150 U. S. 47, 50, 14 Sup. Ct. 32, to the effect that while certain prior patents may not strictly anticipate, yet they may aid to create such a state or condition of the art as to require the restriction of a subsequent patent "closely to the devices and methods claimed" by it, I could not concur in any opinion sustaining the validity of either of these patents. But apparently the trend of this court, as shown in Folding Bed Co. v. Osgood, 7 C. C. A. 382, 58 Fed. 588, and in Herrick v. Leveller Co., 8 C. C. A. 475, 60 Fed. 80, precludes me from following my own views as above expressed. Therefore, I concur in so much of the opinion of the court as gives a broad support to Noyes' first patent.

It seems to me, however, that his second patent must have been taken out as a matter only of greater caution, through fear that, by some possible interpretation of the claims of the first, every method of using the electric currents would not be covered. To my mind, this was unnecessary; and, unless the patents are to be limited to details, the claims of the first patent cover every form of current changes particularized in either. I think, therefore, that under Leggett v. Oil Co., 149 U. S. 287, 13 Sup. Ct. 902, and more particularly and clearly under Miller v. Manufacturing Co., 151 U. S. 186, 14 Sup. Ct. 310, the second patent is void. Most assuredly has there been no infringement of the fourth claim of the second patent, which expressly unites in the combination two receivers. On so much as relates to the second patent, I know of no decision of this court which precludes my judgment.

On the question of infringement I agree fully with the conclusions of the court.

For the reasons stated, I concur touching the first patent, but dissent touching the second.

E. C. ATKINS & CO. v. PARKE et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. May 8, 1894.)
No. 118.

1. PATENTS—ASSIGNMENT—CANCELLATION.
   A clause in an assignment of a patent that, if the assignee fail to make certain statements and payments within a certain time after the same become due, the assignors shall have the right, by giving notice, to cancel the exclusive privilege and grant conferred, does not authorize a cancellation by notice given at a time when no money is due.

2. SAME—SUIT BY ASSIGNEES FOR INFRINGEMENT—CROSS BILL BY ASSIGNORS.
   On a bill by the assignee of a patent against the assignors for infringement, praying for an accounting, defaults of the assignee in not complying with conditions of the assignment and other wrongs on his part, which do not authorize a forfeiture by the terms of the contract, are not grounds for a cross bill by the assignors to cancel the assignment, or to remove the cloud on their title to the patent arising therefrom, or for other affirmative relief, where all the matters complained of may be pleaded as defenses to the original bill, and damages therefor may be considered on the accounting.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan.
This is a bill filed by E. C. Atkins & Co., a corporation created and organized under the laws of the state of Indiana, against Amos S. Parke and Sarah A. Parke, residents of Bay City, in the state of Michigan, for infringement of letters patent No. 333,540, issued to Sarah A. Parke, January 5, 1886, for swaging saw teeth, and for an accounting for profits and damages.

The bill avers that on the 30th of January, 1886, the patentee constituted Amos S. Parke her true and lawful attorney, to sell saw swaging machines, and transfer territorial rights to manufacture and sell the same. On February 2, 1888, the bill avers that said Amos S. Parke, as such agent, sold and conveyed to the plaintiff the right to make and sell said machines throughout the United States, excepting the states of California and Oregon, and the territory of Washington; that all interest in said patent, excepting in said states and territory, was thereby transferred and conveyed to the plaintiff. The bill further avers that the defendants, without the consent or license of the plaintiff, and notwithstanding said grant to sell, have infringed the plaintiff's rights by making, at Bay City, Mich., saw swaging machines according to the invention of said patent, and have refused to desist from such manufacture or account for their profits and damages. The bill prays for an injunction and for an account.

The answer admits that the plaintiff is a corporation; that Sarah A. Parke is the true inventor of the patent named; that she made Amos S. Parke her true and lawful attorney; but denies that said attorney did grant and convey to the plaintiff, or its representatives or assigns, the exclusive right to make and sell said machine according to said invention. But defendants admit that on said 2d of February, 1886, they did enter into a certain contract in relation to the manufacture and sale of the improvements mentioned in said letters patent, and that a copy of said contract is attached to the answer.

The defendants deny that the plaintiff has substantially complied with the terms of said contract, and deny that, by a substantial compliance with the material conditions thereof, all right and title to said letters patent is vested in the complainant. The defendants deny that they have infringed by manufacturing said saw swaging machines, or that the plaintiff had any right or title in and to said improvements described in said letters patent at the time said bill was filed, and, at that time, deny the plaintiff had any interest in the profits of said machines, made under said patent, and deny that the plaintiff had any right to make and vend such machines.

The defendants admit that said Amos S. Parke, after the termination of the contract marked "Exhibit A," as hereinafter stated, on or about the 29th day of January, 1889, did begin to make at Bay City saw swaging machines, and has made about 60 of such machines, but deny that they were unlawfully made in violation of the plaintiff's rights.

(1) Defendants claim that said contract of February 2, 1886, was not an unconditional sale or transfer of the defendants' title, but was only a conditional sale, liable to be terminated by default of the plaintiff, at the election of the defendants.

(2) That said plaintiff was in default by failing to comply with the stipulations in said contract, and same was not in force at the time of the wrongs complained of.

(3) That plaintiff has failed to comply with the condition of said contract by neglecting to fill orders for said machines; that, on the day said contract was made, said defendants gave an order to the plaintiff for twenty-five of said machines, but plaintiff failed to fill said order until about July 8th, following, when ten of said new swages were sent; that repeated orders were sent for said machines, but not filled; and that the defendants thereby lost sales of the same, as they had contracts for the sale of the same.

(4) That plaintiff failed to manufacture said machines as fast as the demands of trade required, and as it agreed to do.

(5) That from February 2, 1886, to January 28, 1888, plaintiff had made and put on the market not to exceed 60 of said machines, and had not sent to defendants to exceed 30, though there was ready sale and an active demand for the same.

(6) That, by said plaintiff's failure to make and place said machines on the market, the defendants lost the sale of a large number, and the profits on the same.
(7) That the plaintiff made what machines were manufactured in a defective and unworkmanlike manner, so as to injure the sale of the same, and, of the 80 sent to defendants, 10 were so defective that they could not be sold, and were returned to the plaintiff; that, out of the 60 machines made and put on the market, 42 were returned, as appeared by the plaintiff’s letter (marked “Exhibit B”), and the defendants charge they were returned because of defective make; that from February 2, 1886, to January 26, 1888, the defendants had orders for machines which would have been filled by machines returned if they had been well made.

(8) That plaintiff failed to promote sales by refusing to advertise; that defendants furnished cuts which were not used; that portions of said invention which related to swaging band saws’ teeth were wholly omitted; that, though the plaintiff manufactured various articles in lumber and working of wood, and advertised largely, in none of said advertisements is said improvements shown.

