v. City & County of Denver, 15 P.3d 806 (Colo. App. 2000); Barton v. Law Offices of John W. McKendree, 126 P.3d 313 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Section applies when a tort action is dismissed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b). Statute neither explicitly nor implicitly contemplates the existence of physical harm to a person or property. Houdek v. Mobil Oil Corp., 879 P.2d 417 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Section applies when an action is dismissed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA). Smith v. Town of Snowmass Vill., 919 P.2d 868 (Colo. App. 1996).

 Section does not apply to claims that are pleaded in contract, but are dismissed pursuant to the CGIA because they lie in tort or could lie in tort. Courts will not read the CGIA's concern for claims that "lie or could lie in tort" into the plain language of this section. Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 2008).

 For purposes of applying this section, the court relies on plaintiff's characterization of the claims in the complaint and does not consider what should or might have been pled. Although the case was dismissed based on preemption after a determination that the action was grounded on federal laws, the dismissal of plaintiff's case triggered application of this section, because plaintiff's claims were pled as torts. Kennedy v. King Soopers Inc., 148 P.3d 385 (Colo. App. 2006).

 Under this section, an award of attorney fees is mandatory when a trial court dismisses an action under C.R.C.P. 12(b). Barnett v. Denver Publ'g Co., 36 P.3d 145 (Colo. App. 2001); Wark v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 47 P.3d 711 (Colo. App. 2002); Wilson v. Meyer, 126 P.3d 276 (Colo. App. 2005); Kreft v. Adolph Coors Co., 170 P.3d 854 (Colo. App. 2007).

 A party who successfully defends a dismissal order under C.R.C.P. 12(b) is also entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal. Henderson v. Bear, 968 P.2d 144 (Colo. App. 1998); Wark v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 47 P.3d 711 (Colo. App. 2002); Wilson v. Meyer, 126 P.3d 276 (Colo. App. 2005); Estate of Harper ex rel. Al-Hamim v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 140 P.3d 273 (Colo. App. 2006); Kreft v. Adolph Coors Co., 170 P.3d 854 (Colo. App. 2007); Ferrel v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 179 P.3d 178 (Colo. App. 2007).

 This section and § 13-16-113 mandate awards of attorney fees and costs and do not permit a reduction for work that may be used in companion litigation. Crandall v. City & County of Denver, 238 P.3d 659 (Colo. 2010).

 This section is applicable where both tort and non-tort claims are pled and dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. This section applies in cases where all claims, both tort and non-tort, have been dismissed on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 grounds. Torres v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 606 F. Supp. 2d 1286 (D. Colo. 2009).

 Award of attorney fees is mandatory when trial court dismisses an action under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Ferrel v. Colo. Dept. of Corr., 179 P.3d 178 (Colo. App. 2007).

 Trial court may award attorney fees and costs to a defendant when claims are still pending as to other defendants at the time of dismissal and, thus, the entire lawsuit has not been dismissed. By using the term "defendant" in the singular, this section necessarily applies to each defendant who has an action against it dismissed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Stauffer v. Stegemann, 165 P.3d 719 (Colo. App. 2006).

 Defendant may not recover attorney fees under this section when (1) the action includes both tort and nontort claims and (2) defendant has obtained dismissal of the tort claims, but not of the nontort claims, under C.R.C.P. 12. Sotelo v. Hutchens Trucking Co., 166 P.3d 285 (Colo. App. 2007).

 Section does not apply to a § 1983 claim. Instead, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 applies, and that section does not authorize an award of fees and costs unless the claim is properly characterized as frivolous, vexatious, unreasonable, groundless, or made in bad faith. State v. Golden's Concrete Co., 962 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1998); Berg v. Shapiro, 36 P.3d 109 (Colo. App. 2001).

 Although plaintiff's action should properly have been founded in tort under § 13-21-115, plaintiff's claim was, nevertheless, framed as a contract claim, and it was the purported contract claim that was dismissed. Hence, this section, which authorizes attorney fee awards when a tort claim is dismissed prior to trial, is inapplicable. Sweeney v. United Artists Theater Circuit, 119 P.3d 538 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Contrary to plaintiff's assertion that his action was primarily a contract action, six of eight claims against defendants, and eight of 10 claims asserted, were pleaded as tort claims within the meaning of this section. Dubray v. Intertribal Bison Coop., 192 P.3d 604 (Colo. App. 2008).

 Trial court did not err in failing to apportion attorney fees requested based on tort versus nontort claims. Even if defendants were entitled to recover fees and costs associated with dismissal of only the tort claims, apportionment would be unwarranted because the entire action was dismissed for the same reason (lack of personal jurisdiction) and defendants would have incurred the same, or nearly the same, fees had the case involved only the tort claims. Dubray v. Intertribal Bison Coop., 192 P.3d 604 (Colo. App. 2008).

 Mandatory attorney fees award provision of this section contains no express exclusion for claims brought in a good faith attempt to establish a new rule of law. Houdek v. Mobile Oil Corp., 879 P.2d 417 (Colo. App. 1994); Tunget v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 992 P.2d 650 (Colo. App. 1999).

 Attorney fees mandatory when motion to dismiss for failure to join an indispensable party granted; consideration of evidentiary matters did not convert motion to a motion for summary judgment. Lyon v. Amoco Prod. Co., 923 P.2d 350 (Colo. App. 1996).

 To the extent this section and § 13-17-102 (7) are in conflict concerning a good faith tort action that is dismissed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b), this section controls as it is more specific to such action and was enacted later in time than § 13-17-102 (7). Houdek v. Mobil Oil Corp., 879 P.2d 417 (Colo. App. 1994); Hewitt v. Rice, 119 P.3d 541 (Colo. App. 2004), aff'd on other grounds, 154 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2007).

 By implication, this section allows a plaintiff to escape liability for attorney fees by seeking a voluntary dismissal, filing a stipulation of dismissal, or confessing to a defense motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b); however, section is not applicable when plaintiffs seek to maintain state law claims unless and until federal court determines that a federal cause of action exists. Houdek v. Mobil Oil Corp., 879 P.2d 417 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Trial court is not duty-bound to conduct a separate hearing on the issue of attorney fees before it may deny a request therefor. Hunter v. Colo. Mountain Jr. Coll., 804 P.2d 277 (Colo. App. 1990).

 When fees are awarded, the court is required to make evidentiary findings and must provide the opportunity for a hearing. Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1989); Little v. Fellman, 837 P.2d 197 (Colo. App. 1991).

 Trial court did not err in treating motion to dismiss as a C.R.C.P. 56 motion for summary judgment, despite fact that no affidavits or documents outside the pleadings were presented; thus, statute permitting award of attorney fees in actions brought as a result of death or injury to person or property, where the action is dismissed on motion of the defendant prior to trial, did not apply. Willer v. City of Thornton, 817 P.2d 514 (Colo. 1991).

 When a defendant has two valid defenses to a tort claim and one meets the statutory requirements for the granting of attorney fees under this section, such fees should be awarded. Because this section precludes the recovery of attorney fees whenever a motion is converted to summary judgment, a defendant who prevails on a motion to dismiss based on first amendment immunity generally may not recover attorney fees. Here, however, because there is an alternative, independent ground upon which respondent's claim may be dismissed that comes within this section, petitioner can recover his or her attorney fees. Petitioner may recover his or her attorney fees because his or her motion to dismiss respondent's claim succeeds not only on the basis of his or her first amendment defense, but also on the independent, alternative basis under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) that respondent failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Krystkowiak v. W.O. Brisben Cos., 90 P.3d 859 (Colo. 2004).

