No appeal was prosecuted from the decree of January 4, 1883, directing the amount due upon the policy issued by the Life Insurance Company of Virginia to be paid over to Mrs. Hume for her own benefit and as guardian of her children, nor is any error now assigned to the action of the court in that regard. Indeed, it is conceded by counsel for the complainants that this contract was perfectly valid as against the world, but it is insisted that, assuming the proof to establish the insolvency of Hume in 1874 and thenceforward, the premiums paid in that and the subsequent years on this policy belonged in equity to the creditors, and that they were entitled to a decree therefor, as well as for the amount of the Maryland and Connecticut policies, and the premiums paid thereon. It is not denied that the contract of the Maryland Insurance Company was directly between that company and Mrs. Hume, and this is, in our judgment, true of that of the Connecticut Mutual, while the Hartford company's certificates were payable to her, if living.

Mr. Hume having been insolvent at the time the insurance was effected, and having paid the premiums himself, it is argued that these policies were within the provisions of 13 Eliz. c. 5, and inure to the benefit of his creditors as equivalent to transfers of property with intent to hinder, delay, and defraud. The object of the statute of Elizabeth was to prevent debtors from dealing with their property in any way to the prejudice of their creditors; but dealing with that which creditors, irrespective of such dealing, could not have touched, is within neither the letter nor the spirit of the statute. In the view of the law, credit is extended in reliance upon the evidence of the ability of the debtor to pay, and in confidence that his possessions will not be diminished to the prejedice of those who trust him. This reliance is disappointed, and this confidence abused, if he divests himself of his property by giving it away after he has obtained credit. And where a person has taken out policies of insurance upon his life for the benefit or his estate, it has been frequently held that, as against creditors, his assignment, when insolvent, of such policies, to or for the benefit of wife and children, or either, constitutes a fraudulent transfer of assets within the statute; and this, even though the debtor may have had no deliberate intention of depriving his creditors of a fund to which they were entitled, because his act has in point of fact withdrawn such a fund from them, and dealt with it by way of bounty. Freeman v. Pope, L. R. 9 Eq. 206, L. R. 5 Ch. 538. The rule stands upon precisely the same ground as any other disposition of his property by the debtor. The defect of the disposition is that it removes the property of the debtor out of the reach of his creditors. Cornish v. Clark, L. R. 14 Eq. 189. But the rule applies only to that which the debtor could have made available for payment of his debts. For instance, the exercise of a general power of appointment might be fraudulent and void under the statute, but not the exercise of a limited or exclusive power; because, in the latter case, the debtor never had any interest in the property himself which could have been available to a creditor, or by which he could have obtained credit. May, Fraud. Conv. 33. It is true that creditors can obtain relief in respect to a fraudulent conveyance where the grantor cannot, but that relief only restores the subjection of the debtor's property to the payment of his indebtedness as it existed prior to the conveyance.