(9) Plaintiff was interested in the Hinkly machine, used for similar purpose, and therefore did not work in good faith under said contract, but made inferior machines to retard their sale.

(10) That plaintiff has forfeited its rights, failed to make reports and pay royalties; that from the 2d of February, 1886, no report of sales was made until March 17, 1887.

(11) That on the 26th of January, 1888, the plaintiff having forfeited its rights under said contract, defendants elected and did declare the contract forfeited, by written notice served on the plaintiff.

(12) Defendants charge that plaintiff was interested in another saw swaging machine, and entered into a contract to control the machines made under the Parke patent for the purpose of preventing said machine from being put on the market, and that said contract was a fraud on its part.

(13) That, since the making of said contract, plaintiff has caused to be made and put on the market other saw swaging machines, and did all in its power to prevent the Parke machines coming onto the market.

(14) Defendants claim the patent described in No. 333,540 to be of great value and use to the public, and, if manufactured and sold, would be a source of great revenue to the defendants and benefit to the public, and, if complainant is permitted to prevent the manufacture and sale, defendants will be irreparably injured. Defendants submit the plaintiff is entitled to no relief, and pray for the same benefit by their answer, as though they had filed a cross bill or a demurrer.

Chester Bradford, for appellant.
James Van Kleeck, for appellees.

Before TAFT and LURTON, Circuit Judges, and RICKS, District Judge.

RICKS, District Judge, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

This case was first heard upon the pleadings and evidence by Circuit Justice Brown, while district judge for the eastern district of Michigan. In an oral opinion, which we find printed in the record, he held that the written instrument of February 2, 1886, set forth in the bill, was an assignment of the patent, and vested the legal title thereto in the assignee, which is the plaintiff corporation, described as E. C. Atkins & Co. He further proceeded to consider whether, without a reassignment or a cancellation of the agreement by a judicial decree, the assignors could claim that they were exonerated from liability as infringers. His conclusion was that:

"Where a patentee contracts for the use or sale of the patented article upon the payment of certain royalties, that he cannot, as against such license,
maintain a suit for infringement simply upon the ground that the licensee has failed to pay the agreed sum. It was said in Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U. S. 547-555, that in such cases the patentee can establish his royalty, and sue at law, and recover every month or every year for what is due. He may also file a bill in chancery to have the license annulled or set aside, because of the difficulties placed in the way of its fair execution by the defendant. It was held, however, that he could not abandon the contract, treat it as a nullity, and charge the defendants as infringers liable as trespassers under the act of congress. 'We do not agree,' says Mr. Justice Miller, 'that either party can, of his own volition, declare the contract rescinded, and proceed precisely as if nothing had been done under it. If it is to be rescinded, it can only be done by a mutual agreement, or by the decree of a court of justice. If either party disregards it, it can be specifically enforced against him, or damages can be recovered for its violation; but, until so rescinded or set aside, it is a subsisting agreement, which, whatever it is or may be shown to be, must govern the rights of these parties in the use of complainant's process, and must be the foundation of any relief given by a court of equity.'

The learned judge then expressed a doubt whether, in view of the breaches of the agreement made by the assignee, and after written notice of a cancellation given by the assignors, the former could maintain a suit for infringement against the patentee. Having such doubt, and desiring to afford the assignors all rights and relief to which they were entitled under the contract and the law, he made an order staying proceedings in the pending case for 30 days, and allowing the defendant to file a cross bill. Thereupon such a cross bill was filed. In it all the material averments set out in the answer were repeated, and additional allegations made charging the defendant with default in not complying with the conditions of said contract, and that, because of such default, the complainants elected to and did terminate and cancel said contract; and further charging that the defendant, E. C. Atkins & Co., had lost all right, title, and interest to said letters patent under said assignment, because of their breach of its conditions.

To this cross bill the defendant corporation made very full and explicit answer to the charge of want of energy on the part of the defendant in manufacturing said machines, and placing the same upon the market. The defendant avers that the complainants were fully aware of the manner in which said business was being prosecuted, and that one of the complainants, Amos S. Parke, spent a considerable period of time at the defendant's works, and expressed himself as substantially satisfied with the manner in which the contract was being carried out; that they employed parties selected by complainants to manufacture the swages covered by the invention; and that, with said employment and skill, the complainants, through A. S. Parke, expressed themselves as satisfied. The defendant denies all charges of giving preference to other swage machines and being interested in the same, and avers that it acted in good faith in making and putting upon the market said machines.
The defendant further claims that all royalties and reports were made in substantial compliance with the contract, and that, if there were any informalities in such reports, or delay in making the same, objections thereto were waived by the acceptance of such royalties and reports by the complainants. The defendant further avers that such royalties and reports were accepted after notice of the cancellation of said contract by complainants. Defendant avers that said contract is still in full force, and was not canceled or rescinded by complainants' pretended notice of January 26, 1888.

Replication was duly filed. The parties stipulated to submit the case upon the pleadings under the cross bill, and upon the evidence taken under the original bill and answer.

The case came to a final hearing before Judge Swan, whose opinion is set forth in the record. In the opinion of Judge Brown, from which we have quoted, in that part ordering a stay of proceedings and allowing the defendants to file a cross bill, he stated that the evidence showed that "the plaintiff [the assignee under the patent] has been guilty of a breach of the very agreement under which he claims title to the patent," and therefore expresses doubt as to his right to maintain the suit for an infringement against the patentee. Judge Swan says: "This conclusion, reached upon the same proofs which are here presented, it will be unseemly to disregard or overrule. It practically leaves nothing for decision."

We do not understand Judge Brown to have intended, by the remark quoted, to pass definitely upon the evidence relating to that issue presented by the pleadings. The evidence on that subject was so voluminous, and the conclusion to be reached from it so important, that it is not to be supposed that he would so summarily have disposed of it. No facts are stated and no reasons given to support the conclusion. He had previously stated in the most positive terms, that the title to a patent conveyed by a written assignment, such as that exhibited to the answer, could not be revested in the assignor by a breach of the contract on the part of the assignee, so as to enable the former to maintain a suit upon the patent. He had quoted approvingly the opinion of Mr. Justice Miller in Hartell v. Tilghman, in 99 U. S. 547, that the only way to rescind such a contract was by a mutual agreement, or by the decree of a court of justice; and that, until so rescinded or set aside, it is a subsisting agreement, which, whatever it is or may be shown to be, must govern the rights of the parties, and must be the foundation of any relief given by a court of equity.

