* Regulations promulgated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons broadly permit federal prisoners to receive publications from the "outside," but authorize prison officials to reject incoming publications found to be detrimental to institutional security.1 For 15 years, respondents, a class of inmates and certain publishers, have claimed that these regulations violate their First Amendment rights under the standard of review enunciated in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974).2 They mount a facial challenge to the regulations as well as a challenge to the regulations as applied to 46 specific publications excluded by the Bureau.

After a 10-day bench trial, the District Court refrained from adopting the Martinez standard. Instead, it favored an approach more deferential to the judgment of prison authorities and upheld the regulations without addressing the propriety of the 46 specific exclusions. App. to Pet. for Cert. 26a, 43a-47a. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, utilized the Martinez standard, found the regulations wanting, and remanded the case to the District Court for an individualized determination of the constitutionality of the 46 exclusions. Abbott v. Meese, 263 U.S.App.D.C. 186, 824 F.2d 1166 (1987).

Petitioners, officials of the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Prisons, sought certiorari. We granted the writ in order to determine the appropriate standard of review. Meese v. Abbott, 485 U.S. 1020, 108 S.Ct. 1572, 99 L.Ed.2d 888 (1988).

We now hold that the District Court correctly anticipated that the proper inquiry in this case is whether the regulations are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests," Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2262, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), and we conclude that under this standard the regulations are facially valid. We therefore disagree with the Court of Appeals on the issue of facial validity, but we agree with that court's remand of the case to the District Court for a determination of the validity of the regulations as applied to each of the 46 publications.

We are concerned primarily with the regulations set forth at 28 CFR §§ 540.70 and 540.71 (1988), first promulgated in 1979.3 These generally permit an inmate to subscribe to, or to receive, a publication without prior approval,4 but authorize the warden to reject a publication in certain circumstances. The warden may reject it "only if it is determined detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or if it might facilitate criminal activity." § 540.71(b). The warden, however, may not reject a publication "solely because its content is religious, philosophical, political, social or sexual, or because its content is unpopular or repugnant." Ibid. The regulations contain a nonexhaustive list of criteria which may support rejection of a publication.5 The warden is prohibited from establishing an excluded list of publications: each issue of a subscription publication is to be reviewed separately. § 540.71(c). The regulatory criteria for rejecting publications have been supplemented by Program Statement No. 5266.5, which provides further guidance on the subject of sexually explicit material.6

The regulations provide procedural safeguards for both the recipient and the sender. The warden may designate staff to screen and, where appropriate, to approve incoming publications, but only the warden may reject a publication. § 540.70(b). The warden must advise the inmate promptly in writing of the reasons for the rejection, § 540.71(d), and must provide the publisher or sender with a copy of the rejection letter, § 540.71(e). The notice must refer to "the specific article(s) or material(s) considered objectionable." § 540.71(d). The publisher or sender may obtain an independent review of the warden's rejection decision by a timely writing to the Regional Director of the Bureau. § 540.71(e). An inmate may appeal through the Bureau's Administrative Remedy Procedure. See §§ 542.10 to 542.16.7 The warden is instructed to permit the inmate to review the rejected material for the purpose of filing an appeal "unless such review may provide the inmate with information of a nature which is deemed to pose a threat or detriment to the security, good order or discipline of the institution or to encourage or instruct in criminal activity." § 540.71(d).8

There is little doubt that the kind of censorship just described would raise grave First Amendment concerns outside the prison context. It is equally certain that "[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution," Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S., at 84, 107 S.Ct., at 2259, nor do they bar free citizens from exercising their own constitutional rights by reaching out to those on the "inside," id., at 94-99, 107 S.Ct., at 2265; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). We have recognized, however, that these rights must be exercised with due regard for the "inordinately difficult undertaking" that is modern prison administration. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S., at 85, 107 S.Ct., at 2259.

In particular, we have been sensitive to the delicate balance that prison administrators must strike between the order and security of the internal prison environment and the legitimate demands of those on the "outside" who seek to enter that environment, in person or through the written word. Many categories of noninmates seek access to prisons. Access is essential to lawyers and legal assistants representing prisoner clients, see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), to journalists seeking information about prison conditions, see Pell v. Procunier, supra, and to families and friends of prisoners who seek to sustain relationships with them, see Procunier v. Martinez, supra. All these claims to prison access undoubtedly are legitimate; yet prison officials may well conclude that certain proposed interactions, though seemingly innocuous to laymen, have potentially significant implications for the order and security of the prison. Acknowledging the expertise of these officials and that the judiciary is "ill equipped" to deal with the difficult and delicate problems of prison management, this Court has afforded considerable deference to the determinations of prison administrators who, in the interest of security, regulate the relations between prisoners and the outside world. Id., at 404-405, 94 S.Ct., at 1807.

