The plaintiff in error was convicted of falsification of documents, under article 300, subdivisions 4, 7 of the Philippine Penal Code. He brings the case here as one in which a statute of the United States is involved, under the act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, § 10. 32 Stat. at L. 695, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1907, p. 214. By the article mentioned a public official is subjected to imprisonment and fine if he commits a falsification, clause 4, 'by perverting the truth in the narration of facts,' or, clause 7, 'by giving out an authentic copy of a fictitious document, or by stating therein a contrary or different thing from that contained in the genuine original.' It is assigned as error that the plaintiff in error was required to answer without being advised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and that he was convicted without due process of law. It is argued further, although not assigned as error, that the sentence inflicted a cruel and unusual punishment, by reason of the amount of the fine and the length of the term of imprisonment; and still further, that the fine was greater than that which the statute imposed, all contrary to the Philippine Bill of Rights. Act of July 1, 1902, chap. 1369, § 5. 32 Stat. at L. 691, 692.

There is no suggestion in the record that any of these questions were raised at any stage below, except in an agreement of counsel that the full record showed that before any evidence was received the plaintiff in error asked leave to withdraw his plea of not guilty and substitute the statement that he did not know how to plead, which was denied, and that he objected to the reception of any evidence in support of the complaint, because it was incapable of being sustained by evidence, which objection was overruled. There was a motion for rehearing, on the grounds set out in the assignment of error, but, as the motion was denied, that cannot be relied upon here. See McMillen v. Ferrum Min. Co. 197 U. S. 343, 49 L. ed. 784, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533. It would be going far in allowance for different habits of thought and action, to treat what was done as equivalent to a demurrer. The court below does not so interpret it, but says that no exception was taken to the sufficiency of the complaint. It would be going farther to treat it as setting up the Philippine Bill of Rights in analogy to a claim of constitutional rights in a circuit court of the United States. If a case is brought up from the circuit court on the ground that it involves the construction or application of the Constitution of the United States, the record must show that the question was raised for the consideration of the court below. Carey v. Houston & T. C. R. Co. 150 U. S. 170, 181, 37 L. ed. 1041, 1044, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 63; Ansbro v. United States, 159 U. S. 695, 40 L. ed. 310, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 187; Cornell v. Green, 163 U. S. 75, 78, 41 L. ed. 76, 77, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 969; Cincinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. Thiebaud, 177 U. S. 615, 619, 620, 44 L. ed. 911-913, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 822; Arkansas v. Schlierholz, 179 U. S. 598, 45 L. ed. 335, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229. The most that could be gathered from this record is that the plaintiff in error contended that the complaint was bad by the rules of criminal pleading. See Cornell v. Green, 163 U. S. 75, 79, 41 L. ed. 76, 77, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 969. There was no hint that he relied on the Bill of Rights or contended that the complaint would not satisfy that. The Bill of Rights, in all probability, was an afterthought when everything else had failed.

Our consideration of the case properly might stop here. But, as the rule laid down probably was not well known, we will add that we find nothing in the errors assigned. The complaint, however open it might be to criticism on demurrer, supposing the strict rules of the old common law should be applied, would leave no doubt in the mind of any person of rudimentary intelligence that it meant to charge the defendant with falsely entering on the stubs of certain specified tax certificates smaller sums than those shown by the certificates and actually received by him, and with altering such stubs to lower sums, with intent of gain; that is to say, with intent to settle his accounts as a public officer on the showing that less was due than was due in fact, contrary to article 300, clauses 4, 6, and 7 of the Penal Code. If the Philippine Code had sanctioned this form, it is extravagant to contend that the enactment would have been void under the laws of the United States. Yet that is a test. See Missouri v. Dockery, 191 U. S. 165, 171, 48 L. ed. 133, 134, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53. The Bill of Rights for the Philippines, giving the accused the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, does not fasten forever upon those islands the inability of the seventeenth century common law to understand stand or accept a pleading that did not exclude every misinterpretation capable of occurring to intelligence fired with a desire to pervert.

We do not feel called upon to consider errors not assigned. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U. S. 323, 331, 36 L. ed. 450, 455, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 693.

Writ of error dismissed.

Mr. Justice Harlan dissents.