Respondent Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company (C & P) was required to relocate some of its telephone transmission facilities by reason of a street realignment. It sought compensation from petitioner Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Authority (NRHA), the local government agency responsible for the urban renewal plan which caused the street realignment. C & P claimed that it was a "displaced person" as that term is defined in the Uniform Relocation Act,1 passed by Congress in 1970. We hold that C & P is not a "displaced person" within the meaning of the Act.

The Relocation Act provides that any person "displaced" from his home or place of business by a federal or federally-funded project is entitled to relocation benefits, including reimbursement for the "actual reasonable expenses in moving himself, his family, business, farm operation, or other personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 4622(a)(1). The Act by its terms binds only federal agencies; but a federal agency may not provide funds for state projects involving condemnation without first receiving "satisfactory assurances" that displaced persons will be given such relocation payments and assistance "as are required to be provided by a Federal agency" under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 4630. In order to qualify for federal funds, therefore, many states, such as Virginia, see Va.Code § 25-235 et seq. (repl.1980), have adopted legislation modelled on the Relocation Act.

NRHA is a political subdivision of the state of Virginia, located in the City of Norfolk. During the 1960's, NRHA began four redevelopment projects in Norfolk for which federal funds were provided under the urban renewal program contained in Title I of the Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. (and Supp.IV) § 1450et seq.2 The development plans approved by the City and carried out by NRHA required the reshaping of certain land parcels, which in turn required a realignment of street patterns. After acquiring the land on both sides of the streets in question, NRHA successfully petitioned the City to close off those streets or parts thereof. Stipulations of Fact 5-6, App. 39-41. New streets were constructed in accordance with the development plans.

C & P is a privately-owned utility company engaged in the business of selling telephone and other telecommunication services in the city of Norfolk and throughout Virginia. To serve its customers, C & P had placed telephone transmission facilities, including manholes, conduits, cables and accessory fittings, within the public rights-of-way of certain streets throughout Norfolk, including streets within the urban renewal project areas.3 When the streets were realigned, C & P was forced to relocate some of its facilities. The manholes and conduits, too massive to move, were simply abandoned in place. The telephone cables were withdrawn and, for the most part, sold for their scrap value, though some cable was stored for possible reuse. Tr. 41 (testimony of Mr. Tucker), App. 100-101. Substitute facilities were installed beneath the new streets to prevent any interruption in service.

C & P sought reimbursement from NRHA for the expenses it incurred in this relocation, claiming that it was a "displaced person" within the meaning of the Relocation Act.4 After a series of administrative rejections, C & P sued NRHA in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.5 The District Court denied relief to C & P, but on appeal its decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, 674 F.2d 298, for the Fourth Circuit. That court held that the definitional provisions of the Relocation Act compelled the conclusion that a utility was not excluded from the definition of "displaced person" under the Act, and that C & P was entitled to compensation as a "displaced person" for the sort of expenses incurred here.

We granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals. --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. ----, 77 L.Ed.2d --- (1983). We now reverse. Our analysis of the statute and its legislative history convinces us that in passing the Relocation Act Congress addressed the needs of residential and business tenants and owners, and did not deal with the separate problem posed by the relocation of utility service lines. We hold, therefore, that the Relocation Act did not change the long-established common law principle that a utility forced to relocate from a public right-of-way must do so at its own expense; it is not a "displaced person" as that term is defined in the Act.

There is no doubt that a utility company could, under certain circumstances, be a "displaced person" within the meaning of the Relocation Act. Businesses as well as natural persons are eligible for relocation benefits.6 Thus, for example, if a branch office of C & P were located in a building condemned by the NRHA, C & P might well be entitled to recover the cost of moving its office equipment and furnishings. C & P, just like any other legitimate business, would be "displaced" by the federally-funded project. But whether C & P can be said to be "displaced" within the meaning of the Act when it relocates telephone lines because an urban renewal project calls for realignment of existing street patterns is a different question which requires more detailed analysis. When streets containing utility conduits are realigned, C & P is not "just like any other legitimate business;" it faces a problem unique to utilities.

Under the traditional common law rule, utilities have been required to bear the entire cost of relocating from a public right-of-way whenever requested to do so by state or local authorities. 12 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 34.74a (3d ed. 1970); 4A Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain § 15.22 (J. Sackman rev. 3d ed. 1970). This rule was recognized and approved by this Court as long ago as New Orleans Gas Co. v. Drainage Comm., 197 U.S. 453, 462, 25 S.Ct. 471, 474, 49 L.Ed. 831 (1905) (holding that the injury sustained by the utility is damnum absque injuria ).

