In these cases, involving alleged damage to fishing grounds caused by discharges and ocean dumping of sewage and other waste, we are faced with questions concerning the availability of a damages remedy, based either on federal common law or on the provisions of two Acts—the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 86 Stat. 816, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp.III), and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 86 Stat. 1052, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp.III).

* Respondents are an organization whose members harvest fish and shellfish off the coast of New York and New Jersey, and one individual member of that organization. In 1977, they brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey against petitioners—various governmental entities and officials from New York,1 New Jersey,2 and the Federal Government.3 Their complaint alleged that sewage, sewage "sludge," and other waste materials were being discharged into New York Harbor and the Hudson River by some of the petitioners. In addition it complained of the dumping of such materials directly into the ocean from maritime vessels. The complaint alleged that, as a result of these activities, the Atlantic Ocean was becoming polluted, and it made special reference to a massive growth of algae said to have appeared offshore in 1976.4 It then stated that this pollution was causing the "collapse of the fishing, clamming and lobster industries which operate in the waters of the Atlantic Ocean."5

Invoking a wide variety of legal theories,6 respondents sought injunctive and declaratory relief, $250 million in compensatory damages, and $250 million in punitive damages. The District Court granted summary judgment to petitioners7 on all counts of the complaint.8

In holdings relevant here, the District Court rejected respondents' nuisance claim under federal common law, see Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972), on the ground that such a cause of action is not available to private parties. With respect to the claims based on alleged violations of the FWPCA, the court noted that respondents had failed to comply with the 60-day notice requirement of the "citizen suit" provision in § 505(b)(1)(A) of the Act, 86 Stat. 888, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). This provision allows suits under the Act by private citizens, but authorizes only prospective relief, and the citizen plaintiffs first must give notice to the EPA, the State, and any alleged violator. Ibid.9 Because respondents did not give the requisite notice, the court refused to allow them to proceed with a claim under the Act independent of the citizen-suit provision and based on the general jurisdictional grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.10 The court applied the same analysis to respondents' claims under the MPRSA, which contains similar citizen-suit and notice provisions. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g).11 Finally, the court rejected a possible claim of maritime tort, both because respondents had failed to plead such claim explicitly and because they had failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the federal and state Tort Claims Acts.12

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed as to the claims based on the FWPCA, the MPRSA, the federal common law of nuisance, and maritime tort. Na- tional Sea Clammers Assn. v. City of New York, 616 F.2d 1222 (1980). With respect to the FWPCA, the court held that failure to comply with the 60-day notice provision in § 505(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A), does not preclude suits under the Act in addition to the specific "citizen suits" authorized in § 505. It based this conclusion on the saving clause in § 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e), preserving "any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief." 616 F.2d at 1226-1228; see n.10, supra. The Court of Appeals then went on to apply our precedents in the area of implied statutory rights of action,13 and concluded that "Congress intended to permit the federal courts to entertain a private cause of action implied from the terms of the [FWPCA], preserved by the savings clause of the Act, on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals who have been or will be injured by pollution in violation of its terms." 616 F.2d, at 1230-1231.

The court then applied this same analysis to the MPRSA, concluding again that the District Court had erred in dismissing respondents' claims under this Act. Although the court was not explicit on this question, it apparently concluded that suits for damages, as well as for injunctive relief, could be brought under the FWPCA and the MPRSA.14

With respect to the federal common-law nuisance claims, the Court of Appeals rejected the District Court's conclusion that private parties may not bring such claims. It also held, applying common-law principles, that respondents "alleged sufficient individual damage to permit them to recover damages for this essentially public nuisance." Id., at 1234. It thus went considerably beyond Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972), which involved purely prospective relief sought by a state plaintiff.15

Petitions for a writ of certiorari raising a variety of arguments were filed in this Court by a group of New Jersey sewerage authorities (No. 79-1711), by the Joint Meeting of Essex and Union Counties in New Jersey (No. 79-1754), by the City and Mayor of New York (No. 79-1760), and by all of the federal defendants named in this suit (No. 80-12).16 We granted these petitions, 449 U.S. 917, 101 S.Ct. 314, 66 L.Ed.2d 145, limiting review to three questions: (i) whether FWPCA and MPRSA imply a private right of action independent of their citizen-suit provisions, (ii) whether all federal common-law nuisance actions concerning ocean pollution now are pre-empted by the legislative scheme contained in the FWPCA and the MPRSA, and (iii) if not, whether a private citizen has standing to sue for damages under the federal common law of nuisance. We hold that there is no implied right of action under these statutes and that the federal common law of nuisance has been fully pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution.17

