Out of these various ordinances and resolutions arise the difficulties suggested in this case. The facts are somewhat complicated by reason of their number, and the inferences to be drawn from them are not always perfectly plain and certain. The complainant contends that, by reason of the action of the city council and the acceptance by the complainant of the various ordinances and resolutions adopted by that council, a valid contract has been entered into between the city and the complainant, by which the right to use the streets named in the ordinances by the Garden street branch has been granted to complainant up to July 1, 1914; or, if it is mistaken as to that time, that then the contract terminates on the 13th of July, 1913. The city contends that neither date is right, but that the contract, so far as it related to the Garden street branch, terminated on the 22d of March, 1905.

The rules of construction which have been adopted by courts in cases of public grants of this nature by the authorities of cities are of long standing. It has been held that such grants should be in plain language, that they should be certain and definite in their nature, and should contain no ambiguity in their terms. The legislative mind must be distinctly impressed with the unequivocal form of expression contained in the grant, 'in order that the privileges may be intelligently granted or purposely withheld. It is matter of common knowledge that grants of this character are usually prepared by those interested in them, and submitted to the legislatures with a view to obtain from such bodies the most liberal grant of privileges which they are willing to give. This is one among many reasons why they are to be strictly construed.' Blair v. Chicago, 201 U. S. 400, 471, 50 L. ed. 801, 830, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427. In the case cited this court has had occasion to state the principle of construction and to cite some of the authorities upon which it is based. This has been so lately done that it is unnecessary to more than refer to that case as authority for the doctrine above stated.

Before proceeding with an examination of the various ordinances and resolutions referred to in the foregoing statement, it is well to say that we do so upon the assumption that the legislature has heretofore granted to the city council of Cleveland most comprehensive power to contract with street railroads within its limits, with regard to the use of its streets, and the length of time for which such use may be granted, not longer than twenty-five years. Cleveland v. Cleveland City R. Co. 194 U. S. 517, 533, 48 L. ed. 1102, 1107, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 756; Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric R. Co. 201 U. S. 529, 541, 50 L. ed. 854, 859, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513. Therefore, in deciding this case, we assume the validity of the contract, whatever it is, that was made. The only question involved herein is one of construction and intent.

The most important of the many ordinances and resolutions relating to the Euclid avenue line, commencing in 1859, have been referred to in the foregoing statement of facts because of the contention of complainant that the Garden street branch is nothing but an extension and, in reality, as in law, a component part of the Euclid avenue line, and that the Garden street grant is limited and governed by the time of the expiration of the Euclid avenue grant. In other words, that the grant of 1888 to the Euclid avenue line of the right to change its motive power, and extending the termination of the grant until twenty-five years from that date, thereby extended the termination of the grant to the Garden street branch to the same time, although the whole branch road had been separately and otherwise provided for, and had never before had The same termination as the Euclid avenue line. The grant is to be implied which is line. The grant is to be implied which is to work such a change in a grant then existing in specific and direct language. The same argument is also set forth in regard to the ordinance of July 17, 1893, which will be again referred to.

Under these circumstances it is important to direct special attention to the Garden street branch.

The East Cleveland Railroad Company, having built and operated its road through the various streets mentioned in the ordinance or 1859, granting it leave so to do, became desirous of building another road in connection with the one it was then operating, but there was no statute at that time in Ohio permitting the extension of a road then built, and the company, therefore, in 1867 and the early part of 1868, took the same proceedings to acquire the right to build the new road that it had taken to build the former, although it did not seek a new incorporation. As a railroad company already existing, it applied to the council of the city of Cleveland for leave to construct a street railroad from the intersection of Prospect and Brownell streets, to connect with the main line of its road, and thence through various streets and along the center of Garden street, to and across Willson avenue, to the easterly boundary of the city. It procured the consents of the property owners along the line; notice for the reception of bids was published by the city as provided for in the statute, and the railroad company made a formal bid for the privilege of laying down its tracks through the various streets, and named the rates of fare which would be charged. That bid was the lowest, if not the only one, made, and it was duly accepted, and the privilege was granted to build a railroad in Garden street, and to operate it for twenty years from the date of the adoption of the ordinance, January 14, 1868, and the company was to continue to use the western end of the Euclid avenue road as stated in the ordinance. The ordinance was accepted and the road built. At this time the grant to the Euclid avenue line expired September 20, 1879.

