Susan K. Krell, Hartford, Conn., for petitioner North Haven Bd. of Ed.

Paul E. Knag, Stamford, Conn., for petitioner Trumbull Bd. of Ed.

Sol. Gen. Rex E. Lee, Washington, D. C., for the Federal respondents.

Beverly J. Hodgson, Bridgeport, Conn., for respondent Linda Potz.

Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

At issue here is the validity of regulations promulgated by the Department of Education pursuant to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Pub.L.92-318, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. These regulations prohibit federally funded education programs from discriminating on the basis of gender with respect to employment.

* Title IX proscribes gender discrimination in education programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. Patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.L.88-352, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp.IV), Title IX, as amended, contains two core provisions. The first is a "program-specific" prohibition of gender discrimination:

"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." § 901(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).

Nine statutory exceptions to § 901(a)'s coverage follow. See §§ 901(a)(1)-(9).1

The second core provision relates to enforcement. Section 902, 20 U.S.C. § 1682, authorizes each agency awarding federal financial assistance to any education program to promulgate regulations ensuring that aid recipients adhere to § 901(a)'s mandate. The ultimate sanction for noncompliance is termination of federal funds or denial of future grants.2 Like § 901, § 902 is program-specific:

"[S]uch termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding [of noncompliance] has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found . . . ."3

In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) invoked its § 902 authority to issue regulations governing the operation of federally funded education programs.4 These regulations extend, for example, to policies involving admissions, textbooks, and athletics. See 34 CFR pt. 106 (1980).5 Interpreting the term "person" in § 901(a) to encompass employees as well as students, HEW included among the regulations a series entitled "Subpart E," which deals with employment practices, ranging from job classifications to pregnancy leave. See 34 CFR §§ 106.51-106.61 (1980). Subpart E's general introductory section provides:

"No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination in employment, or recruitment, consideration, or selection therefor, whether full-time or part-time, under any education program or activity operated by a recipient which receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance." § 106.51(a)(1).6

Petitioners are two Connecticut public school boards that brought separate suits challenging HEW's authority to issue the Subpart E regulations. Petitioners contend that Title IX was not meant to reach the employment practices of educational institutions.

A. The North Haven case. The North Haven Board of Education (North Haven) receives federal funds for its education programs and activities and is therefore subject to Title IX's prohibition of gender discrimination. Since the 1975-1976 school year, North Haven has devoted between 46.8% and 66.9% of its federal assistance to the salaries of its employees; this practice is expected to continue.7

In January 1978, Elaine Dove, a tenured teacher in the North Haven public school system, filed a complaint with HEW, alleging that North Haven had violated Title IX by refusing to rehire her after a one-year maternity leave. In response to this complaint, HEW began to investigate the school board's employment practices and sought from petitioner information concerning its policies on hiring, leaves of absence, seniority, and tenure. Asserting that HEW lacked authority to regulate employment practices under Title IX, North Haven refused to comply with the request.

When HEW then notified petitioner that it was considering administrative enforcement proceedings, North Haven brought this action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the Subpart E regulations exceeded the authority conferred on HEW by Title IX, and an injunction prohibiting HEW from attempting to terminate the school district's federal funds on the basis of those regulations. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and on April 24, 1979, the District Court granted North Haven's motion. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51A. Agreeing with petitioner that Title IX was not intended to apply to employment practices, the court invalidated the employment regulations and permanently enjoined HEW from interfering with North Haven's federal funds because of noncompliance with those regulations.

B. The Trumbull case. The Trumbull Board of Education (Trumbull) likewise receives financial support from the Federal Government and must therefore adhere to the requirements of Title IX and appropriate implementing regulations. In October 1977, HEW began investigating a complaint filed by respondent Linda Potz, a former guidance counselor in the Trumbull school district. Potz alleged that Trumbull had discriminated against her on the basis of gender with respect to job assignments, working conditions, and the failure to renew her contract. In September 1978, HEW notified Trumbull that it had violated Title IX and warned that corrective action, including respondent's reinstatement, must be taken.

Trumbull then filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, contending that HEW's Title IX employment regulations were invalid and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On the basis of its decision in North Haven, the District Court granted Trumbull's motion for summary judgment on May 24, 1979. App. to Pet. for Cert. 76A.8 The court subsequently amended the judgment, on Trumbull's request, to include injunctive and declaratory relief similar to that ordered in North Haven's case. Id., at 77A, 91A-92A.

C. The appeal. The two cases were consolidated on appeal, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. North Haven Bd. of Ed. v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (1980). Finding the language of § 901 inconclusive, the court examined the legislative history and concluded that the provision was intended to prohibit employment discrimination. The court also found the Subpart E regulations consistent with § 902, which the court read as directing only that "any termination of funds be limited to the particular program or programs in which noncompliance with § 901 is found . . . ." 629 F.2d, at 785 (emphasis added). Section 902, the Second Circuit held, does not circumscribe HEW's authority to issue regulations prohibiting gender discrimination in employment and does not require the Department "to specify prior to termination which particular programs receiving financial assistance are covered by its regulations." Ibid. Because HEW had not exercised its § 902 authority to terminate federal assistance to either North Haven or Trumbull, the court declined to decide whether HEW could do so in these cases. The court remanded the cases to the District Court to determine whether petitioners had violated the HEW regulations and, if so, what remedies were appropriate.

