

Clause c of section 67 of the bankrupt act, so far as the same need be considered on this hearing, is as follows:

"A lien created by or obtained in or pursuant to any suit or proceeding at law or in equity, including an attachment upon mesne process or a judgment by confession, which was begun against a person within four months before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by or against such person shall be dissolved by the adjudication of such person to be a bankrupt if it appears that said lien was obtained and permitted while the defendant was insolvent and that its existence and enforcement will work a preference."

The attachment having been levied within four months next preceding the adjudication in bankruptcy, the lien claimed by the creditor as having been thereby secured was dissolved, unless a proper construction of the clause of the bankruptcy law just quoted otherwise requires. As shown, it is admitted that the bankrupt was insolvent when the lien was obtained, and that its existence will work a preference; but it is contended on behalf of the creditor that the lien must not only have been obtained, but that it must have been "permitted" by the bankrupt, by some positive act of consent or assistance in its procurement, in order to work that result. The court does not so understand the law, but is of opinion that the word "permitted," in the section quoted, must be considered as synonymous with "suffered." The bankrupt "permitted" the lien to be obtained when, by not paying the debt, and otherwise, he suffered or allowed or permitted the grounds for the attachment to arise, and when he did not in good faith prevent, or at least resist, the effort of the creditor to obtain the lien by means of the attachment. As it is admitted that the bankrupt was insolvent at the time the lien was obtained, and that the result of the existence of the lien would be a preference to Foerg, the views of the referee were correct, and his ruling is approved.

UNITED STATES v. REISINGER.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. May 25, 1899.)

No. 159.

CUSTOMS DUTIES—CLASSIFICATION—STICKS OF CARBON.

Carbon sticks, 36 inches long, intended for ultimate use in electric lighting, but which require to be cut into suitable lengths, the ends of which must be pointed or ground, before they can be so used, are dutiable under paragraph 97 of the tariff act of 1897, as articles or wares composed wholly of carbon, not specially provided for, and not under paragraph 98, as carbons for electric lighting.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

This cause comes here upon appeal from a decision of the circuit court, Southern district of New York, reversing a decision of the board of general appraisers, which reversed a decision of the collector of the port of New York touching the assessment of duty upon certain imported merchandise. The facts appear in the opinion.

D. Frank Lloyd, for the United States.

W. Wickham Smith, for appellee.

Before WALLACE, LACOMBE, and SHIPMAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. This cause arises under the tariff act of 1897. The relevant paragraphs are found in Schedule B, "Earths, Earth-ware, and Glassware," and read as follows:

"(97) Articles and wares composed wholly or in chief value of earthy or mineral substances or carbon, not specially provided for in this act, if not decorated in any manner, thirty-five per centum ad valorem; if decorated, forty-five per centum ad valorem.

"(98) Gas retorts, three dollars each; lava tips for burners, ten cents per gross and fifteen per centum ad valorem; carbons for electric lighting, ninety cents per hundred; filter tubes, forty-five per centum ad valorem; porous carbon pots for electric batteries without metallic connections, twenty per centum ad valorem."

It is contended by the collector that the articles are covered by paragraph 98, as carbons, rods, or sticks for electric lighting. Inasmuch as they were 36 inches long, "which length," he asserts, "is equal to three carbons of the extreme length for electric lighting," the collector assessed them at the rate of \$2.70 per 100 sticks. The board of general appraisers held that they should be classified under paragraph 97. The circuit court held that the collector's classification was correct, but that he should have assessed them at 90 cents per 100 only. 91 Fed. 638. No testimony was taken in the circuit court. The findings of fact returned by the board of general appraisers are supported by the evidence before them, and read as follows:

"(1) The goods consist of sticks or rods of carbon, imported in lengths, respectively, of 36 inches.

"(2) The articles are not suitable or capable of being used for electric lighting in the lengths and condition in which they are imported, but, in order to adapt them for such use, it is necessary to cut them up into shorter lengths, to point some of them, and smooth or grind the ends of others.

"(3) Prior to July 24, 1897 (the date of the present tariff act), carbons of these lengths were not imported into this country. They were then imported commonly in lengths varying from 4½ to 14 inches, and occasionally as long as 16, and perhaps 20, inches; the greater number being 12 inches long."

Accepting these findings as correct, we concur in the conclusion of the board that, although ultimately intended for electric lighting, the fact that it is necessary to bestow further labor on them, in order to fit them for such use, precludes their inclusion in paragraph 98. Inasmuch as they are not specifically provided for in paragraph 98, they come within the general phraseology of paragraph 97, being "articles or wares composed wholly of carbon." This paragraph, it should be noted, is changed from the similar one, in the act of 1894 (paragraph 86), which was recently considered by us in *U. S. v. Reisinger* (Dec. 7, 1898) 33 C. C. A. 395, 91 Fed. 112, by the insertion of the word "carbon." The decision of the circuit court is therefore reversed, and that of the board of general appraisers is affirmed.

WELSBACH LIGHT CO. v. REX INCANDESCENT LIGHT CO.

(Circuit Court, S. D. New York. April 23, 1898.)

PATENTS—INCANDESCENT MANTLES FOR LIGHTS.

The Rawson patent, No. 407,963, for improvements in incandescent mantles for gaslights, held valid, and infringed, on motion for a preliminary injunction.

This was a suit in equity by the Welsbach Light Company against the Rex Incandescent Light Company for alleged infringement of a patent for incandescent mantles. The cause was heard on a motion for preliminary injunction.

John R. Bennett, for the motion.

Louis Hicks, opposed.

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. This is a suit to prevent infringement of the first claim of United States patent No. 407,963, dated July 30, 1889, to Rawson and another, for production of incandescent mantles. This patent was before Judge Townsend, and the claim sustained, in the recent suit in this court of Same Complainant v. Sunlight Incandescent Co., 87 Fed. 221. It was held that the invention covered by the patent was a most meritorious one; that the patentees may be regarded as pioneers; that the patent should not be narrowly interpreted, but should be so construed as to cover a broad range of equivalents; and that it did cover mantles coated "by dipping or immersing them in a solution composed chiefly of collodion, with the addition of a small percentage of castor oil." Under familiar practice, that decision will be followed here unless some peculiar circumstances are shown. No patent, no prior publication, no authority not before Judge Townsend, is presented here. The proposition advanced upon the argument that no serious defense was made in the earlier suit finds no support in the record, in the briefs, or in the argument of counsel for the defendant in that case, a shorthand report of which has been submitted on this motion. Four affidavits (not properly verified for use in this action, but which may nevertheless be filed with the other papers) have been presented, asserting that affiants know of the use of the patented method prior to the patentee's application. This is what usually happens after a patent has been sustained at final hearing, and this court is slow to accept such ex parte statements as sufficient to do away with the presumption arising from a decree at final hearing sustaining the patent. Infringement is sufficiently shown. Indeed, when the patent is broadly construed, as Judge Townsend held it should be, it is hardly disputed. Motion granted.