

state or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens or subjects." The plaintiff in error must find in this provision his right to proceed in a federal court, and if the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company is not a citizen of a state, or a citizen or subject of a foreign state, the controversy is not among those of which jurisdiction is conferred upon the United States courts by the constitution. It follows that the circuit court erroneously entertained jurisdiction of the cause. For want of jurisdiction the judgment of dismissal is affirmed.

KNOX ROCK-BLASTING CO. v. RAIRDON STONE CO.

(Circuit Court, S. D. Ohio, W. D. June 21, 1898.)

1. EQUITY PLEADING—FORM OF PLEA.

A plea should state some single objection to the plaintiff's case which would be a complete defense either to the whole bill or to some distinct part of it.

2. SAME—PLEA IN PATENT SUIT.

A plea to a bill in the usual form, charging infringement of a patent, is bad where it alleges that during a certain period the patented device was experimented with by defendant by consent of complainant, and that with respect to other occasions it did not infringe.

3. SAME.

A plea to the bill is inappropriate to suits in equity for infringement of a patent unless in very special circumstances.

This was a suit in equity by the Knox Rock-Blasting Company against the Rairdon Stone Company for alleged infringement of a patent. The cause was heard on motion to strike from the files a plea to the bill.

Wood & Boyd and Bakewell & Bakewell, for complainant.
J. R. Ramsey, for defendant.

SEVERENS, District Judge. The motion to strike the defendant's plea from the files must be sustained. To a bill in the usual form, charging infringement of a patent, the defendant pleads that during a certain period the patented device was experimented with by the defendant by consent of the complainant, and that with respect to other occasions it did not infringe. A plea should state some single objection to the plaintiff's case which would be a complete defense either to the whole bill or to some distinct part of it. This plea does neither, but consists of matter which would be a defense for some of the period covered by the allegations of the bill and answers for the rest of the period. It has been several times decided that a defense by plea is inappropriate to this class of cases unless in very special circumstances, and I think the objections to it are re-enforced in this case by the general rule of equity pleading to which I have referred. *Sharp v. Reissner*, 9 Fed. 445; *Hubbell v. De Land*, 14 Fed. 471-474; *Korn v. Wiebusch*, 33 Fed. 50; *Union Switch & Signal Co. v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co.*, 69 Fed. 833-835; *Chishohn v. Johnson*, 84 Fed. 384. Such cases as *Leatherbee v. Brown*, 69 Fed. 590, are distinguishable. There the whole matter of

defense in the case consisted of a single point, and the cases fall within the exception to the general rule above stated. The motion is sustained. Leave is given to answer within 20 days.

SOUTHERN PAC. R. CO. v. GROECK et al.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. May 2, 1898.)

No. 398.

1. **RAILROAD LAND GRANTS—WITHDRAWAL OF LANDS—PRE-EMPTION.**
No valid pre-emption can be made of lands which have been withdrawn from settlement and sale by the officers of the land department; and even if the order of withdrawal is subsequently canceled, and a patent then issues, no title passes, for the acts of the settler were in violation of law, and void.
2. **SAME—WITHDRAWAL BY OPERATION OF LAW.**
The act of July 27, 1866, § 3, granting lands to aid in the construction of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, of itself operated to withdraw from settlement the lands lying within the indemnity as well as the grant limits, from the date of filing of the map of the general route; and the secretary of the interior had no power to affect the grantee's rights, or to authorize a pre-emption settlement on the lands, by subsequently canceling his order withdrawing the lands from settlement.
3. **SAME—FORFEITURE OF LAND GRANT—POWER OF SECRETARY OF INTERIOR.**
Delay in constructing the road, beyond the time limited by law, gives the secretary of the interior no authority to reopen the lands to settlement by canceling his order of withdrawal. A forfeiture of the railroad grant can be declared by congress alone.
4. **SAME—LACHES OF GRANTEE.**
Where the granting act of itself operates to withdraw from settlement lands lying within the indemnity limits as well as within the grant limits (as in the case of the grant of 1866 to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company), laches is not imputable to the grantee, because of delay in completing its road and making its indemnity selections, in a contest with one who has attempted to make a pre-emption entry after the filing of the map of general route.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of California.

William F. Herrin, John Garber, and William Singer, Jr., for appellant.

W. B. Wallace, for appellees.

Before GILBERT and MORROW, Circuit Judges, and HAWLEY, District Judge.

GILBERT, Circuit Judge. The Southern Pacific Railroad Company brought suit against the appellees to obtain a decree that the appellees hold in trust a patent which Otto Groeck received from the United States to a certain tract of land, which it is contended was land granted by the United States to the railroad company by the act of date July 27, 1866. Section 18 of said act authorized the appellant to construct the railroad which now extends from San Francisco, by way of Mojave, to the Needles on the Colorado river. Section 3 provided as follows: