This case presents the question whether certain disclosure requirements of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law, Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 3517.01 et seq., can be constitutionally applied to the Socialist Workers Party, a minor political party which historically has been the object of harassment by government officials and private parties. The Ohio statute requires every political party to report the names and addresses of campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), this Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the government from compelling disclosures by a minor political party that can show a "reasonable probability" that the compelled disclosures will subject those identified to "threats, harassment, or reprisals." Id., at 74, 96 S.Ct., at 661. Employing this test, a three-judge District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that the Ohio statute is unconstitutional as applied to the Socialist Workers Party. We affirm.

* The Socialist Workers Party ("SWP") is a small political party with approximately sixty members in the State of Ohio. The party states in its constitution that its aim is "the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of a workers' government to achieve socialism." As the District Court found, the SWP does not advocate the use of violence. It seeks instead to achieve social change through the political process, and its members regularly run for public office. The SWP's candidates have had little success at the polls. In 1980, for example, the Ohio SWP's candidate for the United States Senate received fewer than 77,000 votes, less than 1.9% of the total vote. Campaign contributions and expenditures in Ohio have averaged about $15,000 annually since 1974.

In 1974 appellees instituted a class action1 in the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio challenging the constitutionality of the disclosure provisions of the Ohio Campaign Expense Reporting Law. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 3517.01 et seq. The Ohio statute requires every candidate for political office to file a statement identifying each contributor and each recipient of a disbursement of campaign funds. § 3517.10.2 The "object or purpose"3 of each disbursement must also be disclosed. The lists of names and addresses of contributors and recipients are open to public inspection for at least six years. Violations of the disclosure requirements are punishable by fines of up to $1,000 for each day of violation. § 3517.99.

On November 6, 1974, the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio entered a temporary restraining order barring the enforcement of the disclosure requirements against the class pending a determination of the merits.4 The case was then transferred to the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, which entered an identical temporary restraining order in February 1975.5 Accordingly, since 1974 appellees have not disclosed the names of contributors and recipients but have otherwise complied with the statute. A three-judge district court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1976). Following extensive discovery, the trial was held in February 1981. After reviewing the "substantial evidence of both governmental and private hostility toward and harassment of SWP members and supporters," the three-judge Court concluded that under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), the Ohio disclosure requirements are unconstitutional as applied to appellees.6

The Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of political associations and beliefs. Such disclosures "can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment." Buckley v. Valeo, supra, 424 U.S., at 64, 96 S.Ct., at 656, citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 83 S.Ct. 889, 9 L.Ed.2d 929 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 80 S.Ct. 412, 4 L.Ed.2d 480 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958). "Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs." NAACP v. Alabama, supra, 357 U.S., at 462, 78 S.Ct., at 1172. The right to privacy in one's political associations and beliefs will yield only to a "subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling," NAACP v. Alabama, supra, 357 U.S., at 463, 78 S.Ct., at 1172 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1219, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (concurring opinion)), and then only if there is a "substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overriding and compelling state interest." Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., supra, 372 U.S., at 546, 83 S.Ct., at 893.

In Buckley v. Valeo this Court upheld against a First Amendment challenge the reporting and disclosure requirements imposed on political parties by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1976). 424 U.S., at 60-74, 96 S.Ct., at 654-661. The Court found three government interests sufficient in general to justify requiring disclosure of information concerning campaign contributions and expenditures:7 enhancement of voters' knowledge about a candidate's possible allegiances and interests, deterrence of corruption, and the enforcement of contribution limitations.8 The Court stressed, however, that in certain circumstances the balance of interests requires exempting minor political parties from compelled disclosures. The government's interests in compelling disclosures are "diminished" in the case of minor parties. Id., at 70, 96 S.Ct., at 659. Minor party candidates "usually represent definite and publicized viewpoints" well known to the public, and the improbability of their winning reduces the dangers of corruption and vote-buying. Ibid. At the same time, the potential for impairing First Amendment interests is substantially greater: "We are not unmindful that the damage done by disclosure to the associational interests of the minor parties and their members and to supporters of independents could be significant. These movements are less likely to have a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in contributions. In some instances fears of reprisals may deter contributions to the point where the movement cannot survive. The public interest also suffers if that result comes to pass, for there is a consequent reduction in the free circulation of ideas both within and without the political arena." Id., at 71, 96 S.Ct., at 659 (footnotes omitted).