Because other federal courts have invalidated the employment regulations as unauthorized by Title IX,9 we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 450 U.S. 909, 101 S.Ct. 1345, 67 L.Ed.2d 332 (1981).

Our starting point in determining the scope of Title IX is, of course, the statutory language. See Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 330, 98 S.Ct. 2370, 2375, 57 L.Ed.2d 239 (1978). Section 901(a)'s broad directive that "no person" may be discriminated against on the basis of gender appears, on its face, to include employees as well as students. Under that provision, employees, like other "persons," may not be "excluded from participation in," "denied the benefits of," or "subjected to discrimination under" education programs receiving federal financial support.

Employees who directly participate in federal programs or who directly benefit from federal grants, loans, or contracts clearly fall within the first two protective categories described in § 901(a). See Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 426 (CA1), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972, 100 S.Ct. 467, 62 L.Ed.2d 387 (1979). In addition, a female employee who works in a federally funded education program is "subjected to discrimination under" that program if she is paid a lower salary for like work, given less opportunity for promotion, or forced to work under more adverse conditions than are her male colleagues. See Dougherty Cty. School System v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735, 737-738 (CA5 1980), cert. pending sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty Cty. School System, No. 80-1023.

There is no doubt that "if we are to give [Title IX] the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its language." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1160, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 307-308, 89 S.Ct. 1697, 1702, 23 L.Ed.2d 318 (1969); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 2202, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968); Piedmont & Northern R. Co. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299, 311-312, 52 S.Ct. 541, 545, 76 L.Ed. 1115 (1932). Because § 901(a) neither expressly nor impliedly excludes employees from its reach, we should interpret the provision as covering and protecting these "persons" unless other considerations counsel to the contrary. After all, Congress easily could have substituted "student" or "beneficiary" for the word "person" if it had wished to restrict the scope of § 901(a).10

Petitioners, however, point to the nine exceptions to § 901(a)'s coverage set forth in §§ 901(a)(1)-(9). See n. 1, supra. The exceptions, the school boards argue, are directed only at students, and thus indicate that § 901(a) similarly applies only to students. But the exceptions are not concerned solely with students and student activities: two of them exempt an entire class of institutions—religious and military schools—and are not limited to student-related activities at such schools. See §§ 901(a)(3), (4). Moreover, petitioners' argument rests on an inference that is by no means compelled; in fact, the absence of a specific exclusion for employment among the list of exceptions tends to support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Title IX's broad protection of "person[s]" does extend to employees of educational institutions. See Andrus v. Glover Construction Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-617, 100 S.Ct. 1905, 1910, 64 L.Ed.2d 548 (1980).11

Although the statutory language thus seems to favor inclusion of employees, nevertheless, because Title IX does not expressly include or exclude employees from its scope, we turn to the Act's legislative history for evidence as to whether Congress meant somehow to limit the expansive language of § 901.12

In the early 1970's, several attempts were made to enact legislation banning discrimination against women in the field of education. Although unsuccessful, these efforts included prohibitions against discriminatory employment practices.13

In 1972, the provisions ultimately enacted as Title IX were introduced in the Senate by Senator Bayh during debate on the Education Amendments of 1972. In addition to prohibiting gender discrimination in federally funded education programs and threatening termination of federal assistance for noncompliance, the amendment included provisions extending the coverage of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act to educational institutions. Summarizing his proposal, Senator Bayh divided it into two parts first, the forerunner of § 901(a), and then the extensions of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act:

"Amendment No. 874 is broad, but basically it closes loopholes in existing legislation relating to general education programs and employment resulting from those programs. . . . [T]he heart of this amendment is a provision banning sex discrimination in educational programs receiving Federal funds. The amendment would cover such crucial aspects as admissions procedures, scholarships, and faculty employment, with limited exceptions. Enforcement powers include fund termination provisions—and appropriate safeguards—parallel to those found in title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Other important provisions in the amendment would extend the equal employment opportunities provisions of title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to educational institutions, and extend the Equal Pay for Equal Work Act to include executive, administrative and professional women." 118 Cong.Rec. 5803 (1972) (emphasis added).

The Senator's description of § 901(a), the "heart" of his amendment, indicates that it, as well as the Title VII and Equal Pay Act provisions, was aimed at discrimination in employment.14

Similarly, in a prepared statement summarizing the amendment, Senator Bayh discussed the general prohibition against gender discrimination:

"Central to my amendment are sections 1001-1005, which would prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs. . . .

* * * * *

"This portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas where abuse has been mentioned—employment practices for faculty and administrators, scholarship aid, admissions, access to programs within the institution such as vocational education classes, and so forth." 118 Cong.Rec. 5807 (1972) (emphasis added).

Petitioners observe that the discussion of this portion of the amendment appears under the heading "A. Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Federally Funded Education Programs," while the provisions involving Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are summarized under the heading "B. Prohibition of Education-Related Employment Discrimination." But we are not willing to ascribe any particular significance to these headings. The Title VII and Equal Pay Act portions of the Bayh amendment are more narrowly focused on employment discrimination than is the general ban on gender discrimination, and the headings reflect that difference. Especially in light of the explicit reference to employment practices in the description of the amendment's general provision, however, the headings do not negate Senator Bayh's intent that employees as well as students be protected by the first portion of his amendment.15

The final piece of evidence from the Senate debate on the Bayh amendment appears during a colloquy between Senator Bayh and Senator Pell, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Education and floor manager of the education bill. In response to Senator Pell's inquiry about the scope of the sections that in large part became §§ 901(a) and (b), Senator Bayh stated:

"As the Senator knows, we are dealing with three basically different types of discrimination here. We are dealing with discrimination in admission to an institution, discrimination of available services or studies within an institution once students are admitted, and discrimination in employment within an institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever.