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act was first enacted in 1948. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. It emphasized state enforcement of water quality standards. When this legislation proved ineffective, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub.L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. The Amendments shifted the emphasis to "direct restrictions on discharges," EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 204, 96 S.Ct. 2022, 2024, 48 L.Ed.2d 578 (1976), and made it "unlawful for any person to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit and complying with its terms," id., at 205, 96 S.Ct., at 2025.18 While still allowing for state administration and enforcement under federally approved state plans, §§ 402(b), (c), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(b), (c), the Amendments created various federal minimum effluent standards, §§ 301-307, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1317.

The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub.L. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052, sought to create comprehensive federal regulation of the dumping of materials into ocean waters near the United States coastline. Section 101(a) of the Act requires a permit for any dumping into ocean waters, when the material is transported from the United States or on an American vessel or aircraft. 33 U.S.C. § 1411(a).19 In addition, it requires a permit for the dumping of material transported from outside the United States into the territorial seas or in the zone extending 12 miles from the coastline, "to the extent that it may affect the territorial sea or the territory of the United States." § 1411(b).

The exact nature of respondents' claims under these two Acts is not clear, but the claims appear to fall into two categories. The main contention is that the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers have permitted the New Jersey and New York defendants to discharge and dump pollutants in amounts that are not permitted by the Acts. In addition, they seem to allege that the New York and New Jersey defendants have violated the terms of their permits. The question before us is whether respondents may raise either of these claims in a private suit for injunctive and monetary relief, where such a suit is not expressly authorized by either of these Acts.20

* It is unnecessary to discuss at length the principles set out in recent decisions concerning the recurring question whether Congress intended to create a private right of action under a federal statute without saying so explicitly.21 The key to the inquiry is the intent of the Legislature. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639, 101 S.Ct. 2061, 2066, 68 L.Ed.2d 500 (1981); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1779, 68 L.Ed.2d 101 (1981); Universities Research Assn. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770, 101 S.Ct. 1451, 1461, 67 L.Ed.2d 662 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15, 100 S.Ct. 242, 245, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2485, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979). We look first, of course, to the statutory language, particularly to the provisions made therein for enforcement and relief. Then we review the legislative history and other traditional aids of statutory interpretation to determine congressional intent.

These Acts contain unusually elaborate enforcement provisions, conferring authority to sue for this purpose both on government officials and private citizens. The FWPCA, for example, authorizes the EPA Administrator to respond to violations of the Act with compliance orders and civil suits. § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.22 He may seek a civil penalty of up to $10,000 per day, § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d), and criminal penalties also are available, § 309(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c). States desiring to administer their own permit programs must demonstrate that state officials possess adequate authority to abate violations through civil or criminal penalties or other means of enforcement. § 402(b)(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7). In addition, under § 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(7). In addition, under § 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b), "any interested person" may seek judicial review in the United States courts of appeals of various particular actions by the Administrator, including establishment of effluent standards and issuance of permits for discharge of pollutants.23 Where review could have been obtained under this provision, the action at issue may not be challenged in any subsequent civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement. § 1369(b)(2).

These enforcement mechanisms, most of which have their counterpart under the MPRSA,24 are supplemented by the express citizen-suit provisions in § 505(a) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), and § 105(g) of the MPRSA, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g). See nn. 9, 11, supra. These citizen-suit provisions authorize private persons to sue for injunctions to enforce these statutes.25 Plaintiffs invoking these provisions first must comply with specified procedures—which respondents here ignored—including in most cases 60 days' prior notice to potential defendants.

In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens suing under MPRSA and FWPCA. As we stated in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, supra, "it is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it." 444 U.S., at 19, 100 S.Ct., at 247. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, supra, at 571-574, 99 S.Ct., at 2486-2488. In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate.