We concluded that in some circumstances the diminished government interests furthered by compelling disclosures by minor parties does not justify the greater threat to First Amendment values.

Buckley v. Valeo set forth the following test for determining when the First Amendment requires exempting minor parties from compelled disclosures:

"The evidence offered need show only a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." Id., at 74, 96 S.Ct., at 661.

The Court acknowledged that "unduly strict requirements of proof could impose a heavy burden" on minor parties. Ibid. Accordingly, the Court emphasized that "[m]inor parties must be allowed sufficient flexibility in the proof of injury." Ibid.

"The proof may include, for example, specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties, or of harassment directed against the organization itself. A pattern of threats or specific manifestations of public hostility may be sufficient. New parties that have no history upon which to draw may be able to offer evidence of reprisals and threats directed against individuals or organizations holding similar views." Ibid.

Appellants concede that the Buckley test for exempting minor parties governs the disclosure of the names of contributors, but they contend that the test has no application to the compelled disclosure of names of recipients of campaign disbursements.9 Appellants assert that the state has a substantial interest in preventing the misuse of campaign funds.10 They also argue that the disclosure of the names of recipients of campaign funds will have no significant impact on First Amendment rights, because, unlike a contribution, the mere receipt of money for commercial services does not affirmatively express political support.

We reject appellants' unduly narrow view of the minor party exemption recognized in Buckley. Appellants' attempt to limit the exemption to laws requiring disclosure of contributors is inconsistent with the rationale for the exemption stated in Buckley. The Court concluded that the government interests supporting disclosure are weaker in the case of minor parties, while the threat to First Amendment values is greater. Both of these considerations apply not only to the disclosure of campaign contributors but also to the disclosure of recipients of campaign disbursements.

Although appellants contend that requiring disclosure of recipients of disbursements is necessary to prevent corruption, this Court recognized in Buckley that this concededly legitimate government interest has less force in the context of minor parties. The federal law considered in Buckley, like the Ohio law at issue here, required campaign committees to identify both campaign contributors and recipients of campaign disbursements. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(c) and (d), and 434(a) and (b). We stated that "by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity," disclosure requirements "ten[d] to 'prevent the corrupt use of money to affect elections.' " Id., at 67, 96 S.Ct., at 657 (emphasis added), quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 548, 54 S.Ct. 287, 291, 78 L.Ed. 484 (1934). We concluded, however, that because minor party candidates are unlikely to win elections, the government's general interest in "deterring the 'buying' of elections" is "reduced" in the case of minor parties. 424 U.S., at 70, 96 S.Ct., at 659.11

Moreover, appellants seriously understate the threat to First Amendment rights that would result from requiring minor parties to disclose the recipients of campaign disbursements. Expenditures by a political party often consist of reimbursements, advances, or wages paid to party members, campaign workers, and supporters, whose activities lie at the very core of the First Amendment.12 Disbursements may also go to persons who choose to express their support for an unpopular cause by providing services rendered scarce by public hostility and suspicion.13 Should their involvement be publicized, these persons would be as vulnerable to threats, harassment, and reprisals as are contributors whose connection with the party is solely financial.14 Even individuals who receive disbursements for "merely" commercial transactions may be deterred by the public enmity attending publicity, and those seeking to harass may disrupt commercial activities on the basis of expenditure information.15 Because an individual who enters into a transaction with a minor party purely for commercial reasons lacks any ideological commitment to the party, such an individual may well be deterred from providing services by even a small risk of harassment.16 Compelled disclosure of the names of such recipients of expenditures could therefore cripple a minor party's ability to operate effectively and thereby reduce "the free circulation of ideas both within and without the political arena." Buckley, supra, 424 U.S., at 71, 96 S.Ct., at 659 (footnotes omitted). See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-251, 77 S.Ct. 1203, 1211-1212, 1 L.Ed.2d 1311 (1957) (plurality opinion) ("Any interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents.").

