The first and principal question is at what time the title of the railroad company attached,—whether at the time the map of definite location was filed in the general ladn-office at Washington, or when, prior thereto, its line was surveyed and staked out on the surface of the ground. While the question, in this precise form, has never been before this court, yet the question as to the time at which the title attaches, under grants similar to this, has been often presented, and the uniform ruling has been that it attaches at the time of the filing of the map of definite location. Grinnell v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 739; Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U. S. 360, 366, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 336; Railway Co. v. Dunmeyer, 113 U. S. 629, 634, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 566; Waldan v. Knevals, 114 U. S. 373, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 898; U. S. v. Railway Co., 141 U. S. 358, 375, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13.

In Van Wyck v. Knevals, where the question arose between Knevals, the grantee of the railroad company, and Van Wyck, who had entered the lands at the local land-office after the filing of the map of definite location with the land department, but before notice thereof had been received at such local land-office, this court said: 'The route must be considered as 'definitely fixed' when it has ceased to be the subject of change at the volition of the company. Until the map is filed with the secretary of the interior, the company is at liberty to adopt such a route as it may deem best, after an examination of the ground has disclosed the feasibility and advantages of different lines. But when a route is adopted by the company, and a map designating it is filed with the secretary of the interior and accepted by that officer, the route is established; it is, in the language of the act, 'definitely fixed,' and cannot be the subject of future change, so as to affect the grant, except upon legislative consent.' And in Railway Co. v. Dunmeyer it is also said: 'We are of opinion that under this grant, as under many other grants containing the same words, or words to the same purport, the act which fixes the time of definite location is the act of filing the map or plat of this line in the office of the commissioner of the general land-office. The necessity of having certainty in the act fixing this time is obvious. Up to that time the right of the company to no definite definite section or part of section is fixed. Until then many rights to the land along which the road finally runs may attach, which will be paramount to that of the compnay building the road. After this no such rights can attach, because the right of the company becomes by that act vested. It is important, therefore, that this act fixing these rights shall be one which is open to inspection. At the same time it is an act to be done by the company. The company makes its own preliminary and final surveys by its own officers. It selects for itself the precise line on which the road is to be built, and it is by law bound to report its action by filing its map with the commissioner, or, rather, in his office. The line is then fixed. The company cannot alter it so as to affect the rights of any other party.'

The reasoning of these opinions is applicable here. The fact that the company has surveyed and staked a line upon the ground does not conclude it. It may survey and stake many, and finally determine the line upon which it will build by a comparison of the cost and advantages of each; and only when, by filing its map, it has communicated to the government knowledge of its selected line, is it concluded by its action. Then, so far as the purposes of the land grant are concerned, is its line definitely fixed; and it cannot thereafter, without the consent of the government, change that line so as to affect titles accruing thereunder. In accordance with these decisions it must therefore be held that the line was not definitely fixed until the 13th of October, 1856.

Inasmuch as Griffey's pre-emption right had attached to this land prior to such time, it did not pass to the railroad company under the grant; and it was a matter of no moment to the company what thereafter became of the title. This is settled by the case of Railway Co. v. Dunmeyer, in which it was said: 'It is not conceivable that congress intended to place these parties as contestants for the land, with the right in each to require proof from the other of complete performance of its obligation. Least of all is it to be supposed that it was intended to raise up, in antagonism to all the actual settlers on the soil, whom it had invited to its occupation, this great corporation, with an interest to defeat their claims, and to come between them and the government as to the performance of their obligations.' And, again: 'Of all the words in the English language, this word 'attached' was probably the best that could have been used. It did not mean mere settlement, residence, or cultivation of the land, but it meant a proceeding in the proper landoffice, by which the inchoate right to the land was initiated. It meant that by such a proceeding a right of homestead had fastened to that land, which could ripen into a perfect title by future residence and cultivation. With the performance of these conditions the company had nothing to do. The right of the homestead having attached to the land, it was excepted out of the grant as much as if in a deed it had been excluded from the convevance by metes and bounds.' See, also, Railroad Co. v. Whitney, 132 U. S. 357, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 112, in which was a similar ruling.

The only other question we deem important is this: On July 5, 1871, the state of Iowa issued a patent, under which plaintiff in error claims, and on June 30, 1882, the United States issued a patent to Griffey, which is the basis of defendants' title. The defendants filed, as was authorized under the Iowa statute, a cross-petition, praying to quiet their title, and the decree entered was one dismissing the plaintiff's bill and quieting defendants' title.

Now, it is claimed that Griffey never complied with the pre-emption laws; that he never made a bona fide settlement; that he secured his pre-emption rights by false representations and a pretended settlement; that he does not come into a court of equity with clean hands, and is entitled to no relief; and that, therefore, there was error in entering a decree in favor of the defendants upon the cross-petition. But, as we have seen, Griffey did make a settlement, file his declaratory statement, and thus initiate a pre-emption right. By these means such pre-emption right had, in the language of the statute, attached. The land, therefore, did not pass under the railroad grant. It was no matter of interest to the company what became of the title. The government—the owner of the land—was satisfied with what Griffey had done, took from him its land—warrant as payment, and patented the land. Into the bona fides of this transaction no one but the government can inquire. As the title was beyond challenge on the part of the railroad company, it had no right to cast a cloud thereupon, and, having done so by accepting a patent from the state of Iowa, under the pretense that the land was a part of the grant made to that state, and having affirmed the validity of the title conveyed by such patent, it does not lie in its mouth, or with those claiming under it, to now object to a decree removing all cloud cast by such patent.

We see no error in the rulings of the supreme court of Iowa, and its judgment is affirmed.