The State of Georgia is the only State—indeed, apparently the only jurisdiction in the common-law world—to retain the common-law rule that a person charged with a criminal offense is incompetent to testify under oath in his own behalf at his trial. Georgia in 1866 abolished by statute the common-law rules of incompetency for most other persons. However, the statute, now Georgia Code § 38 416, expressly retained the incompetency rule as to persons 'charged in any criminal proceeding with the commission of any indictable offense or any offense punishable on summary conviction * * *.' Two years later, in 1868, Georgia allowed the criminal defendant to make an unsworn statement. The statute enacted for that purpose, as amended, is now Georgia Code, § 38—415, and provides: 'In all criminal trials, the prisoner shall have the right to make to the court and jury such statement in the case as he may deem proper in his defense. It shall not be under oath, and shall have such force only as the jury may think right to give it. They may believe it in preference to the sworn testimony in the case. The prisoner shall not be compelled to answer any questions on cross-examination, should he think proper to decline to answer.'

In this case a jury in the Superior Court, Douglas County, Georgia, convicted the appellant of murder, and he is under sentence of death. After the State rested its case at the trial, the appellant's counsel called him to the stand, but the trial judge sustained the State's objection to counsel's attempt to question him. To the argument that to deny counsel the 'right to ask the defendant any questions on the stand * * * violates * * * (Amendment) VI * * * (and) the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States * * * (because) it deprives the defendant of the benefit of his counsel asking him questions at the most important period of the trial * * *,' the trial judge answered that under § 38—415, '* * * you do not have the right to do anything more than instruct your client as to his rights, and * * * you have no right to question him on direct examination.' In affirming the conviction and sustaining this ruling, the Supreme Court of Georgia said:

'The constitutional provisions granting to persons charged with crime the benefit and assistance of counsel confer only the right to have counsel perform those duties and take such actions as are permitted by the law; and to require counsel to conform to the rules of practice and procedure, is not a denial of the benefit and assistance of counsel. It has been repeatedly held by this court that counsel for the accused cannot, as a matter of right, ask the accused questions or make suggestions to him when he is making his statement to the court and jury.' 215 Ga. 117, 119, 109 S.E.2d 44, 46—47.

On appeal brought here under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1257(2), we noted probable jurisdiction. 362 U.S. 901, 80 S.Ct. 616, 4 L.Ed.2d 553.

The only question which the appellant properly brings before us is whether this application by the Georgia courts of § 38—415 denied the appellant 'the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him,' Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55; 64, 77 L.Ed. 158, within the requirements of due process in that regard as imposed upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S.Ct. 1, 99 L.Ed. 4.

Appellant raises no question as to the constitutional validity of § 38—416, the incompetency statute.1 However, decision of the question which is raised under § 38—415 necessarily involves consideration of both statutes. Historically these provisions have been intertwined. For § 38—416 is a statutory declaration of the common-law rule disqualifying criminal defendants from testifying, and § 38 415, also with its roots in the common law, was an attempt to mitigate the rigors of that incompetency.

The disqualification of parties as witnesses characterized the common law for centuries. Wigmore traces its remote origins to the contest for judicial hegemony between the developing jury trial and the older modes of trial, notably compurgation and wager of law. See 2 Wigmore, Evidence, pp. 674—683. Under those old forms, the oath itself was a means of decision. See Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, pp. 24—34. Jury trial replaced decision by oath with decision of the jurors based on the evidence of witnesses; with this change '(T)he party was naturally deemed incapable of being such a witness.' 2 Wigmore, p. 682. Incompetency of the parties in civil cases seems to have been established by the end of the sixteenth century. See 9 Holdsworth, History of English Law, p. 194. In time the principal rationale of the rule became the possible untrustworthiness of the party's testimony; for the same reason disqualification was applied in the seventeenth century to interested nonparty witnesses.2

Its firm establishment for criminal defendants seems to have come somewhat later. In the sixteenth century it was necessary for an accused to conduct his own defense, since he was neither allowed to call witnesses in his behalf nor permitted the assistance of counsel. 1 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, p. 350. The criminal trial of this period has been described as 'a long argument between the prisoner and the counsel for the Crown, in which they questioned each other and grappled with each other's arguments with the utmost eagerness and closeness of reasoning.' Stephen, supra, p. 326. In the process the defendant could offer by way of explanation material that would later be characterized as testimony. 2 Wigmore, p. 684. In the seventeenth century, however, he was allowed to call witnesses in his behalf; the right to have them sworn was accorded by statute for treason in 1695 and for all felony in 1701. 7 Will. III, c. 3; 1 Anne, St. 2, c. 9. See Thayer, supra, pp. 157—161, and n. 4; 2 Wigmore, pp. 685—686. A distinction was drawn between the accused and his witnesses—they gave evidence but he did not. See 2 Wigmore, pp. 684—685, and n. 42; 9 Holdsworth, supra, pp. 195—196. The general acceptance of the interest rationale as a basis for disqualification reinforced this distinction, since the criminal defendant was, of course, par excellence an interested witness. 'The old common law shuddered at the idea of any person testifying who had the least interest.' State v. Barrows, 76 Me. 401, 409. See Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 336—337, 13 S.Ct. 60, 63—64, 36 L.Ed. 991.