 Defendant not entitled to attorney fees where court converted C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment under C.R.C.P. 56. The fact that the court found plaintiff's allegations of willfulness and wantonness insufficient on their face to support subject matter jurisdiction under the Governmental Immunity Act does not render the dismissal one under C.R.C.P. 12(b). In deciding the question of sovereign immunity, the court necessarily construed the Act and issued a legal finding that disposed of the case. That the trial court considered no matters outside the pleadings in doing so was deemed inconsequential. Zerr v. Johnson, 905 F. Supp. 872 (D. Colo. 1995).

 C.R.C.P. 12(b) authorizes the court to consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the motion into a summary judgment motion for motions under subsection C.R.C.P. 12(b) other than C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5). Aztec Minerals Corp. v. State, 987 P.2d 895 (Colo. App. 1999).

 Trial court erred in refusing to award a defendant attorney fees because facts had to be presented and determined by the court. Under the plain language of this section, an award of attorney fees is mandatory when a trial court dismisses an action under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Smith v. Town of Snowmass Vill., 919 P.2d 868 (Colo. App. 1996); Villalpando v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., 181 P.3d 357 (Colo. App. 2007).

 Since the court declined to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss until it heard the evidence presented at trial, this is not a situation in which a defendant delayed seeking dismissal and incurred attorney fees that a timely motion to dismiss could have avoided. Therefore, the court is right in awarding attorney fees pursuant to this section. Abrahamson v. City of Montrose, 77 P.3d 819 (Colo. App. 2003).

 This section not in conflict with § 6-1-113 of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act. This section applies to a motion pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b) while § 6-1-113 allows attorney fees when claims are groundless and in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. The provisions can stand side by side because they mandate awards in different circumstances. US Fax Law Ctr., Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., 205 P.3d 512 (Colo. App. 2009).

 This section applies only when an action is dismissed and does not apply when only a single claim is dismissed. First Interstate Bank v. Berenbaum, 872 P.2d 1297 (Colo. App. 1993); Sundheim v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Douglas County, 904 P.2d 1337 (Colo. App. 1995), aff'd, 926 P.2d 545 (Colo. 1996); Berg v. Shapiro, 36 P.3d 109 (Colo. App. 2001); U.S. Fax Law Ctr., Inc. v. T2 Techs., Inc., 183 P.3d 626 (Colo. App. 2007); Hamon Contractors, Inc. v. Carter & Burgess, Inc., 229 P.3d 282 (Colo. App. 2009).

 The defendant is not entitled to attorney fees when only a single fraud claim was dismissed under a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim of relief. First Interstate Bank v. Berenbaum, 872 P.2d 1297 (Colo. App. 1993).

 Recovery of attorney fees not limited only to fees incurred in preparing motion to dismiss. This section does not so limit an award and instead expressly authorizes "attorney fees in defending the action". Dubray v. Intertribal Bison Coop., 192 P.3d 604 (Colo. App. 2008).

 Absent a finding that the defense to a motion for fees lacks substantial justification, fees and costs may not be awarded for challenging that defense. Foxley v. Foxley, 939 P.2d 455 (Colo. App. 1996).

 Plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge an award of attorney fees entered pursuant to this section against plaintiffs' counsel. Appeal properly dismissed where counsel had not filed a separate notice of appeal or added his name as an appellant to the appeal. Henderson v. Bear, 968 P.2d 144 (Colo. App. 1998).

 Defamation is "an injury to person or property occasioned by the tort of any other person" and therefore an award of attorney fees is appropriate under this section upon a dismissal pursuant to C.R.C.P. 12(b). Barnett v. Denver Publ'g Co., Inc., 36 P.3d 145 (Colo. App. 2001).

13-17-202. Award of actual costs and fees when offer of settlement was made.

Statute text

(1) (a) Notwithstanding any other statute to the contrary, in any civil action of any nature commenced or appealed in any court of record in this state:

(I) If the plaintiff serves an offer of settlement in writing at any time more than fourteen days before the commencement of the trial that is rejected by the defendant, and the plaintiff recovers a final judgment in excess of the amount offered, then the plaintiff shall be awarded actual costs accruing after the offer of settlement to be paid by the defendant.

(II) If the defendant serves an offer of settlement in writing at any time more than fourteen days before the commencement of the trial that is rejected by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff does not recover a final judgment in excess of the amount offered, then the defendant shall be awarded actual costs accruing after the offer of settlement to be paid by the plaintiff. However, as provided in section 13-16-104, if the plaintiff is the prevailing party in the action, the plaintiff's final judgment shall include the amount of the plaintiff's actual costs that accrued prior to the offer of settlement.

(III) If an offer of settlement is not accepted in writing within fourteen days after service of the offer, the offer shall be deemed rejected, and the party who made the offer is not precluded from making a subsequent offer. Evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs.

(IV) If an offer of settlement is accepted in writing within fourteen days after service of the offer, the offer of settlement shall constitute a binding settlement agreement, fully enforceable by the court in which the civil action is pending.

(V) An offer of settlement under this section shall remain open for at least fourteen days from the date of service unless withdrawn by service of withdrawal of the offer of settlement.

(VI) An offer of settlement served at any time fourteen days or less before the commencement of the trial shall not be subject to this section, and evidence thereof is not admissible for any purpose.

(b) For purposes of this section, "actual costs" shall not include attorney fees but shall mean costs actually paid or owed by the party, or his or her attorneys or agents, in connection with the case, including but not limited to filing fees, subpoena fees, reasonable expert witness fees, copying costs, court reporter fees, reasonable investigative expenses and fees, reasonable travel expenses, exhibit or visual aid preparation or presentation expenses, legal research expenses, and all other similar fees and expenses.

(2) When comparing the amount of any offer of settlement to the amount of a final judgment actually awarded, any amount of the final judgment representing interest subsequent to the date of the offer in settlement shall not be considered.

(3) When the liability of one party to another has been determined by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent of the liability remains to be determined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an offer of settlement, which shall have the same effect as an offer made before trial (except with respect to costs already incurred) if it is served pursuant to subsection (1) of this section.

History

 Source: L. 90: Entire section added, p. 852, § 14, effective May 31. L. 95: Entire section amended, p. 1194, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2003: (1) amended, p. 1359, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2008: (1)(a)(II) amended, p. 8, § 1, effective July 1.

Annotations

 Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 1990 act enacting this section, see section 1 of chapter 100, Session Laws of Colorado 1990.

Annotations


RECENT ANNOTATIONS

Annotations

 Inclusion of subrogation interests and putative liens in a settlement offer did not create a nonmonetary condition. Rather, by including those factors, defendant explained the value of the settlement offer. Thus, the settlement offer was covered by the language of this section. Strunk v. Goldberg, 258 P.3d 334 (Colo. App. 2011).

 A settlement offer should be presumed to impliedly include the amount of any post-verdict subrogation setoff. Ferrellgas, Inc. v. Yeiser, 247 P.3d 1022 (Colo. 2011).