Considering the opinion in all its parts, we are therefore justified in concluding that, by the remark quoted, the learned justice did not intend to decide that there had been such a breach of the contract by the assignee as authorized its cancellation by mere notice of rescission by the assignors. The evidence would not support such a conclusion. The sixth clause of the agreement, under which the assignors claim the power to rescind, provides that, if the assignee shall fail to make the statements and payments called for by a preceding clause of the contract within 10 days from the time the same shall become due, then the assignors shall have the right to cancel
the exclusive privilege and grant conferred, by giving notice of such intent. This is a clause providing for the forfeiture of title, and the condition upon which the forfeiture is to accrue must, of course, be strictly construed in favor of the assignee. The condition precedent to forfeiture could not be fulfilled unless there was a failure to make both the reports and the payment within the time required. The evidence conclusively shows that when the assignors attempted to cancel the contract, in January, no money was due from the assignee. Whatever the delinquency as to reports, therefore, the condition of forfeiture was not fulfilled.

The other wrongs complained of in the cross bill are not made conditions authorizing or working a forfeiture by the terms of the contract. They are all wrongs which the complainants, in the cross bill, have pleaded as matters of defense to the original bill, or which may be so pleaded if they ask to be permitted to do so. The original bill prays for an accounting, and in such accounting, before the master, all damages claimed for the wrongs alleged can be considered, and the proper relief allowed, if covered by the proof. They are not of a character to entitle complainants to affirmative relief by a cross bill. In the court below, it was held by Judge Swan that the cross bill could be sustained, in order to relieve complainants from the cloud upon their title to the letters patent. Inasmuch as we have already found that the evidence did not show that the conditions named in clause 6 had been broken as claimed, it follows that there is no cloud upon the title to be removed.

Various other errors are assigned by the appellant, not necessary to consider in view of the conclusion already stated.

For the reasons given, the decree of the circuit court must be reversed, the cross bill be dismissed, the injunction now in force be dissolved, and the case be remanded for further proceedings under the original bill.

REECE BUTTON-HOLE MA. CO. v. GLOBE BUTTON-HOLE MA. CO. et al.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit. April 20, 1894.)

No. 72.

1. PATENTS—LIMITATIONS—EQUIVALENTS.
Where the essence of an invention in respect to buttonhole machines is the production of an automatic relative motion between the stitching mechanism and the plate, whereby the buttonhole is stitched along one side, and then about the eye and along the other side, which constitutes a broad and meritorious invention, the fact that the specifications and claims speak of a movement or traveling of the stitching mechanism only will not prevent the application of the doctrine of equivalents, so as to cover a machine which accomplishes the same result by moving the plate while the stitching mechanism remains stationary. 54 Fed. 834, reversed. Wimans v. Denmead, 15 How. 330, applied.

2. SAME—EFFECT OF AMENDING CLAIMS.
The rejection of a claim and its amendment, where there is no direct issue of novelty or invention, and the amendment comes in incidentally and in reference to an incidental matter, does not necessarily exclude a liberal interpretation or the application of the doctrine of equivalents, when the invention is a broad one. 54 Fed. 834, reversed.
S. SAME—VALIDITY—INFRINGEMENT—BUTTONHOLE MACHINES.

The Reece patent, No. 240,546, for improvements in buttonhole machines, construed, and claims 5, 11, 12, 13, and 18 held valid, and infringed. 54 Fed. 884, reversed.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.

This was an action by the Reece Buttonhole Machine Company against the Globe Buttonhole Machine Company and others for infringement of letters patent Nos. 240,546 and 349,359, to John Reece, for buttonhole sewing machines. The latter patent was withdrawn in the court below before the hearing. The circuit court dismissed the bill (54 Fed. 884), and the complainant appealed.

The claims of patent No. 240,546, which were in controversy, are as follows:

5. In a buttonhole sewing machine, a framework for the needle bar and looper, and a bedplate to hold the material, combined with two cams and with mechanism between the said cams and framework, whereby the needle bar, by the movements imparted to it longitudinally and laterally of a buttonhole by the said frame, is caused to travel backward in a substantially straight line until near the eye of a buttonhole, then backward and outward and inward, then forward and inward, to follow the contour of the edge of the enlarged eye part of the buttonhole, and then forward substantially in a straight line along the other side of the buttonhole, as set forth.

11. In a buttonhole sewing machine, a clamp and bedplate to hold the material, the framework, the bar, the buttonhole cutting device connected therewith, combined with a cam disk to operate the said buttonhole cutter, to cut a slit in the material held by the clamp, and then to move said framework longitudinally upon said bedplate to remove the blade of the cutter from above the clamp, substantially as described.

12. The framework, a, and bedplate, a', and the cloth-clamping mechanism, movably connected with the bedplate, combined with the cutting bed and means for moving the cutting bed and frame longitudinally with relation to the cloth-clamping mechanism, the said cutting bed being provided with inclines or projections to act upon the clamp and spread the buttonhole as the relative positions of the bedplate and framework are changed longitudinally, substantially as described.

13. The main shaft, a', the belt pulley loose on the said main shaft, the disk or pulley, r', fixed to said shaft, and means to connect it with or disconnect it from the loose pulley, the stopping-levers and its spring, the movable framework, which carries the needle and looper mechanisms, and means to move the said framework, in combination with the controlling bar, whereby the belt pulley is disengaged from the fixed pulley, r', to enable the shaft, a', to remain at rest while the belt pulley continues to run loosely on the said shaft, substantially as and for the purposes set forth.

18. The frame of a sewing machine constructed with two arms, one arm carrying above the cloth plate a reciprocating needle bar having a periodical rotary motion, and the other arm carrying below the cloth plate a looping mechanism having a rotary motion in unison with that of the needle bar, substantially as described.

Lange & Roberts and Fish, Richardson & Storrow, for appellant.
Clarke & Raymond, Chauncey Smith, and Charles E. Mitchell, for appellees.

Before COLT and PUTNAM, Circuit Judges, and NELSON, District Judge.

PUTNAM, Circuit Judge. The bill in this case was framed with reference to two patents, but one was withdrawn before the hear-
ing in the court below, so that all we now have to consider are claims 5, 11, 12, 13, and 18 of No. 240,546, issued to John Reece, April 26, 1881. The main question relates to the proposition that this patent can in no event cover a machine of which the frame is stationary and the plate moves. It grows out of the fact that in the specifications and claims are many expressions indicating that the frame moves and the plate is fixed. A part of the preamble is as follows:

"This invention relates to sewing machines for stitching buttonholes, and is an improvement upon that class of the said machines wherein the stitching mechanism is made to travel first along one side of the buttonhole slit, then about the eye, and along the other side of the slit."