It is a well-established principle of statutory construction that "[t]he common law . . . ought not to be deemed repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose." Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 623, 3 L.Ed. 453 (1812).7 Since the elements of the federal law of eminent domain are largely derived from the common law, see, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1943), this canon of construction has a force in this case that it might not have in other contexts of federal statutory construction. We must, therefore, be satisfied that Congress addressed the problem of utility relocation costs in the Relocation Act before we can conclude that C & P is entitled to the benefits it seeks. "As in all cases of statutory construction, our task is to interpret the words of the[ ] statute[ ] in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve." Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1911, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979).

The passage of the Relocation Act in 1970 ended a decade of close consideration of the problems faced by persons displaced by federal and federally-funded projects. See Alexander v. U.S. Dept. of HUD, 441 U.S. 39, 49, 99 S.Ct. 1572, 1580, 60 L.Ed.2d 28 (1979). The principal sponsor of the bill, Senator Muskie, noted that over 50 federal programs resulted in condemnation proceedings and that the victims of such proceedings received widely varying treatment. "Nearly all federally assisted programs have differing, if not conflicting, provisions for helping those displaced. They range from no assistance in some cases to liberal benefits and protection in others." 115 Cong.Rec. 31533 (1969). In part, the Uniform Relocation Act was passed, as its name suggests, simply to ensure uniform treatment of persons displaced by condemnation.8

Another, equally important, purpose of the Act was to ensure that persons displaced by federal and federally-funded programs would "not suffer disproportionate injuries as a result of programs designed for the benefit of the public as a whole." 42 U.S.C. § 4621. Under traditional concepts of eminent domain, a homeowner would receive only the market value of his condemned house. H.R.Rep. No. 91-1656, p. 8 (1970) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 5850. A tenant at will, residing or doing business at condemned premises, received nothing. Id., at 12. Yet both would incur significant, perhaps devastating, expenses in moving personal property. S.Rep. No. 91-488, pp. 6-7 (1969); H.R.Rep. No. 91-1656, pp. 2-3 (1970). The Relocation Act was intended to alleviate the "disproportionate injuries" suffered by such persons.9

In pursuit of both equity and uniformity, Congress relied heavily on prior legislation governing specific federal programs. For the relocation provisions at issue here, Congress adopted as its principal model the relocation provisions in § 501 through § 511 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 (1968 Highway Act), Pub.L. No. 90-495, 82 Stat. 815, 830-835. The legislative history is explicit that the Relocation Act was designed to extend the coverage of that preexisting program to all federal agencies, with modifications "only as necessary to achieve a system of requirements and aids that can be applied uniformly in all Federal and federally assisted programs." S.Rep. No. 91-488, p. 2 (1969). See also H.R.Rep. No. 91-1656, p. 2 (1970), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 5850; 115 Cong.Rec. 31534 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Mundt).10 Much of the language of the Relocation Act, including the declaration of policy,11 the definitions of "person,"12 "business,"13 and "displaced person,"14 as well as the formula for calculating relocation benefits15 are taken directly from the 1968 Highway Act.

In divining Congressional intent, therefore, it is instructive to note that the claims made by C & P in this case would not have been countenanced under the 1968 Highway Act. Utility relocation costs necessitated by federally-funded highway projects were already specifically governed by a separate provision, 23 U.S.C. § 123, which predated and was left intact by the 1968 Act. Careful consideration of this provision demonstrates that Congress considered utility relocation as a problem separate and distinct from the plight of "displaced" persons dealt with in the 1968 Highway Act and later, more generally, in the Relocation Act.

23 U.S.C. § 123 had its origins in S.Rep. No. 1093, 83 Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 12-13 (1954). In 1954, the Senate Committee on Public Works "heard considerable testimony from owners and operators of various public utilities concerning the heavy financial burden placed upon them when reconstruction or modernization of highways requires that their facilities be moved from their prior locations on the highway right-of-way." Id., at 12. But the Committee tentatively concluded that, since the question was governed by long-established state law, it was "neither feasible nor desirable for the Federal Government to give direction to those local relationships by force of application of Federal funds." Id., at 13.