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Law reviews. For article, "Application of the 'Offer of Settlement' Statute: Less Than Legislative Intent?", see 24 Colo. Law. 2557 (1995).

 This section does not violate equal protection principles since it provides equal opportunity to plaintiffs and defendants alike. Rubio v. Farris, 51 P.3d 992 (Colo. App. 2002).

 The 2008 amendment to subsection (1)(a)(II) effected a change to, rather than merely a clarification of, the law. Novak v. Craven, 195 P.3d 1115 (Colo. App. 2008).

 The general assembly intended the 2008 amendment to subsection (1)(a)(II) to operate only prospectively. Novak v. Craven, 195 P.3d 1115 (Colo. App. 2008).

 To award costs under this section, the costs must have accrued after the settlement offer, they must be actual costs, excluding attorney fees, and the costs must be reasonable. Mallon Oil Co. v. Bowen/Edwards Assoc., 940 P.2d 1055 (Colo. App. 1996), aff'd on other grounds, 965 P.2d 105 (Colo. 1998).

 The phrase "and all other similar fees and expenses" at the end of subsection (1)(b) suggests a limitation to the categories of items that may be recovered as actual costs. Catlin v. Tormey Bewley Corp., 219 P.3d 407 (Colo. App. 2009).

 A party challenging the reasonableness of expert fees is entitled to a hearing on the issue. Dunlap v. Long, 902 P.2d 446 (Colo. App. 1995); Harvey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 983 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1998), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Slack v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 5 P.3d 280 (Colo. 2000); Dillen v. HealthOne, L.L.C., 108 P.3d 297 (Colo. App. 2004); Kim v. Grover C. Coors Trust, 179 P.3d 86 (Colo. App. 2007).

 The party must request a hearing, however. Dillen v. HealthOne, L.L.C., 108 P.3d 297 (Colo. App. 2004).

 The plain language of subsection (1)(a) does not require an offer of settlement to contain a reference to this section and use of the term "offer of settlement", although the better practice might be to include such terms in such an offer. Dillen v. HealthOne, L.L.C., 108 P.3d 297 (Colo. App. 2004).

 Subsection (1)(a)(III) does not require an offer to be "final" and specifically provides that an offeror is not precluded from making subsequent offers. Dillen v. HealthOne, L.L.C., 108 P.3d 297 (Colo. App. 2004).

 Plaintiff entitled to award of actual costs under subsection (1)(a)(I) to the extent they constitute "costs other than attorneys' fees" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) and are not preempted by a federal statute such as 28 U.S.C. § 1821 and to the extent, if at all, they constitute "related non-taxable expenses" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). Garcia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 209 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2000).

 Court may not deny costs for expert witness fees under subsection (1)(a)(II) on the basis of the credibility of the witness, but rather must evaluate the costs based on the reasonableness of the fees. Bennett v. Hickman, 992 P.2d 670 (Colo. App. 1999); Paratransit Risk Retention Group Ins. Co. v. Kamins, 160 P.3d 307 (Colo. App. 2007).

 The provisions of this section are mandatory and a trial court does not have discretion to refuse to award actual costs due to a party. Graven v. Vail Assocs., Inc., 888 P.2d 310 (Colo. App. 1994).

 A determination under this section that the defendant is entitled to costs does not preclude an attorney fees award to plaintiff as the prevailing party. Chartier v. Weinland Homes, Inc., 25 P.3d 1279 (Colo. App. 2001).

 Prevailing party is allowed to recover costs in cases where the costs are paid or advanced by an insurance company. Hale v. Erickson, 23 P.3d 1255 (Colo. App. 2001).

 Subsection (1)(a)(II) does not apply to condemnation proceedings. City of Westminster v. Jefferson Center Ass'n, 958 P.2d 495 (Colo. App. 1997).

 Section does not address a prevailing party who received less than its rejected offer of settlement but never rejected an offer under the statute. Therefore, plaintiff is not barred from an award of costs under this section and is entitled to an award of reasonable costs as a prevailing party pursuant to § 13-16-104 and C.R.C.P. 54(d). Hall v. Frankel, 190 P.3d 852 (Colo. App. 2008).

 Recovery pursuant to this section available to extent maximum recovery allowed under § 24-10-114 not reached. Since plaintiff had recovered maximum allowable under § 24-10-114 for injury caused to child by negligence of pharmacy at state hospital, additional recovery for costs not available under this section. DeCordova v. State, 878 P.2d 73 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Offer, which did not unequivocally exclude costs but which was "exclusive of costs", was an offer for settlement apart or separate from costs mandated by this section. Carpentier v. Berg, 829 P.2d 507 (Colo. App. 1992); Aberle v. Clark, 916 P.2d 564 (Colo. App. 1995).

 Offer of a total amount "inclusive of all costs and interest to date" was valid under this section. Aberle v. Clark, 916 P.2d 564 (Colo. App. 1995).

 Subsection (3) does not require an offer of settlement to itemize separately the respective amounts being tendered for settlement of the underlying substantive claim and for costs. Aberle v. Clark, 916 P.2d 564 (Colo. App. 1995).

 In an offer inclusive of "all costs and interest", trial court must consider plaintiff's asserted preoffer costs, and the reasonableness thereof in assessing an award of costs. Rubio v. Farris, 51 P.3d 992 (Colo. App. 2002).

 Ordinarily, a "final judgment" includes prejudgment interest but not costs. Where settlement offer did not reference, much less explicitly include, costs, the trial court erred in including plaintiff's costs as part of the "final judgment". Novak v. Craven, 195 P.3d 1115 (Colo. App. 2008) (decided under law in effect prior to 2008 amendment).

 Offer of settlement as to "all claims" unambiguously includes attorney fees if the only claim for attorney fees appears in the complaint. The offer of settlement need not explicitly reference attorney fees. Bumbal v. Smith, 165 P.3d 844 (Colo. App. 2007).

 In calculating whether a final judgment exceeds the amount of a settlement offer that did not specifically exclude costs, a trial court is to exclude post-offer attorney fees awarded as costs, but include pre-offer fees awarded as costs. Chartier v. Weinland Homes, Inc., 25 P.3d 1279 (Colo. App. 2001).

 Offer and the judgment obtained are to be considered in a like manner. When offer does not specify how to treat an offset, the judgment shall be compared to the offer prior to any offset. Yeiser v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 214 P.3d 458 (Colo. App. 2009).

 Trial court need only award actual costs that are reasonably incurred after rejection of settlement offer. Prior to such award, trial court must make specific finding of reasonableness of costs. Evanson v. Colo. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 879 P.2d 402 (Colo. App. 1993).

 Unreasonable costs may be disallowed by the court under subsection (1)(a)(II). Jorgensen v. Heinz, 847 P.2d 181 (Colo. App. 1992); Cedar Lane Invs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 883 P.2d 600 (Colo. App. 1994); Underwood v. Dillon Co., 936 P.2d 612 (Colo. App. 1997); Salazar v. Am. Sterlizer Co., 5 P.3d 357 (Colo. App. 2000).

 When an expert is hired to testify but is precluded from doing so because his or her testimony is ruled inadmissible, the expert's services are not reasonably necessary to the disposition of the case, and expert fees should not be awarded. Clayton v. Snow, 131 P.3d 1202 (Colo. App. 2006).