In this case, there is no question that publishers who wish to communicate with those who, through subscription, willingly seek their point of view have a legitimate First Amendment interest in access to prisoners. The question here, as it has been in our previous First Amendment cases in this area, is what standard of review this Court should apply to prison regulations limiting that access.

Martinez was our first significant decision regarding First Amendment rights in the prison context. There, the Court struck down California regulations concerning personal correspondence between inmates and noninmates, regulations that provided for censorship of letters that "unduly complain," "magnify grievances," or "expres[s] inflammatory political, racial, religious or other views or beliefs." Id., at 399, 94 S.Ct., at 1804. We reviewed these regulations under the following standard:

"First, the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. Prison officials . . . must show that a regulation authorizing mail censorship furthers one or more of the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation. Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved Thus a restriction on inmate correspondence that furthers an important or substantial interest of penal administration will nevertheless be invalid if its sweep is unnecessarily broad." Id., at 413-414, 94 S.Ct., at 1811.

It is clear from this language, however, that we did not deprive prison officials of the degree of discretion necessary to vindicate "the particular governmental interest involved." Accordingly, we said:

"Some latitude in anticipating the probable consequences of allowing certain speech in a prison environment is essential to the proper discharge of an administrator's duty. But any regulation or practice that restricts inmate correspondence must be generally necessary to protect one or more . . . legitimate governmental interests." Id., at 414, 94 S.Ct., at 1812.

The Court's subsequent decisions regarding First Amendment rights in the prison context, however, laid down a different standard of review from that articulated in Martinez. As recently explained in Turner, these later decisions, which we characterized as involving "prisoners' rights," adopted a standard of review that focuses on the reasonableness of prison regulations: the relevant inquiry is whether the actions of prison officials were "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." 482 U.S., at 89, 107 S.Ct., at 2261. The Court ruled that "such a standard is necessary if 'prison administrators . . ., and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.' " Ibid., quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S., at 128, 97 S.Ct., at 2539. The Court set forth in Turner the development of this reasonableness standard in the respective decisions in Pell and Jones and in Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984), and we need not repeat that discussion here.

The Court's decision to apply a reasonableness standard in these cases rather than Martinez' less deferential approach stemmed from its concern that language in Martinez might be too readily understood as establishing a standard of "strict" or "heightened" scrutiny, and that such a strict standard simply was not appropriate for consideration of regulations that are centrally concerned with the maintenance of order and security within prisons.9 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S., at 81, 87, 89, 107 S.Ct., at 2257, 2260, 2261. Specifically, the Court declined to apply the Martinez standard in "prisoners' rights" cases because, as was noted in Turner, Martinez could be (and had been) read to require a strict "least restrictive alternative" analysis, without sufficient sensitivity to the need for discretion in meeting legitimate prison needs. 482 U.S., at 89-90, 107 S.Ct., at 2262. The Court expressed concern that "every administrative judgment would be subject to the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude that it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand," id., at 89, 107 S.Ct., at 2262, and rejected the costs of a "least restrictive alternative" rule as too high. Id., at 90, 107 S.Ct., at 2262. See also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2405, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (refusing to apply a least restrictive alternative standard for regulation of prisoner work rules having an impact on religious observance).

We do not believe that Martinez should, or need, be read as subjecting the decisions of prison officials to a strict "least restrictive means" test. As noted, Martinez required no more than that a challenged regulation be "generally necessary" to a legitimate governmental interest. 416 U.S., at 414, 94 S.Ct., at 1812. Certainly, Martinez required a close fit between the challenged regulation and the interest it purported to serve. But a careful reading of Martinez suggests that our rejection of the regulation at issue resulted not from a least restrictive means requirement, but from our recognition that the regulated activity centrally at issue in that case—outgoing personal correspondence from prisoners—did not, by its very nature, pose a serious threat to prison order and security.10 We pointed out in Martinez that outgoing correspondence that magnifies grievances or contains inflammatory racial views cannot reasonably be expected to present a danger to the community inside the prison. Id., at 416, 94 S.Ct., at 1812. In addition, the implications for security are far more predictable. Dangerous outgoing correspondence is more likely to fall within readily identifiable categories: examples noted in Martinez include escape plans, plans relating to ongoing criminal activity, and threats of blackmail or extortion. Id., at 412-413, 94 S.Ct., at 1810-1811. Although we were careful in Martinez not to limit unduly the discretion of prison officials to reject even outgoing letters, we concluded that the regulations at issue were broader than "generally necessary" to protect the interests at stake. Id., at 414, 94 S.Ct., at 1812.11