Disqualification for interest was thus extensive in the common law when this Nation was formed. 3 Bl.Comm. 369.3 Here, as in England, criminal defendants were deemed incompetent as witnesses. In Rex v. Lukens, 1 Dall. 5, 6, 1 L.Ed. 13, decided in 1762, a Pennsylvania court refused to swear a defendant as a witness, holding that the issue there is question 'must be proved by indifferent witnesses.' Georgia by statute adopted the common law of England in 1784, and '* * * the rules of evidence belonging to it * * * (were) in force there * * *.' Doe ex dem. Patterson v. Winn, 5 Pet. 233, 241, 8 L.Ed. 108. Georgia therefore followed the incompetency rule for criminal defendants long before it was given statutory form by the Act of 1866. See Jones v. State, 1 Ga. 610; Roberts v. State, 189 Ga. 36, 40—41, 5 S.E.2d 340, 343.4

Broadside assaults upon the entire structure of disqualifications, particularly the disqualification for interest, were launched early in the nineteenth century in both England and America. Bentham led the movement for reform in England, contending always for rules that would not exclude but would let in the truth. See Rationale of Judicial Evidence, bk. IX, pt. III, c. III (Bowring ed.), pp. 393—406. The basic ground of the attack was, as Macaulay said, that '(A)ll evidence should be taken at what it may be worth, that no consideration which has a tendency to produce conviction in a rational mind should be excluded from the consideration of the tribunals.' Lord Macaulay's Legislative Minutes, 1835, pp. 127—128. The qualification in civil cases of nonparty witnesses despite interest came first. See Lord Denman's Act of 1843, 6 & 7 Vict., c. 85. The first general exception in England for party witnesses in civil cases was the County Courts Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 95, although there had been earlier grants of capacity in certain other courts. Best Evidence (Lely ed. 1893), pp. 158—159. Lord Brougham's Act of 1851, 14 & 15 Vict., c. 99, virtually abolished the incompetency of parties in civil cases.5

The qualification of criminal defendants to give sworn evidence if they wished came last. The first statute was apparently that enacted by Maine in 1859 making defendants competent witnesses in prosecutions for a few crimes. Maine Acts 1859, c. 104. This was followed in Maine in 1864 by the enactment of a general competency statute for criminal defendants, the first such statute in the English-speaking world. The reform was largely the work of John Appleton of the Supreme Court of Maine, an American disciple of Bentham. Within 20 years most of the States now comprising the Union had followed Maine's lead. A federal statute to the same effect was adopted in 1878, 20 Stat. 30, 18 U.S.C. § 3481, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3481. Before the end of the century every State except Georgia had abolished the disqualification.6

Common-law jurisdictions outside the United States also long ago abolished the disqualification. This change came in England with the enactment in 1898 of the Criminal Evidence Act, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36.7 Various States of Australia had enacted competency statutes even before the mother country, as did Canada and New Zealand. Competency was extended to defendants in Northern Ireland in 1923, in the Republic of Ireland in 1924, and in India in 1955.8

The lag in the grant of competency to the criminally accused was attributable in large measure to opposition from those who believed that such a grant threatened erosion of the privilege against self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence. '(I)f we were to hold that a prisoner offering to make a statement must be sworn in the cause as a witness, it would be difficult to protect his constitutional rights in spite of every caution, and would often lay innocent parties under unjust suspicion where they were honestly silent, and embarrassed and overwhelmed by the shame of a false accusation. * * * (It would result in) * * * the degradation of our criminal jurisprudence by converting it into an inquisitory system, from which we have thus far been happily delivered.' People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 314, 320 321 (concurring opinion). See also Ruloff v. People, 45 N.Y. 213, 221—222; People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522, 528—530; State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555, 565—566; 1 Am.L.Rev. 443; Maury, Validity of Statutes Authorizing the Accused to Testify, 14 Am.L.Rev. 753.9

The position of many who supported competency gave credence to these fears. Nenther Bentham nor Appleton was a friend of the privilege against self-incrimination.10 While Appleton justified competency as a necessary protection for the innocent, he also believed that incompetency had served the guilty as a shield and thus disserved the public interest. Competency, he thought, would open the accused to cross-examination and permit an unfavorable inference if he declined to take the stand to exculpate himself.11

This controversy left its mark on the laws of many jurisdictions which enacted competency. The majority of the competency statutes of the States forbid comment by the prosecution on the failure of an accused to testify, and provide that no presumption of guilt should arise from his failure to take the stand. The early cases particularly emphasized the importance of such limitations. See, e.g., Staples v. State, 89 Tenn. 231, 14 S.W. 603; Price v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 393; State v. Taylor, 57 W.Va. 228, 234—235, 50 S.E. 247, 249—250. Cf. 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), pp. 658—661. See generally, Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of Accused to Testify, 31 Mich.L.Rev. 40. For the treatment of the accused as a witness in Canada, see 12 Can.Bar Rev. 519, 13 Can.Bar Rev. 336; in Australia, see 6 Res Judicatae 60; and in Great Britain, see 2 Taylor, Evidence (12th ed.) 864—865; 51 L.Q.Rev. 443; 58 L.Q.Rev. 369.

