Appellants (plaintiffs), fifty in number, brought an action in District Court seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that their separation from employment by the United States Mint was in violation of their rights as veterans' preference eligibles, that they were still employees of the United States, and that the Civil Service Commission Regulation under which they were given their notices of release1 was illegal; (2) an injunction restoring them to their positions. The appellees (defendants) are the Director of the Mint, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the members of the United States Civil Service Commission. The District Court, on defendants' motion, dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies, and that their separation from employment was governed by Section 12 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944,2 not by Section 14 as they contended. This appeal is from that judgment.

The plaintiffs' case rests solely on their argument that the separation notices to them were fatally defective in that the notice period therein was not thirty days with pay, but included only seven days active duty, the remainder to be nonpay furlough time.3 Section 14, the keystone of plaintiffs' argument, provides that certain preference eligibles shall not be discharged, reduced in rank, etc., 'except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service and for reasons given in writing,' and the persons affected 'shall have at least thirty days' advance written notice * * * stating any and all reasons, specifically and in detail * * * .' However, that section relates to discharges for cause, and the complaint itself alleges that the plaintiffs were 'not separated for cause' but 'on account of the reduction in the force in the Philadelphia Mint.' Such reductions in force fall under Section 12 of the Act, and are to be made 'in accordance with Civil Service Commission regulations which shall give due effect to tenure of employment, military preference, length of service, and efficiency ratings.' Thus, while Congress did spell out the items which the Commission was obliged to include in the regulations, there was no mention of the thirty days with pay for which the plaintiffs argue. In the absence of clear expression that such is the case, we cannot, as plaintiffs say we should, ascribe to Congress an intention that in reductions in force large numbers of employees must be retained on the public payroll in a pay status for at least thirty days before they are released, although there may be no work for them to do, no funds from which to pay them, or both.

Although defendants also contend that the plaintiffs did not exhaust their administrative remedy since they failed to appeal to the Civil Service Commission,4 we need not decide that question, as the plaintiffs staked their case solely upon the statute, not upon a contention that the regulations were misapplied.

Affirmed.