A person has an insurable interest in his own life for the benefit of his estate. The contract affords no compensation to him, but to his representatives. So the creditor has an insurable interest in the debtor's life, and can protect himself accordingly, if he so chooses. Marine and fire insurance is considered as strictly an indemnity; but while this is not so as to life insurance, which is simply a contract, so far as the company is concerned, to pay a certain sum of money upon the occurrence of an event which is sure at some time to happen, in consideration of the payment of the premiums as stipulated, nevertheless the contract is also a contract of indemnity. If the creditor insures the life of his debtor, he is thereby indemnified against the loss of his debt by the death of the debtor before payment, yet if the creditor keeps up the premiums, and his debt is paid before the debtor's death, he may still recover upon the contract, which was valid when made, and which the insurance company is bound to pay according to its terms; but if the debtor obtains the insurance on the insurable interest of the creditor, and pays the premiums himself, and the debt is extinguished before the insurance falls in, then the proceeds would go to the estate of the debtor. Knox v. Turner, L. R. 9 Eq. 155. The wife and children have an insurable interest in the life of the husband and father, and if insurance thereon be taken out by him, and he pays the premiums and survives them, it might be reasonably claimed, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, that the policy would inure to his estate. In Insurance Co. v. Palmer, 42 Conn. 60, the wife insured the life of the husband, the amount insured to be payable to her if she survived him; if not, to her children. The wife and one son died prior to the husband, the son leaving a son surviving. The court held that, under the provisions of the statute of that state, the policy being made payable to the wife and children, the children immediately took such a vested interest in the policy that the grandson was entitled to his father's share, the wife having died before the husband; but that, in the absence of the statute, 'it would have been a fund in the hands of his representatives for the benefit of the creditors, provided the premiums had been paid by him.' So in the case of Anderson's Estate, 85 Pa. St. 202, A. insured his life in favor of his wife, who died intestate in his life-time, leaving an only child. A. died intestate and insolvent, the child surviving, and the court held that the proceeds of the policy belonged to the wife's estate, and, under the intestate laws, was to be distributed share and share alike between her child and her husband's estate, notwithstanding, under a prior statute, life insurance taken out for the wife vested in her free from the claims of the husband's creditors. But if the wife had survived she would have taken the entire proceeds.

We think it cannot be doubted that in the instance of contracts of insurance with a wife or children, or both, upon their insurable interest in the life of the husband or father, the latter, while they are living, can exercise no power of dispostition over the same without their consent, nor has he any interest therein of which he can avail himself, nor upon his death have his personal representatives or his creditors any interest in the proceeds of such contracts, which belong to the beneficiaries, to whom they are payable. It is indeed the general rule that a policy, and the money to become due under it, belong, the moment it is issued, to the person or persons named in it as the beneficiary or beneficiaries; and that there is no power in the person procuring the insurance, by any act of his, by deed or by will, to transfer to any other person the interest of the person named. Bliss, Ins. (2d Ed.) 517; Glanz v. Gloeckler, 10 Bradw. 486, per MCALLISTER, J.; Id., 104 Ill. 573; Wilburn v. Wilburn, 83 Ind. 55; Ricker v. Insurance Co., 27 Minn. 193, 6 N.W. Rep. 771; Insurance Co. v. Brant, 47 Mo. 419; Gould v. Emerson, 99 Mass. 154; Insurance Co. v. Weitz, Id. 157.

This must ordinarily be so where the contract is directly with the beneficiary; in respect to policies running to the person insured, but payable to another having a direct pecuniary interest in the life insured; and where the proceeds are made to inure by positive statutory provisions. Mrs. Hume was confessedly a contracting party to the Maryland policy; and, as to the Connecticut contracts, the statute of the state where they were made and to be performed explicitly provided that a policy for the benefit of a married woman shall inure to her separate use or that of her children; but, if the annual premium exceed $300, the amount of such excess shall inure to the benefit of the creditors of the person paying the premiums. The rights and benefits given by the laws of Connecticut in this regard are as much part of these contracts as if incorporated therein, not only because they are to be taken as if entered into there, but because there was the place of performance, and the stipulation of the parties was made with reference to the laws of that place. And if this be so as between Hume and the Connecticut companies, then he could not have at any time disposed of these policies without the consent of the beneficiary; nor is there anything to the contrary in the statutes or general public policy of the District of Columbia. It may very well be that a transfer by an insolvent of a Conecticut policy, payable to himself or his personal representatives, would be held invalid in that district, even though valid under the laws of Connecticut, if the laws of the district were opposed to the latter, because the positive laws of the domicile and the forum must prevail; but there is no such conflict of laws in this case, in respect to the power of disposition by a person procuring insurance payable to another.