"In the area of employment, we permit no exceptions." Id., at 5812 (emphasis added).16

Although the statements of one legislator made during debate may not be controlling, see, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311, 99 S.Ct. 1705, 1722, 60 L.Ed.2d 208 (1979), Senator Bayh's remarks, as those of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted, are an authoritative guide to the statute's construction. See, e.g., FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 564, 96 S.Ct. 2295, 2304, 49 L.Ed.2d 49 (1976) (such statements "deserv[e] to be accorded substantial weight . . ."); NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66, 84 S.Ct. 1063, 1068, 12 L.Ed.2d 129 (1964); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394-395, 71 S.Ct. 745, 750-751, 95 L.Ed. 1035 (1951). And, because §§ 901 and 902 originated as a floor amendment, no committee report discusses the provisions; Senator Bayh's statements—which were made on the same day the amendment was passed, and some of which were prepared rather than spontaneous remarks—are the only authoritative indications of congressional intent regarding the scope of §§ 901 and 902.

The legislative history in the House is even more sparse. H.R. 7248, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), the Higher Education Act of 1971, contained, as part of its Title X, a general prohibition against gender discrimination in federally funded education programs that was identical to the corresponding section of the Bayh amendment and to § 901(a) as ultimately enacted. But § 1004 of Title X, like § 604 of Title VI, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3, provided that nothing in Title X authorized action "by any department or agency with respect to any employment practice . . . except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." The debate on Title X included no discussion of this limitation. See 117 Cong.Rec. 39248-39263 (1971).17

When the House and Senate versions of Title IX were submitted to the Conference Committee, § 1004 was deleted. The Conference Reports simply explained:

"[T]he House amendment, but not the Senate amendment, provided that nothing in the title authorizes action by any department or agency with respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor organization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide employment. The House recedes." S.Conf.Rep.No.92-798, p. 221 (1972); H.R.Conf.Rep.No.92-1085, p. 221 (1972).

Expressly a conscious choice, therefore, the omission of § 1004 suggests that Congress intended that § 901 prohibit gender discrimination in employment.

Petitioners and the dissent contend, however, that § 1004 was deleted in order to avoid an inconsistency: Title IX included provisions relating to the Equal Pay Act,18 which obviously concerned employment, and § 1004 conflicted with those portions of the Act. See Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 409 (1975) (1975 Hearings) (remarks of Rep. O'Hara) (arguing that Title IX was a "cut and paste job," using "a Xerox" of Title VI, and that § 1004 "got in through a drafting error"). As the Court of Appeals observed, however, the Conference Committee could easily have altered the wording of § 1004 to make clear that its limitation applied only to § 90119 or could have noted in the Conference Reports that the omission was necessitated by the apparent inconsistency. Instead, by stating that "[t]he House recedes," the Reports suggest that the Senate version of Title IX, which was intended to ban discriminatory employment practices, prevailed for substantive reasons. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 199-200, 95 S.Ct. 392, 400-401, 42 L.Ed.2d 378 (1974) (deletion of a provision by a Conference Committee "militates against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to enact"); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S., at 391-392, 71 S.Ct., at 749. Identical language—"The House recedes" or "The Senate recedes" appears in the Conference Reports with respect to all other changes made in Title IX during the conference. See S.Conf.Rep.No.92-798, pp. 221-222 (1972). See also 118 Cong.Rec. 18437 (1972) (letters printed in the record during the Senate debate on the Conference Report, which imply that employment discrimination is prohibited by § 901).

Petitioners insist additionally that a specific exclusion for employment, such as that contained in § 1004, was unnecessary to limit the scope of § 901. Pointing out that Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the school boards contend that the addition of § 604 to Title VI was not viewed by Congress as diminishing the scope of the Act; rather, petitioners argue, it was agreed that Title VI would not prohibit employment discrimination even before § 604 made the exclusion explicit.

This focus on the history of Title VI—urged by petitioners and adopted by the dissent—is misplaced. It is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964, that is of significance in interpreting Title IX. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 710-711, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1964-1965, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The meaning and applicability of Title VI are useful guides in construing Title IX, therefore, only to the extent that the language and history of Title IX do not suggest a contrary interpretation. Moreover, whether § 604 clarified or altered the scope of Title VI,20 it is apparent that § 601 alone was not considered adequate to exclude employees from the statute's coverage. If Congress had intended that Title IX have the same reach as Title VI, therefore, we assume that it would have enacted counterparts to both § 601 and § 604. For although two statutes may be similar in language and objective, we must not fail to give effect to the differences between them. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584-585, 98 S.Ct. 866, 872, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978).