As noted above, the Court of Appeals avoided this inference. Discussing the FWPCA, it held that the existence of a citizen-suit provision in § 505(a) does not rule out implied forms of private enforcement of the Act. It arrived at this conclusion by asserting that Congress intended in § 505(a) to create a limited cause of action for "private attorneys general"—"non-injured member[s] of the public" suing to promote the general welfare rather than to redress an injury to their own welfare. 616 F.2d, at 1227. It went on to conclude:

"A private party who is injured by the alleged violation, as these plaintiffs allege they were, has an alternate basis for suit under section 505(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e), and the general federal question jurisdiction of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). Section 505(e) is a savings clause that preserves all rights to enforce the Act or seek relief against the Administrator. Coupled with the general federal question jurisdiction it permits this suit to be brought by these parties." Ibid. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

There are at least three problems with this reasoning. First, the language of the saving clause on which the Court of Appeals relied, see n. 10, supra, is quite ambiguous concerning the intent of Congress to "preserve" remedies under the FWPCA itself. It merely states that nothing in the citizen-suit provision "shall restrict any right which any person . . . may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief." It is doubtful that the phrase "any statute" includes the very statute in which this statement was contained.26

Moreover, the reasoning on which the Court of Appeals relied is flawed for another reason. It draws a distinction between "non-injured" plaintiffs who may bring citizen suits to enforce provisions of these Acts, and the "injured" plaintiffs in this litigation who claim a right to sue under the Acts, not by virtue of the citizen-suit provisions, but rather under the language of the saving clauses. In fact, it is clear that the citizen-suit provisions apply only to persons who can claim some sort of injury and there is, therefore, no reason to infer the existence of a separate right of action for "injured" plaintiffs. "Citizen" is defined in the citizen-suit section of the FWPCA as "a person or persons having an interest which is or may be adversely affected." § 505(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g). It is clear from the Senate Conference Report that this phrase was intended by Congress to allow suits by all persons possessing standing under this Court's decision in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). See S.Conf.Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 146 (1972). This broad category of potential plaintiffs necessarily includes both plaintiffs seeking to enforce these statutes as private attorneys general, whose injuries are "noneconomic" and probably noncompensable, and persons like respondents who assert that they have suffered tangible economic injuries because of statutory violations.

Finally, the Court of Appeals failed to take account of the rest of the enforcement scheme expressly provided by Congress including the opportunity for "any interested person" to seek judicial review of a number of EPA actions within 90 days, § 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b). See supra, at 13-14.

The Court of Appeals also applied its reasoning to the MPRSA. But here again we are persuaded that Congress evidenced no intent to authorize by implication private remedies under these Acts apart from the expressly authorized citizen suits. The relevant provisions in the MPRSA are in many respects almost identical to those of the FWPCA. 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g). Although they do not expressly limit citizen suits to those who have suffered some injury from a violation of the Act, we are not persuaded by this fact alone that Congress affirmatively intended to imply the existence of a parallel private remedy, after setting out expressly the manner in which private citizens can seek to enjoin violations.

In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2088, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), the Court identified several factors that are relevant to the question of implied private remedies. These include the legislative history. See ibid. ("Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?") This history does not lead to a contrary conclusion with respect to implied remedies under either Act. Indeed, the Reports and debates provide affirmative support for the view that Congress intended the limitations imposed on citizen suits to apply to all private suits under these Acts.27 Thus, both the structure of the Acts and their legislative history lead us to conclude that Congress intended that private remedies in addition to those expressly provided should not be implied.28 Where, as here, Congress has made clear that implied private actions are not contemplated, the courts are not authorized to ignore this legislative judgment.

Although the parties have not suggested it, there remains a possible alternative source of express congressional authorization of private suits under these Acts. Last Term, in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980), the Court construed 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as authorizing suits to redress violations by state officials of rights created by federal statutes. Accordingly, it could be argued that respondents may sue the municipalities and sewerage boards among the petitioners29 under the FWPCA and MPRSA by virtue of a right of action created by § 1983.

It is appropriate to reach the question of the applicability of Maine v. Thiboutot to this setting, despite the failure of respondents to raise it here or below. This litigation began long before that decision. Moreover, if controlling, this argument would obviate the need to consider whether Congress intended to authorize private suits to enforce these particularly federal statutes. The claim brought here arguably falls within the scope of Maine v. Thiboutot because it involves a suit by a private party claiming that a federal statute has been violated under color of state law, causing an injury. The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the application of § 1983 to statutory violations. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981), we remanded certain claims for a determination (i) whether Congress had foreclosed private enforcement of that statute in the enactment itself, and (ii) whether the statute at issue there was the kind that created enforceable "rights" under § 1983. Id., at 28, 101 S.Ct., at 1545. In the present cases, because we find that Congress foreclosed a § 1983 remedy under these Acts, we need not reach the second question whether these Acts created "rights, privileges, or immunities" within the meaning of § 1983.