We hold, therefore, that the test announced in Buckley for safeguarding the First Amendment interests of minor parties and their members and supporters applies not only to the compelled disclosure of campaign contributors but also to the compelled disclosure of recipients of campaign disbursements.

The District Court properly applied the Buckley test to the facts of this case. The District Court found "substantial evidence of both governmental and private hostility toward and harassment of SWP members and supporters." Appellees introduced proof of specific incidents of private and government hostility toward the SWP and its members within the four years preceding the trial. These incidents, many of which occurred in Ohio and neighboring states, included threatening phone calls and hate mail, the burning of SWP literature, the destruction of SWP members' property, police harassment of a party candidate, and the firing of shots at an SWP office. There was also evidence that in the 12-month period before trial 22 SWP members, including four in Ohio, were fired because of their party membership. Although appellants contend that two of the Ohio firings were not politically motivated, the evidence amply supports the District Court's conclusion that "private hostility and harassment toward SWP members make it difficult for them to maintain employment."

The District Court also found a past history of government harassment of the SWP. FBI surveillance of the SWP was "massive" and continued until at least 1976. The FBI also conducted a counterintelligence program against the SWP and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the SWP's youth organization. One of the aims of the "SWP Disruption Program" was the dissemination of information designed to impair the ability of the SWP and YSA to function. This program included "disclosing to the press the criminal records of SWP candidates, and sending anonymous letters to SWP members, supporters, spouses, and employers."17 Until at least 1976, the FBI employed various covert techniques to obtain information about the SWP, including information concerning the sources of its funds and the nature of its expenditurers. The District Court specifically found that the FBI had conducted surveillance of the Ohio SWP and had interfered with its activities within the State.18 Government surveillance was not limited to the FBI. The United States Civil Service Commission also gathered information on the SWP, the YSA, and their supporters, and the FBI routinely distributed its reports to Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence, the United States Secret Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The District Court properly concluded that the evidence of private and government hostility toward the SWP and its members establishes a reasonable probability that disclosing the names of contributors and recipients will subject them to threats, harassment, and reprisals.19 There were numerous instances of recent harassment of the SWP both in Ohio and in other states.20 There was also considerable evidence of past government harassment. Appellants challenge the relevance of this evidence of government harassment in light of recent efforts to curb official misconduct. Notwithstanding these efforts, the evidence suggests that hostility toward the SWP is ingrained and likely to continue. All this evidence was properly relied on by the District Court. Buckley, supra, 424 U.S., at 74, 96 S.Ct., at 661.

The First Amendment prohibits a state from compelling disclosures by a minor party that will subject those persons identified to the reasonable probability of threats, harassment or reprisals. Such disclosures would infringe the First Amendment rights of the party and its members and supporters. In light of the substantial evidence of past and present hostility from private persons and government officials against the SWP, Ohio's campaign disclosure requirements cannot be constitutionally applied to the Ohio SWP.

The judgment of the three-judge District Court for the Southern District of Ohio is affirmed.

Justice BLACKMUN, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.