Experience under the American competency statutes was to change the minds of many who had opposed them. It was seen that the shutting out of his sworn evidence could be positively hurtful to the accused, and that inno-] cence was in fact aided, not prejudiced, by the opportunity of the accused to testify under oath. An American commentator discussing the Massachusetts statute in the first year of its operation said: 'We have always been of opinion, that the law permitting criminals to testify would aid in the detection of guilt; we are now disposed to think that it will be equally serviceable for the protection of innocence.' 1 Am.L.Rev. 396. See also 14 Am.L.Reg. 129.

This experience made a significant impression in England and helped to persuade Parliament to follow the American States and other common-law jurisdictions in granting competency to criminal defendants. In the debates of 1898, the Lord Chancellor quoted a distinguished English jurist, Russell Gurney: '(A)fter what he had seen there (in America), he could not entertain a doubt about the propriety of allowing accused persons to be heard as witnesses on their own behalf.' 54 Hansard, supra, p. 1176. Arthur Balfour reported to the Commons that 'precisely the same doubts and difficulties which beset the legal profession in this country on the suggestion of this change were felt in the United States, but the result of the experiment, which has been extended gradually from State to State, is that all fears have proved illusory, that the legal profession, divided as they were before the change, have now become unanimous in favor of it, and that no section of the community, not even the prisoners at the bar, desire to see any alteration made in the system.' 60 Hansard, supra, pp. 679—680.12

A particularly striking change of mind was that of the noted authority on the criminal law, Sir James Stephen. Writing in 1863, Stephen opposed the extension of competency of defendants. He argued that it was inherent that a defendant could not be a real witness: '(I)t is not in human nature to speak the truth under such a pressure as would be brought to bear on the prisoner, and it is not a light thing to institute a system which would almost enforce perjury on every occasion.' A General View of the Criminal Law of England, p. 202. Competency would put a dangerous discretion in the hands of counsel. 'By not calling the prisoner he might expose himself to the imputation of a tacit confession of guilt, by calling him he might expose an innocent man to a cross-examination which might make him look guilty.' Ibid. Allowing questions about prior convictions 'would indirectly put the man upon his trial for the whole of his past life.' Id., p. 203. Twenty years later, Stephen, after many years' experience on the criminal bench, was to say: 'I am convinced by much experience that questioning, or the power of giving evidence is a positive assistance, and a highly important one, to innocent men, and I do not see why in the case of the guilty there need by any hardship about it. * * * A poor and ill-advised man * * * is always liable to misapprehend the true nature of his defence, and might in many cases be saved from the consequences of his own ignorance or misfortune by being questioned as a witness.' 1 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England, pp. 442, 444.

In sum, decades ago the considered consensus of the English-speaking world came to be that there was no rational justification for prohibiting the sworn testimony of the accused, who above all others may be in a position to meet the prosecution's case. The development of the unsworn-statement practice was itself a recognition of the harshness of the incompetency rule. While its origins antedated the nineteenth century,13 its strong sponsorship by English judges of that century is explained by their desire for a mitigation of the rigors of that rule. Baron Alderson said: 'I would never prevent a prisoner from making a statement, though he has counsel. He may make any statement he pleases before his counsel addresses the jury, and then his counsel may comment upon that statement as a part of the case. If it were otherwise, the most monstrous injustice might result to prisoners.' Reg. v. Dyer, 1 Cox C.C. 113, 114. See also Reg. v. Malings, 8 Car. & P. 242; Reg. v. Walkling, 8 C. & P. 243; Reg. v. Manzano, 2 F. & F. 64; Reg. v. Williams, 1 Cox C.C. 363. Judge Stephen's sponsorship of the practice was especially influential. See Reg. v. Doherty, 16 Cox C.C. 306. See also Reg. v. Shimmin, 15 Cox C.C. 122; 60 Hansard, supra, p. 657. It became so well established in England that it was expressly preserved in the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898.14

The practice apparently was followed in this country at common law in a number of States and received statutory recognition in some. Michigan passed the first such statute in 1861; unlike the Georgia statute of 1868, it provided that the prisoner should be subject to cross-examination on his statement. See People v. Thomas, 9 Mich. 314.15 The Georgia Supreme Court, in one of the early decisions considering the unsworn-statement statute, stressed the degree of amelioration expected to be realized from the practice, thereby implicitly acknowledging the disadvantages for the defendant of the incompetency rule. The Court emphasized 'the broad and liberal purpose which the legislature intended to accomplish. * * * This right granted to the prisoner is a modern innovation upon the criminal jurisprudence of the common law, advancing to a degree hitherto unknown the right of the prisoner to give his own narrative of the accusation against him to the jurors, who are permitted to believe it in preference to the sworn testimony of the witnesses.' Coxwell v. State, 66 Ga. 309, 316 317.16

But the unsworn statement was recognized almost everywhere else as simply a stopgap solution for the serious difficulties for the accused created by the incompetency rule. 'The system of allowing a prisoner to make a statement had been introduced as a mere makeshift, by way of mitigating the intolerable hardship which occasionally resulted from the prisoner not being able to speak on his own behalf.' 60 Hansard, supra, p. 652. 'The custom grew up in England out of a spirit of fairness to give an accused, who was otherwise disqualified, an opportunity to tell his story in exculpation.' State v. Louviere, 169 La. 109, 119, 124 So. 188, 192. The abolition of the incompetency rule was therefore held in many jurisdictions also to abolish the unsworn-statement practice. 'In such cases the unsworn statement of an accused becomes secondary to his right of testifying under oath and cannot be received.' State v. Louviere, supra, 169 La. at page 119, 124 So. at page 192. 'The privilege was granted to prisoners because they were debarred from giving evidence on oath, and for that reason alone. When the law was changed and the right accorded to them to tell their story on oath as any other witness the reason for making an unsworn statement was removed.' Rex v. Krafchenko, (1914) 17 D.L.R. 244, 250 (Man.K.B.).17