 No requirement that costs awarded relate to any particular phase of a lawsuit so long as they are incurred after the offer of settlement. Reasonable costs may include answer and jury fees and trial preparation fees of expert witnesses, even when some work of expert witnesses is performed after entry of summary judgment but before experts can be notified to stop work. Cedar Lane Invs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 883 P.2d 600 (Colo. App. 1994).

 The costs for a witness's airfare could be "reasonable travel expenses" under subsection (1)(b) of this section, even if the airfare exceeds the mileage reimbursement rate provided in § 13-33-103, depending on the circumstances that led the witness to travel by air and the type of arrangements chosen. The same would be true of "gasoline money", even if it exceeded the mileage fees provided in § 13-33-103. The trial court should make findings on the reasonableness of such costs claimed by plaintiff. Catlin v. Tormey Bewley Corp., 219 P.3d 407 (Colo. App. 2009).

 Under unusual circumstances, traveling companion expenses could be awarded under this section because the expenses of a traveling companion are "similar" to "reasonable travel expenses", and this phrase in subsection (1)(b) is not limited to such expenses of a witness. In considering such an award, a trial court should make findings regarding the need for the traveling companion's presence, as well as the reasonableness of his or her travel arrangements. Catlin v. Tormey Bewley Corp., 219 P.3d 407 (Colo. App. 2009).

 Trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a defendant only a portion of the actual costs incurred where such costs could have been avoided if defendant had availed itself of the procedures that would have limited the action to the resolution of a jurisdictional issue. Smith v. Town of Snowmass Vill., 919 P.2d 868 (Colo. App. 1996) (decided under former law).

 Court may tax costs jointly and severally. It is within the court's discretion to decide how to tax the costs. Hale v. Erickson, 23 P.3d 1255 (Colo. App. 2001).

 Because the court considered the plaintiff's bill of costs and amended bill of costs in awarding minimal costs, even though both the bill and amended bill were filed more than 15 days after the entry of judgment, the trial court was required to award the plaintiff reasonable costs incurred after the offer of settlement. Borquez v. Robert C. Ozer, P.C., 923 P.2d 166 (Colo. App. 1995), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 940 P.2d 371 (Colo. 1997).

 Offers of judgment are not revocable by the offeror for the statutory period of 10 days. Centric-Jones Co. v. Hufnagel, 848 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1993).

 Relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b) is available for judgments entered pursuant to this section. Domenico v. Southwestern Props. Venture, 914 P.2d 390 (Colo. App. 1995).

 An offer of settlement made to multiple plaintiffs must be apportioned among the parties to allow each to decide independently whether to settle and avoid a potential award of costs pursuant to this section. Weeks v. City of Colo. Springs, 928 P.2d 1346 (Colo. App. 1996); Antolovich v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582 (Colo. App. 2007).

 This section does not apply where an offer of settlement was made in a previous action, involving at least some claims that are different from those asserted in the later case, and where a timely statutory offer of settlement was not made in the action in which the judgment was obtained. Huffman v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 205 P.3d 501 (Colo. App. 2009).

 Subsection (3) does not apply to an unapportioned offer to multiple plaintiffs. Taylor by and through Taylor v. Clark, 883 P.2d 569 (Colo. App. 1994).

 Trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that the entry of summary judgment for one of two offerors of an offer of judgment voided the offer of judgment. An offer of judgment is both irrevocable and absolute for the 10-day statutory period. Centric-Jones Co. v. Hufnagel, 848 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1993).

 Statutory period for accepting an offer of settlement cannot be extended by rule. The additional three-day period established in C.R.C.P. 6(e) for service by e-filing does not apply to statutorily established time periods. Montoya v. Connolly's Towing, Inc., 216 P.3d 98 (Colo. App. 2008).

 Offer made to husband and wife could only be accepted by both parties and attempt by wife to accept half constituted a material change to the terms of the offer and was therefore a rejection of the offer. Since husband did not recover more from the jury than was offered by defendant he is not entitled to recover costs. Askew v. Gerace, 851 P.2d 199 (Colo. App. 1992).

 Nothing in the statute permits one to condition an offer of settlement upon dismissal of claims against a third party whose claims would not be resolved in the settlement. Because the settlement offer required defendant to dismiss all counterclaims against plaintiffs but all plaintiffs did not join in the offer to dismiss their claims, plaintiffs did not comply with this section. Lawry v. Palm, 192 P.3d 550 (Colo. App. 2008).

 Offer served less than ten days before trial was not within statutory period and the trial court was correct in not entering judgment on such offer. Larson v. A.T.S.I., 859 P.2d 273 (Colo. App. 1993).

 Defendant's offer of $1.00 in settlement did not violate the spirit of this section and was both permissible and within the purpose of this section since this section is designed not only to encourage settlement but also to discourage unnecessary litigation and reduce the attendant costs. Graven v. Vail Assocs., Inc., 888 P.2d 310 (Colo. App. 1994).

 It is contrary to the purpose of this section to allow non-monetary conditions to be imposed as part of a settlement offer. Therefore, any provisions extending the scope of the offer beyond the claims at issue remove the offer from the scope of the statute. Martin v. Minnard, 862 P.2d 1014 (Colo. App. 1993); Tallitsch v. Child Support Servs., Inc., 926 P.2d 143 (Colo. App. 1996); URS Group, Inc. v. Tetra Tech FW, Inc., 181 P.3d 380 (Colo. App. 2008).

 By requiring a release of all "future claims" relating to the project that was the subject of litigation, defendant imposed a nonmonetary condition that took its offer outside the scope of this section. URS Group, Inc. v. Tetra Tech FW, Inc., 181 P.3d 380 (Colo. App. 2008).

 A settlement offer conditioned upon confidentiality cannot be used as a basis for seeking costs because either party has the right to make an offer and acceptance part of the public records. Martin v. Minnard, 862 P.2d 1014 (Colo. App. 1993).

 Settlement offer provision inapplicable to condemnation proceedings in which the final judgment is less than the amount of the offer of settlement. City of Westminster v. Hart, 928 P.2d 758 (Colo. App. 1996).

 Defendant failed to establish basis for relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b) where offer of settlement made by defendant's insurance attorney failed to specify whether the offer addressed fewer than all of the claims between the parties. Guevara v. Foxhoven, 928 P.2d 793 (Colo. App. 1996).

 The intent of subsection (1)(a)(II) is to encourage the settlement of litigation by imposing upon a party who rejects a reasonable offer of settlement but recovers less than the amount of the offer, all of the post-offer costs of the offeror. Bennett v. Hickman, 992 P.2d 670 (Colo. App. 1999); Rubio v. Farris, 51 P.3d 992 (Colo. App. 2002).

 This section modifies § 13-16-104 and C.R.C.P. 54(d) by not allowing a party who rejects a settlement offer and recovers less at trial to recover his or her costs, even though that party is determined to be the prevailing party. Bennett v. Hickman, 992 P.2d 670 (Colo. App. 1999); Rubio v. Farris, 51 P.3d 992 (Colo. App. 2002).

 "Actual costs accruing after the offer of settlement" means due and payable or vested and thus costs that were paid prior to making an offer of settlement to plaintiff did not accrue or become due until after the settlement date and, therefore, fall within the scope of subsection (1)(a)(II). Bennett v. Hickman, 992 P.2d 670 (Colo. App. 1999).

