We must examine each of the principal grounds upon which the plaintiff bases her claim for relief; for if, as contended, Ralston was in such condition, mentally and physically, when the deeds of 1880 and 1881 were executed, that he could not or did not comprehend the nature of the transactions, or if their execution was obtained by means of undue influence exercised over him by Turpin, in either case the plaintiff would be entitled to relief. It would be granted upon the principle laid down in Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat. 103, 125, which was a suit by heirs at law to set aside conveyances obtained from their ancestor. Chief Justice MARSHALL there said: 'If these deeds were obtained by the exercise of undue influence over a man whose mind had ceased to be the safe guide of his actions, it is against conscience for him who has obtained them to derive any advantage from them. It is the peculiar province of a court of conscience to set them aside.' Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506, 511. On the contrary, if it does not appear that he was incapable, by reason of physical or mental debility, of exercising a discriminating judgment in respect to the disposition of his property, or was driven to make the gifts in question against his own wishes, and under some influence that he was unable, no matter from what cause, to resist, the relief asked must be denied. 'The undue influence for which a will or deed will be annulled,' this court said in Conley v. Nailor, 118 U. S. 127, 134, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1005, 'must be such as that the party making it has no free will, but stands in vinculis.' In a case of conflicting proof, as here, it is a circumstance not without weight that the plaintiff, who, more than any one else, was cognizant of the grantor's condition during the entire period in question, makes no averment in the original bill of the husband's want of capacity to dispose of his property. The averment was that when the deeds were made he was in a declining state of health, and his constitution greatly weakened by dissipation. Such a condition does not, however, necessarily imply an absence of sufficient capacity to dispose of property by gift or otherwise. Nearly a year passed after the institution of this suit before she distinctly made the issue that the deeds were void for the want of capacity upon the part of her husband to make them. The proof does show beyond question—indeed, it is admitted that for many years prior to the execution of the deeds, and thenceforward until his death, in 1883, he was intemperate in his use of ardent spirits. He was often intoxicated, and when in that condition was incapacitated to transact business. But for many years prior to his death there were intervals, some of them quite long, during which he avoided excessive indulgence in strong drink. His capacity, when sober, to transact business is abundantly shown. The vital inquiry is as to his capacity, not when he was intoxicated, but when the deeds were executed. Conley v. Nailor, 118 U. S. 127, 131, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1001. The evidence leaves no room to doubt that at those particular dates he fully comprehended the character of the deeds. If it satisfactorily appeared that, from habitual dissipation or other cause, he was in such enfeebled condition of mind or body, immediately before or immediately after the dates of the respective deeds, as to render him incompetent to transact business, the presumption might arise that he was unable, at the time of their execution, to understand what he was doing, and thus the burden of proof as to his capacity, at those particular dates, to dispose of his property, be imposed upon the grantee. Even in that view, the plaintiff would not be entitled to a decree canceling the deeds, on the ground of the grantor's mental incapacity; for it appears that on each occasion when the respective deeds were executed he was perfectly sober, and possessed sufficient capacity to dispose of his property with an intelligent understanding of what he was doing. He knew at the time that each deed conveyed certain property to Turpin in trust for the children named, and that they were substantially in execution of his settled purpose to make provision out of his estate for the children of the man who had been for years the fast friend and confidential adviser of his parents and of himself. That purpose was based upon motives entirely creditable to him, and, so far as the record discloses, was originally formed without any suggestion by Turpin or his children. Prior to his leaving Macon, in 1879, and before making the will of that year, he often said to companions or acquaintances that he intended to make, or had made, such provision out of his estate.