Where the practice survives outside America, little value has been attached to it. 'If the accused does not elect to call any evidence or to give evidence himself, he very often makes an unsworn statement from the dock. It is well understood among lawyers that such a statement has but little evidential value compared with the sworn testimony upon which the accused can be cross-examined * * *.' Rex v. Zware, (1946) S.A.L.R. 1, 7—8. 'How is a jury to understand that it is to take the statement for what it is worth, if it is told that it cannot regard it as evidence (i.e., proof) of the facts alleged?' 68 L.Q.Rev. 463. The unsworn statement 'is seldom of much value, since it is generally incoherent and leaves open many doubts which cannot be resolved by cross-examination.' 69 L.Q.Rev. 22, 25. 'The right of a prisoner to make an unsworn statement from the dock still exists * * * but with greatly discounted value.' 1933 Scots Law Times 29. Commentators and judges in jurisdictions with statutory competency have suggested abrogation of the unsworn-statement right. See 94 Irish Law Times, March 5, 1960, p. 56; 68 L.Q.Rev. 463; Rex v. McKenna, (1951) Q.S.R. 299, 308.

Georgia judges, on occasion, have similarly disparaged the unsworn statement. 'Really, in practice it is worth, generally, but little if anything to defendants. I have never known or heard of but one instance where it was supposed that the right had availed anything. It is a boon that brings not much relief.' Bird v. State, 50 Ga. 585, 589. 'The statement stands upon a peculiar footing. It is often introduced for the mere purpose of explaining evidence, or as an attempt at mitigation; the accused and his counsel throw it in for what it may happen to be worth and do not rely upon it as a substantive ground of acquittal.' Underwood v. State, 88 Ga. 47, 51, 13 S.E. 856, 858.

The unsworn statement has anomalous characteristics in Georgia practice. It is not treated as evidence or like the testimony of the ordinary sworn witness. 'The statement may have the effect of explaining, supporting, weakening, or overcoming the evidence, but still it is something different from the evidence, and to confound one with the other, either explicitly or implicitly, would be confusing, and often misleading. * * * The jury are to deal with it on the plane of statement and not on the plane of evidence, and may derive from it such aid as they can in reaching the truth. The law fixes no value upon it; it is a legal blank. The jury may stamp it with such value as they think belongs to it.' Vaughn v. State, 88 Ga. 731, 739, 16 S.E. 64, 66. Because the statement is not evidence, even the charge in the strict terms of the statute favored by the Georgia Supreme Court, see Garrett v. State, 203 Ga. 756, 765, 48 S.E.2d 377, 383; Emmett v. State, 195 Ga. 517, 541, 25 S.E.2d 9, 23, calls attention to the fact that the defendant is not under oath. Moreover, charge after charge going beyond the terms of the statute has been sustained. Thus in Garrett v. State, supra, the trial judge instructed that while the defendants were 'allowed' to make a statement, 'they are not under oath, not subject to cross-examination, and you are authorized to give to their statement just such weight and credit as you think them entitled to receive.' (203 Ga. 756, 48 S.E.2d 378). In Emmett v. State, 195 Ga. at page 540, 25 S.E.2d at page 22, the instruction was that the statement might be believed in preference to the sworn testimony 'if you see proper to give it that weight and that place and that importance in the trial of this case.' In Douberly v. State, 184 Ga. 573, 575, 192 S.E. 223, 225, the jury were told they might credit the statement 'provided they believe it to be true.' In Allen v. State, 194 Ga. 430, 436, 22 S.E.2d 65, 68, the charge was: 'There is no presumption attached to the defendant's statement. No presumption that it is true, nor any presumption that it is not true. In other words, it goes to you without a presumption either for or against him. You have the right to reject the statement entirely if you do not believe it to be true.' In many cases the trial judges have been sustained in specifically pointing out that defendants were not subject to the sanction for perjury with respect to their unsworn statements. '(I)f he failed to tell you the truth, he incurred no penalty by reason of such failure.' Darden v. State, 171 Ga. 160, 161, 155 S.E. 38, 40. '(T)he defendant's statement is not under oath; no penalty is prescribed for making a false statement * * *.' Klug v. State, 77 Ga. 734, 736. 'Surely there can be no wrong in calling the attention of the jury to circumstances which should impair the force of such testimony or which should enable them to give it the weight to which it is entitled.' Poppell v. State, 71 Ga. 276, 278. See also Grimes v. State, 204 Ga. 854, 51 S.E.2d 797; Thurmond v. State, 198 Ga. 410, 31 S.E.2d 804; Willingham v. State, 169 Ga. 142, 149 S.E. 887; Millen v. State, 175 Ga. 283, 165 S.E. 226.

