

ance was insisted on, and had not given notice that the cotton would be kept or stored at the risk of the steamship line upon failure to comply with the request. The request to come and remove it "as soon as practicable" was, in effect, one to remove it at the earliest convenience of the steamship line. There is nothing in the case to indicate that the defendant had not acquiesced in the delay which intervened between the request and the fire.

The bills of lading did not restrict the ordinary liability of a carrier who receives goods for a destination beyond its own line, for transportation by a connecting carrier. On the contrary, the contract between the parties was carefully framed to adjust the liability of the carriers as between themselves, and to protect the shipper, in the event of a disputable custody of the goods. By its terms, the carrier, and that carrier only, "in whose actual custody" the cotton should be, was to be liable for any loss or damage to it whereby any legal liability might be incurred. It was the manifest purpose of this provision to define the rights of the parties to the contract in the event of doubt or dispute, and to make that carrier liable only who was in actual custody of the goods at the time of the loss, irrespective of the question whether there had been any constructive change of possession between the two carriers previously.

A verdict for the plaintiffs was properly directed. The judgment is therefore affirmed.

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In re HO QUAI SIN.

(District Court, N. D. California. January 7, 1898.)

No. 11,401.

**CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES—EXCLUSION OF CHINESE.**

The fact that a Chinese person told the customs officers that she was born in China, but had been told to say that she was born in San Francisco, is sufficient ground for rejecting her testimony to the contrary in habeas corpus proceedings, and may also be considered in determining the credibility of other witnesses who testified that she was born in San Francisco.

This was a petition by Ho Quai Sin for a writ of habeas corpus.

Thos. D. Riordan, for petitioner.

H. S. Foote, U. S. Atty.

DE HAVEN, District Judge. The special referee was justified in rejecting the positive testimony of the petitioner and the other witnesses, given in her behalf, under the principle of law declared in *Quock Ting v. U. S.*, 140 U. S. 417, 11 Sup. Ct. 733, 851, and the cases referred to in that opinion. When first examined by the customs officers, on board the steamer *Coptic*, the petitioner stated that she was born in China, but had been told to report her birthplace as San Francisco, Cal. The fact that such statement was made is sufficiently shown by a credible witness, who acted as interpreter on that occasion, and may be considered in determining the credibility of the other witnesses, who testified that the petitioner was born here.

In the face of the petitioner's former statement that she was born in China, the court is not bound to give credit to her present testimony, nor to the evidence of other witnesses who testify that she was born in this country. If there was any reason to believe the statement which she in fact made to the customs officers when examined by them in relation to her right to land at the port of San Francisco was not properly interpreted, or that she did not upon that occasion fully understand the questions to which she gave answers, the question presented would be entirely different. Petitioner remanded to the custody whence she was taken, for the purpose of deportation to China.

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In re EBANKS.

(District Court, N. D. California. December 2, 1897.)

No. 11,400.

1. HABEAS CORPUS—APPEAL.

Under Rev. St. § 766, providing that, pending an appeal in habeas corpus proceedings, any order or proceeding against a person restrained of his liberty under state authority shall be void, an order of the state court directing the infliction of the death penalty, pending an appeal from an order of the district court denying a writ of habeas corpus, is invalid.

2. SAME—JURISDICTION.

The district court has the power in habeas corpus proceedings to make any order necessary to protect a person brought before it from proceedings and orders of a state court which are beyond its jurisdiction.

3. COURTS—STAY OF PROCEEDINGS.

A writ of habeas corpus issued from a federal court to protect a person against invalid proceedings of a state court will not be continued in force after such proceedings have been stayed by an order of the state supreme court.

Joseph Jepheth Ebanks was convicted of murder, and sentenced to death, and his application to the United States district court for a writ of habeas corpus was denied, whereupon he appealed to the United States supreme court. Pending such appeal, the state court ordered that its sentence be carried out, and Ebanks brings this proceeding upon a writ of habeas corpus. Prior to the hearing herein, the state supreme court made an order staying the proceedings of the state court.

Eugene N. Deuprey and Louis P. Boardman, for petitioner.

Henry E. Carter, for Warden of State Prison at San Quentin, California.

DE HAVEN, District Judge. It appears that prior to October 8, 1897, the petitioner herein was convicted in the superior court of the county of San Diego, Cal., of the crime of murder, and thereupon adjudged by said court to suffer the penalty of death. On the said 8th day of October, application was made by the petitioner to this court for a writ of habeas corpus; and in the petition therefor it was alleged, among other things, that the said judgment of conviction was not based upon any indictment charging the petitioner with the commission of the crime of which he was thereby adjudged to have been