I join Parts I, III, and IV of the Court's opinion and agree with much of what is said in Part II. But I cannot agree, with the Court or with the partial dissent, that we should reach the issue whether a standard of proof different from that applied to disclosure of campaign contributions should be applied to disclosure of campaign disbursements. See ante, at 94, n. 9; post, at 112-113, n. 7.1 Appellants did not suggest in the District Court that different standards might apply. Nor was the issue raised in appellants' jurisdictional statement or in their brief on the merits in this Court. Consequently, I would merely assume for purposes of our present decision—as appellants apparently have assumed throughout this litigation and as the District Court clearly assumed—that the flexible proof rule of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), applies equally to forced disclosure of contributions and to forced disclosure of expenditures. I would leave for another day, when the issue is squarely presented, considered by the courts below, and adequately briefed here, the significant question that now divides the Court.

This Court's Rule 15.1(a) states: "Only the questions set forth in the jurisdictional statement or fairly included therein will be considered by the Court." Appellants' jurisdictional statement presented a single question:

"Whether, under the standards set forth by this Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), the provisions of Sections 3517.10 and 3517.11 of the Ohio Revised Code, which require that the campaign committee of a candidate for public office file a report disclosing the full names and addresses of persons making contributions to or receiving expenditures from such committee, are consistent with the right of privacy of association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States when applied to the committees of candidates of a minority party which can establish only isolated instances of harassment directed toward the organization or its members within Ohio during recent years." Juris. Statement i.

The question assumes the applicability of Buckley to the entire case, and asks this Court to decide only whether the evidence presented to and facts found by the District Court were sufficient to support that court's conclusion that the Buckley test was satisfied.

Absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court does not decide issues beyond those it has agreed to review. Mayor v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 623, 94 S.Ct. 1323, 1334, 39 L.Ed.2d 630 (1974); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 339, n. 4, 92 S.Ct. 515, 518, n. 4, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971); General Talking Pictures Co. v. Western Electric Co., 304 U.S. 175, 178-179, 58 S.Ct. 849, 851-852, 82 L.Ed. 1273 (1938). According to the Court, however, the issue whether the flexible standard of proof established in Buckley applies to recipients of expenditures is " 'fairly included' in the question presented." Ante, at 94, n. 9. But appellants' failure to present the issue was not a mere oversight in phrasing that question. That appellants did not invoke this Court's jurisdiction to review specifically the proper standard for disclosure of campaign expenditures is also apparent from appellants' arguments in their jurisdictional statement and their brief on the merits. In their jurisdictional statement, under the heading "The Question is Substantial," appellants stated:

"The standards governing the resolution of actions involving challenges to reporting requirements by minority parties were set forth by this Court in the case of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 [96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659] (1976). In Buckley the Court held that in order to receive relief from reporting requirements such as those at issue in this action a minority party must establish '. . . a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of a party's contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.' 424 U.S., at 74 [96 S.Ct., at 661]." Juris. Statement 10.

Appellants went on to state that the flexible standard of proof of injury established in Buckley applied to "disclosure requirements." Juris. Statement 12-13. Similar assertions are found in appellants' brief on the merits. See Brief for Appellants 12 ("Summary of Argument"); id., at 18 ("While refusing to grant minority parties a blanket exemption from financial disclosure requirements, the Court in Buckley established a standard under which they may obtain relief . . . .")

Thus, appellants' exclusive theme in the initial presentation of their case here was that the District Court erred in finding that the Buckley standard was satisfied. They did not suggest that the standard was inapplicable, or applied differently, to campaign expenditure requirements. It was not until their reply brief, submitted eight years after this suit was instituted and at a time when appellees had no opportunity to respond in writing, that appellants sought to inject this new issue into the case. See Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 129, 74 S.Ct. 381, 98 L.Ed. 561 (1954) (plurality opinion of Jackson, J.). In my view, it simply cannot be said that it was "fairly included" in the jurisdictional statement.

