The individual petitioners are 15 employees of the Department of Sanitation of New York City. Claiming they were wrongfully dismissed from employment in violation of their rights under the United States Constitution, they commenced this action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. That court dismissed the action and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 383 F.2d 364 (1967). We granted certiorari 390 U.S. 919, 88 S.Ct. 851, 19 L.Ed.2d 979 (1968).

Sometime in 1966, the Commissioner of Investigation of New York City1 began an investigation of charges that employees of the Department of Sanitation were not charging private cartmen proper fees for use of certain city facilities and were diverting to themselves the proceeds of fees that they did charge. The Commissioner obtained an order from the Supreme Court in New York County authorizing him to tap a telephone leased by the Department of Sanitation for the transaction of official business at the city facilities in question.2

In November 1966 each of the petitioners was summoned before the Commissioner. Each was advised that, in accordance with § 1123 of the New York City Charter, if he refused to testify with respect to his official conduct or that of any other city employee on the grounds of self-incrimination, his employment and eligibility for other city employment would terminate.3

Twelve of the petitioners, asserting the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, refused to testify. After a disciplinary hearing held pursuant to § 75 of the New York Civil Service Law, McKinney's Consol.Laws, c. 7, they were dismissed by the Commissioner of Sanitation on the explicit ground provided by § 1123 of the City Charter that they had refused to testify.

Three of the petitioners answered the questions put to them, denying the charges made. They were thereafter suspended by the Commissioner of Sanitation on the basis of 'information received from the Commissioner of Investigation concerning irregularities arising out of (their) employment in the Department of Sanitation.' Subsequently, they were summoned before a grand jury and asked to sign waivers of immunity. They refused. Administrative hearings were held pursuant to § 75 of the Civil Service Law, and they were dismissed from employment on the sole ground that they had violated § 1123 of the City Charter by refusing to sign waivers of immunity. We consider only the dismissal, rather than the suspension, of these petitioners.

Relying upon the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Gardner v. Broderick, 20 N.Y.2d 227, 282 N.Y.S.2d 487, 229 N.E.2d 184 (1967) (reversed this day, 392 U.S. 273, 88 S.Ct. 1913, 20 L.Ed.2d 1082), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the dismissal of petitioners did not offend the Federal Constitution. For the reasons which we elaborate in our opinion reversing the New York court's decision in Gardner v. Broderick, supra, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred.

Petitioners were not discharged merely for refusal to account for their conduct as employees of the city. They were dismissed for invoking and refusing to waive their constitutional right against self-incrimination. They were discharged for refusal to expose themselves to criminal prosecution based on testimony which they would give under compulsion, despite their constitutional privilege. Three were asked to sign waivers of immunity before the grand jury. Twelve were told that their answers to questions put to them by the Commissioner of Investigation could be used against them in subsequent proceedings,4 and were discharged for refusal to answer the questions on this basis. Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 87 S.Ct. 616, 17 L.Ed.2d 562 (1967), in which we held that testimony compelled by threat of dismissal from employment could not be used in a criminal prosecution of the witness, had not been decided when these 12 petitioners were put to their hazardous choice. In any event, we need not decide whether these petitioners would have effectively waived this constitutional protection if they had testified following the warning that their testimony could be used against them. They were entitled to remain silent because it was clear that New York was seeking, not merely an accounting of their use or abuse of their public trust, but testimony from their own lips which, despite the constitutional prohibition, could be used to prosecute them criminally.5

As we stated in Gardner v. Broderick, supra, if New York had demanded that petitioners answer questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of their official duties on pain of dismissal from public employment without requiring relinquishment of the benefits of the constitutional privilege, and if they had refused to do so, this case would be entirely different. In such a case, the employee's right to immunity as a result of his compelled testimony would not be at stake. But here the precise and plain impact of the proceedings against petitioners as well as of § 1123 of the New York Charter was to present them with a choice between surrendering their constitutional rights or their jobs. Petitioners as public employees are entitled, like all other persons, to the benefit of the Constitution, including the privilege against self-incrimination. Gardner v. Broderick, supra; Garrity v. State of New Jersey, supra. Cf. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, at 79, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1607, at 1609, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964). At the same time, petitioners, being public employees, subject themselves to dismissal if they refuse to account for their performance of their public trust, after proper proceedings, which do not involve an attempt to coerce them to relinquish their constitutional rights.

Reversed.

Mr. Justice BLACK concurs in the result.