Referring to the procedure under which the Garden street branch was created and the permission of the city council to build the road obtained, it is plain that the branch thus built was not a mere extension or part of the Euclid avenue line, so that a grant to the latter necessarily covered the other as an inseparable part of it, but was a distinct line, with a separate route, with the exception of a short distance at the west end, where it was permitted to use the tracks of the Euclid avenue line. The termination of the right was at a different time from that provided for the Euclid avenue line. This use of the Euclid avenue tracks for a short distance did not make the Garden street branch a mere extension of the former road. Whether authorized by its charter to build the Garden street road is not important. It did so, and its right to do it was given by an ordinance of the council which has been recognized as valid ever since. Because on some occasions it has been called a branch does not alter the weight to be given the facts stated, or turn the branch into a mere extension where it has been otherwise uniformly treated.

It is contended that by the resolution of March 25, 1873, which granted to the East Cleveland Railway Company the right to lay a double track street railroad, intersecting with its main line at Erie street and Prospect street, and thence through other streets mentioned in the resolution, the Garden street line thereby became an extension of the main line, or was recognized as a mere extension. The preamble to that resolution recites that the railroad company desires to connect the Garden street branch with the main line of their road at the intersection of Erie and Prospect streets, and to remove the other track from Brownell street, between Ohio and Prospect streets, and therefore permission is granted to the company so to do. That resolution provided simply for changing the connection of the Garden street branch with the Euclid avenue line from Brownell street to Erie street, and for the taking up of the track on Brownell street, between Ohio and Prospect streets. It did not make the Garden street branch any more of an extension of the main line than it had been before. The branch road certainly did not become a part of the main road simply because it ran in connection with it, or because it ran over a small portion of the tracks of that road. It remained what is started out as, a road with a separate route and a different term of life.

The grant made in 1876 to the company to extend its Garden street tracks from its then terminus at Baden street, to and along other streets towards the east, with the right to equip and operate said extension for twenty years, in connection with the said Garden street branch and its main line, had no effect upon the question we are discussing. That extension of the tracks of the Garden street branch spoken of in the ordinance was also a short one, and was to terminate at a different time from that then existing in regard to the other portion of the Garden street branch. That it was to be operated in connection with its Garden street branch and the main line did not make the branch as extended a part of the main line, or alter the fact that the branch was a separate road, although operated in connection with the main line. It is quite diffidult to see why the right to operate this particular extension should have been granted for twenty years or until 1896, instead of being limited to terminate with the branch, but, at any rate, the grant is in unambiguous terms, and states in so many words the length of time it is to last. Its importance is not very great, and is entirely effaced by the subsequent ordinance of 1880, which provided for the termination of the whole Garden street branch at the time specified,—1905.

By that ordinance (March 22, 1880) the question of the termination of the grant for the whole Garden street branch was distinctly settled. By it the right to extend that branch of its railroad in an easterly direction, on and along Quincy street, was given to the company, and the right 'to equip and operate the said extension and its Garden street branch' was given for the period of twenty-five years from the passage of the ordinance, but without increase of fare on any portion. This, of course, placed the termination of the whole grant to the Garden street branch on March 22, 1905. There is no ambiguity as to this grant, and the termination of the grants to the two roads was kept apart, one being September 20, 1904, the other March 22, 1905.

