Seeking to recover for supplies and services furnished at New York during November, 1920, in order to fit her for an intended voyage across the Atlantic, appellee libeled the steamship Gul Djemal and caused her arrest under the ordinary admiralty practice. Her master, appearing for the sole purpose of objecting to the court's jurisdiction, claimed immunity for the vessel because owned and possessed by the Turkish government, and asked that she be released. No one except the master has advanced this claim.

The parties stipulated1: The Turkish government and the United States are at peace with each other, but diplomatic relations have been severed. The Gul Djemal is the absolute property of the Turkish government and under the administration of the transport section of the Ministry of Marine. That government employed and paid the master, officers and crew—the master being a reserve naval officer—and was in possession of the ship when arrested. She —

'was engaged in commercial trade, under charter for one round voyage to George Dedeoglou, who engaged to carry passengers and goods for hire, and in such trade the Gul Djemal was not functioning in a naval or military capacity, nor was there anything of a naval or military character connected with the voyage of the Gul Djemal from Constantinople to New York and return.' return.'

The court below denied the alleged immunity and passed a decree for the libelant. Upon this direct appeal only the question of jurisdiction is presented. The relevant certificate follows:

'The sole question raised by the answer of the claimant herein, and the sole issue before this court, was the jurisdiction of the court over the steamship Gul Djemal, a vessel owned, manned, operated by, and in the possession of the sovereign government of Turkey, at peace with the government of the United States of America. The allegations of the libelant that it had furnished supplies to the vessel, were admitted by the claimant, whose answer set up that the vessel was immune, as a sovereign owned vessel, from the process of this court, and that the vessel was not within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of this court. I have granted a decree for the amount prayed for by the libelant, and have denied immunity to the vessel, because at the time the cause of action and liability on which the libel is founded were created, and at the time the vessel was seized under process of this court, she was, although owned, manned by, and in the possession of the sovereign government of Turkey, engaged in commercial trade, under charter for hire to a private trader, and furthermore, because diplomatic relations between the United States and Turkey were then severed, and no appropriate suggestion was filed from the State Department of the United States.'

Appellee maintains that whatever may be the proper rule in our courts concerning the ultimate immunity of vessels owned by foreign governments and employed in ordinary trade and commerce, such immunity will not be granted upon the mere claim of the master, especially when the United States has no diplomatic relations with the sovereign owner. Such claim can be made only by one duly authorized to vindicate the owner's sovereignty. Ex parte Muir, 254 U. S. 522, 532, 533, 41 Sup. Ct. 185, 187 (65 L. Ed. 383), is relied upon to support this view. It is there said:

'As of right the British government was entitled to appear in the suit, to propound its claim to the vessel and to raise the jurisdictional question. * * * Or, with its sanction, its accredited and recognized representative might have appeared and have taken the same steps in its interest. * * * And, if there was objection to appearing as a suitor in a foreign court, it was open to that government to make the asserted public status and immunity of the vessel the subject of diplomatic representations to the end that, if that claim was recognized by the Executive Department of this government, it might be set forth and supported in an appropriate suggestion to the court by the Attorney General, or some law officer acting under his direction.'

Treating Ex parte Muir as relevant, appellant insists that within the meaning of the declaration there made the master of the Gul Djemal, a duly commissioned officer of the Turkish Navy, was the accredited and recognized representative of that government, possessed of adequate authority to protest against the seizure and object to the court's jurisdiction.

We agree with the view advanced by the appellee. The Anne, 3 Wheat. 435, 4 L. Ed. 428, reaffirmed by The Sao Vicente, 260 U. S. 151, 43 Sup. Ct. 15, 67 L. Ed. 179, is enough to show that the immunity could not have been successfully set up by a duly recognized consul, representative of his sovereign in commercial matters, in the ordinary course of his official duties, and there seems no adequate reason to presume that the master of the Gul Djemal had any greater authority in respect thereto. Although an officer of the Turkish Navy, he was performing no naval or military duty, and was serving upon a vessel not functioning in naval or military capacity, but engaged in commerce under charter to a private individual, who undertook to carry passengers and goods for hire. He was not shown to have any authority to represent his sovereign, other than can be inferred from his position as master and the circumstances specified in the stipulation of facts.

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice HOLMES concurs in the result.