The obvious distinction between the transfer of a policy taken out by a person upon his insurable interest in his own life, and payable to himself or his legal representatives, and the obtaining of a policy by a person upon the insurable interest of his wife and children, and payable to them, has been repeatedly recognized by the courts. Thus in Elliott's Appeal, 50 Pa. St. 75, where the policies were issued in the name of the husband, and payable to himself or his personal representatives, and while he was insolvent were by him transferred to trustees for his wife's benefit, the supreme court of Pennsylvania, while holding such transfers void as against creditors, say: 'We are to be understood in thus deciding this case that we do not mean to extend it to policies effected without fraud, directly and on their face for the benefit of the wife, and payable to her; such policies are not fraudulent as to creditors, and are not touched by this decision.' In the use of the words 'without fraud,' the court evidently means actual fraud participated in by all parties, and not fraud inferred from the mere fact of insolvency; and, at all events, in McCutcheon's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. 137, the court say, referring to Elliott's Appeal: 'The policies in that case were effected in the name of the husband, and by him transferred to a trustee for his wife at a time when he was totally insolvent. They were held to be valuable choses in action, the property of the assured, liable to the payment of his debts, and hence their voluntary assignment operated in fraud of creditors, and was void as against them under the statute of 13 Eliz. Here, however, the policy was effected in the name of the wife, and in point of fact was given under an agreement for the surrender of a previous policy for the same amount, also issued in the wife's name. * * * The question of good faith or fraud only arises in the latter case; that is, when the title of the beneficiary arises by assignment. When it exists by force of an original issue in the name or for the benefit of the beneficiary, the title is good, nothwithstanding the claims of creditors. * * * There is no anomaly in this, nor any conflict with the letter or spirit of the statute of Elizabeth, because in such cases the policy would be at no time the property of the assured, and hence no question of fraud in its transfer could arise as to his creditors. It is only in the case of the assignment of a policy that once belonged to the assured that the question of fraud can arise under this act.' And see Bank v. Insurance Co., 24 Fed. Rep. 770; Pence v. Makepeace, 65 Ind. 347; Succession of Hearing, 26 La. Ann. 326; Stigler's Ex'r v. Stigler, 77 Va. 163; Thompson v. Cundiff, 11 Bush, 567.

Conceding, then, in the case in hand, that Hume paid the premiums out of his own money, when insolvent, yet, as Mrs. Hume and the children survived him, and the contracts covered their insurable interest, it is difficult to see upon what ground the creditors, or the administrators as representing them, can take away from these dependent ones that which was expressly secured to them in the event of the death of their natural supporter. The interest insured was neither the debtor's nor his creditors'. The contracts were not payable to the debtor, or his representatives, or his creditors. No fraud on the part of the wife, or the children, or the insurance company is pretended. In no sense was there any gift or transfer of the debtor's property, unless the amounts paid as premiums are to be held to constitute such gift or transfer. This seems to have been the view of the court below, for the decree awarded to the complainants the premiums paid to the Virginia Company from 1874 to 1881, inclusive, and to the other companies from the date of the respective policies; amounting, with interest, to January 4, 1883, to the sum of $2,696.10, which sum was directed to be paid to Hume's administrators out of the money which had been paid into court by the Maryland and Connecticut Mutual Companies. But, even though Hume paid this money out of his own funds when insolvent, and if such payment were within the statute of Elizabeth, this would not give the creditors any interest in the proceeds of the policies, which belonged to the beneficiaries for the reasons already stated.

Were the creditors, then, entitled to recover the premiums? These premiums were paid by Hume to the insurance companies, and to recover from them would require proof that the latter participated in the alleged fraudulent intent, which is not claimed. Cases might be imagined of the payment of large premiums, out of all reasonable proportion to the known or reputed financial condition of the person paying, and under circumstances of grave suspicion, which might justify the inference of fraud on creditors in the withdrawal of such an amount from the debtor's resources; but no element of that sort exists here. The premiums form no part of the proceeds of the policies, and cannot be deducted therefrom on that ground. Mrs. Hume is not shown to have known of or suspected her husband's insolvency, and if the payments were made at her instance, or with her knowledge and assent, or if, without her knowledge, she afterwards ratified the act, and claimed the benefit, as she might rightfully do, (Thompson v. Ins. Co., 46 N. Y. 675,) and as she does, (and the same remarks apply to the children,) then has she thereby received money which ex aequo et bono she ought to return to her husband's creditors; and can the decree against her be sustained on that ground? If in some cases payments of premiums might be treated as gifts inhibited by the statute of Elizabeth, can they be so treated here?