In light of these considerations, it is understandable that the Court in Martinez concluded that the regulations there at issue swept too broadly. Where, as in Martinez, the nature of the asserted governmental interest is such as to require a lesser degree of case-by-case discretion, a closer fit between the regulation and the purpose it serves may safely be required. Categorically different considerations—considerations far more typical of the problems of prison administration—apply to the case presently before this Court.

We deal here with incoming publications, material requested by an individual inmate but targeted to a general audience. Once in the prison, material of this kind reasonably may be expected to circulate among prisoners, with the concomitant potential for coordinated disruptive conduct. Furthermore, prisoners may observe particular material in the possession of a fellow prisoner, draw inferences about their fellow's beliefs, sexual orientation, or gang affiliations from that material, and cause disorder by acting accordingly. See App. 22-23, 52, 59, 88; see generally Prisoners and the Law 3-14 I. Robbins (ed. 1988) (noting that possession of homosexually explicit material may identify the possessor as homosexual and target him for assault). As the Deputy Solicitor General noted at oral argument: "The problem is not . . . in the individual reading the materials in most cases. The problem is in the material getting into the prison." Tr. of Oral Arg. 10. See also id., at 26; App. 10. In the volatile prison environment, it is essential that prison officials be given broad discretion to prevent such disorder.

In Turner, we dealt with incoming personal correspondence from prisoners; the impact of the correspondence on the internal environment of the prison was of great concern. There, we recognized that Martinez was too readily understood as failing to afford prison officials sufficient discretion to protect prison security. In light of these same concerns, we now hold that regulations affecting the sending of a "publication" (see the regulations' specific definition of this word, n. 4, supra ) to a prisoner must be analyzed under the Turner reasonableness standard. Such regulations are "valid if [they are] reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner, 482 U.S., at 89, 107 S.Ct., at 2261.

Furthermore, we acknowledge today that the logic of our analyses in Martinez and Turner requires that Martinez be limited to regulations concerning outgoing correspondence. As we have observed, outgoing correspondence was the central focus of our opinion in Martinez. The implications of outgoing correspondence for prison security are of a categorically lesser magnitude than the implications of incoming materials. Any attempt to justify a similar categorical distinction between incoming correspondence from prisoners (to which we applied a reasonableness standard in Turner ) and incoming correspondence from nonprisoners would likely prove futile, and we do not invite it. To the extent that Martinez itself suggests such a distinction, we today overrule that case; the Court accomplished much of this step when it decided Turner.

In so doing, we recognize that it might have been possible to apply a reasonableness standard to all incoming materials without overruling Martinez: we instead could have made clear that Martinez does not uniformly require the application of a "least restrictive alternative" analysis. We choose not to go that route, however, for we prefer the express flexibility of the Turner reasonableness standard. We adopt the Turner standard in this case with confidence that, as petitioners here have asserted, "a reasonableness standard is not toothless." Pet. for Cert. 17, n. 10.

The Court in Turner identified several factors that are relevant to, and that serve to channel, the reasonableness inquiry.

The first Turner factor is multifold: we must determine whether the governmental objective underlying the regulations at issue is legitimate and neutral, and that the regulations are rationally related to that objective. We agree with the District Court that this requirement has been met.12

The legitimacy of the Government's purpose in promulgating these regulations is beyond question. The regulations are expressly aimed at protecting prison security, a purpose this Court has said is "central to all other corrections goals." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S., at 823, 94 S.Ct., at 2804.

As to neutrality, "[w]e have found it important to inquire whether prison regulations restricting inmates' First Amendment rights operated in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression." Turner, 482 U.S., at 90, 107 S.Ct., at 2262. The ban on all correspondence between certain classes of inmates at issue in Turner clearly met this "neutrality" criterion, as did the restrictions at issue in Pell and Wolfish. The issue, however, in this case is closer.

