This case presents the question of whether Oregon's judicial procedure for eviction of tenants after nonpayment of rent violates either the Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The material facts were stipulated. Appellants were the month-to-month tenants of appellee Normet1 and paid $100 a month for the use of a single-family residence in Portland, Oregon. On November 10, 1969, the City Bureau of Buildings declared the dwelling unfit for habitation due to substandard conditions on the premises.2 Appellants requested appellee to make certain repairs which, with one minor exception, appellee refused to do. Appellants, who had paid the November rent, refused to pay the December rent until the requested improvements had been made. Appellee's attorney wrote a letter on December 15 threatening to 'get a Court Order out on this matter' unless the accrued rent was immediately paid.

On January 7, 1970, however, before statutory eviction procedures were begun in the Oregon courts, appellants filed suit in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking a declaratory judgment that the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer (hereinafter sometimes FED) Statute, Ore.Rev.Stat. (ORS) §§ 105.105—105.160,3 was unconstitutional on its face, and an injunction against its continued enforcement. A three-judge court was convened under 28 U.S.C. § 2281, a temporary restraining order was issued against the enforcement of the FED Statute, and appellants were ordered to make their rent payments into an escrow account during the pendency of the District Court proceeding. A lengthy stipulation of facts was agreed upon, a number of exhibits and depositions were submitted, and the District Court then granted appellee's motion to dismiss the complaint,4 after concluding that the statute was not unconstitutional under either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Appellants promptly appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction.6

* The Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute establishes a procedure intended to insure that any entry upon real property 'shall be made in a peaceable manner and without force.' § 105.105. A landlord may bring an action for possession whenever the tenant has failed to pay rent within 10 days of its due date, when the tenant is holding contrary to some other covenant in a lease, and whenever the landlord has terminated the rental arrangement by proper notice and the tenant remains in possession after the expiration date specified in the notice. § 105.115. Service of the complaint on the tenant must be not less than two nor more than four days before the trial date, § 105.135; a tenant may obtain a two-day continuance, but grant of a longer continuance is conditioned on a tenant's posting security for the payment of any rent that may accrue, if the plaintiff ultimately prevails, during the period of the continuance. § 105.140. The suit may be tried to either a judge or a jury, and the only issue is whether the allegations of the complaint are true, §§ 105.145, 105.150. The only award that a plaintiff may recover is restitution of possession. § 105.155. A defendant who loses such a suit may appeal only if he obtains two sureties who will provide security for the payment to the plaintiff, if the defendant ultimately loses on appeal, of twice the rental value of the property from the time of commencement of the action to final judgment. § 105.160.7

Appellants' principal attacks8 are leveled at three characteristics of the Oregon FED Statute: the requirement of a trial no later than six days after service of the complaint unless security for accruing rent is provided; the provisions of § 105.145 which, either on their face or as construed, are said to limit the triable issues in an FED suit to the tenant's default and to preclude consideration of defenses based on the landlord's breach of a duty to maintain the premises; and the requirement of posting bond on appeal from an adverse decision in twice the amount of the rent expected to accrue pending appellate decision. These provisions are asserted to violate both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Except for the appeal bond requirement (see Part IV, infra), we reject these claims.

We are unable to conclude that either the early-trial provision or the limitation on litigable issues is invalid on its face under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In those recurring cases where the tenant fails to pay rent or holds over after expiration of his tenancy and the issue in the ensuing litigation is simply whether he has paid or held over, we cannot declare that the Oregon statute allows an unduly short time for trial preparation. Tenants would appear to have as much access to relevant facts as their landlord, and they can be expected to know the terms of their lease, whether they have paid their rent, whether they are in possession of the premises, and whether they have received a proper notice to quit, if one is necessary. Particularly where, as here, rent has admittedly been deliberately withheld and demand for payment made, claims of prejudice from an early trial date are unpersuasive. The provision for continuance of the action if the tenant posts security for accruing rent means that in cases where tenant defendants, unlike appellants, deny nonpayment of rent and may require more time to prepare for litigation, they will not be forced to trial if they provide for rent payments in the interim. A requirement that the tenant pay or provide for the payment of rent during the continuance of the action is hardly irrational or oppressive. It is customary to pay rent in advance, and the simplicity of the issues in the typical FED action will usually not require extended trial preparation and litigation, thus making the posting of a large security deposit unnecessary. Of course, it is possible for this provision to be applied so as to deprive a tenant of a proper hearing in specific situations, but there is no such showing made here, and possible infirmity in other situations does not render it invalid on its face.9