Moreover, "[w]here issues are neither raised before nor considered [by the court below], this Court will not ordinarily consider them." Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 147, n. 2, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1603 n. 2, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 362-363, n. 16, 78 S.Ct. 311, 324-325, n. 16, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 (1958). The District Court did not address the question whether some standard other than that developed in Buckley should apply to disclosure of campaign expenditures. The reason for this was that appellants conceded in the District Court, as they concede here, that the "flexibility in proof of injury" applicable to disclosure of contributors governed the entire case. In their post-trial memorandum, for example, appellants did not even hint that a different standard should govern disclosure of the identities of recipients of expenditures. Instead, they quoted the Buckley test and granted that "evidence of past harassment may be presented by plaintiffs in cases such as the instant one." Defendants' Post-Trial Memorandum 4-5.

This case presents no extraordinary circumstances justifying deviation from this Court's Rule 15.1(a) and its long established practice respecting issues not presented below. We have deviated from the rule when jurisdictional issues have been omitted by the parties and lower courts, see, e.g., United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 197, 76 S.Ct. 763, 767, 100 L.Ed. 1081 (1956), or when the Court has noticed "plain error" not assigned, see Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 412, 67 S.Ct. 775, 784, 91 L.Ed.2d 973 (1947). Obviously, the issue that divides the Court from the partial dissent is not jurisdictional. Nor, as the Court's opinion persuasively demonstrates, is application of the Buckley test to disclosure of campaign disbursements "plain error." Indeed, I consider it quite possible that, after full consideration, the Court would adopt the Buckley standard in this context for the reasons stated by the Court. I also consider it quite possible that, after full consideration, the Court might wish to revise the Buckley standard as applied to campaign disbursements—perhaps to take account of the different types of expenditures covered and their differing impacts on associational rights, or perhaps along the lines suggested in the partial dissent. But this significant constitutional decision should not be made until the question is properly presented so that the record includes data and arguments adequate to inform the Court's judgment.

The Court's apparent reliance on Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 560, n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 855, 859, n. 6, 55 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978), does not provide a rationale for deciding this issue at this time. The petitioner there had included in his petition for certiorari all the questions we eventually decided. Notwithstanding the fact that the Court limited its grant of the petition to a single question, the parties fully briefed the questions on which review had been denied. Deciding those questions, therefore, was neither unwise nor unfair. In this case, in contrast, appellants affirmatively excluded the point at issue in their jurisdictional statement and in their brief on the merits. By failing to raise it until their reply brief, appellants prevented appellees from responding to the argument in writing. There can be no question that, as the Court observes, "our power to decide is not limited by the precise terms of the question presented." Ante, at 421, n. 9 (quoting Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S., at 560, n. 6, 98 S.Ct., at 859, n. 6) (emphasis supplied). But Rule 15.1(a) is designed, as a prudential matter, to prevent the possibility that such tactics will result in ill-considered decisions. It is cases like this one that show the wisdom of the Rule.

Thus, for purposes of this case, I would assume, as appellants' jurisdictional statement and brief on the merits assume, that the Buckley standard applies to campaign expenditures just as it applies to contributions.2 Appellees presented "specific evidence of past or present harassment of members due to their associational ties, or of harassment directed against the organization itself," sufficient under the rule in Buckley to establish a "reasonable probability" that the Ohio law would trigger "threats, harassment, or reprisals" against contributors. 424 U.S., at 74, 96 S.Ct., at 661. On this basis, I would affirm the judgment of the District Court in its entirety.

Justice O'CONNOR, with whom Justice REHNQUIST and Justice STEVENS join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in the judgment that the Socialist Workers Party ("SWP") has sufficiently demonstrated a reasonable probability that disclosure of contributors will subject those persons to threats, harassment, or reprisals, and thus under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), the state of Ohio cannot constitutionally compel the disclosure. Further, I agree that the broad concerns of Buckley apply to the required disclosure of recipients of campaign expenditures. But, as I view the record presented here, the SWP has failed to carry its burden of showing that there is a reasonable probability that disclosure of recipients of expenditures will subject the recipients themselves or the SWP to threats, harassment, or reprisals. Moreover, the strong public interest in fair and honest elections outweighs any damage done to the associational rights of the party and its members by application of the state's expenditure-disclosure law.