In our view, the legislative history thus corroborates our reading of the statutory language and verifies the Court of Appeals' conclusion that employment discrimination comes within the prohibition of Title IX.21

The postenactment history of Title IX provides additional evidence of the intended scope of the Title and confirms Congress' desire to ban employment discrimination in federally financed education programs. Following the passage of Title IX, Senator Bayh published in the Congressional Record a summary of the final version of the bill. That description expressly distinguishes Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with respect to employment practices:

"Title VI . . . specifically excludes employment from coverage (except where the primary objective of the federal aid is to provide employment). There is no similar exemption for employment in the sex discrimination provisions relating to federally assisted education programs." 118 Cong.Rec. 24684, n. 1 (1972) (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added).

See also 120 Cong.Rec. 39992 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).

Then, in June 1974, HEW published proposed Title IX regulations pursuant to § 902. See 39 Fed.Reg. 22228 (1974). Included among these regulations was Subpart E, containing provisions prohibiting discriminatory employment practices in federally funded education programs. During the comment period, nearly 10,000 formal responses to the regulations were submitted, reputedly the most HEW had ever received on one of its proposals. See Salomone, Title IX and Employment Discrimination: A Wrong in Search of a Remedy, 9 J.Law & Ed. 433, 436 (1980). But not one suggested that § 901 was not meant to prohibit discriminatory employment practices. See 1975 Hearings 479 (statement of Peter E. Holmes, Director of the Office for Civil Rights).

On June 4, 1975, HEW published its final Title IX regulations, see 40 Fed.Reg. 24128 (1975), and, as required by § 431(d)(1) of the General Education Provisions Act, Pub.L.93-380, 88 Stat. 567, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1), submitted the regulations to Congress for review. This "laying before" provision was designed to afford Congress an opportunity to examine a regulation and, if it found the regulation "inconsistent with the Act from which it derives its authority . . .," to disapprove it in a concurrent resolution. If no such disapproval resolution was adopted within 45 days, the regulation would become effective.

Resolutions of disapproval were introduced in both Houses of Congress. The two Senate resolutions, which did not mention the employment regulations, were not acted upon.22 In the House, the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor held six days of hearings to determine whether the HEW regulations were "consistent with the law and with the intent of the Congress in enacting the law." 1975 Hearings 1 (remarks of Rep. O'Hara). One witness expressed opposition to the employment regulations, interpreting the legislative history much as petitioners have. Id., at 406-408 (statement of Janet L. Kuhn); see also Kuhn, 65 Geo.L.J., at 49. Senator Bayh testified, however, that the regulations, "as the Congress mandated, call for equality in admissions . . . and in the case of teachers and other educational personnel, employment, pay and promotions." 1975 Hearings 169.23 And HEW Secretary Weinberger stated that he did not see "any way you can find that employees do not participate in education programs and activities receiving Federal assistance, and, therefore, they are within the protected class . . . ." Id., at 478. See also id., at 140 (statement of Jean Simmons, President, Federation of Organizations for Professional Women); 154-155 (statement of Rep. Carr); 164 (statement of Rep. Mink); 329 (statement of Dr. Bernice Sandler, Director, Project of the Status and Education of Women, Association of American Colleges).

Following the hearings, members of the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education introduced concurrent resolutions disapproving certain portions of the HEW regulations, but not referring specifically to the employment regulations. H.R.Con.Res. 329, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R.Con.Res. 330, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see 121 Cong.Rec. 21687 (1975). Representatives Quie and Erlenborn introduced an amendment to H.R.Con.Res. 330 that explicitly sought to disapprove the employment regulations as inconsistent with Title IX. See Unpublished Amendment to H.R.Con.Res. 330, quoted in 629 F.2d, at 783.24 Neither resolution was passed, and HEW's regulations went into effect on July 21, 1975.

Admittedly, Congress' failure to disapprove the HEW regulations does not necessarily demonstrate that it considered those regulations valid and consistent with the legislative intent. See § 431(d)(1) of the General Education Provisions Act (as amended approximately four months after the Title IX regulations went into effect), 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1). But the postenactment history of Title IX does indicate that Congress was made aware of the Department's interpretation of the Act and of the controversy surrounding the regulations governing employment, and it lends weight to the argument that coverage of employment discrimination was intended. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14-16, 61 S.Ct. 422, 426-427, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941); Comment, 1976 B.Y.U.L.Rev., at 153-157. And the relatively insubstantial interest given the resolutions of disapproval that were introduced seems particularly significant since Congress has proceeded to amend § 901 when it has disagreed with HEW's interpretation of the statute.25 While amending these other portions of § 901, however, Congress has not seen fit to disturb the Subpart E regulations.

In fact, Congress has refused to pass bills that would have amended § 901 to limit its coverage of employment discrimination. On the day the 45-day review period for the HEW regulations expired, Senator Helms introduced a bill that would have added a provision to Title IX stating that "[n]othing in [§ 901] shall apply to employees of any educational institution subject to this title." S.2146, § 2(1), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); see 121 Cong.Rec. 23845-23847 (1975). No action was taken on the bill. Similarly, Senator McClure sponsored an amendment to S.2657, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), the Education Amendments of 1976, which would have restricted the meaning of the term "educational program or activity" in § 901(a) to the "curriculum or graduation requirements of the institutions . . ." receiving federal funds. 122 Cong.Rec. 28136 (1976). Senator Bayh successfully opposed the amendment, in part on the ground that it "would exempt those areas of traditional discrimination against women that are the reason for the congressional enactment of title IX[,]" including "employment and employment benefits . . . ." Id., at 28144. The McClure amendment was rejected. Id., at 28147.