Nor does Oregon deny due process of law by restricting the issues in FED actions to whether the tenant has paid rent and honored the covenants he has assumed, issues that may be fairly and fully litigated under the Oregon procedure. The tenant is barred from raising claims in the FED action that the landlord has failed to maintain the premises, but the landlord is also barred from claiming back rent or asserting other claims against the tenant.10 The tenant is not foreclosed from instituting his own action against the landlord and litigating his right to damages or other relief in that action.11

'Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every available defense.' American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168, 53 S.Ct. 98, 102, 77 L.Ed. 231 (1932). See also Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396, 54 S.Ct. 743, 744, 78 L.Ed. 1323 (1934). Appellants do not deny, however, that there are available procedures to litigate any claims against the landlord cognizable in Oregon. Their claim is that they are denied due process of law because the rental payments are not suspended while the alleged wrongdoings of the landlord are litigated.12 We see no constitutional barrier to Oregon's insistence that the tenant provide for accruing rent pending judicial settlement of his disputes with the lessor.13

The Court has twice held that it is permissible to segregate an action for possession of property from other actions arising out of the same factual situation that may assert valid legal or equitable defenses or counterclaims. In Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133, 35 S.Ct. 279, 59 L.Ed. 501 (1915) (Holmes, J.), the Court upheld against due process attack a Louisiana procedure that provided that a defendant sued in a possessory action for real property could not bring an action to establish title or present equitable claims until after the possessory suit was brought to a conclusion.14 In Bianchi v. Morales, 262 U.S. 170, 43 S.Ct. 526, 67 L.Ed. 928 (1923) (Holmes, J.), the Court considered Puerto Rico's mortgage law which provided for summary foreclosure of a mortgage without allowing any defense except payment. The Court concluded that it was permissible under the Due Process Clause to 'exclude all claims of ultimate right from possessory actions,' id., at 171, 43 S.Ct., at 526, and to allow other equitable defenses to be set up in a separate action to annul the mortgage.

Underlying appellants' claim is the assumption that they are denied due process of law unless Oregon recognizes the failure of the landlord to maintain the premises as an operative defense to the possessory FED action and as an adequate excuse for nonpayment of rent. The Constitution has not federalized the substantive law of landlord-tenant relations, however, and we see nothing to forbid Oregon from treating the undertakings of the tenant and those of the landlord as independent rather than dependent covenants. Likewise, the Constitution does not authorize us to require that the term of an otherwise expired tenancy be extended while the tenant's damage claims against the landlord are litigated. The substantive law of landlord-tenant relations differs widely in the various States. In some jurisdictions, a tenant may argue as a defense to eviction for nonpayment of rent such claims as unrepaired building code violations, breach of an implied warranty of habitability, or the fact that the landlord is evicting him for reporting building code violations or for exercising constitutional rights.15 Some States have enacted statutes authorizing rent withholding in certain situations.16 In other jurisdictions, these claims, if cognizable at all, must be litigated in separate tort, contract, or civil rights suits. There is no showing that Oregon excludes any defenses it recognizes as 'available' on the three questions (physical possession, forcible withholding, legal right to possession) at issue in an FED suit.

We also cannot agree that the FED Statute is invalid on its face under the Equal Protection Clause. It is true that Oregon FED suits differ substantially from other litigation, where the time between complaint and trial is substantially longer,17 and where a broader range of issues may be considered. But it does not follow that the Oregon statute invidiously discriminates against defendants in FED actions.

The statute potentially applies to all tenants, rich and poor, commercial and noncommercial; it cannot be faulted for over-exclusiveness or under-exclusiveness. And classifying tenants of real property differently from other tenants for purposes of possessory actions will offend the equal protection safeguard 'only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective,' McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961), or if the objective itself is beyond the State's power to achieve, Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 84 S.Ct. 1302, 12 L.Ed.2d 325 (1964); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). It is readily apparent that prompt as well as peaceful resolution of disputes over the right to possession of real property is the end sought by the Oregon statute.18 It is also clear that the provisions for early trial and simplification of issues are closely related to that purpose. The equal protection claim with respect to these provisions thus depends on whether the State may validly single out possessory disputes between landlord and tenant for especially prompt judicial settlement. In making such an inquiry a State is 'presumed to have acted within (its) constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, (its) laws result in some inequality.' McGowan v. Maryland, supra, 366 U.S., at 425—426, 81 S.Ct., at 1105.