When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983. As Justice STEWART, who later joined the majority in Maine v. Thiboutot, stated in Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 673, n. 2, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1945, n. 2, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979) (dissenting opinion), when "a state official is alleged to have violated a federal statute which provides its own comprehensive enforcement scheme, the requirements of that enforcement procedure may not be bypassed by bringing suit directly under § 1983."30 As discussed above, the FWPCA and MPRSA do provide quite comprehensive enforcement mechanisms. It is hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action when it created so many specific statutory remedies, including the two citizen-suit provisions.31 See Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Virginia State Water Control Board, 501 F.Supp. 821 (ED Va. 1980) (rejecting a § 1983 action under the FWPCA against the Chairman of a State Water Board, with reasoning based on the comprehensiveness of the remedies provided and the federalism concerns raised). We therefore conclude that the existence of these express remedies demonstrates not only that Congress intended to foreclose implied private actions but also that it intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be available under § 1983. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1474, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980).

The remaining two issues on which we grant certiorari relate to respondents' federal claims based on the federal common law of nuisance. The principal precedent on which these claims were based is Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972), where the Court found that the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider the federal common-law issues raised by a suit for injunctive relief by the State of Illinois against various Wisconsin municipalities and public sewerage commissions, involving the discharge of sewage into Lake Michigan. In these cases, we need not decide whether a cause of action may be brought under federal common law by a private plaintiff, seeking damages. The Court has now held that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive scope of the FWPCA, which was completely revised soon after the decision in Illinois v. Milwaukee. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 101 S.Ct. 1784, 68 L.Ed.2d 114 (1981).

This decision disposes entirely of respondents' federal common-law claims, since there is no reason to suppose that the pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when pollution of coastal waters is at issue. To the extent that this litigation involves ocean waters not covered by the FWPCA, and regulated under the MPRSA, we see no cause for different treatment of the pre-emption question. The regulatory scheme of the MPRSA is no less comprehensive, with respect to ocean dumping, than are analogous provisions of the FWPCA.32

We therefore must dismiss the federal common-law claims because their underlying legal basis is now pre-empted by statute. As discussed above, we also dismiss the claims under the MPRSA and the FWPCA because respondents lack a right of action under those statutes. We vacate the judgment below with respect to these two claims, and remand for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice BLACKMUN joins, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.

When should a person injured by a violation of federal law be allowed to recover his damages in a federal court? This seemingly simple question has recently presented the Court with more difficulty than most substantive questions that come before us.1 During most of our history, however, a simple presumption usually provided the answer. Although criminal laws and legislation enacted for the benefit of the public at large were expected to be enforced by public officials, a statute enacted for the benefit of a special class presumptively afforded a remedy for members of that class injured by violations of the statute. See Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40, 36 S.Ct. 482, 484, 60 L.Ed. 874.2 Applying that presumption, our truly conservative federal judges—men like Justice Harlan,3 Justice Clark,4 Justice Frankfurter,5 and Judge Kirkpatrick6—readily concluded that it was appropriate to allow private parties who had been injured by a violation of statute enacted for their special benefit to obtain judicial relief. For rules are meant to be obeyed, and those who violate them should be held responsible for their misdeeds. See Rigsby, supra, 241 U.S., at 39, 36 S.Ct., at 484. Since the earliest days of the common law, it has been the business of courts to fashion remedies for wrongs.7

In recent years, however, a Court that is properly concerned about the burdens imposed upon the federal judiciary, the quality of the work product of Congress, and the sheer bulk of new federal legislation, has been more and more reluctant to open the courthouse door to the injured citizen. In 1975, in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26, the Court cut back on the simple common-law presumption by fashioning a four-factor formula that led to the denial of relief in that case.8 Although multifactor balancing tests generally tend to produce negative answers, more recently some Members of the Court have been inclined to deny relief with little more than a perfunctory nod to the Cort v. Ash factors. See, e. g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 302, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1783, 68 L.Ed.2d 101 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment). The touchstone now is congressional intent. See ante, at 13. Because legislative history is unlikely to reveal affirmative evidence of a congressional intent to authorize a specific procedure that the statute itself fails to mention,9 that touchstone will further restrict the availability of private remedies.