It is assumed by complainants that the money paid was derived from Hume himself, and it is therefore argued that to that extent his means for payment of debts were impaired. That the payments contributed in any appreciable way to Hume's insolvency, is not contended. So far as premiums were paid in 1880 and 1881, (the payments prior to those years having been the annual sum of $196.18 on the Virginia policy,) we are satisfied from the evidence that Hume received from Mrs. Pickrell, his wife's mother, for the benefit of Mrs. Hume and her family, an amount of money largely in excess of these payments, after deducting what was returned to Mrs. Pickrell; and that, in paying the premiums upon procuring the policies in the Maryland and the Connecticut Mutual, Hume was appropriating to that purpose a part of the money which he considered he thus held in trust; and we think that, as between Hume's creditors and Mrs. Hume, the money placed in Hume's hands for his wife's benefit is, under the evidence, equitably as much to be accounted for to her by Hume, and so by them, as is the money paid on her account to be accounted for by her to him or them. We do not, however, dwell particularly upon this, nor pause to discuss the bearing of the laws of the states of the insurance companies upon this matter of the payment of premiums by the debtor himself, so far as they may differ from the rule which may prevail in the District of Columbia, in the absence of specific statutory enactment upon that subject, because we prefer to place our decision upon broader grounds.

In all purely voluntary conveyances it is the fraudulent intent of the donor which vitiates. If actually insolvent, he is held to knowledge of his condition; and if the necessary consequence of his act is to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, within the statute, the presumption of the fraudulent intent is irrebuttable and conclusive, and inquiry into his motives is inadmissible. But the circumstances of each particular case should be considered, as in Partridge v. Gopp, 1 Eden, 163, Amb. 596, where the Lord Keeper, while holding that debts must be paid before gifts are made, and debtors must be just before they are generous, admitted that 'the fraudulent intent might be collected from the magnitude and value of the gift.' Where fraud is to be imputed, or the imputation of fraud repelled, by an examination into the circumstances under which a gift is made to those towards whom the donor is under natural obligation, the test is said, in Kipp v. Hanna, 2 Bland, 33, to be the pecuniary ability of the donor at that time to withdraw the amount of the donation from his estate without the least hazard to his creditors, or in any material degree lessening their then prospects of payment; and, in considering the sufficiency of the debtor's property for the payment of debts, the probable, immediate, unavoidable, and reasonable demands for the support of the family of the donor should be taken into the account and deducted, having in mind also the nature of his business and his necessary expenses. Emerson v. Bemis, 69 Ill. 541. This argument in the interest of creditors concedes that the debtor may rightfully preserve his family from suffering and want. It seems to us that the same public policy which justifies this, and recognizes the support of wife and children as a positive obligation in law as well as morals, should be extended to protect them from destitution after the debtor's death, by permitting him, not to accumulate a fund as a permanent provision, but to devote a moderate portion of his earnings to keep on foot a security for support already, or which could thereby be, lawfully obtained, at least to the extent of requiring that, under such circumstances, the fraudulent intent of both parties to the transaction should be made out. And inasmuch as there is no evidence from which such intent on the part of Mrs. Hume or the insurance companies could be inferred, in our judgment none of these premiums can be recovered.

The decree is affirmed, except so far as it directs the payment to the administrators of the premiums in question and interest, and, as to that, is reversed, and the cause remanded to the court below, with directions to proceed in conformity with this opinion. Ordered accordingly.