On their face, the regulations distinguish between rejection of a publication "solely because its content is religious, philosophical, political, social or sexual, or because its content is unpopular or repugnant" (prohibited) and rejection because the publication is detrimental to security (permitted). 28 CFR § 540.71(b) (1988). Both determinations turn, to some extent, on content. But the Court's reference to "neutrality" in Turner was intended to go no further than its requirement in Martinez that "the regulation or practice in question must further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression." 416 U.S., at 413, 94 S.Ct., at 1811.13 Where, as here, prison administrators draw distinctions between publications solely on the basis of their potentia implications for prison security, the regulations are "neutral" in the technical sense in which we meant and used that term in Turner.14

We also conclude that the broad discretion accorded prison wardens by the regulations here at issue is rationally related to security interests. We reach this conclusion for two reasons. The first has to do with the kind of security risk presented by incoming publications. This has been explored above in Part III. The District Court properly found that publications can present a security threat, and that a more closely tailored standard "could result in admission of publications which, even if they did not lead directly to violence, would exacerbate tensions and lead indirectly to disorder." App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a. Where the regulations at issue concern the entry of materials into the prison, we agree with the District Court that a regulation which gives prison authorities broad discretion is appropriate.

Second, we are comforted by the individualized nature of the determinations required by the regulation. Under the regulations, no publication may be excluded unless the warden himself makes the determination that it is "detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or . . . might facilitate criminal activity." 28 CFR §§ 540.70(b), 540.71(b) (1988). This is the controlling standard. A publication which fits within one of the "criteria" for exclusion may be rejected, but only if it is determined to meet that standard under the conditions prevailing at the institution at the time. Indeed, the regulations expressly reject certain shortcuts that would lead to needless exclusions. See § 540.70(b) (nondelegability of power to reject publications); § 540.71(c) (prohibition against establishing an excluded list of publications). We agree that it is rational for the Bureau to exclude materials that, although not necessarily "likely" to lead to violence, are determined by the warden to create an intolerable risk of disorder under the conditions of a particular prison at a particular time.15

A second factor the Court in Turner held to be "relevant in determining the reasonableness of a prison restriction . . . is whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates." 482 U.S., at 90, 107 S.Ct., at 2262. As has already been made clear in Turner and O'Lone, "the right" in question must be viewed sensibly and expansively. The Court in Turner did not require that prisoners be afforded other means of communicating with inmates at other institutions, 482 U.S., at 92, 107 S.Ct., at 2263, nor did it in O'Lone require that there be alternative means of attending the Jumu'ah religious ceremony, 482 U.S., at 351, 107 S.Ct., at 2405. Rather, it held in Turner that it was sufficient if other means of expression (not necessarily other means of communicating with inmates in other prisons) remained available, and in O'Lone if prisoners were permitted to participate in other Muslim religious ceremonies. As the regulations at issue in the present case permit a broad range of publications to be sent, received, and read, this factor is clearly satisfied.

The third factor to be addressed under the Turner analysis is the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on others (guards and inmates) in the prison. 482 U.S., at 90, 107 S.Ct., at 2262. Here, the class of publications to be excluded is limited to those found potentially detrimental to order and security; the likelihood that such material will circulate within the prison raises the prospect of precisely the kind of "ripple effect" with which the Court in Turner was concerned. Where, as here, the right in question "can be exercised only at the cost of significantly less liberty and safety for everyone else, guards and other prisoners alike," id., at 92, 107 S.Ct., at 2263, the courts should defer to the "informed discretion of corrections officials," id., at 90, 107 S.Ct., at 2262.

Finally, Turner held "[T]he existence of obvious, easy alternatives may be evidence that the regulation is not reasonable, but is an 'exaggerated response' to prison concerns. . . . But if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard." 482 U.S., at 90-91, 107 S.Ct., at 2262. We agree with the District Court that these regulations, on their face, are not an "exaggerated response" to the problem at hand: no obvious, easy alternative has been established.

Regarding the all-or-nothing rule, we analyze respondents' proposed alternatives to that rule as alternative means of accommodating respondents' asserted rights. The District Court discussed the evidence and found, on the basis of testimony in the record, that petitioners' fear that tearing out the rejected portions and admitting the rest of the publication would create more discontent than the current practice was "reasonably founded." App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. The Court of Appeals did not contest the District Court's factual finding as such, but ruled that upholding a practice merely because it is based upon "reasonably founded" fears is improper under Martinez: the Court of Appeals held that this finding "conflicts with the holding of Martinez that prison administrators have the burden of showing that a restrictive practice is 'generally necessary.' " 263 U.S.App.D.C., at 194, 824 F.2d, at 1174.