 A cost judgment under this section is to be offset from a jury award only after the prejudgment interest has been added. Bennett v. Hickman, 992 P.2d 670 (Colo. App. 1999).

 This section details the steps a party must take in regard to offers of settlement. C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1)(C) and C.R.C.P. 26(e) exist, in part, to promote the exchange of sufficient information in order to encourage settlement. By binding plaintiff to the damage computations listed in plaintiff's initial disclosure statement merely because plaintiff did not designate the computations as estimates, the trial court effectively imposed a settlement on plaintiff and improperly involved the court in the settlement process. The trial court overemphasized plaintiff's failure to state that the initial disclosure of damages was an estimate, neglected to view the initial disclosures in the context of being information "now known and reasonably available," and was insufficiently attentive to the importance of an early exchange of information and the resulting need to update information under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1)(C) and 26(e). Absent some indication plaintiff tried to mislead the defendants or the court in plaintiff's initial disclosure or tried to frustrate the settlement process, plaintiff not required to accept an offer limited to plaintiff's initial disclosures. By granting the defendants' joint motion for judgment for a specific amount of damages over the objection of plaintiff, the court abused its discretion. Morgan v. Genesee Co., 86 P.3d 388 (Colo. 2004).

 Applied in Lasher v. Paxton, 956 P.2d 647 (Colo. App. 1998); Goodwin v. Homeland Cent. Ins. Co., 172 P.3d 938 (Colo. App. 2007).

13-17-203. Limitation on attorney fees in class action litigation against public entities.

Statute text

If the plaintiffs prevail in any class action litigation brought against any public entity, as defined in section 24-10-103 (5), C.R.S., the amount of attorney fees which the plaintiffs' attorney is entitled to receive out of any award to the plaintiffs shall be determined by the court; except that such amount shall not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars. Such limitation shall apply where the public entity pays the attorney fees directly to the plaintiffs' attorneys or where the public entity is required to pay the attorney fees indirectly through any program it administers by reducing the benefits or amounts due to the individual plaintiffs.

History

 Source: L. 92: Entire section added, p. 272, § 1, effective April 28.

Annotations

 Cross references: For provisions relating to limitations on attorney fees in class action litigation against public entities under the "Colorado Governmental Immunity Act", see § 24-10-114.5.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Where attorneys' right to fee award out of common fund established in class action vested before the enactment of this section, the state constitution prohibits the retrospective application of this section to defeat class counsel's right to the court-ordered fee. Kuhn v. State, 924 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 1996).

 This section does not violate the equal protection guarantees of the U.S. or Colorado Constitutions because it is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of protecting class members' recovery for unlawful governmental action. A statute does not necessarily violate the equal protection guarantee because its classifications are imperfect. Buckley Powder Co. v. Colo., 70 P.3d 547 (Colo. App. 2002).

 This section does not deny equal access to the courts. Aggrieved individuals may sue as individuals or as a class; therefore, the statutory cap does not place an unreasonable burden on class claimants. Buckley Powder Co. v. Colo., 70 P.3d 547 (Colo. App. 2002).

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PART 3
RETENTION OF ATTORNEYS BY GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES -
LIMITATION ON CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACTS

13-17-301. Short title.

Statute text

This part 3 shall be known and may be cited as the "Government Attorney Ethics Act".

History

 Source: L. 2003: Entire part added, p. 924, § 1, effective August 6.

13-17-302. Legislative declaration.

Statute text

(1) The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and declares that:

(a) In recent years, it has become increasingly common for governmental entities to retain attorneys pursuant to contingent fee contracts and disputes have arisen in several states regarding the amount and propriety of contingent fees;

(b) Contingent fees are intended to enable persons of modest means to obtain legal representation that they might not otherwise be able to afford but governmental entities have resources that are unavailable to individual citizens;

(c) Governmental entities should be required to fully consider the costs and risks of litigation before retaining an attorney pursuant to a contingent fee contract;

(d) The department of law ordinarily represents the interests of the state of Colorado;

(e) Governmental officials, including attorneys who represent governmental entities on a contractual basis, are entrusted to protect the health, safety, and well-being of citizens and it is the policy of the state that a person who exercises authority on behalf of a governmental entity generally should not have a personal financial stake in the outcome of litigation initiated on behalf of the governmental entity;

(f) A contingent fee contract that gives an attorney who is retained to represent a governmental entity a direct personal stake in the outcome of legal proceedings is potentially unfair to the citizens or businesses against whom the governmental entity has filed suit and may not serve the best interests of the citizens or businesses on whose behalf the governmental entity initiates legal proceedings;

(g) Because contingent fee contracts do not require the appropriation of moneys, such contracts circumvent the system of checks and balances that ordinarily provides accountability for decisions of governmental entities and it is appropriate to limit contingent fee contracts to ensure that the decision-making process is protected;

(h) A contingent fee contract may result in the payment of excessive attorney fees by a governmental entity, thereby denying citizens represented by government the full measure of justice awarded by the courts;

(i) It is in the best interest of the people of Colorado to limit the circumstances in which governmental entities may retain private attorneys pursuant to contingent fee contracts.

History

 Source: L. 2003: Entire part added, p. 924, § 1, effective August 6.

13-17-303. Definitions.

Statute text

As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:

(1) "Contingent fee" means a fee for legal services that is contingent in whole or in part upon the successful outcome of the matter for which the legal services were retained.

(2) "Contingent fee contract" or "contract" means a contract for legal services in which the amount of the fee to be paid for the legal services depends in whole or in part upon the successful outcome of the matter for which the services were obtained. The term also includes any contract that specifies that fees for legal services will be determined by a court or an arbitrator or any provision of a settlement agreement that requires the opposing party to pay fees for legal services directly to a private attorney retained by a governmental entity pursuant to a contingent fee contract.

(3) "Governmental entity" means the state, any department or agency of the state, and any state-sponsored institution of higher education.

History

 Source: L. 2003: Entire part added, p. 925, § 1, effective August 6.

13-17-304. Limitation on contingent fees - applicability.

Statute text

(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (2) and (3) of this section, and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a contingent fee contract between a governmental entity and a private attorney shall:

(I) Require the private attorney to maintain and provide to the governmental entity on a monthly basis a contemporaneous record of the hours of legal services provided by individual attorneys, the nature of such services, and any court costs incurred during each month and in the aggregate from the effective date of the contingent fee contract;

(II) Require the private attorney, upon the successful resolution of the matter for which the private attorney was retained, to provide to the governmental entity a statement of the hours of legal services provided by attorneys, the nature of such services, the amount of court costs incurred, the total amount of the contingent fee, and the average hourly rate for legal services provided by attorneys; and

(III) Specify an alternative hourly rate, not to exceed one thousand dollars per hour, at which the attorney shall be compensated in the event that the statement provided by the attorney indicates an average hourly rate for legal services provided by attorneys of more than one thousand dollars per hour.

(b) The average hourly rate for legal services provided by attorneys shall be determined by dividing the amount of the contingent fee, less the amount of court costs incurred if said amount is part of the contingent fee, by the number of hours of legal services provided by attorneys. Clerical work, including but not limited to transcription, photocopying, and document filing and organization, shall not be considered legal services provided by attorneys even if an attorney performs such work.