Although I agree with the Court's disposition of the implied-private-right-of-action question in these cases, I write separately to emphasize that the Court's current approach to the judicial task of fashioning appropriate remedies for violations of federal statutes is out of step with the Court's own history and tradition. More importantly, I believe that the Court's appraisal of the intent expressed by Congress in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. III), with respect to the availability of private remedies under other federal statutes or the federal common law is palpably wrong.

In the present context of these cases, we of course know nothing about the ultimate merits of the claims asserted by respondents. As the cases come to us, however, we must make certain assumptions in analyzing the questions presented. First, we must assume that the complaint speaks the truth when it alleges that the petitioners have dumped large quantities of sewage and toxic waste in the Atlantic Ocean and its tributaries, and that these dumping operations have violated the substantive provisions of the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 80, n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 1571, 1575, n. 3, 67 L.Ed.2d 750. Second, we must also assume that these illegal operations have caused an injury to respondents' commercial interests. Third, because some of the petitioners are "persons" who allegedly acted under color of state law, as the Court recognizes, see ante, at 19, and n. 29, we must assume that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. III)10 provides an express remedy for their violations of these two federal statutes, unless Congress has expressly withdrawn that remedy. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555. Finally we must assume that, apart from these two statutes, the dumping operations of petitioners would constitute a common-law nuisance for which respondents would have a federal remedy. The net effect of the Court's analysis of the legislative intent is therefore a conclusion that Congress, by enacting the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA, deliberately deprived respondents of effective federal remedies that would otherwise have been available to them. In my judgment, the language of both statutes, as well as their legislative history, belies this improbable conclusion.

* The Court's holding that Congress decided in the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA to withdraw the express remedy provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. III) seems to rest on nothing more than the fact that these statutes provide other express remedies and do not mention § 1983. Because the enforcement mechanisms provided in the statutes are "quite comprehensive," the Court finds it "hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action. . . ." Ante, at 20. There are at least two flaws in this reasoning. First, the question is not whether Congress "intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action," but rather whether Congress intended to withdraw that right of action.11 Second, I find it not at all hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve, or, more precisely, did not intend to withdraw, the § 1983 remedy because Congress made this intention explicit in the language of both statutes and in the relevant legislative history.

I agree with the Court that the remedial provisions of the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA are "quite comprehensive." I cannot agree, however, with the Court's implicit conclusion that this determination ends the inquiry under Maine v. Thiboutot, supra. The question that must be answered in determining whether respondents may pursue their claims under § 1983 is whether Congress intended that the remedies provided in the substantive statutes be exclusive. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1545, 67 L.Ed.2d 694. Because Congress did not expressly address this question in the statutes, the Court looks elsewhere for an answer and finds it in the comprehensive character of the express statutory remedies. I have no quarrel as a general matter with the proposition that a comprehensive remedial scheme can evidence a congressional decision to preclude other remedies. Cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra, 451 U.S., at 93-94, 101 S.Ct., at 1581-1582. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that our evaluation of a statute's express remedies is merely a tool used to discern congressional intent; it is not an end in itself. No matter how comprehensive we may consider a statute's remedial scheme to be, Congress is at liberty to leave other remedial avenues open. Express statutory language or clear references in the legislative history will rebut whatever presumption of exclusivity arises from comprehensive remedial provisions. In my judgment, in these cases we are presented with both express statutory language and clear references in the legislative history indicating that Congress did not intend the express remedies in the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA to be exclusive.

Despite their comprehensive enforcement mechanisms, both statutes expressly preserve all legal remedies otherwise available. The statutes state in so many words that the authorization of an express remedy in the statute itself shall not give rise to an inference that Congress intended to foreclose other remedies. Thus, § 505(e) of the Clean Water Act states:

"Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator or a State agency)." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).

"The injunctive relief provided by this subsection shall not restrict any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including relief against the Administrator, the Secretary, or a State agency)." 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(5).

Respondents' right to proceed under § 1983 in light of these statutory provisions could have been made more plain only had Congress substituted the citation "42 U.S.C. § 1983" for the words "any statute" in the saving clauses.