* Buckley upheld the validity of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which requires the disclosure of names of both contributors to a campaign and recipients of expenditures from the campaign. Buckley recognized three major governmental interests in disclosure requirements: deterrence of corruption; enhancement of voters' knowledge about a candidate's possible allegiances and interests; and provision of the data and means necessary to detect violations of any statutory limitations on contributions or expenditures. The precise challenge that the Buckley Court faced, however, was the overbreadth of the Act's requirements "insofar as they apply to contributions to minor parties and independent candidates." Id., at 68-69, 96 S.Ct., at 658-659 (emphasis added).1 Since the appellants in Buckley did not challenge the application of requirements of disclosure of expenditures to minor parties, the Court had no occasion to consider directly the First Amendment interests of a minor political party in preventing disclosure of expenditures, much less to weigh them against the governmental interests in disclosure. The test adopted by Buckley, quoted by the majority, ante, at 93, reflects this limitation, for it contemplates only assessing possible harassment of contributors, without a word about considering the harassment of recipients of expenditures if their names are disclosed or any effects this harassment may have on the party.

This is not to say that Buckley provides no guidance for resolving this claim. I agree with the majority that appellants have overstated their argument in declaring that Buckley has no application to the disclosure of recipients of expenditures. Certainly, Buckley enunciates the general governmental interest in regulating minor parties, who, although unlikely to win, can often affect the outcome of an election. Id., at 70, 96 S.Ct., at 659. Buckley also emphasizes the sensitive associational rights of minor parties.

Nevertheless, there are important differences between disclosure of contributors and disclosure of recipients of campaign expenditures—differences that the Buckley Court had no occasion to address, but that compel me to conclude that the balance should not necessarily be calibrated identically. First, unlike the government's interest in disclosure of contributions, its interest in disclosure of expenditures does not decrease significantly for small parties. The Court in Buckley recognized that knowing the identity of contributors would not significantly increase the voters' ability to determine the political ideology of the minor-party candidate, for the stance of the minor-party candidate is usually well known. Ibid.2 Nor would identifying a minor party's contributors further the interest in preventing the "buying" of a candidate, because of the improbability of the minor party candidate's winning the election. Ibid. Thus, these two major government interests in disclosure of contributions are significantly reduced for minor parties.3

In sharp contrast, however, the governmental interest in disclosure of expenditures remains significant for minor parties. The purpose of requiring parties to disclose expenditures is to deter improper influencing of voters. Corruption of the electoral process can take many forms: the actual buying of votes; the use of "slush funds;" dirty tricks; and bribes of poll watchers and other election officials. Certainly, a "persuasive" campaign worker on election day can corral voters for his minor-party candidate with even a modest "slush fund."4 Even though such improper practices are unlikely to be so successful as to attract enough votes to elect the minor-party candidate, a minor party, whose short-term goal is merely recognition, may be as tempted to resort to impermissible methods as are major parties, and the resulting deflection of votes can determine the outcome of the election of other candidates.5 The requirement of a full and verifiable report of expenditures is important in deterring such practices, for otherwise the party could hide the improper transactions through an accounting sleight-of-hand.6

On the other side of the balance, disclosure of recipients of expenditures will have a lesser impact on a minority party's First Amendment interests than will disclosure of contributors. As the majority states, ante, at 91, the First Amendment interest here is "[t]he right to privacy in one's political associations and beliefs." We have never drawn sharp distinctions between members and contributors, Buckley, 424 U.S., at 66, 96 S.Ct., at 657. As we recognized in Buckley, the privacy rights of contributors are especially sensitive, since many seek to express their political views privately through their pocketbook rather than publicly through other means. Disclosure of contributors directly implicates the contributors' associational rights.