At common law, one with the right to possession could bring an action for ejectment, a 'relatively slow, fairly complex, and substantially expensive procedure.'19 But, as Oregon cases have recognized, the common law also permitted the landlord to 'enter and expel the tenant by force, without being liable to an action of tort for damages, either for his entry upon the premises, or for an assault in expelling the tenant, provided he uses no more force than is necessary, and do(es) no wanton damage.' Smith v. Reeder, 21 Or. 541, 546, 28 P. 890, 891 (1892). The landlord-tenant relationship was one of the few areas where the right to self-help was recognized by the common law of most States, and the implementation of this right has been fraught with 'violence and quarrels and bloodshed.' Entelman v. Hagood, 95 Ga. 390, 392, 22 S.E. 545 (1895).20 An alternative legal remedy to prevent such breaches of the peace has appeared to be an overriding necessity to many legislators and judges.

Hence, the Oregon statute was enacted in 1866 to alter the common law and obviate resort to self-help and violence. The statute, intended to protect tenants as well as landlords, provided a speedy, judicially supervised proceeding to settle the possessory issue in a peaceful manner:

'But if (the landlord) forcibly enter and expels the tenant, while he may not be liable to him in an action of tort, he is guilty of a violation of the forcible entry and detainer act, which is designed to protect the public peace; and in such case the law will award restitution to the tenant, not because it recognizes any rights in him, but for the reason that, out of regard for the peace and good order of society, it does not permit a person, in the quiet and peaceable possession of land, to be disturbed by force, even by one lawfully entitled to the possession.' Smith v. Reeder, 21 Or., at 546—547, 28 P., at 891.

Before a tenant is forcibly evicted from property the Oregon statute requires a judicial determination that he is not legally entitled to possession. 'The action of forcible entry and detainer is intended for the benefit of him whose possession is invaded.' Taylor v. Scott, 10 Or. 483, 485 (1883). The objective of achieving rapid and peaceful settlement of possessory disputes between landlord and tenant has ample historical explanation and support. It is not beyond the State's power to implement that purpose by enacting special provisions applicable only to possessory disputes between landlord and tenant.

There are unique factual and legal characteristics of the landlord-tenant relationship that justify special statutory treatment inapplicable to other litigants. The tenant is, by definition, in possession of the property of the landlord; unless a judicially supervised mechanism is provided for what would otherwise be swift repossession by the landlord himself, the tenant would be able to deny the landlord the rights of income incident to ownership by refusing to pay rent and by preventing sale or rental to someone else. Many expenses of the landlord, continue to accrue whether a tenant pays his rent or not. Speedy adjudication is desirable to prevent subjecting the landlord to undeserved economic loss and the tenant to unmerited harassment and dispossession when his lease or rental agreement gives him the right to peaceful and undisturbed possession of the property. Holding over by the tenant beyond the term of his agreement or holding without payment of rent has proved a virulent source of friction and dispute. We think Oregon was well within its constitutional powers in providing for rapid and peaceful settlement of these disputes.

Appellants argue, however, that a more stringent standard than mere rationality should be applied both to the challenged classification and its stated purpose. They contend that the 'need for decent shelter' and the 'right to retain peaceful possession of one's home' are fundamental interests which are particularly important to the poor and which may be trenched upon only after the State demonstrates some superior interest. They invoke those cases holding that certain classifications based on unalterable traits such as race21 and lineage22 are inherently suspect and must be justified by some 'overriding statutory purpose.' They also rely on cases where classifications burdening or infringing constitutionally protected rights were required to be justified as 'necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.'23

We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality, or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease without the payment of rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the relevant agreement. Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions. Nor should we forget that the Constitution expressly protects against confiscation of private property or the income therefrom.