Because it is not evidence, the statement is not a foundation supporting the offer of corroborative evidence. Champman v. State, 155 Ga. 393, 117 S.E. 321; Medlin v. State, 149 Ga. 23, 98 S.E. 551. 'The statute is silent as to corroborating the mere statement of the accused, and, while it allows the jury to believe it in preference to the sworn testimony, it seems to contemplate that the statement shall compete with sworn testimony single-handed, and not that it shall have the advantage of being reinforced by facts which do not weaken the sworn evidence otherwise than by strengthening the statement opposed to it.' Vaughn v. State, 88 Ga. 731, 736, 16 S.E. 64, 65. Similarly the statement is not an independent basis for authenticating and introducing documents. Sides v. State, 213 Ga. 482, 99 S.E.2d 884; see also Register v. State, 10 Ga.App. 623, 74 S.E. 429. In the absence of a specific request, the trial judge need not charge the law applicable to a defense presented by the statement but not supported in sworn testimony. Prater v. State, 160 Ga. 138, 143, 127 S.E. 296, 298; Cofer v. State, 213 Ga. 22, 96 S.E.2d 601; Willingham v. State, 169 Ga. 142, 149 S.E. 887; Holleman v. State, 171 Ga. 200, 154 S.E. 906; Darby v. State, 79 Ga. 63, 3 S.E. 663. In contrast the trial judge may sua sponte instruct the jury to treat the accused's explanation as not presenting a defense in law; '(i)n proper cases the jury, may be guarded by a charge from the court against giving the statement an undue effect in favor of the prisoner * * *.' Underwood v. State, 88 Ga. 47, 51, 13 S.E. 856, 858; Fry v. State, 81 Ga. 645, 8 S.E. 308.

It is said that an advantage of substance which the defendant may realize from the distinction is that the contents of his statement are not circumscribed by the ordinary exclusionary rules of evidence. Prater v. State, 160 Ga. 138, 142—147, 127 S.E. 296, 298—300; Richardson v. State, 3 Ga.App. 313, 59 S.E. 916; Birdsong v. State, 55 Ga.App. 730, 191 S.E. 277; Tiget v. State, 110 Ga. 244, 34 S.E. 1023. However, 'The prisoner must have some regard to relevancy and the rules of evidence, for it was never intended that, in giving his narrative of matters pertaining to his defense, he should attempt to get before the jury wholly immaterial facts or attempt to bolster up his unsworn statement by making profert of documents, letters, or the like, which, if relevant, might be introduced in evidence, on proof of their genuineness.' Nero v. State, 126 Ga. 554, 555, 55 S.E. 404. See also Saunders v. State, 172 Ga. 770, 158 S.E. 791; Montross v. State, 72 Ga. 261; Theis v. State, 45 Ga.App. 364, 164 S.E. 456; Vincent v. State, 153 Ga. 278, 293—294, 112 S.E. 120, 127.

The situations in which the Georgia cases do assimilate the defendant to an ordinary witness emphasize the anomalous nature of the unsworn statement. If he admits relevant facts in his statement the prosecution is relieved of the necessity of proving them by evidence of its own. 'The prisoner's admission in open court, made as a part of his statement on the trial, may be treated by the jury as direct evidence as to the facts.' Hargroves v. State, 179 Ga. 722, 725, 177 S.E. 561, 563. 'It is well settled that the statement of a defendant to a jury is a statement made in judicio and is binding on him. Where the defendant makes an admission of a fact in his statement, such admission is direct evidence, and the State need not prove such fact by any other evidence.' Barbour v. State, 66 Ga.App. 498, 499, 18 S.E.2d 40, 41; Dumas v. State, 62 Ga. 58. And admissions in a statement will open the door to introduction of prosecution evidence which might otherwise be inadmissible. McCoy v. State, 124 Ga. 218, 52 S.E. 434. Admissions in a statement at one trial are admissible against the accused in a later trial. Cady v. State, 198 Ga. 99, 110, 31 S.E.2d 38; Dumas v. State, supra. The prosecution may comment on anything he says in the statement. Frank v. State, 141 Ga. 243, 277, 80 S.E. 1016. Although it has been held that the mere making of a statement does not put the defendant's character in issue, Doyle v. State, 77 Ga. 513, it is settled that 'A defendant's statement may be contradicted by testimony as to the facts it narrates, and his character may be as effectively put in issue by his statement as by witnesses sworn by him for this purpose.' Jackson v. State, 204 Ga. 47, 56, 48 S.E.2d 864, 870; Barnes v. State, 24 Ga.App. 372, 100 S.E. 788. The prosecution may introduce rebuttal evidence of alleged false statements. Johnson v. State, 186 Ga. 324, 197 S.E. 786; Camp v. State, 179 Ga. 292, 175 S.E. 646; Morris v. State, 177 Ga. 106, 169 S.E. 495.