(2) The limitations and requirements of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to any contingent fee contract entered into by a governmental entity prior to August 6, 2003.

(3) The limitations and requirements of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to any contingent fee contract entered into by a governmental entity if the contract is for legal services performed by an attorney in connection with the collection of debts or taxes owed to a governmental entity and was entered into pursuant to section 23-3.1-104 (1) (f) or (2) (i), 23-5-113 (1), 24-30-202.4, or 39-21-114, C.R.S., or any other statutory provision that expressly authorizes or requires the payment of a portion of the moneys collected to an attorney retained to collect such debts or taxes.

(4) Compliance with this part 3 does not relieve a contracting attorney of any obligation or legal responsibility imposed by the Colorado rules of professional conduct or any provision of law.

History

 Source: L. 2003: Entire part added, p. 926, § 1, effective August 6.

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ARTICLE 17.5
COSTS - ATTORNEY FEES -
INMATE LAWSUITS


Section

13-17.5-101. Legislative declaration.

13-17.5-102. Definitions.

13-17.5-102.3. Exhaustion of remedies.

13-17.5-102.7. Successive claims.

13-17.5-103. Filing fees.

13-17.5-104. Stay of state judicial proceedings.

13-17.5-105. Proceedings before magistrate.

13-17.5-106. Assessment of costs and attorney fees - review of inmate spending from account - recovery of costs from inmate accounts - alternative sanctions - continuing garnishment authorized.

13-17.5-106.5. Court-ordered payment.

13-17.5-107. Construction of article - severability.

13-17.5-108. Teleconferenced hearings.

13-17.5-101. Legislative declaration.

Statute text

(1) The general assembly declares that the state has a strong interest in limiting substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious inmate lawsuits that impose an undue burden on the state judicial system. While recognizing an inmate's right to access the courts for relief from unlawful state actions, the general assembly finds that a significant number of inmates file substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious lawsuits.

(2) The general assembly, therefore, determines that it is necessary to enact legislation that promotes efficiency in the disposition of inmate lawsuits by providing for preliminary matters to be determined by magistrates and to provide for sanctions against inmates who are allowed to file claims against public defendants and whose claims are dismissed as frivolous.

History

 Source: L. 95: Entire article added, p. 478, § 1, effective July 1.

13-17.5-102. Definitions.

Statute text

As used in this article only:

(1) "Civil action" means the filing of a complaint, petition, writ, or motion with any court within the state, including any appellate court; except that "civil action" does not include any criminal action or an action for habeas corpus under article 45 of this title.

(1.5) "Detaining facility" means any state correctional facility, as defined in section 17-1-102 (1.7), C.R.S., including the youthful offender system, any private correctional facility housing state prisoners pursuant to part 2 of article 1 of title 17, C.R.S., any local jail, as defined in section 16-11-308.5 (1.5), C.R.S., or any community corrections program, established in article 27 of title 17, C.R.S. A detaining facility shall not include any juvenile detention facility that detains only juveniles.

(2) "Inmate" means a person who is sentenced or is awaiting sentencing to any detaining facility.

(3) "Public defendant" means any state, county, or municipal agency, any state, county, or municipal official or employee acting within the scope of his or her authority, or any agent acting on behalf of any state, county, or municipal agency.

History

 Source: L. 95: Entire article added, p. 478, § 1, effective July 1. L. 98: (1) amended and (1.5) added, p. 246, § 1, effective April 13.

13-17.5-102.3. Exhaustion of remedies.

Statute text

(1) No inmate shall bring a civil action based upon prison conditions under any statute or constitutional provision until all available administrative remedies have been exhausted in a timely fashion by the entity operating the detaining facility and inmate. For purposes of this subsection (1), an inmate shall be considered to have exhausted all available administrative remedies when the inmate has completed the last step in the inmate grievance process as set forth in the regulations promulgated by the entity operating the detaining facility. Failure to allege in the civil action that all available administrative remedies have been exhausted in accordance with this subsection (1) shall result in dismissal of the civil action.

(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, if a court finds that a claim filed by an inmate is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from monetary relief, a court may dismiss the claim without first requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies.

History

 Source: L. 98: Entire section added, p. 247, § 2, effective April 13. L. 2001: (1) amended, p. 289, § 1, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 This section requires an inmate to exhaust the last step in the inmate grievance process before proceeding to court. Glover v. State, 129 P.3d 1083 (Colo. App. 2005).

 However, section does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies before bringing a civil action based on prison conditions when the action consists only of claims brought under the common law. Adams v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 187 P.3d 1190 (Colo. App. 2008).

 Section neither precludes plaintiffs from bringing an action in common law nor bars them from subsequently renewing a request for punitive damages if the prerequisites for such a request are met. Adams v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 187 P.3d 1190 (Colo. App. 2008).

 Subsection (1) requires dismissal of the action for failure to allege the exhaustion of all administrative remedies, even if the relief sought may not be available through the administrative process. Glover v. State, 129 P.3d 1083 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Applied in Graham v. Maketa, 227 P.3d 516 (Colo. App. 2010).

13-17.5-102.7. Successive claims.

Statute text

(1) No inmate who on three or more occasions has brought a civil action based upon prison conditions that has been dismissed on the grounds that it was frivolous, groundless, or malicious or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or sought monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, shall be permitted to proceed as a poor person in a civil action based upon prison conditions under any statute or constitutional provision.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, an inmate may proceed as a poor person in a civil action if the judge finds that the action alleges sufficient facts which, if assumed to be true, would demonstrate that the inmate is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.

(3) (a) A copy of any court order that dismisses an inmate's civil action on the grounds that it is frivolous, groundless, or malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief shall be mailed by the court clerk to the Colorado attorney general, whether or not the attorney general entered an appearance in the civil action, and whether or not the civil action involved a state correctional facility or state defendant. The attorney general shall monitor the dismissals described in this paragraph (a).

(b) The attorney general shall inform the state judicial department or the chief judge of each judicial district whenever the attorney general becomes aware that an inmate has been assessed three or more dismissals as described in paragraph (a) of this subsection (3). Each judicial district shall maintain a registry of such information. An inmate listed in the registry who brings a civil action shall be subject to the provisions of subsections (1) and (2) of this section.

History

 Source: L. 98: Entire section added, p. 247, § 2, effective April 13. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 289, § 2, effective July 1.

13-17.5-103. Filing fees.

Statute text

(1) An inmate who seeks to proceed in any civil action without prepayment of fees, in addition to filing any required affidavit, shall submit a copy of the inmate's account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the civil action, certified by an appropriate official at the detaining facility. If the inmate account demonstrates that the inmate has sufficient funds to pay the filing fee, or if the action on its face is frivolous, groundless, or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief, the motion to proceed as a poor person shall be denied.

(2) Any inmate who is allowed to proceed in the civil action as a poor person shall be required to pay the full amount of the filing fee and service of process fees previously paid by the court in the following installments:

(a) If the inmate has ten dollars or more in his or her inmate account, make an initial partial payment in accordance with the order of the court; and

(b) Regardless if the inmate has ten dollars in his or her inmate account at the time of the filing of the civil action, make continuing monthly payments to the court equal to twenty percent of the preceding month's deposits in the inmate's account until the filing fee and service of process fees previously paid by the court are paid in full.