The fifth claim also contains the following: "Whereby the needle bar, by the movements imparted to it longitudinally and laterally of a buttonhole by the said frame, is caused to travel backward." Other expressions of like character appear, with more or less positiveness and fullness, in nearly all the other claims, and in various parts of the specifications; and nowhere throughout the patent is found any indicating that the frame might be fixed and the plate movable.

Theoretically, an inventor, in taking out a patent under the statutes of the United States, subtracts and adds nothing from or to his actual invention. The proceedings recognize his incipient ownership, and theoretically they constitute only a division of time, by which there is carved out of the entire estate a holding for a period of years for the inventor, and the fee is left to the public. Thus his patent is not at all akin to the king's grant, which must be expressed "ex speciali gratia, certa scientia, et mero motu regis," or be interpreted against the subject who receives it. Except for the provisions which, for public interests, require in a patent a description and claim, the same unrestricted rules of the common law would protect an inventor's statute right as are relied on to support a trade-mark or business good will. Nevertheless, with reference to patents, the courts are necessarily subject to the restraints arising from the incorporation into them of the description and claim which the statutes require. In interpreting these, however, the rule must be accepted that it is to be presumed the inventor did not intend to split up his invention. This is only an application of the ordinary rule of interpretation that transactions are to be construed in the light of all the circumstances and of the apparent purposes of the parties to them. Specifications and claims have not yet fallen into such settled forms as to enable the courts to construe them, in any considerable part, with such certainty as they construe many words and phrases in formal instruments at the common law; but, on the whole, the entire subject-matter must be taken together for effectuating the true purpose of the transaction, as contracts and wills, which are so frequently drawn informally, are usually construed. The ordinary rule that if by a literal construction an instrument would be rendered frivolous and ineffectual, and its apparent object frustrated, a different exposition will be applied if it can be supported by anything in it, requires that words which re-
late to what may be held nonessentials, however much multiplied, shall not be permitted unnecessarily to control the sense. For the most part, such words are merely illustrative, or are used through inadvertence. On the other hand, it is true that words and phrases which might have been omitted on the presumption that they relate to nonessentials, may be introduced in such direct and positive manner as to leave the courts no option except to regard them as affecting the objects and limitations of the instrument in question. Especially may this be so when words which otherwise might be regarded as unimportant are introduced by the way of amendment. This is a common rule, which perhaps has been illustrated more frequently with marine insurance policies than elsewhere. There is no doubt that if into an instrument which has been prepared and submitted additional words are subsequently introduced by mutual consent, greater effect may sometimes be attributed to such words than otherwise would be given them; for they then become the immediate language selected by the parties, and may be assumed to have been especially within their intention. The leading rule which we have given has been constantly restated by the text writers and the courts as having full application to patents. They make use of such expressions as “ut res magis valeat quam pereat;” that “a patent should be construed in a liberal spirit, sustaining the just claims of the inventor;” that the titles by which patents are held “should not be overthrown upon doubts or objections, capable of a reasonable and just solution in favor of their validity;” that “in construing a patent the court will remember that the specification and claims are often unskillfully drawn;” and that “the claim shall be construed, if possible, to sustain the patentee’s right to all that he has invented.” It is true the general rules we have stated include the subordinate principle, which applies everywhere, that they are not to be “carried so far as to exclude what is in the patent, or to interpolate anything which it does not contain.” It is impossible, however, to carry this to the extent of applying to patents as fully as it is applied to instruments in general, the maxim. “Enumeratio unius exclusio alterius.” With the aid of the doctrine of equivalents, the courts are constantly engrafing on specifications and claims what they do not contain in the same sense in which the letter of ordinary instruments is required to contain matter on which the parties rely. To extend, in disregard of this fact, the rule against interpolations to any particular case, requires either that the patent relate to such mere matters of form or detail that interpretation by exclusion becomes just and reasonable, or that the specifications and claims be so phrased as in fact to contain a clearly intended exclusion, or the equivalent thereof. In the opinion of the court, the ingenious presentation of the defense in this case overlooks this last principle. The defense claims, that, on account of the numerous expressions to which we have referred, the patentee was limited to machines in which the frame travels and the plate remains at rest. It must be conceded that, taking these specifications and the claims as a whole, they show that Reece had present
In his own mind, at the time of his application, a machine with a movable frame and a fixed plate. But, if this is all there is of it, and if this is sufficient to establish the defense, the question arises, where does the doctrine of equivalents come in?

The most important parts of the case at bar are within the four corners of the principles we have stated. The court has no doubt that Reece was the inventor of nearly everything, if not everything, demanded by the Reece Buttonhole Machine Company in the case at bar, and was entitled to a patent therefor; and the question is whether, by reason of the peculiar phraseology of his specifications and claims as first drawn, or by reason of the making of certain amendments during the progress of his application through the patent office, Reece, notwithstanding the rules of interpretation entitle him to a favorable construction, has limited himself to a mechanism in which the frame travels; or whether, if he has thus expressed the literal terms of his patent, he has further so limited himself as to deprive himself of the benefit of the law of equivalents with reference to a machine in all respects a copy of his actual invention as shown in his patent, except as to the nonessential characteristic that the frame remains at rest, and motion is given to the plate. There may be reasons for finding that Reece was the inventor of the entire machine, with numerous functions, in somewhat the same way in which Morley was such inventor, as determined in Sewing Mach. Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U. S. 263, 9 Sup. Ct. 299. It is, however, so clear that Reece's claims do not cover the machine as a whole, but only various parts of it, that all the propositions made in his behalf having a different aspect fail to assist us. Yet Reece was clearly far in advance of those who preceded him, and entitled to the full benefit of whatever may be deduced from that fact.

In Manufacturing Co. v. Adams, 151 U. S. 139, 144, 14 Sup. Ct. 295, the court said:

"But when, in a class of machines so widely used as those in question, it is made to appear that at last, after repeated and futile attempts, a machine has been contrived which accomplishes the result desired, and when the patent office has granted a patent to the successful inventor, the court should not be ready to adopt a narrow or ascrite construction, fatal to the grant."

This applies directly to the facts of the case at bar. In Miller v. Manufacturing Co., 151 U. S. 186, 14 Sup. Ct. 310, the court, in laying down the latest, and, to our thinking, the best, expression of the rule touching so-called "pioneer patents," used the following language:

"The range of equivalents depends upon the extent and nature of the invention. If the invention is broad, or primary in its character, the range of equivalents will be correspondingly broad, under the liberal construction which the courts give to such inventions."