Perhaps any adverse consequences resulting from these anomalous characteristics might be in some measure overcome if the defendant could be assured of the opportunity to try to exculpate himself by an explanation delivered in an organized, complete and coherent way. But the Georgia practice puts obstacles in the way of this. He must deliver a finished and persuasive statement on his first attempt, for he will probably not be permitted to supplement it. Apparently the situation must be most unusual before the exercise by the trial judge of his discretion to refuse to permit the defendant to make a supplemental statement will be set aside. See Sharp v. State, 111 Ga. 176, 36 S.E. 633; Jones v. State, 12 Ga.App. 133, 76 S.E. 1070. Even after the State has introduced new evidence to rebut the statement or to supplement its own case, leave to make a supplemental statement has been denied. Fairfield v. State, 155 Ga. 660, 118 S.E. 395; Johnson v. State, 120 Ga. 509, 48 S.E. 199; Knox v. State, 112 Ga. 373, 37 S.E. 416; Boston v. State, 94 Ga. 590, 21 S.E. 603; Garmon v. State, 24 Ga.App. 586, 101 S.E. 757. If the subject matter of the supplementary statement originates with counsel and not with the defendant, it has been held that this is sufficient reason to refuse to permit the making of a supplemental statement. August v. State, 20 Ga.App. 168, 92 S.E. 956. And the defendant who may have a persuasive explanation to give has no effective way of overcoming the possible prejudice from the fact that he may not be subjected to cross-examination without his consent, for he has no right to require cross-examination. Boyers v. State, 198 Ga. 838, 844—845, 33 S.E.2d 251, 255—256. Of course, even in jurisdictions which have granted competence to defendants, the prosecution may decline to cross-examine. But at least the defendants in those jurisdictions have had the advantage of having their explanation elicited through direct examination by counsel. In Georgia, however, as was held in this case, counsel may not examine his client on direct examination except in the discretion of the trial judge. The refusal to allow counsel to ask questions rarely seems to be reversible error. See, e.g., Corbin v. State, 212 Ga. 231, 91 S.E.2d 764; Brown v. State, 58 Ga. 212. 'This discretion is to be sparingly exercised, but its exercise will not be controlled except in cases of manifest abuse.' Whitley v. State, 14 Ga.App. 577, 578, 81 S.E. 797. Indeed, even where the defendant has been cross-examined on his statement, it has been held that defense counsel has no right to ask a question, Lindsay v. State, 138 Ga. 818, 76 S.E. 369. Nor may counsel call the attention of the defendant to a material omission in his statement without permission of the trial court. Echols v. State, 109 Ga. 508, 34 S.E. 1038; Clark v. State, 43 Ga.App. 384, 159 S.E. 135.

This survey of the unsworn-statement practice in Georgia supports the conclusion of a Georgia commentator: 'The fact is that when the average defendant is placed in the witness chair and told by his counsel or the court that nobody can ask him any questions, and that he may make such statement to the jury as he sees proper in his own defense, he has been set adrift in an uncharted sea with nothing to guide him, with the result that his statement in most cases either does him no good or is positively hurtful.' 7 Ga.B.J. 432, 433 (1945).18

The tensions of a trial for an accused with life or liberty at stake might alone render him utterly unfit to give his explanation properly and completely. Left without the 'guiding hand of counsel,' Powell v. State of Alabama, supra, 287 U.S. at page 69, 53 S.Ct. at page 64, he may fail properly to introduce, or to introduce at all, what may be a perfect defense. '* * * though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.' Ibid. The treatment accorded the unsworn statement in the Georgia courts increases this peril for the accused. The words of Cooley, J., in his opinion for the Michigan Supreme Court in Annis v. People, 13 Mich. 511, 519—520, fit his predicament.

'But to hold that the moment the defendant is placed upon the stand he shall be debarred of all assistance from his counsel, and left to go through his statement as his fears or his embarrassment may enable him, in the face of the consequences which may follow from imperfect or unsatisfactory explanation, would in our opinion be to make, what the statute designed as an important privilege to the accused, a trap into which none but the most cool and self- possessed could place himself with much prospect of coming out unharmed. An innocent man, charged with a heinous offence, and against whom evidence of guilt has been given, is much more likely to be overwhelmed by his situation, and embarrassed, when called upon for explanation, than the offender, who is hardened in guilt; and if he is unlearned, unaccustomed to speak in public assemblies, or to put together his thoughts in consecutive order any where, it will not be surprising if his explanation is incoherent, or if it overlooks important circumstances.'19

We therefore hold that, in effectuating the provisions of § 38—415, Georgia, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, could not, in the context of § 38—416, deny appellant the right to have his counsel question him to elicit his statement. We decide no more than this. Our decision does not turn on the facts that the appellant was tried for a capital offense and was represented by employed counsel. The command of the Fourteenth Amendment also applies in the case of an accused tried for a noncapital offense, or represented by appointed counsel. For otherwise, in Georgia, 'the right to be heard by counsel would be of little worth.' Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10, 75 S.Ct. 1, 5, 99 L.Ed. 4.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

Ala.Code, 1940, Tit. 15, § 305.

Alaska Comp.Laws Ann.1949, § 66—13—53.

Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann., 1956, § 13—163.

Ark.Stat.1947, § 43—2016.

Cal.Pen.Code, § 1323.5, West's Ann.Code. See also Cal.Pen.Code, § 1323, West's Ann.Code; Cal.Const.Art. I, § 13, West's Ann.Code.

Colo.Rev.Stat.Ann.1953, § 39—7—15.

Conn.Gen.Stat.1958, § 54—84, C.G.S.A.

Del.Code Ann.1953, Tit. 11, § 3501.

Fla.Stat., 1959, § 918.09, F.S.A.

Hawaii Rev.Laws 1955, § 222—15.

Idaho Code Ann.1948, § 19—3003.

Ill.Rev.Stat., 1959, c. 38, § 734.