Much stress is laid by the complainant on the ordinance of the 9th of February, 1885, which was entitled 'An Ordinance to Permit the East Cleveland Railroad Company to Extend the Garden Street Branch of Its Railway.' The company was thereby authorized to extend the Garden street branch from the intersection of Quincy street and Lincoln avenue in an easterly direction, to Woodland Hills avenue. It was to be operated in connection 'with said branch and its main line and terminating with the grant for the main line,' but with no increase of fare. It is contended that the particular grant mentioned in this ordinance was to terminate with the grant for the main line, which would make it terminate September 20, 1904, instead of March 22, 1905. If this were the only question, of course, the complainant would not insist that the grant to it should be shortened six months. But it is cited for the purpose of showing an intention of the council to limit the termination of the Garden street branch by the limitation then existing in regard to the Euclid avenue line. It is contended that from the time of the passage of this ordinance by the council and its acceptance by the complainant the parties thereby agreed that the extension should be operated with the main line, and that its grant for such operation should expire with the grant for the main or Euclid avenue line, and that this was in pursuance of the plan by the city to have the grants to the two roads expire at the same time. And the claim is that the subsequent ordinances must be construed in the same manner and for the purpose of carrying out the same scheme. There is here undoubtedly some room for the contention of complainant, but we think, upon looking at all the facts in connection with this question, that the intention of the council was not that way. The Garden street branch, running from the intersection of Erie and Prospects streets, towards the east, terminated, at the time of this grant, at Lincoln avenue. This made a long line of road. By the ordinance it was lengthened from Lincoln avenue to Woodland Hills avenue,—a comparatively short extension of track. The right granted to the whole branch line as far east as Lincoln avenue then terminated on the 22d of March, 1905, and yet, by this construction of the ordinance of 1885, this small extension of track from Lincoln avenue to Woodland Hills avenue was to expire September 20, 1904. Why this difference? The ordinance did not assume in any way to alter the time of the termination of the then-existing grant to the rest of the Garden street branch, but it simply limited the time of the termination of the grant for the extension then given. Hence it is difficult to see how any agreement can be found to arise from the ordinance for the simultaneous termination of all the grants to both the main line and the Garden street branch. Nor can any general scheme to have the grants of both roads terminate together be evolved from anything done by the parties up to and including 1885.

There is nothing in Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric R. Co. 201 U. S. 529, 539, 50 L. ed. 854, 858, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 513, that covers this case. The language of the ordinance adverted to in that case is to be applied to very different facts from those existing here. We assume the ability of the council to make such a contract as complainant contends for herein, but we think none such was made in fact.

So far as can be determined from this record, there was absolutely no reason for terminating the right to use this small extension of track in September, 1904, while the rest of the branch then existing was not to terminate until six months later. It cut up the branch line in a way which it is impossible from this record to give any reason for, and accordingly, under the then-existing circumstances, it might be argued that the words, 'terminate with the grant for the main line,' did not mean the Euclid avenue line, but it referred to the Garden street branch, which was, as a matter of fact, the main line so far as concerned the small extension of the track from Lincoln avenue to Woodland Hills avenue. To terminate the grant for the extension at the same time with the grant for the line thereby extended would be the most obvious and natural course to pursue. It is true the ordinance itself recognizes the 'branch and its main line' as constituting two different lines, and provides that the grant is to terminate with the grant for the main line. And yet the real meaning of the ordinance, when regarded in the light of the facts then existing, becomes, to say the least, ambiguous. The general provision for the termination of the grant for the whole Garden street branch, as made in 1880, ought not to be expunged by an implication arising out of such doubtful language as is found in this 1885 ordinance. But if otherwise, it results only that the particular extension expired in September, 1904, with the grant to the Euclid avenue line, which, at that period, expired on that date.

In 1887, June 17, an extension of the Garden street branch was granted, which, by the terms of the ordinance, was to terminate 'with the grant for the Garden street main line,' without increase of fare being charged. Here the council, it will be observed, expressly referred to the Garden street branch as the main line, and it is undoubtedly plain that it was properly so referred to. In extending the branch, and with reference to the extension, the branch would naturally be regarded and spoken of as the main line. If not done in all cases it is somewhat difficult to find any reason for it.

Again, by an ordinance passed March 10, 1890, granting leave to change the motive power on the Garden street branch, the right was given to operate that branch by electric power 'during the term of its present grant of said Garden street branch.' The 'present grant' for the Garden street branch was that which was granted in March, 1880, which was to terminate in twenty-five years, or March 22, 1905. Here was a clear recognition of the time when that grant expired, and there had been no ordinance or resolution of the council, since 1880, which, in our opinion, changed the termination of that grant. It is an entire mistake to say that at this time the right to operate the Garden street tracks terminated at the same time with the right of the company to operate the Euclid avenue line, or that the Garden street branch was but an extension of that line.