As we here do not apply the Martinez standard, we reject the Court of Appeals' sole ground for questioning the District Court's findings in this respect. In our view, when prison officials are able to demonstrate that they have rejected a less restrictive alternative because of reasonably founded fears that it will lead to greater harm, they succeed in demonstrating that the alternative they in fact selected was not an "exaggerated response" under Turner. Furthermore, the administrative inconvenience of this proposed alternative is also a factor to be considered and adds additional support to the District Court's conclusion that petitioners were not obligated to adopt it. See Wolfish, 441 U.S., at 549, 99 S.Ct., at 1879.

In sum, we hold that Turner § reasonableness standard is to be applied to the regulations at issue in this case, and that those regulations are facially valid under that standard. We agree with the remand for an examination of the validity of the regulations as applied to any of the 46 publications introduced at trial as to which there remains a live controversy. See 263 U.S.App.D.C., at 196, 824 F.2d, at 1176.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered. Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BRENNAN and Justice MARSHALL join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

An article in Labyrinth, a magazine published by the Committee for Prisoner Humanity & Justice, began as follows:

"In January 1975, William Lowe, a black prisoner at the

United States Penitentiary at Terre Haute, Indiana died of asthma. . . . In August 1975, Joseph (Yusef) Jones, Jr., a black prisoner at the U.S. Penitentiary, Terre Haute, IN. died of asthma.

". . . The prison infirmary at that time had only one respirator[,] known to be inoperative in January 1975 when William Lowe died. It was still broken in August 1975 when Joseph Jones needed it.

"On the day of his death Jones was suffering an acute asthma attack; he was gasping for breath in the stale, hot, humid air in the cell. He requested medical aid of the guards. After several hours of unheeded pleading, accompanied by complaints to the guards from fellow prisoners in the cell block, Jones became frantic. Each breath was painful; each breath brought him closer to suffocation. Finally, guards called the PA (physician's assistant) . . ., who brought with him the broken respirator. Finding the equipment unusable, the PA gave Jones an injection of the tranquilizer, thorazine, to calm him. Treatment with a tranquilizer was unquestionably contraindicated by Jones' medical condition. Twenty minutes later, Jones was dead.

* * * * *

"Conclusion: Jones, who was convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to 10 years in prison, was in fact, sentenced to death and was murdered by neglect."1

The incident described above eventually came to the attention of this Court, which allowed Jones' mother to pursue her civil rights action against prison officials. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). Clearly the Labyrinth article's report of inadequate medical treatment of federal prisoners raised "a matter that is both newsworthy and of great public importance." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830, n. 7, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2808, n. 7, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). As the Court concedes, ante, at 407, both publishers and recipients of such criticism ordinarily enjoy the fullest First Amendment protections.2 See Pell, supra, at 822, 94 S.Ct., at 2804; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-147, 63 S.Ct. 862, 865, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943).

Yet Labyrinth's efforts to disseminate the article to its subscribers at Marion Federal Penitentiary met Government resistance. Marion officials, acting within Federal Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) regulations,3 returned the magazine on the ground that "the article entitled 'Medical Murder' would be detrimental to the good order and discipline of this institution. . . . [T]his type of philosophy could guide inmates in this institution into situations which could cause themselves and other inmates problems with the Medical Staff." J.L. 12. Two years after publication a Marion official testified that he believed the article had posed no threat. App. 104. Nonetheless, the District Court below found the suppression of this and 45 other publications "reasonable," and thus sustained the rejections wholesale. App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a-34a, 47a. This Court holds today that such carte blanche deference was improper and remands for case-by-case review. I agree with this aspect of the Court's decision. I cannot agree, however, with either its holding that another finding of "reasonableness" will justify censorship or its premature approval of the Bureau's regulations. These latter determinations upset precedent in a headlong rush to strip inmates of all but a vestige of free communication with the world beyond the prison gate.4