Since the purpose of the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer Statute is constitutionally permissible and since the classification under attack is rationally related to that purpose, the statute is not repugnant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

We agree with appellants, however, that the double-bond prerequisite for appealing an FED action violates their right to the equal protection of the laws. To appeal a civil case in Oregon, the ordinary litigant must file an undertaking, with one or more sureties, covering 'all damages, costs and disbursements which may be awarded against him on the appeal.' ORS § 19.040.24 In order to secure a stay of execution, the undertaking, where the judgment is for money, must also provide that the appellant will satisfy the judgment if he loses the appeal or, if the judgment is for real property, that he will commit no waste during the pendency of the appeal and, if he loses the appeal, that he will pay for the use of the property during this time. In an FED action, however, a defendant who loses in the district court and who wishes to appeal must give 'in addition to the undertaking now required by law upon appeal,' an undertaking with two sureties for the payment of twice the rental value of the premises 'from the commencement of the action in which the judgment was rendered until final judgment in the action.' ORS § 105.160. (Emphasis added.) In the event the judgment is affirmed, the landlord is automatically entitled to twice the rents accruing during the appeal without proof of actual damage in that amount. See Priester v. Thrall, 229 Or. 184, 187, 349 P.2d 866, 868 (1960). In Scales v. Spencer, 246 Or. 111, 113—114, 424 P.2d 242, 243 (1967), the Oregon Supreme Court explained the rationale of the double-bond requirement:

'Inasmuch as a final judgment for restitution could not include a judgment for rent pending appeal it appears obvious that the legislative purpose for requiring this particular bond on appeal was to guarantee that the rent pending an appeal would be paid. That the bond must provide for double the rental value was, no doubt, intended to prevent frivolous appeals for the purpose of delay. If there were not some added cost or restriction every ousted tenant would appeal, regardless of the justification. It can also be assumed that the additional payment would compensate for waste or is in lieu of damages for the unlawful holding over.'

We have earlier said that Oregon may validly make special provision for the peaceful and expeditious settlement of disputes over possession between landlord and tenant and that the early-trial and continuance bond provisions of the FED statute rationally implement that purpose because the tenant's right to possession beyond the initial six-day period is conditioned on securing the landlord against the loss of accruing rent. Similar conditions on the tenant's right to appeal, such as those imposed by § 19.040, would also raise no serious constitutional questions at least on the face of such a statute. Section 105.160, however, imposes additional requirements that in our judgment bear no reasonable relationship to any valid state objective and that arbitrarily discriminate against tenants appealing from adverse decisions in FED actions.

This Court has recognized that if a full and fair trial on the merits is provided, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a State to provide appellate review, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18, 76 S.Ct. 585, 590, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 627, 57 S.Ct. 660, 663, 81 L.Ed. 843 (1937); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District, 281 U.S. 74, 80, 50 S.Ct. 228, 230, 74 L.Ed. 710 (1930); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508, 23 S.Ct. 390, 392, 47 L.Ed. 563 (1903); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687—688, 14 S.Ct. 913, 914—915, 38 L.Ed. 867 (1894), and the continuing validity of these cases is not at issue here. When an appeal is afforded, however, it cannot be granted to some litigants and capriciously or arbitrarily denied to others without violating the Equal Protection Clause. Griffin v. Illinois, supra; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6 L.Ed.2d 39 (1961); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 83 S.Ct. 788, 9 L.Ed.2d 892 (1963); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 87 S.Ct. 362, 17 L.Ed.2d 290 (1966); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 580, 21 L.Ed.2d 601 (1969). Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 82 S.Ct. 917, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 (1962); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 78 S.Ct. 974, 2 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1958).