If he executed the deeds of 1880 without knowing what he was doing, he would naturally, at some subsequent time, have expressed dissatisfaction with what he had done, and taken steps to have them set aside. But no expression of dissatisfaction was ever made by him. On the contrary, upon receiving the deed of 1881, accompanied by the request that he would execute it, he promptly complied with that request, and returned the deed duly acknowledged by himself and wife to Turpin. His correspondence with the latter during 1880 and 1881 furnishes persuasive, if not conclusive, evidence that he had accurate knowledge of the condition of his property and its management by Turpin & Ogden, under the direction of Turpin, and was in the enjoyment of good health. On July 28, 1880, within less than a month before making the first deed of gift, he wrote to Turpin from Stamford, Conn., stating, among other things, that he was 'enjoying good health.' On April 18, 1881, the day preceding the last deed of gift, he wrote from the same place to Turpin: 'My health is splendid, but Ida has been ill all winter, and is so still.' The body of each of these letters is in the handwriting of the complainant. They are inconsistent with her present contention that, not only at the time, but both before and after, the deeds of gift were executed, her husband's mind and body had been so wrecked by dissipation that he did not intelligently comprehend what he did, or possess sufficient will to resist the importunities or persuasion of others. To these considerations we may add the significant fact that in no one of the letters that passed between Turpin and the plaintiff, after the latter left Macon, is there any intimation that she disapproved ofthe provision made for Turpin's children. We concur entirely with the conclusion reached upon this issue by the court below.

It remains to consider whether the deeds of gift were the result of undue influence exercised by Turpin over Ralston. In discussing this question counsel for the plaintiff call attention to section 2666 of the Code of Georgia, which provides that 'a gift by any person just arrived at majority, or other wise peculiarly subject to be affected by such influences, to his parent, guardian, trustee, attorney, or other person standing in a similar relationship of confidence, shall be scrutinized with great jealously, and, upon the slightest evidence of persuasion or influence towards this object, shall be declared void, at the instance of the donor or his legal representative, at any time within five years after the making of such gift.' We do not perceive that this provision has any direct bearing upon this case. There was here no gift by the ward just after he arrived at his majority. If the deeds in question had been made immediately upon Ralston's arriving at full age, or shortly after he came into possession of his estate, they would, in view of the then recent relation of guardian and ward, have been more difficult to sustain. Still they would have been sustained if it had appeared that they were freely and voluntarily made, upon full knowledge of the facts, without misrepresentation or suppression of material facts by the guardian. In Hylton v. Hylton, 2 Ves. Sr. 547, Lord Chancellor HARDWICKE said: 'Undoubtedly, if after the ward or cestui que trust comes of age, and after actually put into possession of the estate, he thinks fit, when sui juris, and at liberty, to grant that or any other reasonable grant by way of reward for care and trouble, when done with eyes open, the court could never set that aside; but the court guards against doing it at the very time of accounting and delivering up the estate, as the terms; for the court will not suffer them to make that the terms of doing their duty.' In the case before us more than 11 years elapsed after Ralston attained full age, and after Turpin finally settled his accounts as guardian, before the first of the deeds of gift was made. In respect to that settlement, it may be observed that by section 1847 of the Georgia Code it is declared that 'no final settlement made between guardian and ward can bar the ward, at any time within four years thereafter, from calling the guardian to a settlement of his account, unless it is made to appear that the same was made after a full exhibit of all the guardian's accounts, and with a full knowledge by the ward of his legal rights.' Nothing is disclosed by the record that impeaches the entire accuracy of the guardian's final settlement; nothing that suggests any want of intelligence or integrity in his administration of the ward's estate; nothing to show that he ever realized anything from the position of guardian, except such compensation as the law permitted him to receive. When, therefore, the relation of guardian and ward was severed, Ralston had every reason to confide in Turpin's integrity, and to feel grateful, not only for his uniform kindness, but for faithful devotion to his interests.