* This Court first addressed the First Amendment in the prison context in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). Prior lower court treatments had varied: some courts had maintained "a hands-off posture," while others had required "demonstration of a 'compelling state interest' to justify censorship of prisoner mail." Id., at 406, 94 S.Ct., at 1808. With characteristic wisdom Justice Powell, in his opinion for the Court, rejected both extremes. The difficulties of prison administration, he perceived, make the strict scrutiny that the First Amendment demands in other contexts inappropriate.5 See, e.g., First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1421, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 2684, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) (per curiam ). Focusing not on the rights of prisoners, but on the "inextricably meshed" rights of nonprisoners "who have a particularized interest in communicating with them," he wrote that an "undemanding standard of review" could not be squared with the fact "that the First Amendment liberties of free citizens are implicated in censorship of prisoner mail." Martinez, supra, 416 U.S., at 408, 409, 94 S.Ct., at 1808, 1809. Thus he chose an "intermediate" means of evaluating speech restrictions, 416 U.S., at 407, 94 S.Ct., at 1808, allowing censorship if it "further[ed] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression," and "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms [was] no greater than [was] necessary or essential," id., at 413, 94 S.Ct., at 1811. "Prison officials may not censor inmate correspondence simply to eliminate unflattering or unwelcome opinions or factually inaccurate statements," Justice Powell stressed. Ibid. Censorship might be permitted, however, to ensure "the preservation of internal order and discipline, the maintenance of institutional security against escape or unauthorized entry, and the rehabilitation of the prisoners." Id., at 412, 94 S.Ct., at 1811 (footnote omitted). Prison administrators did not have "to show with certainty that adverse consequences would flow from the failure to censor a particular letter," but "any regulation or practice that restricts inmate correspondence must be generally necessary to protect one or more of the legitimate governmental interests identified above." Id., at 414, 94 S.Ct., at 1811-1812.6

In the 15 years since Martinez was decided, lower courts routinely have applied its standard to review limitations not only on correspondence between inmates and private citizens, but also on communications—such as the newsletters, magazines, and books at issue—between inmates and publishers.7 Carefully examining free speech rights and countervailing governmental interests, these courts approved some restrictions and invalidated others.8 This Court thus correctly recognizes that Martinez's standard of review does not deprive prison officials of the discretion necessary to perform their difficult tasks. Ante, at 409. Inexplicably, it then partially overrules Martinez by limiting its scope to outgoing mail; letters and publications sent to prisoners now are subject only to review for "reasonableness." Ante, at 413-414.

This peculiar bifurcation of the constitutional standard governing communications between inmates and outsiders is unjustified. The decision in Martinez was based on a distinction between prisoners' constitutional rights and the protection the First Amendment affords those who are not prisoners—not between nonprisoners who are senders and those who are receivers. As Justice Powell explained:

"Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. And this does not depend on whether the nonprisoner correspondent is the author or intended recipient of a particular letter, for the addressee as well as the sender of direct personal correspondence derives from the First and Fourteenth Amendments a protection against unjustified governmental interference with the intended communication. . . . The wife of a prison inmate who is not permitted to read all that her husband wanted to say to her has suffered an abridgment of her interest in communicating with him as plain as that which results from censorship of her letter to him." 416 U.S., at 408-409, 94 S.Ct., at 1809 (citations omitted).

The Court today abandons Martinez's fundamental premise. In my opinion its suggestion that three later opinions applying reasonableness standards warrant this departure, see ante, at 410, n. 9, is disingenuous. Those cases did involve communications between inmates and outsiders; however, as I shall demonstrate, their legal and factual foundations differed critically from those in Martinez or in this case.

In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974), inmates and reporters challenged regulations prohibiting face-to-face media interviews with specific prisoners. Id., at 819, 94 S.Ct., at 2802. The infringement on prisoners' rights, the Court held, was reasonable because prisoners could write letters to the media—a means of communication less disruptive than the physical entry of reporters into the prison. Id., at 824, 94 S.Ct., at 2805. The reporters' assertion of a special right of access could not prevail, the Court explained, because the First Amendment does not give the media greater access to public events or institutions—including prisons—than it gives ordinary citizens.9 Id., at 835, 94 S.Ct., at 2810. Pell in no way diluted the basic distinction articulated in Martinez.