It cannot be denied that the double-bond requirement heavily burdens the statutory right of an FED defendant to appeal. While a State may properly take steps to insure that an appellant post adequate security before an appeal to preserve the property at issue, to guard a damage award already made, or to insure a landlord against loss of rent if the tenant remains in possession, the double-bond requirement here does not effectuate these purposes since it is unrelated to actual rent accrued or to specific damage sustained by the landlord. This requirement is unnecessary to assure the landlord payment of accrued rent since the undertaking an FED defendant must file pursuant to the general appeal bond statute, ORS § 19.040(1)(b), must cover 'the value of the use and occupation of such property . . . from the time of the appeal until the delivery of the possession thereof,' and since the landlord may bring a separate action at law for payment of back rent under ORS § 91.220.25 Moreover, the landlord is protected against waste or damages occurring during the appeal by the § 19.040(1)(b) undertaking that the tenant must file if he wishes to remain in possession of the property during the appeal. The claim that the double-bond requirement operates to screen out frivolous appeals is unpersuasive, for it not only bars nonfrivolous appeals by those who are unable to post the bond but also allows meritless appeals by others who can afford the bond. The impact on FED appellants is unavoidable: if the lower court decision is affirmed, the entire double bond is forfeited; recovery is not limited to costs incurred by the appellee, rent owed, or damage suffered. No other appellant is subject to automatic assessment of unproved damages. We discern nothing in the special purposes of the FED statute or in the special characteristics of the landlordtenant relationship to warrant this discrimination.

We do not question here reasonable procedural provisions to safeguard litigated property, cf. National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37, 75 S.Ct. 92, 99 L.Ed. 46 (1954), or to discourage patently insubstantial appeals, if these rules are reasonably tailored to achieve these ends and if they are uniformly and nondiscriminatorily applied. Moreover, a State has broad authority to provide for the recovery of double or treble damages in cases of illegal conduct that it regards as particularly reprehensible, even though posting an appeal bond by an appellant will be doubly or triply more difficult than it otherwise would be. In the case before us, however, the State has not sought to protect a damage award or property an appellee is right-fully entitled to because of a lower court judgment.26 Instead, it has automatically doubled the stakes when a tenant seeks to appeal an adverse judgment in an FED action. The discrimination against the poor, who could pay their rent pending an appeal but cannot post the double bond, is particularly obvious. For them, as a practical matter, appeal is foreclosed, no matter how meritorious their case may be. The nonindigent FED appellant also is confronted by a substantial barrier to appeal faced by no other civil litigant in Oregon. The discrimination against the class of FED appellants is arbitrary and irrational, and the double-bond requirement of ORS § 105.160 violates the Equal Protection Clause.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Mr. Justice POWELL and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting in part.

* I agree with the Court that the double-bond provision in the Oregon eviction statute denies tenants who are affected by forcible entry and wrongful detainer procedures (called FED) that equal protection guaranteed against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment.

The ordinary or customary litigant who appeals must file a bond with one or more sureties covering 'all damages, costs and disbursements which may be awarded against him on the appeal.'1 To obtain a stay of execution pending the appeal the undertaking must also provide: (1) if the suit is for recovery of money or personal property (or its value), that the appellant will satisfy the claim if he loses the appeal and (2) if the judgment is for the recovery of possession of real property, for a partition or for the foreclosure of a lien, that during possession the appellant will not commit waste and that if he loses the appeal, he will pay the value of the use of the property during the appeal.

By contrast, if a tenant in an FED action appeals, he must give 'in addition to the undertaking now required by law upon appeal'2 an undertaking with two sureties for payment of twice the rental value of the premises from the commencement of the action until final judgment.

The more onerous requirement placed on tenants is said to be a guarantee that rent pending appeal will be paid. Scales v. Spencer, 246 Or. 111, 424 P.2d 242. Yet the general appeal statute would give that protection.3

It is said that the landlord deserves protection for waste or damages pending appeal. Ibid. But that protection is also provided under the general appeal statute.

It is said that a double-rent bond protects the landlord against possible waste or damage which occurs prior to, not during, the appeal. But the same reason would be germane to waste or damage in other suits brought to obtain possession of property. Drawing the line between the present suits to obtain possession and other suits and saddling tenants with double-rent bonds but not saddling other owners with such bonds seems to me obviously an invidious discrimination.

It is said that the double-rent bond is designed to prevent frivolous appeals taken for the sole purpose of delaying eviction as long as possible. Ibid. Yet frivolous appeals could as well be taken by defendants whose lien is being foreclosed and who desire to remain in possession. It is an invidious discrimination at which the Equal Protection Clause is aimed for a legislature to select one class of appellants who seek to retain possession of property and place a more onerous condition on their right to appeal than is placed on other like appellants.