Although postenactment developments cannot be accorded "the weight of contemporary legislative history, we would be remiss if we ignored these authoritative expressions concerning the scope and purpose of Title IX. . . ." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S., at 687, n. 7, 99 S.Ct., at 1952, n. 7. Where "an agency's statutory construction has been 'fully brought to the attention of the public and the Congress,' and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation although it has amended the statute in other respects, then presumably the legislative intent has been correctly discerned." United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554, n. 10, 99 S.Ct. 2470, 2476, n. 10, 61 L.Ed.2d 68 (1979), quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489, 60 S.Ct. 982, 989, 84 L.Ed. 1311 (1940). See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S., at 702-703, 99 S.Ct., at 1960; NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1762, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974); United States v. Bergh, 352 U.S. 40, 46-47, 77 S.Ct. 106, 109-110, 1 L.Ed.2d 102 (1956). These subsequent events therefore lend credence to the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Title IX.26

Although we agree with the Second Circuit's conclusion that Title IX proscribes employment discrimination in federally funded education programs, we find that the Court of Appeals paid insufficient attention to the "program-specific" nature of the statute. The court acknowledged that, under § 902, termination of funds "shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which . . . noncompliance has been . . . found," but implied that the Department's authority to issue regulations is considerably broader. See 629 F.2d, at 785-786.27 We disagree.

It is not only Title IX's funding termination provision that is program-specific. The portion of § 902 authorizing the issuance of implementing regulations also provides:

"Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 901 with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken." (Emphasis added.)

Certainly, it makes little sense to interpret the statute, as respondents urge, to authorize an agency to promulgate rules that it cannot enforce. And § 901(a) itself has a similar program-specific focus: it forbids gender discrimination "under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ."

Title IX's legislative history corroborates its general program-specificity. Congress failed to adopt proposals that would have prohibited all discriminatory practices of an institution that receives federal funds. See 117 Cong.Rec. 30155-30157, 30408 (1971) (Sen. Bayh's 1971 amendment); H.R. 5191, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1001(b) (1971) (administration proposal); 1970 Hearings 690-691 (Dept. of Justice's proposed alternative to § 805 of H.R. 16098); cf. Title IX, § 904 (proscribing discrimination against the blind by a recipient of federal assistance with no program-specific limitation). In contrast, Senator Bayh indicated that his 1972 amendment, which in large part was ultimately adopted, was program-specific. See 118 Cong.Rec. 5807 (1972) (observing that the amendment "prohibit[s] discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education programs," and that "[t]he effect of termination of funds is limited to the particular entity and program in which such noncompliance has been found . . ."); cf. 117 Cong.Rec. 39256 (1971) (colloquies between Reps. Green and Waggoner and between Reps. Green and Steiger). Finally, we note that language in §§ 601 and 602 of Title VI, virtually identical to that in §§ 901 and 902 and on which Title IX was modeled, has been interpreted as being program-specific. See Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (CA5 1969). We conclude, then, that an agency's authority under Title IX both to promulgate regulations and to terminate funds is subject to the program-specific limitation of §§ 901 and 902. Cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S., at 690-693, 99 S.Ct., at 1954-1955.

Examining the employment regulations with this restriction in mind, we nevertheless reject petitioners' contention that the regulations are facially invalid. Although their import is by no means unambiguous, we do not view them as inconsistent with Title IX's program-specific character. The employment regulations do speak in general terms of an educational institution's employment practices, but they are limited by the provision that states their general purpose: "to effectuate title IX . . .[,] which is designed to eliminate (with certain exceptions) discrimination on the basis of sex in any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." 34 CFR § 106.1 (1980) (emphasis added).28

HEW's comments accompanying publication of its final Title IX regulations confirm our view that Subpart E is consistent with the Act's program-specificity.29 The Department recognized that § 902 limited its authority to terminate funds to particular programs that were found to have violated Title IX, and it continued:

"Therefore, an education program or activity or part thereof operated by a recipient of Federal financial assistance administered by the Department will be subject to the requirements of this regulation ifit [30] receives or benefits from such assistance. This interpretation is consistent with the only case specifically ruling on the language contained in title VI, which holds that Federal funds may be terminated under title VI upon a finding that they 'are infected by a discriminatory environment . . .' Board of Public Instruction of Taylor County, Florida v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969)." 40 Fed.Reg. 24128 (1975).

By expressly adopting the Fifth Circuit opinion construing Title VI as program-specific, HEW apparently indicated its intent that the Title IX regulations be interpreted in like fashion. So read, the regulations conform with the limitations Congress enacted in §§ 901 and 902.

Whether termination of petitioners' federal funds is permissible under Title IX is a question that must be answered by the District Court in the first instance. Similarly, we do not undertake to define "program" in this opinion. Neither of the cases before us advanced beyond a motion for summary judgment, and the record therefore does not reflect whether petitioners' employment practices actually discriminated on the basis of gender or whether any such discrimination comes within the prohibition of Title IX. Neither school board opposed HEW's investigation into its employment practices on the grounds that the complaining employees' salaries were not funded by federal money, that the employees did not work in an education program that received federal assistance, or that the discrimination they allegedly suffered did not affect a federally funded program.31 Instead, petitioners disputed the Department's authority to regulate any employment practices whatsoever, and the District Court adopted that view, which we find to be error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals but remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and Justice REHNQUIST join, dissenting.