Ind.Ann.Stat.1956, § 9—1603.

Iowa Code, 1958, § 781.12, I.C.A. See also Iowa Code § 781.13, I.C.A.

Kan.Gen.Stat.Ann.1949, § 62—1420.

Ky.Rev.Stat.1960, § 455.090.

La.Rev.Stat.1950, § 15.461, LSA—R.S. See also La.Rev.Stat. § 15.462, LSA—R.S.

Me.Rev.Stat.Ann.1954, c. 148, § 22.

Md.Ann.Code 1957, Art. 35, § 4.

Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., 1959, c. 233, § 20.

Mich.Comp.Laws 1948, § 617.64.

Minn.Stat., 1957, § 611.11, M.S.A.

Miss.Code Ann.1942, § 1691.

Mo.Rev.Stat., 1959, § 546.260, V.A.M.S. See also Mo.Rev.Stat. § 546.270, V.A.M.S.

Mont.Rev.Codes Ann.1947, § 94—8803.

Neb.Rev.Stat.1956, § 29—2011.

Nev.Rev.Stat.1957, § 175.170. See also Nev.Rev.Stat. § 175.175.

N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann.1955, § 516.31. See also N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 516.32.

N.J.Rev.Stat.1951, § 2A:81—8, N.J.S.A.

N.M.Stat.Ann.1953, § 41—12—19.

N.Y.Code Crim.Proc. § 393.

N.C.Gen.Stat.1953, § 8—54.

N.D.Rev.Code 1943, § 29—2111.

Ohio Rev.Code Ann.1953, § 2945.43.

Okla.Stat.1951, Tit. 22, § 701.

Ore.Rev.Stat.1953, § 139.310.

Pa.Stat., 1930, Tit. 19, § 681. See also Pa.Stat.Tit. 19, § 631.

R.I.Gen.Laws Ann.1956, § 12—17—9.

S.C.Code 1952, § 26—405.

S.D.Code 1939, § 34.3633.

Tenn.Code Ann.1955, § 40—2402. See also Tenn.Code Ann. § 40 2403.

Vernon's Ann.Tex.Code Crim.Proc.1948, Art. 710.

Utah Code Ann.1953, § 77—44—5.

13 Vt.Stat.Ann.1959, § 6601.

Va.Code Ann.1950, § 19.1—264.

Wash.Rev.Code 1951, § 10.52.040.

W.Va.Code Ann.1955, § 5731.

Wis.Stat.1959, § 325.13, W.S.A.

Wyo.Stat.1957, § 7—244.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER'S separate opinion for reversing the conviction, in which Mr. Justice CLARK joins.

Georgia in 1784 adopted the common law of England, Act of February 25, 1784, Prince's Digest 570 (1837). This adoption included its rules of competency for witnesses, whereby an accused was precluded from being a witness in his own behalf. It is doubtful whether and to what extent the common-law privilege of an accused, barred as a witness, to address the jury prevailed in Georgia, but it is a fair guess that the practice was far less than uniform. See Roberts v. State, 189 Ga. 36, 41, 5 S.E.2d 340, 343. While the common-law rigors of incompetency were alleviated by an enactment of 1866 because 'the inquiry after truth in courts of justice is often obstructed by incapacities created by the present law,'* Georgia retained the incompetency of an accused to testify in his own defense. In 1868, for the first time a statutory provision granted the accused the privilege of making an unsworn statement to the jury. Ga.Laws 1868, p. 24. The sum of all this legislative history is that the defendant in a criminal prosecution in Georgia was disqualified as a witness, but was given opportunity to say his say to the jury. These two aspects of the legal situation in which Georgia placed the accused were made consecutive sections of the penal code in 1895, Ga.Code 1895, §§ 1010, 1011, and have thus remained through their present form as §§ 38—415 and 38—416.

(1) It would seem to be impossible, because essentially meaningless as a matter of reason, to consider the constitutional validity of § 38—415 without impliedly incorporating the Georgia law which renders the defendant incompetent to present testimony in his own behalf under oath. This is not a right-to-counsel case. As the Georgia Supreme Court correctly stated: 'The constitutional provisions * * * confer only the right to have counsel perform those duties and take such actions as are permitted by the law; and to require counsel to conform to the rules of practice and procedure, is not a denial of the benefit * * * of counsel.' 215 Ga. 117, 119, 109 S.E.2d 44, 46. What is in controversy here is the adequacy of an inextricably unified scheme of Georgia criminal procedure. The right to make an unsworn statement, provided by § 38—415, is an attempt to ameliorate the harsh consequences of the incompetency rule of the section following. Standing alone, § 38 415 raises no constitutional difficulty. Only when considered in the context of the incompetency provision does it take on meaning. If Georgia may constitutionally altogether bar an accused from establishing his innocence as a witness, it goes beyond its constitutional duty if it allows him to make a speech to the jury whether or not aided by counsel. Alternatively, if § 38—416 is unconstitutional—a legal nullity—a Georgia accused can insist on being sworn as a competent witness, and the privilege also to make an unsworn statement without benefit of counsel would constitute an additional benefit of which he may or may not choose to avail himself. If, as is the truth, § 38—415 has meaning only when applied in the context of § 38—416's rule of incompetency, surely we are not so imprisoned by any formal rule governing our reviewing power that we cannot consider the two parts of a disseverable, single whole because petitioner has not asked us in terms to review both halves. It is formalism run riot to find that the division into two separate sections of what is organically inseparable may not for reviewing purpose be treated as a single, appealable unit. This Court, of course, determines the scope of its reviewing power over a state court judgment.