Inmates in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977), had maintained that First Amendment associational rights protected their efforts to form a union. The Court concluded that the administrators' grounds for preventing union organizing within the prison—an activity occurring largely among inmates—ere reasonable. Id., at 129, 97 S.Ct., at 2539. It also approved the officials' refusal to deliver bulk packets of union literature to specific inmates for distribution to others. Applying Equal Protection Clause as well as First Amendment standards, the Court held that the restriction was reasonable because it was limited in scope and because the union retained "other avenues of outside informational flow. . . ." Id., at 131, 97 S.Ct., at 2540; see id., at 133, 136, 97 S.Ct., at 2541, 2543.

In the third case, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), the Court upheld a regulation that allowed only publishers, bookstores, and book clubs to mail hardbound books to pretrial detainees. Hardbacks might serve as containers for contraband, jail administrators argued. Since the risk of improper use by publishers and similar sources was low, the jail delivered books from them but not from other outsiders. Id., at 549, 99 S.Ct., at 1879. The Court found this explanation acceptable and held that the rule did not violate the detainees' First Amendment rights. Id., at 550, 99 S.Ct., at 1880. Although the Court did not expressly address the rights of nonprisoners, the fact that softcover publications were delivered without restriction, see id., at 552, 99 S.Ct., at 1881, minimized the abridgment of outsiders' rights. The approval in Wolfish of greater protection for publishers than for individual citizens reinforces Martinez's view that the First Amendment rights of nonprisoners must be carefully weighed and undermines the Court's approach today.

Most recently, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), confirmed the vitality of Martinez for evaluating encroachments on the First Amendment rights of nonprisoners. The Court relied on the three interim "prisoners' rights" cases to establish a reasonableness standard for reviewing inmate-to-inmate correspondence. Id., at 89, 107 S.Ct., at 2261. But in its unanimous invalidation of a restriction on inmate marriages, the Court acknowledged that "because the regulation may entail a 'consequential restriction on the [constitutional] rights of those who are not prisoners,' " Martinez might posit the correct level of review. 482 U.S., at 97, 107 S.Ct., at 2266 (quoting Martinez, 416 U.S., at 409, 94 S.Ct., at 1809). It did not "reach this question, however, because even under the reasonable relationship test, the marriage regulation does not withstand scrutiny."10 482 U.S., at 97, 107 S.Ct., at 2266.

The Turner opinion cited and quoted from Martinez more than 20 times; not once did it disapprove Martinez's holding, its standard, or its recognition of a special interest in protecting the First Amendment rights of those who are not prisoners. Notwithstanding, today the Court abandons the premise on which Martinez was grounded. This casual discarding of " 'the secure foundation' " of considered precedent ill serves the orderly development of the law. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190-191, 96 S.Ct. 2586, 2604, 49 L.Ed.2d 415 (1976) (STEVENS, J., concurring) (quoting B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921)).

In lieu of Martinez's rationale, which properly takes into consideration the effects that prison regulations have on the First Amendment rights of nonprisoners, the Court applies a manipulable "reasonableness" standard to a set of regulations that too easily may be interpreted to authorize arbitrary rejections of literature addressed to inmates. As I pointed out in my partial dissent in Turner, an

"open-ended 'reasonableness' standard makes it much too easy to uphold restrictions on prisoners' First Amendment rights on the basis of administrative concerns and speculation about possible security risks rather than on the basis of evidence that the restrictions are needed to further an important governmental interest." 482 U.S., at 101, n. 1, 107 S.Ct., at 2268, n. 1.

To be sure, courts must give prison administrators some berth to combat the "Herculean obstacles" blocking their efforts to maintain security and prevent escapes or other criminal conduct, see Martinez, 416 U.S., at 404, 94 S.Ct., at 1807 and I do not object to those regulations clearly targeted at such interests.11 Nevertheless, I agree with the Court of Appeals that provisions allowing prison officials to reject a publication if they find its contents are "detrimental" to "security, good order, or discipline" or "might facilitate criminal activity" are impermissibly ambiguous. See Abbott v. Meese, 263 U.S.App.D.C. 186, 193, 824 F.2d 1166, 1173 (1987). The term "detrimental" invites so many interpretations that it scarcely checks administrators' actions. Similarly, "might facilitate"—in contrast with "encourage" or "advocate"—so attenuates the causal connection between expression and proscribed conduct that the warden has virtually free rein to censor incoming publications.