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in education programs and activities receiving federal funds. In 1975, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)1 promulgated regulations prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender in employment by fund recipients. 34 CFR § 106.51(a)(1). Today, the Court upholds the validity of these regulations, relying on the statutory language, its legislative history, and several postenactment events. Because I believe the Court's interpretation is neither consistent with the statutory language nor supported by its legislative history, I dissent.2

* Although the Court begins with the language of the statute, it quotes the relevant language in its entirety only in the opening paragraphs of the opinion. In the section considering the statute's meaning, the Court quotes two words of the statute and paraphrases the rest, thereby suggesting an interpretation actually at odds with the language used in the statute. Thus, according to the Court, "[s]ection 901(a)'s broad directive that 'no person' may be discriminated against on the basis of gender appears, on its face, to include employees as well as students." Ante, at 520. This is not what the statutory language provides.

"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . ." Education Amendments of 1972, § 901(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).

A natural reading of these words would limit the statute's scope to discrimination against those who are enrolled in, or who are denied the benefits of, programs or activities receiving federal funding. It tortures the language chosen by Congress to conclude that not only teachers and administrators, but also secretaries and janitors, who are discriminated against on the basis of sex in employment, are thereby (i) denied participation in a program or activity;3 (ii) denied the benefits of a program or activity; or (iii) subject to discrimination under an education program or activity. Moreover, Congress made no reference whatever to employers or employees in Title IX, in sharp contrast to quite explicit language in other statutes regulating employment practices.4

It is noteworthy that not one of the other five Courts of Appeals to consider the question before us reached the conclusion that HEW's interpretation is supported by the statutory language. The issue was presented initially to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Islesboro School Committee v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424, 426, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972, 100 S.Ct. 467, 62 L.Ed.2d 387 (1979), and that decision has been followed by most other Courts of Appeals to consider the question. There, the court concluded that "[t]he language of section 901, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), on its face, is aimed at the beneficiaries of the federal monies, i.e., either students attending institutions receiving federal funds or teachers engaged in special research being funded by the United States government." The court went on to point out that this reading of "the plain language of the statute is buttressed by an examination of the specific exemptions mentioned in the statute," all of which relate to students, not employees.5 Ibid. In the next appellate decision, Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972, 100 S.Ct. 467, 62 L.Ed.2d 388 (1979), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also rejected the interpretation of the statute now relied on by this Court, noting: "[A]s actually written, the statute is not nearly so broad. The words 'no person' are modified by later language which clearly limits their meaning." 600 F.2d, at 584. The court concluded that the statute "reaches only those types of disparate treatment" that involve discrimination against program beneficiaries.6 Ibid.

The Court acknowledges, as it must, that § 901 of Title IX "does not expressly include . . . employees." But it finds a strong negative inference in the fact that § 901 does not "exclude employees from its scope." Ante, at 522. The Court then turns to the legislative history for evidence as to whether or not § 901 was meant to prohibit employment discrimination. Ibid. I agree with the several Courts of Appeals that have concluded unequivocally that the statutory language cannot fairly be read to proscribe employee discrimination. Only rarely may legislative history be relied upon to read into a statute operative language that Congress itself did not include. To justify such a reading of a statute, the legislative history must show clearly and unambiguously that Congress did intend what it failed to state.7 The Court's elaborate exposition of the history of Title IX falls far short of this standard.

Title IX originated in a floor amendment sponsored by Senator Bayh to Senate bill S. 659, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). The amendment was intended to close loopholes in earlier civil rights legislation; three problem areas had been identified in hearings by a special House Committee in 1970. See Discrimination Against Women: Hearings on Section 805 of H.R. 16098 before the Special Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, though generally barring employment discrimination on the basis of sex, race, religion, or national origin, did not apply to discrimination "with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of [educational] institutions." Pub.L. 88-352, Title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255. And the Equal Pay Act of 1963 banned discrimination in wages on the basis of sex, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1), but it did not apply to administrative, executive, or professional workers, including teachers. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1970 ed.) (no longer in force). Finally, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, barred discrimination on the basis of "race, color, or national origin," but not sex, in any federally funded programs and activities.

The Bayh floor amendment, No. 874, introduced in 1972, 118 Cong.Rec. 5803 (1972) (print of amendment), closed these loopholes. Section 1005 amended Title VII to cover employment discrimination in educational institutions. Ibid. Sections 1009-1010 amended the Equal Pay Act so that discrimination in pay on the basis of sex was barred, even for teachers and other professionals. Ibid. And §§ 1001-1003 created a new Title IX banning discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded educational programs and activities, thus effectively extending Title VI's prohibition to sex discrimination in such programs.

Since the amendments to Title VII and the Equal Pay Act explicitly covered discrimination in employment in educational institutions, there was no need to include §§ 1001-1003 of the Bayh amendment to proscribe such discrimination. Instead, Title IX presumably was enacted, as its language clearly indicates, to bar discrimination against beneficiaries of federally funded educational programs and activities. This interpretation of Title IX is confirmed by the fact that it was modeled after Title VI, a statute limited in its scope to discrimination against beneficiaries of federally funded programs, not general employment practices of fund recipients.8 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3.9 And, as this Court noted in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-701, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1956-1960, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), when Congress passed Title IX, it expected the new provision to be interpreted consistently with Title VI, which had been its model.