On the 30th of March, 1891, the right was granted to construct and operate a second or additional track upon Central avenue (Garden street) from the east line of Willson avenue to the Cleveland & Pittsburg Railroad tracks. It was provided in that ordinance that the right therein granted should be for and until the expiration of the grants for the said company's main line. Here again the question arises, What was the meaning of the expression 'main line' as used in this connection? The ordinance allowed a second or additional track in a street in which the company then had the right to use, and was using, a single track. So far as that extended grant was concerned, the main line was the rest of the Garden street branch, and the same observations that we have made heretofore in regard to the main line are operative here.

It cannot be possible that it was intended to limit the right to use the second or additional track, in the portion of the street mentioned, to a different time than that which existed with relation to the first track laid down by the company in the same street. Of course, the two grants were meant to terminate at the same time.

At this time the grant to the company's Euclid avenue line had been extended so that it did not expire until July 13, 1913. Can it be supposed that the council intended that this short length of road, in which a second or additional track was to be laid, was to be operated with two tracks until 1905 and after that with one track until 1913? We think such a construction is not permissible, and that what is meant by the language, 'main line,' in that ordinance, means the line which is the main line with reference to the extension therein granted; namely, the Garden street branch, and not the Euclid avenue line.

The ordinance of the 20th of April, 1891, is somewhat important. It granted the East Cleveland Railroad Company permission to lay an additional or second track in Quincy street, from New street to Woodland Hills avenue. That street at the point indicated is part of the Garden street branch, and, as compared with the rest of the Garden street branch, is a very small portion thereof, and the ordinance only grants the right to lay an additional track. The right granted was, by the terms of § 3, to 'be valid until the expiration of the grants for said company's tracks on said Quincy street, east of Lincoln avenue, to wit, July 13, 1913.'

It is said that the council, in such ordinance, expressly authorizes the continuation of the operation of this Central avenue (Garden street) extension until July 13, 1913, the date of the expiration of the Euclid avenue line of the company. But the language used in this ordinance as to the time of the expiration of the grant for the company's tracks on Quincy street, east of Lincoln avenue, is a clear mistake of fact. The grant, it will be observed, is not in terms an extension to July 13, 1913. The reference to that date is but the expression of an opinion that the date named is the true time of the termination of the Quincy street grants. It is not a grant extending to that date, unless the previous grants are limited to that time. Now, on April 20, 1891, the grants on Quincy street, east of Lincoln avenue, in fact terminated either in 1904 or 1905, depending upon the construction of the language of the original grant in Quincy street, made in February, 1885. That was a grant which was to expire with the termination of the grant for the main line. For the reasons already given we think that that language meant the Garden street branch, which was the main line as to that extension, and that it, therefore, expired in 1905, March 22. There was no subsequent legislation which extended that grant beyond that time.

But if it be assumed that the grant for the company's tracks on Quincy street, east of Lincoln avenue, was to terminate with the grant for the Euclid avenue line as the main line, it must be recollected that that grant on Quincy street was made February 9, 1885, to the Garden street branch, and at that time the grant to the Euclid avenue line terminated in September, 1904. The grant of 1885 was not made to terminate with the grant for the main line, as that main line might thereafter be extended, but it referred to that grant as it then existed, and it was to be measured by such existing grant, and not by any subsequent extension which might be granted to the Euclid avenue line.

Nor do we think the time for the termination of the Garden street branch was in any degree affected by the consolidation of the various roads in 1893. The communication from the railway company, through its vice president, May 22, 1893, states distinctly that it 'does not claim any rights greater than the constituent companies forming the organization, and that it intends to obey all ordinances to which each and all of the constituent companies were subject.' Its intention to issue transfer checks, so as to have a continuous ride for one fare, gave no greater rights to the company than it theretofore had, nor did the resolution of the council, consenting to the consolidation on condition that but one fare should be charged for a continuous ride, give any greater rights to the consolidated company than each of the constituent companies had theretofore enjoyed. The consolidation does not require, in order to comply with the conditions specified in the resolution consenting to the consolidation, that the consolidated companies should be permitted to operate until the expiration of the longest grant to any of the companies. At the expiration of the grant to the Garden street branch the operation of that road might terminate, while the operation of the rest of the consolidated roads could go on perfectly well. To hold that, by virtue of the consolidation, upon the conditions stated, there was an implied extension of the grant to the Garden street branch of at least eight years, is to violate the rules of construction above referred to in regard to grants of this nature.