(2.5) The court shall include in its order granting permission to proceed as a poor person the requirement that the inmate comply with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section.

(2.7) A copy of any order granting an inmate's motion to proceed in a civil action as a poor person shall be forwarded by the court to the detaining facility that has custody of the inmate. Upon receipt of the order, the detaining facility shall forward payments from the inmate's account to the court in accordance with the order granting leave to proceed as a poor person.

(3) In no event shall an inmate be prohibited from filing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment because the inmate has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial payment.

History

 Source: L. 95: Entire article added, p. 479, § 1, effective July 1. L. 98: Entire section amended, p. 248, § 4, effective April 13. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 290, § 3, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 Statutory section not void for vagueness since there are no words or phrases in this section that are not readily comprehensible to persons of ordinary intelligence without further definition. Collins v. Jaquez, 15 P.3d 299 (Colo. App. 2000).

 Nor does statutory section violate inmate's right to have access to the courts, since inmate has opportunity to demonstrate insufficient funds to pay filing fees in order to be permitted access to the courts without incurring those fees. Collins v. Jaquez, 15 P.3d 299 (Colo. App. 2000).

 In addition, section does not violate constitutional rights to due process or equal protection under a rational basis test. Collins v. Jaquez, 15 P.3d 299 (Colo. App. 2000).

 Being granted the ability to proceed as a poor person under this section, without prepayment of fees, does not relieve an inmate from liability for the filing fee. Indigent inmates are not excused from paying the filing fee. The payment of the fee is merely placed on an installment schedule. Schwartz v. Owens, 134 P.3d 455 (Colo. App. 2005).

 Trial court was required to give copies of summons and complaint to sheriff for service of process, unless the court concluded that the claims were frivolous or filed in bad faith. It was improper for the trial court to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute. Edmond v. City of Colo. Springs, 226 P.3d 1248 (Colo. App. 2010).

 Applied in Harrison v. Wilson, 998 P.2d 1110 (Colo. App. 2000).

13-17.5-104. Stay of state judicial proceedings.

Statute text

If the court determines, during the course of a state civil action by an inmate against any public defendant, that a federal civil action or grievance procedure is pending that involves the inmate and any of the same issues raised in the state civil action, the court shall stay the state civil action until the federal civil action or the grievance procedure is completed and all rights of appeal have been exhausted.

History

 Source: L. 95: Entire article added, p. 479, § 1, effective July 1.

13-17.5-105. Proceedings before magistrate.

Statute text

As provided by sections 13-5-201 and 13-6-501, district and county court magistrates may preside over inmate motions filed pursuant to section 13-16-103 and motions filed pursuant to the Colorado rules of civil procedure to dispose of the inmate's action without the necessity of trial.

History

 Source: L. 95: Entire article added, p. 479, § 1, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations

 A magistrate may, without the consent of the parties, act upon an inmate's in forma pauperis request and dispose of the case in accordance with its ruling thereon. Therefore, it is appropriate for such action to be governed by C.R.M. 7(a), which sets out procedures for review of a magistrate's orders and judgments that have been entered without consent of the parties. Bryan v. Neet, 85 P.3d 556 (Colo. App. 2003).

13-17.5-106. Assessment of costs and attorney fees - review of inmate spending from account - recovery of costs from inmate accounts - alternative sanctions - continuing garnishment authorized.

Statute text

(1) (a) In any action based upon prison conditions brought under any statute or constitutional provision, if attorney fees are recoverable pursuant to any state or federal statute, no attorney fees shall be awarded to an inmate, except to the extent that:

(I) The fees were directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the inmate's rights protected by the constitution or statute; and

(II) (A) The amount of the fees is proportionately related to the court-ordered relief for the violation; or

(B) The fees were directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.

(b) No award of attorney fees under paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) shall be based on an hourly rate in excess of one hundred fifty percent of the hourly rate paid to court-appointed counsel in the district in which the action was filed.

(c) Whenever a separate monetary judgment is awarded in an action in which attorney fees are awarded under paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), a portion of the judgment not to exceed twenty-five percent shall be applied to reduce the amount of attorney fees awarded against the defendant.

(d) Nothing in this subsection (1) shall prohibit an inmate from entering into an agreement to pay an attorney fee in excess of the amount authorized in this subsection (1), if the fee is paid by the individual rather than by a defendant.

(2) The court may also enter judgment against an inmate who has been allowed to proceed as a poor person pursuant to section 13-16-103 for the amount of court costs and fees that the inmate would have incurred except for the provisions of that section, if the court awards attorney fees pursuant to subsection (1) of this section. The judgment entered by the court shall be collected and applied in accordance with subsection (3) of this section.

(3) If judgment for costs and attorney fees is awarded to a public defendant or to the court, pursuant to subsection (1) or (2) of this section, the court, pursuant to section 13-54.5-102, shall issue a writ of continuing garnishment of the inmate's account with the detaining facility, which garnishment shall continue until the judgment is paid in full, notwithstanding the requirement set forth in section 13-54.5-103 that the garnishment be renewed.

History

 Source: L. 95: Entire article added, p. 479, § 1, effective July 1. L. 98: (1) amended, p. 247, § 3, effective April 13.

13-17.5-106.5. Court-ordered payment.

Statute text

Any compensatory damages awarded to an inmate in connection with a civil action brought against any federal, state, or local jail, prison, or facility or against any official or agent of a jail, prison, or facility, after deduction for any award of attorney fees pursuant to section 13-17.5-106 (1) (c), shall be paid directly to satisfy any outstanding court-ordered payments pending against the inmate, including but not limited to restitution or child support. The remainder of the award after full payment of all pending court orders shall be forwarded to the inmate.

History

 Source: L. 98: Entire section added, p. 247, § 2, effective April 13.

13-17.5-107. Construction of article - severability.

Statute text

Nothing in this article shall be construed to impede an inmate's constitutional right of access to the courts. If any provision of this section or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid or unconstitutional, such invalidity or unconstitutionality shall not affect other provisions or applications of this section which can be given effect without the invalid or unconstitutional provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this section are declared to be severable.

History

 Source: L. 95: Entire article added, p. 480, § 1, effective July 1.

13-17.5-108. Teleconferenced hearings.

Statute text

The department of law, the department of corrections, and the state judicial department shall cooperate to determine the cost of and actively pursue federal funding and contributions from any public or private entity for the purpose of developing, implementing, and maintaining a teleconferencing system for conducting proceedings in connection with state or federal civil actions filed by an inmate against a public defendant. On or before December 1, 1996, the state judicial department shall inform the judiciary committees of the general assembly of the progress made in pursuing funds for the development of the system. On or before March 1, 1996, the state judicial department shall submit a detailed plan to implement the use of a teleconferencing system for all proceedings in which an inmate is a witness or a party.

History

 Source: L. 95: Entire article added, p. 480, § 1, effective July 1.

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DAMAGES

——————————

Regulation of Actions and Proceedings

——————————

ARTICLE 20
ACTIONS

Annotations

 Annotator's note. For a discussion of standing issues in a child's claim for loss of consortium in the death of a parent, an issue of first impression in Colorado, see Reighley v. International Playtex, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1078 (D. Colo. 1985).