The practical effect of this defense is to maintain, in substance, that the entire novelty of Reece's fifth claim, which we will use for illustration, turns on the fact that the plate is fixed and the frame moves. In other words, Reece stands no better, practically, on the construction put by the defense on this claim, than if he had found
a stitching mechanism in all respects the same as that invented by him, with all the elements which go into it, but anticipating him, and had combined it with a fixed plate. As the principle of his stitching mechanism is clearly such that the relative movements between it and the plate are essential, while the absolute movements—that is, whether the plate moves or the frame moves—are nonessential, the proposition of the defense, if maintained, destroys, through the phraseology of the application and claims touching matters thus nonessential, the entire value of this most important, useful, and hitherto profitable invention. A suggestion of such triviality as is involved in a construction which will produce such a result cannot be well accepted.

Among all the cases brought to our attention we have seen none that goes to this extent with reference to the class of inventions described in the extract from Miller v. Manufacturing Co., ubi supra. The citations which we have made from Manufacturing Co. v. Adams, ubi supra, and Miller v. Manufacturing Co., ubi supra, and others which we will hereafter make use of, ought plainly to lay out of the case all rules of interpretation found in the decisions of the courts or in text-books which appertain solely to inventions plainly and essentially narrow, and ought thus to sift out easily, and render it unnecessary for us to examine, a considerable number of the authorities brought to our attention. We lay aside at this stage all decisions growing out of the fact that amendments were made in the application on its passage through the patent office. This includes Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. U. S. Cartridge Co., 112 U. S. 624, 5 Sup. Ct. 475, and all others of that character. We do not mean by this, however, to reject, in considering this first question, what was thus made new; but we take the specifications and claims as they now stand, without reference to the fact that they were changed at any stage. We also lay aside all those in which the court, after all, with the aid of the entire case, came down to the essence of the invention, and held in substance that the claims covered it fully. Among others of this class appear to be Brooks v. Fisk, 15 How. 212; Klein v. Russell, 19 Wall. 433; Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U. S. 222; Bene v. Jeantet, 129 U. S. 683, 9 Sup. Ct. 428; and Gordon v. Warder, 150 U. S. 47, 14 Sup. Ct. 32. This sifting leaves, however, a number of cases which, if they stood alone, might be regarded as carrying so far the effect of a literal construction of specifications and claims as would compel us to find for the defense on the proposition in question. Those on which the defense relies which use the most striking expressions are Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U. S. 274; Fay v. Corderman, 109 U. S. 408, 3 Sup. Ct. 236; Manufacturing Co. v. Sargent, 117 U. S. 373, 6 Sup. Ct. 931; and Dryfoos v. Wiese, 124 U. S. 32, 8 Sup. Ct. 354. And we may also add Burns v. Meyer, 100 U. S. 671, and Huber v. Manufacturing Co., 148 U. S. 270, 13 Sup. Ct. 603. Another extreme case of the same character is Brown v. Manufacturing Co., 6 C. C. A. 528, 57 Fed. 731, decided by the court of appeals in the sixth circuit. Against these cases it is sufficient to put Winans v. Denmead, 15
How. 330. That, so far as concerns the case at bar, this decision is still recognized as law, is apparent from the fact that it is cited, without disapproval of any part of it, in Sewell v. Jones, 91 U. S. 171, 183; Eddy v. Dennis, 95 U. S. 560, 669; Werner v. King, 96 U. S. 218, 230; Electric Co. v. La Rue, 139 U. S. 601, 606, 11 Sup. Ct. 670; and Hoyt v. Horne, 145 U. S. 302, 309, 12 Sup. Ct. 922. In Werner v. King and Hoyt v. Horne it is cited and accepted with reference to the very pith of the matters which we are now considering. It will be noticed that Winans v. Demmead is thus reaffirmed at later dates than the cases on which the defense relies, and that it comes much closer to the case at bar than any one of them is too apparent to need any explanation at length. In fact, the analogy is as close as could be expected to be found in any cases whatever. Winans v. Demmead related to the peculiar construction of cars for the transportation of coal, and the patent was granted in 1847, after the enactment of all the statute provisions the existence or re-enactment of which the defense can rely on. Railroad Co. v. Mellon, 104 U. S. 112, 118. The specifications in Winans v. Demmead described only a conical form, and the claim (page 342) was, by its letter, strictly limited to the frustrum of a cone. There was nothing whatever in the patent to show that the patentee ever had in his mind any form except the conical. The alleged infringement was by use of the octagonal form. Yet the court made the clear distinction appearing on page 343, as follows:

"Undoubtedly there may be cases in which the letters-patent do include only the particular form described and claimed. Davis v. Palmer, 2 Brock. 309, Fed. Cas. No. 3,645, seems to have been one of those cases. But they are in entire accordance with what is above stated. The reason why such a patent covers only one geometrical form is not that the patentee has described and claimed that form only; it is because that form only is capable of embodying his invention; and, consequently, if the form is not copied, the invention is not used. Where form and substance are inseparable, it is enough to look at the form only. Where they are separable, where the whole substance of the invention may be copied in a different form, it is the duty of courts and juries to look through the form for the substance of the invention,—for that which entitled the inventor to his patent, and which the patent was designed to secure. Where that is found, there is an infringement; and it is not a defense that it is embodied in a form not described, and in terms claimed by the patentee."

The court further remarked—which is a general rule, applicable to the case at bar—as follows:

"Patentees sometimes add to their claims an express declaration to the effect that the claim extends to the thing patented, however its form or proportions may be varied. But this is unnecessary. The law so interprets the claim without the addition of these words."

It is not necessary for us to reconcile case by case the expressions relied on by the defense, which, as interpreted by it, are not in harmony with the conclusions or the expressions in Winans v. Demmead. Very likely they can all be harmonized by following out the distinctions made by us in our references to Manufacturing Co. v. Adams, ubi supra, and Miller v. Manufacturing Co., ubi supra, and by noting the peculiar circumstances of each case. In fact, we think there is nothing to be deduced from any of the decisions
which goes beyond the illustrative paragraph in Walker on Patents (2d Ed. § 350), as follows:

"But where a patentee states in his specification that a particular part of his invention is to be constructed of a particular material, and states or implies that he does not contemplate any other material as being suitable for the purpose, it is not certain that any other material will be treated by a court as an equivalent of the one recommended in the patent."

However this may be, Winans v. Denmead leaves sufficient room for the application to the case at bar of the general rules of construction, and those relating to equivalents, which we have stated.