The legislative history of both statutes makes it clear that the saving clauses were intended to mean what they say. The Senate Report on the Clean Water Act states:

"It should be noted, however, that the section would specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution damages." S.Rep.No.92-414, p. 81 (1971), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1972, p. 3746.

See also H.R.Rep.No.92-911, p. 134 (1972). And the corresponding report on the MPRSA similarly states that the authorization of citizen suits shall not restrict or supersede "any other right to legal action which is afforded the potential litigant in any other statute or the common law." S.Rep.No.92-451, pp. 23-24 (1971), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1972, p. 4250. See also H.R.Rep.No.92-361, p. 23 (1971).

The words "any other law" in the former Report and "any other statute" in the latter surely encompass 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 ed., Supp. III), as do the words "any statute" in the saving clauses themselves. It therefore seems little short of remarkable that unambiguous expressions of legislative intent such as these can be read to express a purpose to withdraw the express statutory remedy provided by § 1983.

The Court, of course, discusses the saving clauses and this legislative history elsewhere in its opinion. See ante, at 15-17, and n. 26. In rejecting the Court of Appeals' conclusion, based in part on the saving clauses, that respondents may invoke implied rights of action under the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA, the Court finds it "doubtful" that the phrase "any statute" in the saving clauses refers to the very statutes in which the clauses appear. See ante, at 15-16. The Court's doubt is reinforced by use of the word "other" in the passages from the Senate Reports quoted above. See ante, at 16, n. 26. Thus, the Court holds that the statutory phrase "any statute" does not refer to the Clean Water Act or the MPRSA; the Court apparently also holds that it does not refer to § 1983, even though that statute clearly qualifies as "any other statute" or "any other law," within the meaning of the legislative history.12

In my judgment, the Court has failed to uncover "a clear congressional mandate"13 to withdraw the § 1983 remedy otherwise available to the respondents. Moreover, the statutory language and the legislative history reveal the exact opposite: a clear congressional mandate to preserve all existing remedies, including a private right of action under § 1983. I therefore respectfully dissent from this portion of the Court's decision.

The effect of the Court's holding in Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 101 S.Ct. 1784, 68 L.Ed.2d 114, was to make the city of Milwaukee's compliance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act a complete defense to a federal common-law nuisance action for pollution damage. It was, and still is, difficult for me to reconcile that holding with the excerpts from the statutes and the Senate Reports quoted above—particularly the statement:

"Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution damages." S.Rep.No.92-414, at 81 (1971), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1972, p. 3746.

Today, the Court pursues the pre-emption rationale of Milwaukee v. Illinois to its inexorable conclusion and holds that even noncompliance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA is a defense to a federal common-law nuisance claim.14 Because Justice BLACKMUN has already exposed in detail the flaws in the Court's treatment of this issue, see Milwaukee v. Illinois, supra, at 333-347, 101 S.Ct., at 1800-1808 (dissenting opinion), I merely note that the reasoning in his dissenting opinion in Milwaukee applies with special force in this case.15

Although I agree with the Court's holding that neither of these statutes implicitly authorizes a private damages remedy, I reach that conclusion by a different route. Under the traditional common-law analysis discussed supra, at 23-24, the primary question is whether the statute was enacted for the special benefit of a particular class of which the plaintiff is a member. See Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S., at 39-40, 36 S.Ct., at 484. As we have held in the past, "[t]hat question is answered by looking to the language of the statute itself." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1953, 60 L.Ed.2d 560.

The language of neither the Clean Water Act nor the MPRSA defines any such special class. Both the substantive provisions of these statutes and the breadth of their authorizations of citizen suits indicate that they were "enacted for the protection of the general public." Cannon, supra, at 690, 99 S.Ct., at 1954.16 Thus, even under the more liberal approach to implied rights of action represented by Rigsby and its antecedents, respondents cannot invoke implied private remedies under these statutes. See generally California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S., at 294-296, 101 S.Ct., at 1779-1780.

The conclusion required by the statutory language is fortified by the legislative history on which the Court relies. I agree that the legislative deliberations about civil remedies under the Clean Air Act, see ante, at 17-18, n. 27, illuminate the meaning of the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA—since these statutes were enacted only a short time later and had similar environmental objectives—and that those deliberations reveal a conscious congressional choice not to authorize a new statutory damages remedy. Accordingly, I agree with the conclusion reached by the Court in Part II-A of its opinion, but I respectfully dissent from the remainder of its judgment.