(2) But if limitations on our power to review prevent us from considering and ruling upon the constitutionality of the application of Georgia's incompetency law—which alone creates the significant constitutional issue—then I should think that what is left of this mutilation should be dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. Considered in vacuo, § 38—415 fails, as has been pointed out, to present any reasonable doubts as to its constitutionality, for it provides only an additional right. If appellant had in fact purposefully chosen not to be a witness, had agreed to the validity of the incompetency provisions, and had intentionally limited his attack to § 38—415 as applied, he would be presenting an issue so abstract that the Court would not, I believe, entertain it.

Perhaps the accused failed to offer himself as a witness because he thought it would be a fultile endeavor under settled Georgia law, while the opportunity to have the aid of counsel in making an unsworn statement pursuant to § 38—415 would be a discretionary matter for Georgia judges. Since I cannot assume that appellant purposefully intended to waive his constitutional claim concerning his incompetency—though he may not explicitly have asserted this claim—I have no difficulty in moving from the Court's oblique recognition of the relevance to this controversy of § 38—416 to the candid determination that that section is unconstitutional.

Mr. Justice CLARK, whom Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER joins, concurring.

Because, as applied by the Georgia court, § 38—415 grants criminal defendants the opportunity to make unsworn statements in their own behalf, but withholds from the same defendants the assistance of their counsel in eliciting perhaps more effective statements, the Court today strikes down that section. It is held to be unconstitutional 'in the context of § 38—416' which renders criminal defendants incompetent as witnesses at their own trials. The Court does not, however, treat § 38—416 as anything more substantial than 'context,' and, while rendering its validity doubtful, fails to pass upon its constitutionality. The Court's hesitancy to reach that question appears to be due to appellant's tactic, at the trial, of offering his statement under § 38—415 and, in so doing, demanding the aid of his counsel, but not offering himself as a competent witness or challenging his exclusion under § 38—416. This has proven to be a perfect cast of appellant's line, for the Court has risen to the bait exactly as anticipated. The resulting advantage of the Court's present holding to the criminal defendant in Georgia is obvious—as matters now stand, the defendant may make an unsworn statement as articulate and convincing as the aid of counsel can evoke, but the prosecution may not cross-examine.

It is true that merely to defeat such a result is insufficient justification for this Court to reach out and decide additional constitutional questions otherwise avoidable. Nevertheless, the problem appellant poses under § 38—415 is so historically and conceptually intertwisted with the rule of § 38—416 that not only must they be considered together, as the Court expressly recognizes, but they must be allowed to stand or fall together, as a single unitary concept, uncircumscribed by the accident of divisive codification. The section today struck down, § 38—415, is not even intelligible except in terms of the incompetency imposed by § 38—416.* Were the latter rule not codified, its proscription would have to be understood as § 38—415's operative premise of common-law disability. The purported boon of § 38—415 was founded on that disability, against the hardships of which, nowhere else presently imposed, it was intended to at least partially relieve. I would not withhold adjudication because of the fact of codification, nor merely on account of the procedural dodge resorted to by counsel.

Reaching the basic issue of incompetency, as I feel one must, I do not hesitate to state that in my view § 38—416 does not meet the requirements of due process and that, as an unsatisfactory remnant of an age gone by, it must fall as surely as does its palliative, § 38—415. Until such time as criminal defendants are granted competency by the legislature, the void created by rejection of the codified common-law rule of Georgia may be filled by state trial judges who would have to recognize, as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, the right of a criminal defendant to choose between silence and testifying in his own behalf. In the same manner the state courts presently implement other federal rights secured to the accused, and therefore the fact that a void of local policy would be created is not an insuperable obstacle to the disposition I propose. Nor would past convictions be automatically rendered subject to fatal constitutional attack unless, as was, in my view, done here, the proper challenge had been preserved by appropriate objection to active operation of the concept embodied in the incompetency rule in either of its phases. In view of the certain fact that criminal prosecutions will continue to be had in Georgia, and that some defendant, if not appellant himself at his new trial, will demand the right to testify in his own behalf, in strict compliance with the procedural standard adhered to today, we will sooner or later have the question of the validity of § 38—416 back on our doorstep. The result, predictably, will be the same as that reached under § 38 415 today. If that proves in fact to be the Court's future disposition of the claim I anticipate, the stability of interim convictions may well be jeopardized where related constitutional claims are preserved but, perhaps, not pressed. So too, on the reverse side of the coin, there may well be interim convictions where, had defendants been permitted to testify under oath in their own behalf verdicts of acquittal would have been returned. This Court should not allow the administration of criminal justice to be thus frustrated or unreasonably delayed by such a fragmentation of the critical issue through procedural niceties made solely in the hope of avoiding a controlling decision on a question of the first magnitude.

For these reasons I deem it impractical as well as unwise to withhold for a future date a decision by the Court on the constitutionality of § 38—416.

Disagreeing with the distorted way by which the Court reverses the judgment, I join in its reversal only on the grounds stated here and in the opinion of my Brother FRANKFURTER which I join.