

The judgment in this case was obtained in 1896, and the provisions of said subsection c have no application in this case. A lien created on personal property by issuing an execution on a judgment obtained two years before is not a lien created pursuant to any suit or proceeding at law or in equity begun against the bankrupt within four months of his being adjudicated a bankrupt. Subsection f, § 67, of the bankrupt act is also invoked to sustain the contention that the levy of the execution issued on the 5th day of September, 1898, was null and void, because made within four months prior to the filing of the petition against the bankrupt. This provision so clearly applies to a case of involuntary bankruptcy as not to admit of discussion in a case like this, of voluntary bankruptcy. An order will be entered dissolving the injunction.

---

In re COFFMAN.

(District Court, N. D. Texas. April 12, 1899.)

No. 9.

**BANKRUPTCY—EXEMPTIONS—GROWING CROPS.**

Where the homestead laws of the state do not include growing crops, a bankrupt cannot claim, as exempt property under the bankruptcy act, a crop growing on his homestead at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy, although an execution could not have been levied on such crop before its severance; and if, after the appointment of the trustee, the bankrupt gathers and removes the crop, he must surrender the same, or the proceeds of its sale, to the trustee.

**In Bankruptcy.** On review of decision of referee. Affirmed.

Seay & Seay, for B. F. Coffman.

D. A. Eldridge, pro se.

**MEEK**, District Judge. The bankrupt, B. F. Coffman, complains of the action of the referee in sustaining the motion of the trustee, asking that the bankrupt be compelled to turn over to the trustee, or account for, the proceeds of the sale of three bales of cotton. The cotton composing the three bales was, at the time Coffman was adjudicated a bankrupt, growing on his homestead. Subsequent to the appointment and qualification of the trustee, it was gathered and taken from said homestead. The bankrupt claims said cotton as exempt to him under the laws of Texas. The exemption laws of the state of Texas in effect at the time of the filing of the petition herein did not include crops growing upon the homestead. Rev. St. Tex. 1895, art. 2395. While execution could not be levied upon a crop growing upon a homestead, yet execution can be levied on a crop after it has been gathered and removed from the homestead. *Coates v. Caldwell*, 71 Tex. 21, 8 S. W. 922; *Silberberg v. Trilling*, 82 Tex. 526, 18 S. W. 591. This cotton not being exempt to the bankrupt, the title to the same which he may have possessed at the time he was adjudged a bankrupt vested, by operation of law, in the trustee, upon his appointment and qualification, as of the date of said adjudication. Bankruptcy Act 1898, § 70. The trustee could not, at the time of his appointment and qualification, take possession of said cot-

ton, without entering upon the homestead of the bankrupt to gather it. The law does not countenance such intrusion and violation of the homestead right in the levy of an ordinary execution upon a judgment. *Coates v. Caldwell*, 71 Tex. 21, 8 S. W. 922. But in a case of voluntary bankruptcy, where the bankrupt comes forward, and tenders all of his property subject to execution, to be applied ratably on his debts, in order that he may reap the benefits of the bankruptcy act, the question may well be asked, does he not, by his act, extend an invitation and give warrant to the trustee to come upon his homestead and gather that which belongs to his creditors? This question, however, does not arise here, as the trustee only seeks to have reduced to his possession three bales of cotton, or the proceeds thereof, which had been gathered and removed from the homestead. In view of the holding of the court that such cotton was not exempt to the bankrupt, and that the title to the same passed to the trustee as of the date of his adjudication as a bankrupt, the ruling of the referee herein will be affirmed, and the costs of this appeal will be taxed against the bankrupt.

---

In re GARDEN.

(District Court, N. D. Alabama, S. D. February 10, 1899.)

**BANKRUPTCY—EXEMPTIONS—WAIVER.**

Where a debt, proved and allowed against the estate of a bankrupt, is founded on a promissory note, in which the bankrupt, as authorized by the laws of the state, and in the manner therein prescribed, has waived his right of exemption, he will not be entitled, as against such debt, to have property set apart to him as exempt under section 6 of the bankruptcy act (30 Stat. 548).

In Bankruptcy. On petition of the Birmingham Dry-Goods Company, a proving creditor, for review of an order of the referee in bankruptcy in the matter of the allowance of exemptions to the bankrupt.

Ward & Houghton, for creditor.

BRUCE, District Judge. M. Garden filed his petition in voluntary bankruptcy in this court, and was duly adjudicated a bankrupt. The schedule of assets filed with petition shows about \$800 worth of property, all of which the bankrupt claims as exempt. The Birmingham Dry-Goods Company, a creditor of the bankrupt, proved its claim in the cause, which claim was allowed; and it set forth an indebtedness of the bankrupt, due upon promissory notes in which there is a waiver of exemptions in due form. The creditor, the Birmingham Dry-Goods Company, moved to disallow the claim of exemptions made by the bankrupt, so far as its debt was concerned, which motion was overruled by the referee; and the correctness of this ruling is the question here presented for review.

The naked question is the right of a bankrupt to exemptions of personal property in the face of his waiver of exemptions contained in his note to his creditor, who has proved his claim in bankruptcy.