In sum, the double-bond procedure is landlord legislation, not evenly weighted between his proprietary interest in the property and the rights of the tenants. Over a third of our population lives in apartments or other rented housing.4 The home whether rented or owned—is the very heart of privacy in modern America. Mr. Justice Marshall in Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 52, 90 S.Ct. 200, 203, 24 L.Ed.2d 214 (dissenting), spoke of the protection afforded 'fundamental interests' when it came to classifications made by legislatures. In that case it was the franchise. Race is in the same category (McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S.Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222); so are wealth (Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169); procreation (Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655); and interstate travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600). Classifications that burden, impinge, or discriminate against such fundamental interests5 are 'highly suspect.' McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 807, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1407, 22 L.Ed.2d 739.

Modern man's place of retreat for quiet and solace is the home. Whether rented or owned, it is his sanctuary. Being uprooted and put into the street is a traumatic experience. Legislatures can, of course, protect property interests of landlords. But when they weight the scales as heavily as does Oregon for the landlord and against the fundamental interest of the tenant they must be backed by some 'compelling . . . interest,' Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1889, 23 L.Ed.2d 583. No such 'compelling . . . interest' underlies this statutory scheme.

The double-rent bond required of tenants, but not required of others in possession of real estate, is properly held to be unconstitutional by reason of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I cannot agree, however, that the remainder of Oregon's FED Statute satisfies the requirements of due process of law.

I am satisfied that the Court properly addresses itself to the remaining questions rather than requiring appellants, who are already destitute, to start litigation all over in the Oregon state courts. The three-judge court that decided this case is a panel of distinguished Oregon lawyers and judges. Judge Goodwin came to the District Court from the Supreme Court of Oregon. Judge Solomon has practiced and sat in Portland, Oregon, for years. Judge Kilkenny was a well-known practitioner in Pendleton, Oregon, before coming to the federal bench. These men have their roots deep in Oregon law and are by no means outsiders unfamiliar with it. On local-law questions we have long deferred to federal judges who have come from law practice in a State whose local law is at issue in a federal case. See MacGregor v. State Mutual Life Assur. Co., 315 U.S. 280, 281, 62 S.Ct. 607, 86 L.Ed. 846; Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237, 64 S.Ct. 1015, 1018, 88 L.Ed. 1246; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 204, 76 S.Ct. 273, 277, 100 L.Ed. 199; Magenau v. Aetna Freight Lines, 360 U.S. 273, 281 n. 2, 79 S.Ct. 1184, 1189, 3 L.Ed.2d 1224 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

This is a most appropriate occasion to honor that tradition. While there are occasional appropriate cases for abstention (see Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 90 S.Ct. 788, 25 L.Ed.2d 68), this Court's abstention doctrine that requires litigants to start all over again in a state court after having financed their course all the way to this Court is likely to exhaust only the litigants.

This all-Oregon panel said on the abstention issue:

'It is unlikely that an application of state law would change the posture of the federal constitutional issues. No state administrative process is involved. The case has been thoroughly briefed and argued on the merits, and is presented on a clear and complete record. It is ripe for decision. Only one appeal (to the United States Supreme Court) will now be needed to settle the federal constitutional question. While the state courts are also capable of applying the United States Constitution to a challenged state law, two levels of appeal would be needed in an F.E.D. case within the state system. A final state-court decision would still not necessarily settle the federal constitutional question.

'Closely related to the time element is economy. Cases of this sort tax both courts and counsel. Until finally resolved, these cases produce expense, uncertainty, and frustration. Delay produces no balancing benefit, either of comity or of clarity in state-federal relations.'

Agreeing with that view, I come to the remaining constitutional issues.

In my view, there are defects in the Oregon procedures which go to the essence of a litigant's right of access to the courts, whether he be rich or poor, black or white.

The problem starts with Judge Wright's statement in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 138 U.S.App.D.C. 369, 372, 428 F.2d 1071, 1074:

'When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shelter' today, they seek a well known package of goods and services—a package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.'

This vital interest that is at stake may, of course, be tested in so-called summary proceedings. But the requirements of due process apply and due process entails the right 'to sue and defend in the courts,' a right we have described as 'the alternative of force' in an organized society. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148, 28 S.Ct. 34, 35, 52 L.Ed. 143. In essence the question comes down to notice and an opportunity to defend. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865.