It is also strongly urged by the complainant that the ordinance passed soon after the consolidation ordinance, viz., the ordinance of July 17, 1893, not only imposed additional burdens on the consolidated company, but that the ordinance relates to a portion of the line originally constructed as part of the Garden street branch, and that it also required the operation of all the Garden street cars over these tracks, so that the council legislated as to the operation of the tracks upon Garden street and provided that such operation should continue until July 13, 1913. It is true the ordinance provided that the grant therein made should be limited to the above date, and there were certain conditions attached to the making of the grant, but it is quite plain to us that the ordinance could not be read as thereby extending the time for the termination of the Garden street branch without a most violent implication, based upon a very small foundation. This is made clear when it is seen that the streets through which the ordinance provides for extending the double track railroad formed no part of the line originally constructed as part of the Garden street branch. The latter road was permitted to use, for a short distance, the tracks of the Euclid avenue line from a point at the junction of Brownell street (subsequently made Erie street) with Prospect street, west to the public square. But that portion of the track of the Euclid avenue line was never part of the line originally constructed for the Garden street branch, nor did it become such because subsequently the branch road was permitted to use it for the passage of its cars to the public square. It is quite clear, therefore, that the limitation of the time for the termination of the grant provided for in the 6th section of the ordinance was not also an extension of the time for the termination of the separate grant to the Garden street branch from 1905 to 1913.

The same may be said of the ordinance of February 19, 1894, extending the tracks in Willson avenue. While the council consented to the extension by the complainant and the Cleveland City Railroad Company of the line of railway in Willson avenue, and also to the operation of that line in connection with other lines of the consolidated company, which included the Garden street branch, yet it cannot be held that there arose from that ordinance, when accepted by the company, a contract which should extend the time on all of the roads until the expiration of the grant contained in that ordinance, July 1, 1914. By such means an implied extension of time, affecting over 200 miles of track, as is stated, would be accomplished by making these conditions in regard to the Willson avenue grant a substitute for a grant, in plain language, affecting the Garden street branch. On the contrary, we think that the effect of that ordinance was simply to make it necessary for the Garden street branch and the other roads also, to comply with the conditions set forth in the ordinance until the expiration of their respective and existing grants, but that ordinance did not thereby extend the various other railroad grants by implication. There is no such connection between the various roads as to make it necessary, in order to operate one, that all the others should be in operation as a unit, and as comprehending one indivisible system. There is nothing in this record which shows any difficulty whatever in operating the Garden street branch as separate from the rest of the so-called system, or in operating that system separate from the branch. If the council had intended to extend the time of the termination of the various grants to these railroads it surely would have said so, and not left it to such vague and uncertain presumptions.

The chief importance of the various ordinances and resolutions for the extension of the Garden street branch, coupled with the user of the tracks of the Euclid avenue line by the branch road from Erie street west to the public square, and providing for but one fare over the whole road, is to strengthen, if possible, the contention of complainant that such branch has always been treated by the city and the company as a mere extension of the Euclid avenue line, and to be operated in connection with it, so that a grant extending the time of the termination of the latter line included thereby the Garden street branch. We think the contention is not justified by the facts. The whole history of the branch line shows differently. Even in the important matter of a change of motive power, the Euclid avenue line was provided for in 1888 and 1889, while there was a separate and distinct provision made for the Garden street branch in 1890, and a statement therein made that the permission was granted to the Garden street branch during the term of the present grant to said branch.

A careful examination of the whole record leads us to the opinion that there is no error therein so far as the complainant's appeal is concerned, and the decree upon its appeal is affirmed.

Upon the appeal of the defendants, we think little need be said. The defendants insist that, upon the termination of the grant to the Garden street branch, the rails, poles, and other appliances for operating that road, and then remaining on the various streets, became the property of the city; or, at least, that the city had the right to take possession of the streets and of the rails, tracks, etc., therein existing. We agree with the court below in the opinion that the title to the property remains in the railroad company which had been operating the road, and we are of opinion that the Forest City Railway Company had no rights in the streets, so far as to affect the right of the complainant to its property then existing in such streets. How that property may be disposed of is not now a matter before this court. We only hold that the defendant company cannot avail itself of the provisions of the ordinance of January 11, 1904, so far as taking possession of the property of the complainant is concerned.

The decree upon the defendants' appeal is also affirmed.