Despite this vagueness, the Court accepts petitioners' assertion that they need "broad discretion" to prevent internal disorder, and thus holds that all the regulations are facially valid. See ante, at 416. This premature leap of faith creates a presumption that rejections pursuant to these regulations are "reasonable"—a presumption that makes likely far less judicial protection of publishers' rights than I believe the First Amendment requires. As was Justice BLACKMUN in Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 593, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3236, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984) (concurring in judgment), I am concerned that the Court today too readily "substitute[s] the rhetoric of judicial deference for meaningful scrutiny of constitutional claims in the prison setting." Cf. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 358, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 2409, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Jones, 433 U.S., at 142-143, 97 S.Ct., at 2546 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting).

The feeble protection provided by a "reasonableness" standard applied within the framework of these regulations is apparent in this record.12 Like the Labyrinth issue, many of the 46 rejected publications criticized prison conditions or otherwise presented viewpoints that prison administrators likely would not welcome.13 Testimony by one mail clerk14 and the rote explanations for decisions15 suggest that rejections were based on personal prejudices or categorical assumptions rather than individual assessments of risk. Cf. Martinez, 416 U.S., at 415, 94 S.Ct., at 1812. These circumstances belie the Court's interpretation of these regulations as "content-neutral" and its assertion that rejection decisions are made individually. See ante, at 414-417. Some of the rejected publications may represent the sole medium for conveying and receiving a particular unconventional message; thus it is irrelevant that the regulations permit many other publications to be delivered to prisoners. See ante, at 417-418. No evidence supports the Court's assumption that, unlike personal letters, these publications will circulate within the prison and cause ripples of disruption.16 See ante, at 412, 418. Nor is th re any evidence that an incoming publication ever caused a disciplinary or security problem; indeed, some of the rejected publications were delivered to inmates in other prisons without incident. See App. 60, 99, 116-117. In sum, the record convinces me that under either the Martinez standard or the more deferential "reasonableness" standard these regulations are an impermissibly exaggerated response to security concerns. Cf. Turner, 482 U.S., at 89-90, 107 S.Ct., at 2261-2262.

If a prison official deems part of a publication's content even just one page of a book—to present an intolerable security risk, the Bureau's regulations authorize the official to return the entire issue to the publisher. See 28 CFR § 540.71(e) (1988). In their challenge to this all-or-nothing rule, respondents argue that First Amendment interests easily could be accommodated if administrators omitted the objectionable material and forwarded the rest of the publication to the inmate. The District Court, however, found that "defendants' fears" that "such censorship would create more discontent than the current practice" were "reasonably founded." App. to Pet. for Cert. 34a. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals applied the Martinez standard and held that "rejection of the balance is not 'generally necessary' to protect the legitimate governmental interest involved in the portion properly rejected." 263 U.S.App.D.C., at 193-194, 824 F.2d, at 1173-1174.

In this Court petitioners argue that on remand the Court of Appeals should conduct "a detailed analysis of the evidence in this case" to determine if the all-or-nothing rule is "reasonable." Brief for Petitioners 31. "The validity of that policy," they continue, "will depend, among other things, on the security and administrative justifications for that policy, the availability of alternative courses of action, and the costs and risks associated with employing those alternatives." Ibid. It is remarkable that after 16 years of litigation petitioners have failed to develop an argument that tells us anything about the assumed security or administrative justification for this rule. Even more remarkable is the Court's conclusion that since it does not apply the Martinez standard, it need not examine the appropriateness of the District Court's finding that the rule was reasonable. See ante, at 419. A review of the record reveals that the Court thus defers to "findings" of a security threat that even prison officials admitted to be nonexistent.

There is no evidence that delivery of only part of a publication would endanger prison security.17 Rather, the primary justification advanced for the all-or-nothing rule was administrative convenience. See App. 41, 68. The Bureau has objected that a contrary rule "would mean defacing the material and laboriously going over each article in each publication. . . ." 44 Fed.Reg. 38258 (1979). But general speculation that some administrative burden might ensue should not be sufficient to justify a meat-ax abridgment of the First Amendment rights of either a free citizen or a prison inmate. It is difficult even to imagine such a burden in this instance: if, as the regulations' text seems to require, prison officials actually read an article before rejecting it, the incremental burden associated with clipping out the offending matter could not be of constitutional significance. The Bureau's administrative convenience justification thus is insufficient as a matter of law under either the Martinez standard or a "reasonableness" standard. The District Court's contradictory finding simply highlights the likelihood that an attitude of broad judicial deference, coupled with a "reasonableness" standard, will provide inadequate protection for the rights at stake.18

For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.