Oregon gives the tenant 'not less than two or more than four days'6 after service of summons to go to trial. If service is on a Friday, trial could be on the following Monday. There can be no continuance for more than two days 'unless the defendant . . . gives an undertaking . . . with good and sufficient security' covering the rent which may accrue during the trial.7

For slum tenants—not to mention the middle class—this kind of summary procedure usually will mean in actuality no opportunity to be heard. Finding a lawyer in two days, acquainting him with the facts, and getting necessary witnesses make the theoretical opportunity to be heard and interpose a defense a promise of empty words. It is, indeed, a meaningless notice and opportunity to defend. The trial is likely to be held in the presence of only the judge and the landlord and the landlord's attorney.8

Moreover, even for tenants who have been lucky to find a lawyer, the landlord need only plead9 and prove10 the following items in order to win a judgment: (1) a description of the premises, (2) that the defendant is in possession of the premises, (3) that he entered upon them 'with force,' or unlawfully holds them 'with force,'11 and (4) that the plaintiff is entitled to possession.

Affirmative defenses such as the failure of the landlord to make repairs or that the motivation for the eviction was retaliation for a report by the tenant of a violation of a housing code are apparently precluded. This reflects the ancient notion that a lease is a conveyance of an 'estate in land,' in which the respective covenants—a tenant's to pay rent, the landlord's to repair—were deemed independent of each other. This approach was appropriate in the feudal culture in which property law evolved.12 But this feudal notion of landlord-tenant law—rooted in the special needs of an agrarian society—has not been a realistic approach to landlord-tenant law for many years,13 and has been replaced by what eminent authorities have described as 'a predominantly contractual' analysis of leasehold interests.14 This led Judge Wright in Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 138 U.S.App.D.C., at 373, 428 F.2d, at 1075, to hold 'that leases of urban dwelling units should be interpreted and construed like any other contract.' Oregon takes the same view and treats a lease as a contract. Wright v. Baumann, 239 Or. 410, 398 P.2d 119; Eggen v. Wetterborg, 193 Or. 145, 237 P.2d 970.

The Housing Code of Portland, Oregon, has as its declared purpose the protection of the life, health, and welfare of the public and of the owners and occupants of residential buildings.15 It forbids anyone to use or permit a building to be used in violation of its provisions. Id., § 8—204.

We do not know what Oregon would hold if a lease in violation of a housing code was before it in an FED case. But if the lease is a contract, then the opportunity to be heard would certainly embrace the issue of legality, if due process is to have any real significance. Oregon's statutory FED scheme is plainly to protect landlords against loss of rental income during lengthy litigation. See Menefee Lumber Co. v. Abrams, 138 Or. 263, 5 P.2d 709; Friedenthal v. Thompson, 146 Or. 640, 31 P.2d 643. But that is no justification for denial to tenants of due process, as there are other less drastic devices for protecting the landlord. Judge Wright in the Javins case, 138 U.S.App.D.C., at 381 n. 67, 428 F.2d, at 1083 n. 67, proposed 'an excellent protective procedure' in the form of a requirement that the tenant, who raises an affirmative defense based on housing code violations or other discriminatory landlord practices, pay rent into court as it became due.16 See also Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 139 U.S.App.D.C. 101, 430 F.2d 474. The District Court in the present case employed a similar procedure.

Appellees assert that the affirmative defenses mentioned are not relevant to the issues posed under Oregon's FED Act. They represent to us that the Oregon judges at the trial level have usually held that such defenses are not relevant, though the Oregon Supreme Court has not considered the question. What Oregon will hold or should hold is not the issue. Since, however, Oregon holds that a lease is a contract, all defenses relevant to its legality and its actual operation would seem to be within the ambit of the opportunity to be heard that is embraced within the concept of due process, at least until the issue has been resolved to the contrary.

The Court suggests that landlord-tenant law raises no federal questions. This is not quite so clear to me. We have held that the right to complain to public authorities is constitutionally protected. In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 15 S.Ct. 959, 39 L.Ed. 1080. If a defendant in an FED action is denied the right to assert as a defense the claim that he is being evicted, not for the nonpayment of rent, but because he exercised his constitutional right to complain to public officials about the disrepair of his apartment, a substantial federal question would be presented. See Edwards v. Habib, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 126, 129—137, 397 F.2d 687, 690—698 (1968).