Some of the most important inventions in special arts have come from persons unskilled in those arts, and who, therefore, had no knowledge of the possible equivalents; so that it would involve improbability to assume that they had present in their own minds, at the time of the application, any matters of form except those incorporated in it. The rules cited from Winans v. Denmead, ubi supra, are needed to protect not only this class, but all others who have made valuable inventions, and who, through their own ignorance, or for any other reason, have not understood, or have overlooked, possible equivalents. Without attempting the unnecessary discussion of case by case, it is enough that almost every patent in which this question can arise lies between the expressions in Winans v. Denmead, ubi supra, on the one hand, and those relied on by the defense on the other. Winans v. Denmead clearly goes as far in its direction as the case at bar. Applying the principles of construction and the law of equivalents already stated in the way in which we are bound to apply them, there is not sufficient in any or all of the expressions in the patent at bar relied on by the defense to justify us in holding that they amount to such a positive exclusion, arising either from the nature of the invention or from the necessary force of the words themselves, as will defeat a charge of infringement of all the claims in controversy, merely on account of a change in the method of producing relative movements of the parts, involving in itself no invention and producing no result essentially new.

Some of the cases relied on by the defense strengthen these conclusions by the reflex light of the distinctions they make. Snow v. Railway Co., 121 U. S. 617, 7 Sup. Ct. 1343, held the patentee strictly to the details of his combination in question, because, as shown on page 630, 121 U. S., and page 1343, 7 Sup. Ct., those details, for the reasons there stated, were essential parts. Sargent v. Lock Co., 114 U. S. 63, 5 Sup. Ct. 1021, runs back, so far as this point is concerned, to Water-Meter Co. v. Desper, 101 U. S. 332; and so, also, does Fay v. Cordesman, 109 U. S. 408, 3 Sup. Ct. 236, already cited. In Water-Meter Co. v. Desper, page 336, the court stated, touching a certain crank shaft which was in question, that it could not say that it was an immaterial part of the combination, and continued:

"The patent, as it stands, occupies very narrow ground. It requires the presence of every one of the elements specified in the combination secured by it."

On page 335 this rule of interpretation is applied generally to combinations, and in this form the rule is traced through to the latest
case named. What is meant by the word "combination," here and in Fay v. Cordesman, may not be easily determined; but it is very certain Reece invented something more than a mere combination as it existed in those cases.

The Corn-Planter Patent, 23 Wall. 181, also supports the conclusion which we have reached. The court said (page 221):

"The only pretense on which it"—that is, the alleged infringing machine—"can be claimed to be different is that the framework of which it is constructed is not the kind of framework described by Brown in his specification, namely, 'without gearing, without spoked wheels, and other expensive fixtures, and resembling a drag or sled more than it does a carriage or wagon in its main or general construction.' By this description Brown was evidently attempting to show how simply and cheaply the thing could be made, not that it was to be confined to that specific form. It might as well be contended that he intended to confine his invention to wood, and that a machine made of iron or other metal, though made in precisely the same form, would not be an infringement, because it would not have the same quality of cheapness and simplicity which he describes."

Hoyt v. Horne, 145 U. S. 302, 12 Sup. Ct. 922, is still more striking. The words in the claim in that case, "consisting in circulating the fibrous material and liquid in vertical planes" (page 304, 145 U. S., and page 922, 12 Sup. Ct.), refer back to the improvement itself, limit it grammatically and literally, and, so far as the mere letter of the claim is concerned, were apparently quite as material a part of it as the words in question in the case at bar. Yet (page 308, 145 U. S., and page 922, 12 Sup. Ct.) the court rejected them, for the reasons there stated, and which need not be recited in this opinion.

The preamble of the patent, already cited, has been brought especially to the attention of the court, in that it specifically points out the invention as related to the class of machines "wherein the stitching mechanism is made to travel," etc. There is ground for maintaining that this word "travel," in this connection, had in mind the relative motions, as it is frequently thus used by persons accustomed to mechanical operations; and also that this part of the preamble had in mind a classification of machines as between those in which the material is held firmly to the plate and the relative movements are automatic, aided by a reciprocating needle bar, and those in which the material is turned by the hand. It is, however, not necessary to determine this. The preamble states that Reece's invention was an improvement on the class of machines which it names, whatever that class may be; but this does not exclude the truth that it would be an improvement on every other class of machines to which it could be applied. Still keeping in mind the distinction between a broad invention and a narrow one, it does not follow that because the inventor, if his invention was of the former class, declared it to be available for a certain use or machine, and had present in mind only that specific use or machine, it might be taken by others, without restriction, for other uses or other machines. On the other hand, the rule is clear that ordinarily a patentee who is first to make an invention is entitled to his claim for all the uses and all the advantages which belong to it, so far as the new application does not itself involve further invention. Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U. S. 150, 157; Stow v. Chicago, 104 U. S. 547, 550;
Miller v. Manufacturing Co., 151 U. S. 186, 201, 14 Sup. Ct. 310. The rule was laid down clearly, although perhaps as a dictum, in Electric Co. v. La Rue, 139 U. S. 601, 11 Sup. Ct. 670, already referred to. On page 606, 139 U. S., and page 670, 11 Sup. Ct., the court, in connection with a reference to Winans v. Denmead, said that a certain expression in it, which the court quotes, "amounts to a declaration that the application of the patented device to another use, where such new application does not involve the exercise of the inventive faculty, is as much an infringement as though the new machine were an exact copy of the old." Indeed, the whole of the case at bar, so far as we have gone, might, on sound principles, be put on the single proposition of what is known as the "rule of double use," so far as it can be availed of to protect the patentee of a broad invention.

We now come to the effect of the fact that the claims and specifications were amended during the progress of the application through the patent office. It must be admitted, as already said, that what is thus done may have a special weight beyond the effect of the same words appearing in the application as originally drawn, because, whatever may be inserted or stricken out under such circumstances may ordinarily be regarded as especially selected by the parties to the transaction. It is as though by agreement the phrases thus made were emphasized. Nevertheless it defeats the very essence of this rule to extend it to what was inserted inadvertently, or to push the construction of what was thus inserted in one direction, when it is plain from the whole transaction that the parties inserting were looking in another. There is a further consideration which cannot be overlooked. In transactions between private parties, and, indeed, in ordinary transactions between the public authorities and private parties resulting in contracts or grants, the rules of equity may be invoked, on a proper judicial issue, to correct or supply what is erroneous, or was omitted through inadvertence; but if the position of the defense is correct, and the decisions of the supreme court touching this point lay down so rigid a rule as the defense maintains, a patent cannot be relieved on this account and in this particular, except it be by application for a reissue, which is not a judicial proceeding, nor in any of its phases as far-reaching as the relief granted in equity with reference to other matters. Courts ought, therefore, to be the more careful, under circumstances like those at bar, to give a patentee the benefit of all the equities which can be raised in his behalf, by any reasonable implication, from what appears on the face of the amendments, or from the transaction as it passed through the patent office.