Annotations

 Law reviews: For article, "Section 1983 Litigation in State Courts: A Review", see 18 Colo. Law. 27 (1989).


Section


PART 1 SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS 

13-20-101. What actions survive.

13-20-102. Effect of repeal.


PART 2 ACTIONS ABOLISHED - MARITAL 

13-20-201. Legislative declaration.

13-20-202. Civil causes abolished.

13-20-203. Breach of contract to marry not actionable.

13-20-204. Certain contracts made in settlement of claims void.

13-20-205. Unlawful to file pleading.

13-20-206. Unlawful to name corespondent.

13-20-207. Corespondent not to be disclosed - cross-examination - effect.

13-20-208. Penalty for violations.


PART 3 INFORMED CONSENT TO
 MEDICAL PROCEDURES 

13-20-301 to 13-20-305. (Repealed)


PART 4 WRITTEN INFORMED CONSENT TO
 ELECTROCONVULSIVE TREATMENTS 

13-20-401. Definitions.

13-20-402. Physician to provide information for written informed consent.

13-20-403. Restrictions on electroconvulsive treatment - rights of minors.


PART 5 ACTIONS AGAINST ARCHITECTS,
 ENGINEERS, AND
 LAND SURVEYORS 

13-20-501. (Repealed)


PART 6 ACTIONS AGAINST LICENSED
 PROFESSIONALS 

13-20-601. Legislative declaration.

13-20-602. Actions against licensed professionals and acupuncturists - certificate of review required.


PART 7 ACTIONS BASED ON
 ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 

13-20-701. Legislative declaration.

13-20-702. Definitions.

13-20-703. Environmental third-party liability - ownership.


PART 8 CONSTRUCTION DEFECT ACTIONS FOR PROPERTY LOSS AND DAMAGE 

13-20-801. Short title.

13-20-802. Legislative declaration.

13-20-802.5. Definitions.

13-20-803. List of defects required.

13-20-803.5. Notice of claim process.

13-20-804. Restriction on construction defect negligence claims.

13-20-805. Tolling of statutes of limitation.

13-20-806. Limitation of damages.

13-20-807. Express warranty - not affected.

13-20-808. Insurance policies issued to construction professionals.


PART 9 CLASS ACTIONS 

13-20-901. Class actions - appellate review.


PART 10 INJURIES OCCURRING OUT OF STATE 

13-20-1001. Short title.

13-20-1002. Legislative declaration.

13-20-1003. Definitions.

13-20-1004. Forum non conveniens.

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PART 1
SURVIVAL OF ACTIONS

13-20-101. What actions survive.

Statute text

(1) All causes of action, except actions for slander or libel, shall survive and may be brought or continued notwithstanding the death of the person in favor of or against whom such action has accrued, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged after the death of the person against whom such punitive damages or penalties are claimed; and, in tort actions based upon personal injury, the damages recoverable after the death of the person in whose favor such action has accrued shall be limited to loss of earnings and expenses sustained or incurred prior to death and shall not include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement, nor prospective profits or earnings after date of death. An action under this section shall not preclude an action for wrongful death under part 2 of article 21 of this title.

(2) Any action under this section may be brought or the court on motion may allow the action to be continued by or against the personal representative of the deceased. Such action shall be deemed a continuing one and to have accrued to or against such personal representative at the time it would have accrued to or against the deceased if he had survived. If such action is continued against the personal representative of the deceased, a notice shall be served on him as in cases of original process, but no judgment shall be collectible against a deceased person's estate or personal representative unless a claim, for the amount of such judgment as may be recovered in such continuing action, has been presented within the time and in the manner required for other claims against an estate.

History

 Source: L. 73: p. 1646, § 5. C.R.S. 1963: § 41-5-1. L. 75: (2) amended, p. 587, § 4, effective July 1.

Annotations


ANNOTATION

Annotations


Analysis


I. General Consideration.
II. Damages.

I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.

 Law reviews. For article, "The Survival of Actions in Colorado", see 12 Dicta 45 (1934). For note, "The Effect of the Wrongdoer's Death Upon an Action for Wrongful Death", see 22 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 99 (1949). For article, "Family Law, Probate Law, and Constitutional Law", see 31 Dicta 471 (1954). For article, "Highlights of the 1955 Colorado Legislative Session -- Wills and Decendents' Estates", see 28 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 83 (1955). For comment on Kling v. Phayer, appearing below, see 29 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 245 (1955). For comment on Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, appearing below, see 36 Dicta 371 (1959). For article, "One Year Review of Wills, Estates and Trusts", see 38 Dicta 115 (1960). For note, "Wrongful Death in Colorado", see 33 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 393 (1961). For review, "Right-to-Die Damage Actions: Developments in the Law", see 65 Den. U. L. Rev. 181 (1988). For article, "Claims Against Decedents' Estates", see 27 Colo. Law. 45 (May 1998).

 Actions of law generally do not die with the person. Publix Cab Co. v. Colo. Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 338 P.2d 702 (1959); Olmstead v. Allstate Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Colo. 1971).

 Those mentioned in this section do die with the person. All actions in law whatsoever shall survive except those specifically mentioned in the exceptions contained in the statute. Kling v. Phayer, 130 Colo. 158, 274 P.2d 97 (1954); People in Interest of M.E.W.F., 42 Colo. App. 495, 600 P.2d 108 (1979).

 It prevents abatement of actions and causes of action. The so-called survival statute is to prevent certain actions or causes of action already accrued from abating by reason of the death of either of the parties. Micheletti v. Moidel, 94 Colo. 587, 32 P.2d 266 (1934); Brown v. Stookey, 134 Colo. 11, 298 P.2d 955 (1956); Espinoza v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455 (Colo. 1981), appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 456 U.S. 430, 102 S. Ct. 1865, 72 L. Ed.2d 237 (1982).

 Claims of plaintiffs and defendants. It is inconsistent that one rule should be adopted in determining the survivability of a claim as to a plaintiff and apply an opposite rule as to the defendant. Brown v. Stookey, 134 Colo. 11, 298 P.2d 955 (1956).

 The coincidence of death of both parties is immaterial. Since the medieval notion that tort actions are punitive has long been abandoned, the wrongdoer's death should not end liability, and his distributees should be made to satisfy claims against him. Since conversely, compensation is the purpose of modern tort recovery, it should accrue not only to a living person but also to his estate. On this analysis, the coincidence of the deaths of both parties is immaterial. Kling v. Phayer, 130 Colo. 158, 274 P.2d 97 (1954).

 A right to damages under this section survives. Nemer v. Anderson, 151 Colo. 411, 378 P.2d 841 (1963).

 This section was intended to create remedies. This section's form indicates an intention to create remedies rather than to kill or suppress them. Publix Cab Co. v. Colo. Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 338 P.2d 702 (1959).

 This section modifies common law. This section was intended to modify the common law and to declare that all actions survive except those excluded. Publix Cab Co. v. Colo. Nat'l Bank, 139 Colo. 205, 338 P.2d 702 (1959).

 Section to be strictly construed. Since at common law there was no survival of personal injury actions, this section is in derogation of the common law and thus must be strictly construed. Estate of Burron v. Edwards, 42 Colo. App. 141, 594 P.2d 1064 (1979).