The Court also implies that to find for appellants in this case, we would have to hold, as a matter of constitutional law, that a lease is required to be interpreted as an ordinary contract. But this is not at all necessary. Oregon has already adopted the modern, contractual view of leasehold analysis. The issue that confronts the Court is not whether such a view is constitutionally compelled, but whether, once Oregon has gone this far as a matter of state law, the requirements of due process permit a restriction of contract-type defenses in an FED action. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 627 n. 6, 89 S.Ct., at 1327, 22 L.Ed.2d 600; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404—406, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1794—1795, 10 L.Ed.2d 965.

Normally a State may bifurcate trials, deciding, say, the right to possession in one suit and the right to damages in another. See Bianchi v. Morales, 262 U.S. 170, 43 S.Ct. 526, 67 L.Ed. 928; American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 53 S.Ct. 98, 77 L.Ed. 231.

But where the right is so fundamental as the tenant's claim to his home, the requirements of due process should be more embracing. In the setting of modern urban life, the home, even though it be in the slums, is where man's roots are. To put him into the street when the slum landlord, not the slum tenant, is the real culprit deprives the tenant of a fundamental right without any real opportunity to defend. Then he loses the essence of the controversy, being given only empty promises that somehow, somewhere, someone may allow him to litigate the basic question in the case.

Bianchi v. Morales, supra, which sanctioned the bifurcated trial in the rural setting of Puerto Rico, where the contest was between mortgagor and mortgagee, would be an insufferable addition to the law of the modern ghetto.

A judgment obtained by the landlord, whether by default or otherwise, gives him the right to levy on the goods of the tenant to recover the costs and disbursements of the suit.17 Moreover, any past waste or damages, which are covered by the appeal bond, are not an issue in litigation in FED cases. As noted, the issues in Oregon FED cases are limited and the proceedings summary. Making the tenant liable for past waste or damage through the device of an appeal bond when he has no real opportunity to defend is a manifest denial of due process.

I dissent from an affirmance of this judgment.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN, dissenting in part.

In my view the District Court erred in declining to apply the doctrine of abstention with respect to the availability of defenses in FED actions.* The issue is whether Oregon would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if its substantive law in some circumstances recognized a tenant's rights to withhold rent and retain possession based on the landlord's breach of duty to maintain the premises, but its procedural law would not permit assertion of those rights in defense of an FED action. This constitutional issue is ripe for decision if, and only if, Oregon law (1) recognizes substantive rights of the tenant based on the landlord's breach of duty; (2) recognizes, because of such breach, that a tenant may remain in possession while withholding rent during the term or may hold over after expiration of the term, and (3) excludes the assertion of these rights to continued possession as a defense to an FED action.

The Court's opinion exposes the fallacy of the District Court's conclusion that Oregon law is 'clear' and that '(i)t is unlikely that an application of state law would change the posture of the federal constitutional issues.' App. 73. For the Court cites Oregon decisions that have recognized certain equitable defenses in FED actions, ante, at 66 n. 11, and can only conjecture that the defenses appellants sought to raise are 'apparently' not in this category. We cannot confidently say, therefore, how the Oregon courts would treat appellants' defenses, if available at all, when asserted in an FED suit, or how, if those defenses are available in FED suits, the Oregon courts would apply the requirement of a trial no later than six days after service of process. Clearly, therefore, the Oregon law is susceptible of a 'construction by the state courts that would avoid or modify the constitutional question.' Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249, 88 S.Ct. 391, 396, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967); Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 90 S.Ct. 788, 25 L.Ed.2d 68 (1970). In these circumstances the District Court should have remitted appellants to the Oregon courts for an authoritative interpretation of Oregon law in these respects before adjudicating appellants' plainly nonfrivolous constitutional attacks upon the FED Statute.

I would vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand with direction to the District Court (1) to enter judgment declaring that the double-bond requirement of Ore.Rev.Stat. § 105.160 violates the Equal Protection Clause, and (2) to retain jurisdiction and reinstate the temporary restraining order conditioned on the payment of rent into the escrow account, provided appellants, within a time fixed by the District Court, institute appropriate proceedings in the Oregon courts to obtain an authoritative interpretation of the FED Statute with respect to defenses available in actions thereunder.