The case shows numerous amendments at various stages, but we have no occasion to consider any of them except the following: The first claim, at one stage, contained the words, "and means to change the relative positions of the bedplate and framework longitudinally." These were objected to by the examiner for the following specific reason, given by him: "As no means is shown and described for moving the bedplate relatively to the framework, as the claim would seem to imply." Thereupon the words objected to were
stricken out, and those were inserted which now appear, "and means to move such framework longitudinally upon said bedplate." For the same specified reason a similar change was made in the eleventh claim. The twelfth claim was also required to be amended by including means for moving the cutting bed and frame longitudinally, on the ground, specified by the examiner, that otherwise the combination covered by the claim would be inoperative, and incapable of accomplishing any useful result or function. The thirteenth claim, which was objected to by the examiner as being for an incomplete combination, was largely modified, the expression which now appears touching "the movable framework" being inserted, with others. The fifth claim was amended only by inserting the words "of a buttonhole" where they appear after the word "laterally." The eighteenth claim is entirely new. Whatever other amendments there were need not be noticed.

The patent office record shows no reason for requiring these amendments, so far as concerns the effect of the question we are now discussing, except those already stated. The specifications did show one method of putting the invention and all its parts into practical operation. The theory of the examiner was that the claims must be limited to correspond with the form of operation explained. The extracts which we have made from Winans v. Demead, 15 How. 330, and other citations which might be made, establish the well-known rule that this was erroneous, unless as a mere matter of detail in the practice of the patent office, depending on the varying judgments of different examiners as to the clearness with which the operation of machines should be set out.

No question of novelty was made, and no other issue which brought to the attention of the inventor any matter of substance. In Ball & Socket Fastener Co. v. Ball Glove-Fastening Co., 7 C. C. A. 498, 58 Fed. 818, this court, in considering the principle now under consideration, said:

"The rule touching the effect of such amendments has been several times laid down by the supreme court in patent cases, although it is only a peculiar application of the general principles of law relative to the interpretation of instruments. In the case at bar the amendments relate to the very pith and marrow of the alleged improvement, touch directly the question of novelty, and were understandably and deliberately assented to; so that the rule of interpretation referred to undoubtedly applies."

We do not see that the law requires us at present to go any further, or to qualify this statement of the rule; although, of course, its application, where the invention is in mere matters of form or detail, would be more freely made than where it is of a broad character.

The following cases, we believe, are all where this rule has come before the supreme court, the first being Leggett v. Avery, 101 U. S. 256, decided October term, 1879, and the last Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co., 152 U. S. 425, 14 Sup. Ct. 627. Leggett v. Avery, so far as it appertains to this rule, contains only dicta, as in that case there had been an actual disclaimer, on an application for a reissue, of the whole of
five claims in the original patent, and the case turned on the effect of that express disclaimer. In Sargent v. Lock Co., 114 U. S. 63, 5 Sup. Ct. 1021; Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U. S. 593, 6 Sup. Ct. 493; Sutter v. Robinson, 119 U. S. 530, 7 Sup. Ct. 376; Crawford v. Hey- singer, 123 U. S. 539, 8 Sup. Ct. 399; Watson v. Railway Co., 132 U. S. 161, 10 Sup. Ct. 45; Roemer v. Peddie, 132 U. S. 313, 10 Sup. Ct. 98; Caster Co. v. Spiegel, 133 U. S. 360, 10 Sup. Ct. 409; Yale Lock Manuf'g Co. v. Berkshire Nat. Bank, 135 U. S. 342, 10 Sup. Ct. 884; Dobson v. Lees, 137 U. S. 258, 11 Sup. Ct. 71; Corbin Cabinet Lock Co. v. Eagle Lock Co., 150 U. S. 38, 14 Sup. Ct. 28; Knapp v. Morss, 150 U. S. 221, 14 Sup. Ct. 81; and the latest case, Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Perforated Wrapping Paper Co.,—there were direct issues of novelty, or of interference, based on specific prior patents or pending applications, to which the inventor yielded. Therefore, in each of these cases there was a fair issue, formulated and understood by the applicant for the patent, requiring him clearly to yield directly a portion of what he claimed; and the effect of his yielding could not be mistaken. In Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. U. S. Cartridge Co., 112 U. S. 624, 5 Sup. Ct. 475, the issue was no less distinct, although it came in a different form. It appeared that the patentee had applied on a reissue for the same subject-matter which was disallowed him by the supreme court, but the point was distinctly made by the commissioner that it involved "a substantially new and different invention" from anything embraced in the original patent. In Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U. S. 222, which was decided with express reference to Leggett v. Avery, ubi supra, it appeared (page 228) that the subject of controversy at the patent office was distinctly as to what the invention covered, and as to what claim should be allowed. The court said there could be no doubt what the patentee understood he had patented, and that both he and the commissioner regarded it to be "for a manufacture made exclusively of vulcanites." The issue was plain, formal, and essential; yet the court did not rest the case wholly on that proposition, but mainly on the ground that what occurred at the patent office tended to confirm the conclusions to which the court had otherwise arrived in interpreting the patent. In Royer v. Coupe, 146 U. S. 524, 13 Sup. Ct. 166, an entire claim was rejected, and the rejection acquiesced in. This was also apparently put on the ground of want of novelty; but, however that may have been, the essence of the transaction was plainly the same as though there had been a formal disclaimer after a patent had been obtained, as was the case in Leggett v. Avery, ubi supra. In no place has the rule been thoroughly discussed by the supreme court, and its modifications, limitations, and practical application determined. It has grown up without much discussion from Leggett v. Avery, ubi supra, which was a case on a reissue, and, as already said, involved a formal disclaimer of five specific and entire claims. Under all the circumstances, the case at bar is clearly distinguishable, in that it presented no direct issue of novelty or invention, and the amendments came in only incidentally, and in reference to an incidental matter.
In conclusion, therefore, touching all which appears on the face of the patent with reference to the movability of the frame and the fixedness of the plate, including whatever emphasis can be added by reason of the acquiescence of Reece in the amendments proposed at the patent office, we do not find enough to require us to refuse to give him the benefit of the favorable rules we have explained.