The Court discounts the importance of Title VI to the proper interpretation of Title IX for three reasons. First, it notes that "[i]t is Congress' intention in 1972, not in 1964, that is of significance in interpreting Title IX." Ante, at 529 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, supra, at 710-711, 99 S.Ct., at 1964-1965). This point begs the question, however, since there is no evidence that in 1972, when it passed Title IX, Congress thought Title VI applied to employment discrimination. The second reason advanced by the Court for disregarding Title VI is that it, unlike Title IX, includes a section, i.e., § 604, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3, expressly stating that Title VI applies only to discrimination against fund beneficiaries, not to employment discrimination per se. But in an earlier version of the legislation that was to become Title IX, the amendment was drafted as a modification of Title VI, simply adding the word "sex." In the end, it is true, Title IX was enacted as a statute separate from Title VI, but the reason for this approach was strategic, not substantive. Supporters feared that if Title VI were opened for amendment, Title VI itself might be "gutted" on the floor of the Congress. Sex Discrimination Regulations: Review of Regulations to Implement Title IX, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 409 (1975) (1975 Hearings).

Finally, to break the link between Titles VI and IX, the Court stresses that the House version of the Senate's Bayh amendment originally contained a provision, § 1004, equivalent to § 604 of Title VI, explicitly stating that no section of the 1972 legislation applied to discrimination in employment, but this provision was eliminated by the Conference. Ante, at 527-528. A strong argument, however, can be made that there was a nonsubstantive reason for eliminating § 1004 from the House bill. In 1975 hearings before the House Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education and Labor, Representative O'Hara, Chairman of that Subcommittee, while explaining the background of Title IX to a witness, noted that this change was made at Conference simply to eliminate, as quietly as possible, a recently discovered drafting error. 1975 Hearings 409. Even without reference to Representative O'Hara's remarks, made in 1975, it is clear that, at the time of the Conference on the House bill and the Senate's Bayh amendment, § 1004 of the House bill was a drafting mistake; it stated that no section of the House bill applied to employment, though sections of the House bill, as well as the Senate version, contained express changes to the employment discrimination provisions of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Since the analogous provision of Title VI, § 604, had been regarded as a mere clarification,10 the Court is on weak ground in arguing that the Conference Report's use of the ritualistic words "the House recedes" reveals a substantive change rather than the quiet correction of an obvious drafting error at a very late stage in the legislative process.

In concluding that the legislative history indicates Title IX was intended to extend to employment discrimination, the Court is forced to rely primarily on the statements of a single Senator.11 The first statement, ante, at 524 (quoting 118 Cong.Rec. 5803 (1972)), is ambiguous. Senator Bayh did state that faculty employment would be covered by his amendment after mentioning the sections enacting Title IX but prior to any mention of those amending Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Immediately thereafter, however, he stated that Title IX's enforcement powers paralleled those in Title VI. Yet Title VI has never provided for fund termination to redress discrimination in employment.

Next, the Court quotes Bayh's statements that (i) he regarded "sections 1001-1005" as "[c]entral to [his] amendment" and (ii) "[t]his portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas," including employment. Ante, at 525 (quoting 118 Cong.Rec. 5807 (1972)). But § 1005 of the Bayh Amendment is the section amending Title VII and thus §§ 1001-1005 cover employment discrimination regardless of whether Title IX does.12 Moreover, the Court uses an ellipsis rather than include the following words from the second Bayh statement:

"Discrimination against the beneficiaries of federally assisted programs and activities is already prohibited by title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately the prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the basis of sex. In order to close this loophole, my amendment sets forth prohibition and enforcement provisions which generally parallel the provisions of title VI." 118 Cong.Rec. 5807 (1972) (in ellipsis, ante, at 525).

Thus, for a second time, Bayh indicated to the Senate that he regarded Title IX of his amendment as parallel to Title VI rather than as a substantial departure from Title VI.

In the third Bayh statement, ante, at 526 (quoting 118 Cong.Rec. 5812 (1972)), the Senator was responding to a question from Senator Pell regarding Title IX, and the Court assumes that each sentence in that response refers to Title IX. But, as the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit noted in Islesboro :

"A fair reading both of the colloquy . . ., as well as the discussion immediately preceding and following the above-quoted passage, indicates that Senator Bayh divided his analysis into three sections, two of which were specifically aimed at students (admissions and services), the third at employees (employment). While Senator Bayh's response was more extended than it needed to be for a direct answer to Senator Pell's question, we think HEW's reading is strained. We think this particularly in light of the fact that the discussion was an oral one and thus not as precise as a response in written form . . . ." 593 F.2d, at 427.

Rather than supporting the Court's view, the legislative history accords with the natural reading of the statute. Title IX prohibits discrimination only against beneficiaries of federally funded programs and activities, not all employment discrimination by recipients of federal funds. Title IX is modeled after Title VI, which is explicitly so limited—and to the extent statements of Senator Bayh can be read to the contrary, they are ambiguous.13

As indicated above, when critical words, in this case "employment discrimination," are absent from a statute and its meaning is otherwise clear, reliance on legislative history to add omitted words is rarely appropriate. Only when legislative history gives clear and unequivocal guidance as to congressional intent should a court presume to add what Congress failed to include. And, however else one might describe the legislative history relied upon by the Court today, it is neither clear nor unequivocal.