The impact on privacy interests arising from disclosure of expenditures is of a quite different—and generally lesser dimension. Many expenditures of the minority party will be for quite mundane purposes to persons not intimately connected with the organization. Payments for such things as office supplies, telephone service, bank charges, printing and photography costs would generally fall in this category. The likelihood that such business transactions would dry up if disclosed is remote at best. Unlike silent contributors, whom disclosure would reveal to the public as supporters of the party's ideological positions, persons providing business services to a minor party are not generally perceived by the public as supporting the party's ideology, and thus are unlikely to be harassed if their names are disclosed. Consequently, the party's associational interests are unlikely to be affected by disclosure of recipients of such expenditures.

Other recipients of expenditures may have closer ideological ties to the party. The majority suggests that campaign workers receiving per diem, travel, or room expenses may fit in this category. Ante, at 97, n. 12. It is certainly conceivable that such persons may be harassed or threatened for their conduct. Laws requiring disclosure of recipients of expenditures, however, are not likely to contribute to this harassment. Once an individual has openly shown his close ties to the organization by campaigning for it, disclosure of receipt of expenditures is unlikely to increase the degree of harassment so significantly as to deter the individual from campaigning for the party. Further, in striking the balance, the governmental concerns are greatest precisely for the actions of campaign workers that might improperly influence voters. Thus, whatever marginal deterrence that may arise from disclosure of expenditures is outweighed by the heightened governmental interest.

In sum, the heightened governmental interest in disclosure of expenditures and the reduced marginal deterrent effect on associational interests demand a separately focused inquiry into whether there exists a reasonable probability that disclosure will subject recipients or the party itself to threats, harassment, or reprisals.7

Turning to the evidence in this case, it is important to remember that, even though proof requirements must be flexible, Buckley, supra, at 74, 96 S.Ct., at 661, the minor party carries the burden of production and persuasion to show that its First Amendment interests outweigh the governmental interests. Additionally, the application of the Buckley standard to the historical evidence is most properly characterized as a mixed question of law and fact, for which we normally assess the record independently to determine if it supports the conclusion of unconstitutionality as applied.8

Here, there is no direct evidence of harassment of either contributors or recipients of expenditures. Rather, as the majority accurately represents it, the evidence concerns harassment and reprisals of visible party members, including violence at party headquarters and loss of jobs. I concur in the majority's conclusion that this evidence, viewed in its entirety, supports the conclusion that there will be a reasonable probability of harassment of contributors if their names are disclosed. This evidence is sufficiently linked to disclosure of contributors in large part because any person publicly known to support the SWP's unpopular ideological position may suffer the reprisals that this record shows active party members suffer, and the disclosure of contributors may lead the public to presume these people support the party's ideology.

In contrast, the record, read in its entirety, does not suggest that disclosure of recipients of expenditures would lead to harassment of recipients or reprisals to the party or its members. Appellees gave no breakdown of the types of expenditures they thought would lead to harassment if disclosed. The record does contain the expenditure statements of the SWP, which itemize each expenditure with its purpose while usually omitting the name and address of the recipient. The majority of expenditures, both in number and dollar amount, are for business transactions such as office supplies, food, printing, photographs, telephone service, and books. There is virtually no evidence that disclosure of the recipients of these expenditures will impair the SWP's ability to obtain needed services.9 Even if we assume that a portion of expenditures went to temporary campaign workers or others whom the public might identify as supporting the party's ideology,10 these persons have already publicly demonstrated their support by their campaign work. There is simply no basis for inferring that such persons would thereafter be harassed or threatened or otherwise deterred from working for the party by virtue of inclusion of their names in later expenditure reports, or that if any such remote danger existed, it would outweigh the concededly important governmental interests in disclosure of recipients of expenditures.

It is plain that appellees did not carry their burden of production and persuasion insofar as they challenge the expenditure disclosure provisions. I would therefore uphold the constitutionality of those portions of the Ohio statute that require the SWP to disclose the recipients of expenditures.11