We now come to the especial consideration of the several claims. The fifth claim was the successful conclusion of numerous and expensive efforts to stitch automatically a buttonhole in the form in which it is ordinarily desired,—that is, with an eye. This had never been accomplished. Those machines whose work in stitching were automatic were unable to form the eye, and those which formed the eye accomplished this only with the aid of the clumsy and slow operation of turning the material with the hand. We do not think it necessary, either with reference to this claim or any other, to proceed at length on the question of novelty. The single fact that so valuable a patent as this, where so large interests were at stake, and such heavy expenditures had been made in vain, as is shown by the record, for accomplishing what Reece accomplished, had received the continuous and uniform acquiescence of the public and the trade for a period of nearly 10 years, and until the efforts of the respondents below, affords sufficient reason for not prolonging this opinion by an analysis of the alleged anticipatory matters, or by detailed explanations in support of our conclusions that none of them in fact anticipated Reece. This line of defense has been pressed mainly against the fifth claim, but clearly the device to which it relates accomplished what none of the older buttonhole machines accomplished, and it, its method of operation, and its purpose lie in a different field from the invention of Bonnaz, and from all the other earlier mechanisms except those appropriate to the stitching of buttonholes. The essential feature of this claim is the so-called “compound movement” given the needle bar, the result of simultaneous longitudinal and lateral motions. This alone was, of course, old and common in the arts; yet the suggestion of its application to this purpose, combined with the mechanism devised therefor, constitute a patentable invention of a fundamental character, highly meritorious, and one to be protected by a liberal construction. So far as this claim is concerned, we have no doubt that the rules which we have laid down fully apply, and that Reece is entitled to the benefit of the invention, without reference to the changed method shown in the case of producing the relative movements between the frame and the plate.

The elements specified in the fifth claim do not constitute an operative mechanism without the aid of a reciprocating needle bar, or something which will supply its need, and perhaps also not without the spreader. The eighteenth claim covers a reciprocating needle bar, and the twelfth a spreader, and each are fully explained in the specifications. The fifth claim falls within that class where reference may be made to the specifications to supply in a claim what it is plain to every one skilled in the art is a necessary incident.
Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. 516, 547; Day v. Railway Co., 132 U.
S. 98, 102, 10 Sup. Ct. 11. However, no question was raised on this
account, and we refer to the matter simply in order to make clear
our conception of the scope of the claim. Infringement of the fifth
claim is hardly contested, except on the ground of the propositions
touching its construction and effect which we have rejected; and,
so far as concerns it, we must order a decree for the complainant
below.

The eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth claims relate to the cutting
and spreading mechanisms, and the "stop" devices. Each is un-
doubtedly to be construed as in combination with a stitcher in a
buttonhole machine; and Reece was the first to combine any of
these in such way that all its elements should be operated in
their proper order, by mere mechanical power. The defense urged
against these claims is mainly the same as that urged against the
fifth. Having disposed of what could be raised by that defense,
the court considers the alleged structural differences between Reece's
and the infringing machines not material. The majority of the
court are of the opinion that Reece has made these operations of
cutting, spreading, and stopping automatic in combination with the
machine as a whole, and that his invention in that respect is so
fundamental and meritorious as to require the application to the
eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth claims of the same rules which we
have applied to the fifth.

In view of the state of the art, the eighteenth claim cannot be
broadly construed, and it must be held to be fully limited by the
words, "substantially as described." This limitation, however, re-
lates to what concerns this particular device. Lake Shore & M.
 Ct. 33. Therefore we find nothing in these words which restricts
this claim to a machine in which the frame moves. To give such
an effect to the word "carries" as is claimed is more for the pundit
than the courts. It is as commonly used in all kindred matters to
mean supporting without movement as supporting with it. We
are not required to give it a narrow interpretation for the purpose
of depriving the inventor of any part of his invention. Nor are
we constrained by any well-settled or just rule of construction to
import phraseology from other claims for the same purpose. Ex-
cept in the particulars covered by these propositions, we do not
understand that there is any question of infringement of this claim,
even when narrowly construed.

Decree of the circuit court reversed. Case remanded to that
court, with instructions to enter a decree for an injunction, and
an account on claims 5, 11, 12, 13, and 18 of appellant's patent, No.
240,546, issued to John Reece, April 26, 1881, and for further pro-
ceedings in accordance with law.
BROWN MANUF'G CO. v. DEERE et al.
SAME v. DAVID BRADLEY MANUF'G CO.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. May 1, 1894.)
Nos. 88 and 89.

Patents—Limitation of Claim.
In the Brown patent, No. 190,816, for an improved coupling for cultivators, consisting of a tube or pipe box turning loosely on the horizontal ends of the crank axle, connected with a head to which the forward ends of the plow beams are bolted, and provided with means for turning it against the gravity of the cultivator in the rear, the first claim, for "the pipe box, provided with a projection adapted to co-operate with a spring, weight, or the draft, to rock the said pipe box against or with the weight of the rear cultivators or plows," cannot be construed as for a combination of the pipe box described with other parts of a cultivator named in the claim or specification, and must be limited to the particular forms of construction of the pipe box described. 51 Fed. 226, affirmed.

Appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.
These were two suits by the Brown Manufacturing Company—one against Deere & Co., and the other against the David Bradley Manufacturing Company—for infringement of a patent. The circuit court decided in favor of complainant (21 Fed. 709), but, upon a rehearing on its own motion, rendered decrees in both cases for defendants. 51 Fed. 226; Id. 229. Complainant appealed.

These suits were each brought to obtain an accounting and an injunction against infringement of the first claim of letters patent No. 190,816, which read as follows:
"Be it known that I, William P. Brown, of Zanesville, in the county of Muskingum, and state of Ohio, have invented a new and improved coupling for cultivator; and I do hereby declare that the following is a full, clear, and exact description of the same, reference being had to the accompanying drawing, forming part of this specification, in which Fig. 1 is a perspective view of the particular form of cultivator to which my coupling is to be applied; Fig. 2 is a side view of one of the couplings, looking in a line with the axle; Fig. 3 is a front view of one of the couplings, looking at right angles to the axle; Fig. 4, an enlarged transverse section through line, x, x, Fig. 3.
"My invention relates to an improved form of coupling for fastening the forward ends of the beams of plows or gangs to the axle of a wheeled cultivator. The improvement consists in the particular construction and arrangement of a tube or pipe box turning loosely upon the horizontal ends of the crank axle, and connected, through an adjustable stirrup or sleeve and bracket, with a head having a long bearing at right angles to the pipe box, to which head the forward ends of the plow beams are bolted, while the pipe box is provided with means for turning it against the gravity of the attached cultivator in the rear, whereby the said cultivators are manipulated with greater ease, as hereinafter more fully described.
"In the drawing, A represents the longitudinal bars, extending forward to form the tongue, and constituting the main frame of a wheeled cultivator, to which my invention is applied, which bars are arranged upon the elevated crank axle, B, supported upon wheels, C. Upon the horizontal parts of said crank axle, between the upright portions and the wheels, are arranged my couplings, which secure the beams of the plows or gangs, D. These couplings are constructed as follows: E are tubes or pipe boxes, which embrace the axle, B, and turn freely thereon. G is a stirrup, which is held to the pipe box, E, by means of a loop, s, and is made to rigidly connect with said pipe box by means of longitudinal ribs upon the stirrup, which engage with corresponding ribs upon the pipe box. The stirrup, however, instead of having a loop, s, may be constructed in form of a sleeve, and made to embrace pipe box,