But it is contended that the relations subsequently existing between them were such as are described in section 3177 of the Georgia Code, which declares that 'any relations shall be deemed confidential arising from nature or created by law, or resulting from contracts, where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another, or where, from similar relations of mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost good faith, such as partners, principal and agent,' etc. Undoubtedly, the relation of principal and agent existed between Ralston and Turpin after the relation of guardian and ward had been severed, and up to the death of Ralston. The section of the Georgia Code quoted is an expression of a general rule that has always governed courts of equity. The agent is bound to act with absolute good faith towards the principal in respect to every matter intrusted to his care and management. In accepting a gift from his principal, he is under an obligation to withhold no information in his possession respecting the subject of the gift, or the condition of the estate in his hands, which good faith requires to be disclosed, or that may reasonably influence the judgment of the principal in making the gift. All transactions between them whereby the agent derives advantages beyond legitimate compensation for his services will be closely examined by courts of equity, and set aside if there be any ground to suppose that he has abused the confidence reposed in him. It is for the common security of mankind, Mr. Justice Story well says, 'that gifts procured by agents, and purchases made by them from their principals, should be scrutinized with a close and vigilant suspicion.' 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 315. An instructive case upon this point is Harris v. Tremenheere, 15 Ves. 34, 38, which was a suit to cancel leases to a party who at the time held the relation of steward, agent, and attorney to the lessor. Some of the leases were pure gifts by the employer. Lord Chancellor ELDON disclaimed any jurisdiction to annul such gifts, when based upon the generosity of the donor, or to weigh the value or amount of the consideration, as if it had been the subject of barter, but said that if he could find 'in the answer or the evidence the slightest hint that the defendant had laid before his employer an account of the value of the premises that was not perfectly accurate, he would set aside such leases.' He would do this, he said, without regard to the intention of the parties, 'upon the general ground that the principal would never be safe if the agent could take a gift from him upon a representation that was not most accurate and precise.'

We do not intend to qualify or weaken in any degree these salutary doctrines. Their recognition, however, does not determine the present case, unless it be held that a principal cannot, under any circumstances whatever, make a valid gift to his agent of property committed to the latter's care or management. No such doctrine has ever been established, nor could it be, without impairing the natural right of an owner to make such disposition of his property as he may think would best subserve his interest and comfort or gratify his feelings. That Turpin held such relations, personal and otherwise, to young Ralston as would enable him to exercise great influence over the latter in respect to the mode in which his property should be managed for purposes of revenue; that Ralston trusted Turpin's judgment as to matters of business more than the judgment of any other man; and that he had an abiding confidence in Turpin's integrity, as well as in his desire to protect his interests, are conceded. But we are satisfied that Turpin did not improperly use the infiuence he had over, or abuse the confidence reposed in him by, young Ralston. It was the latter's own thought, induced, no doubt, by his friendly feeling for Turpin and gratitude for the latter's fidelity to his interests, to make some provision for Turpin's family. This thought was first formally expressed in the will of 1874, when he was capable of making a disposition of his property. It was substantially repeated in the will of 1879, drawn in precise conformity with his directions. The circumstances detailed by the plaintiff's counsel to show that the deeds of 1880 and 1881 were procured by undue influence upon the part of Turpin lose most of their force in view of the fact that they covered the same property and named the same beneficiaries that are described in the will of 1879. That Turpin caused the first deed to be prepared, and requested Ralston to execute it, are facts of but little weight. Turpin had been informed of the will of 1879, and it was his right, if not his duty to his children, to inform Ralston that his marriage had revoked that will, and to suggest that, if he was so minded, the execution of a deed was an appropriate mode to give effect to his intention in respect to those children. Nor was the presence in Stamford, when the deeds of 1880 were executed, of Ogden, the partner of Turpin, a suspicious circumstance. The correspondence between Ralston and Turpin, prior to that time, shows that the former was aware of Ogden's purpose to visit the North during the summer of 1880, and desired Ogden to visit him at Stamford.

Upon a careful examination of the record, we concur with the court below in holding that the plaintiff has failed to show that the deeds of 1880 and 1881 were obtained by undue influence. On the contrary, it appears by the great preponderance of evidence (to state the case made by the defendants in no stronger language) that, although their execution may have been induced, not unnaturally, by feelings of friendship for and gratitude to the defendant Turpin, the grantor acted upon his own independent, deliberate judgment, with full knowledge of the nature and effect of the deeds. It was for the donor, who had sufficient capacity to take a survey of his estate, and to dispose of it according to an intelligent, fixed purpose of his bounty. In respect to the allegation that determine how far such feelings should control him when selecting the objects of his bounty. In respect to the allegatioin that Turpin suppressed facts touching the condition of Ralston's estate, as affected by the claim of Mrs. Smith, it is sufficient to say that it is not sustained by the proof. Other facts than those we have mentioned are disclosed by the record, and other questions were discussed at the bar, but as they do not, in our judgment, materially affect the decision of the case, we need not specially refer to them. Decree affirmed.