As the sole issue before us is the meaning of § 901(a) of Title IX, I repeat the relevant language:

"No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . ."

The Court acknowledges that, in view of the lack of support for its position in this language, it must look to the legislative history for evidence as to whether or not § 901 was meant to prohibit employment discrimination. Ante, at 522. Although the Court examines at length the truncated legislative history, it ignores other factors highly relevant to congressional intent: (i) whether the ambiguity easily could have been avoided by the legislative draftsman; (ii) whether Congress had prior experience and a certain amount of expertise in legislating with respect to this particular subject; and (iii) whether existing legislation clearly and adequately proscribed, and provided remedies for, the conduct in question. When these factors are considered, there is no justification for reading sex employment discrimination language into § 901.

If there had been such an intent, no competent legislative draftsman would have written § 901 as above set forth. The draftsman would have been guided, of course, by the employment-discrimination language in Title VII and the Equal Pay Act, language specifically addressing this problem. Moreover, although these other statutes had been enacted by an earlier Congress, at the time Title IX was being drafted and considered Title VII and the Equal Pay Act also were amended to proscribe explicitly employment discrimination in educational institutions on the basis of sex. Congress hardly would have enacted a third statute addressing this problem, but, in contrast to the other two, use language ambiguous at best.

In addition, a comparison of the provisions of Title VII and Title IX suggests that Congress would not have enacted the inconsistent provisions of the latter with respect to remedies and procedures. Title VII is a comprehensive antidiscrimination statute with carefully prescribed procedures for conciliation by the EEOC, federal-court remedies available within certain time limits, and certain specified forms of relief, designed to make whole the victims of illegal discrimination and available unless discriminatory conduct falls within one of several exceptions. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp.IV). This thoughtfully structured approach is in sharp contrast to Title IX, which contains only one extreme remedy, fund termination, apparently now available at the request of any female employee who can prove discrimination in employment in a federally funded program or activity. This cutoff of funds, at the expense of innocent beneficiaries of the funded program, will not remedy the injustice to the employee. Indeed, Title IX does not authorize a single action, such as employment, reemployment, or promotion, to rectify employment discrimination. And Title IX, unlike Title VII, has no time limits for action, no conciliation provisions, and no guidance as to procedure.14 Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (Title IX) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp.IV) (Title VII). The Solicitor General conceded at oral argument that appropriate relief for the two employees who initiated this suit was available under Title VII.15 See Tr. of Oral Arg. 27.

Finally, Congress delegated the administration of Title IX to the Department of HEW. In contrast, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act are administered by the Department of Labor and EEOC. It is most unlikely that Congress would intend not only duplicate substantive legislation but also enforcement of these provisions by different departments of government with different enforcement powers, areas of expertise, and enforcement methods.16 The District Court in Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 438 F.Supp. 1021 (E.D.Mich.1977), aff'd., 600 F.2d 581 (CA6), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972, 100 S.Ct. 467, 62 L.Ed.2d 388 (1979), correctly observed:

"These governmental agencies, particularly the EEOC, were established specifically for the purpose of regulating discrimination in employment practices. These agencies have the expertise and their enabling legislation has provided them with the investigative and enforcement machinery necessary to compel compliance with regulations against sex discrimination in employment. HEW does not have similar enforcement authority." 438 F.Supp., at 1034.

Even the Solicitor General, in the brief on behalf of the federal respondents in this case, acknowledges what the Romeo court thought was self-evident:

"The Department of Education has only limited expertise in employment matters. Its view is that employment cases are better resolved under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides more appropriate remedies for such cases." Brief for Federal Respondents 37, n. 26.

In sum, the Court's decision today, finding an unarticulated intent on the part of Congress, is predicated on five perceptions of congressional action that I am unable to share: (i) that Congress neglectfully or forgetfully failed to include language in § 901 with respect to discrimination that would have made clear its intent; (ii) that Congress enacted a third statute proscribing sex discrimination in employment in educational institutions in the absence of any showing of a need for such duplicative legislation; (iii) that Congress failed to include in the third statute appropriate procedural and remedial provisions relevant to employment discrimination; (iv) that it vested the authority to enforce the third statute in HEW, a department that even the Solicitor General concedes lacks the experience and the qualifications to oversee and enforce employment legislation; and, (v) finally that in Title IX, it gave a new "remedy" for sex discrimination in employment, but did not make that remedy available to those discriminated against on the basis of race.

In response to this dissent, see ante, at 536, n. 26, the Court states that the factors considered in this Part III, summarized above, "are not relevant" to "ascertaining legislative intent." If this were a "plain language" case, this statement probably would be unobjectionable. But the Court recognizes that its position cannot be sustained solely by the plain language of the statute, and it therefore relies heavily on ambiguous and muddled oral statements made on the floor of the Senate. In these circumstances, it defies reason to say that a court should not consider what reasonable legislators surely would have considered. Where ambiguity exists it is not "irrelevant," to the process of ascertaining the intention of Congress, to consider specifically other statutes on the same subject. Nor must a court shun common sense in resolving ambiguities.17