The Committee did, however, authorize a study of the problem, and this study16 led to the adoption of § 111 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 (1956 Highway Act), Pub.L. No. 84-627, 70 Stat. 374, 383. Some states had, by statute or practice, altered the common law in order to reimburse utilities for the costs of relocation. Congress felt that such reimbursement should be considered a legitimate project expense for which the federal government would contribute its pro rata share. Thus, § 111 provided that when a state, in accordance with state law, pays the costs of relocation of a utility necessitated by a federally-funded highway project, "Federal funds may be used to reimburse the State for such cost in the same proportion as Federal funds are expended on the project." 23 U.S.C. § 123(a). The question of utility reimbursement was, thus, left to the laws of the individual states, with no congressional displacement of those laws. The House Report accompanying the 1956 Highway Act specifically stressed: "There is no requirement in this section, either express or implied, that a State must pay all or any part of utility relocation costs." H.R.Rep. No. 2022, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 14 (1956).

In response to the 1956 Highway Act, a number of states passed legislation providing for reimbursement of the cost of relocating utility facilities for federal-aid highway projects.17 The Senate Committee on Public Works expressed concern over "this drastic change in existing practices," noting that "the use of Federal funds for reimbursement to the States for this purpose will increase substantially, thereby reducing the amount of Federal funds available for construction of highways." S.Rep. No. 1407, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 28 (1958). In response, the Committee proposed to put a 70% cap on federal contributions to states for reimbursement of utilities. Ibid. This limitation was rejected in the final bill, however, and the only amendment to 23 U.S.C. § 123 was a proviso that reimbursement be made "only after evidence satisfactory to the Secretary shall have been presented to him substantiating the fact that the State has paid such cost from its own funds . . . ." Pub.L. No. 85-381, § 11(a), 72 Stat. 89, 94-95. Thus, after careful consideration of the alternatives, the relations between utilities and the states were left, once again, to state law. No federal right to reimbursement was ever granted to utilities, although pro rata federal reimbursement remained available to the states if state law required reimbursement of utilities.

As noted, the 1968 Highway Act did nothing to change this situation. 23 U.S.C. § 123 was left untouched. The relocation provisions in § 501 through § 511 of the 1968 Act were directed at a separate problem: the plight of those displaced from their homes or places of business. H.R.Rep. No. 1584, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 20 (1968); S.Rep. No. 1340, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7 (1968) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 3482. Utility relocation costs were never mentioned and, given 23 U.S.C. § 123, were clearly not intended to be covered by § 501 through § 511.

The history of the Federal-Aid Highway Act from 1954 to 1968 shows, therefore, that Congress considered utility relocation costs and the expenses incurred by "displaced persons" to be separate and distinct problems calling for separate and distinct solutions. Congress showed that it was aware of the common law rule that utilities must bear their own relocation expenses, and it proved unwilling, after extensive consideration and debate, to federalize the relations between utilities and state and local governments.

In the Relocation Act, Congress chose to deal with only one of these two problems. In modifying and extending § 501 through § 511 of the 1968 Highway Act, Congress was addressing the needs of residential and business tenants and owners, living and working in buildings that would be bulldozed by federal and federally-funded programs. 115 Cong.Rec. 31533 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Muskie) (expressing his concern at "the bulldozing of hundreds of thousands of people from their homes and businesses annually").18 § 220 of the Relocation Act repealed those sections of prior law that had been superceded or rendered superfluous by the Relocation Act, including § 501 through § 511 of the 1968 Highway Act. See H.R.Rep. No. 91-1656, pp. 21, 32-38 (1970). Yet 23 U.S.C. § 123, governing utility relocation costs occasioned by federally-funded highway projects, was left intact. It was neither contradicted nor rendered superfluous because it addressed a problem outside the scope of the Relocation Act.

At no point in the extensive hearings,19 congressional debates,20 or committee reports21 was it ever suggested that the Relocation Act would alter the state rules governing utility relocation expenses. Given that Congress had hitherto expressly declined to alter those rules, after extensive consideration and debate, the conclusion seems inescapable that Congress did not do so in a fit of absent-mindedness when it modified and extended the provisions of the 1968 Highway Act, provisions directed at a different problem.

Virginia has continuously recognized the common law rule that a utility forced to relocate from a public right-of-way must do so at its own expense. In Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Fugate, 211 Va. 745, 747-748, 180 S.E.2d 657 (1971), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a franchise agreement, such as that between Norfolk and C & P, which allows a utility to place its facilities in public streets is revocable at will and confers no property right on the utility. Established practice under the franchise agreement between Norfolk and C & P was to the same effect. C & P has always in the past borne all costs of relocation and has included those expenses as part of its operating expenses within the rate structure approved by the State Corporation Commission. Stipulations of Fact 10-11, App. 43-44. We hold that the Relocation Act did not grant utilities such as C & P a new, federal right to reimbursement for expenses of the sort incurred here.

Reversed.

Justice POWELL took no part in the consideration or disposition of this case.