

## THE LUD KEEFER.

WERLING *et al.* v. THE LUD KEEFER.

(District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania. February 8, 1892.)

## 1. SEAMEN—CONTRACT FOR WAGES—RIVER PILOTS.

Where a steam-boat bound from Pittsburgh, Pa., to Louisville, Ky., engages pilots without the written contract required by Rev. St. U. S. § 4530, she is liable, under section 4531, for the highest wages shown to have been voluntarily paid at Pittsburgh to any pilot for a similar voyage during the three months preceding.

## 2. SAME—STATUTORY PROVISIONS—EQUITIES.

The purpose of the statute is to prevent disputes as to the agreement for wages, and its positive provisions in favor of the seamen cannot be affected by any equities in the case.

In Admiralty. Libel by Werling and Reno against the steam-boat Lud Keefer for wages as pilots. Decree for complainants.

*M. A. Woodward*, for libelants.

*George C. Wilson* and *David S. McCann*, for claimant.

REED, District Judge. The testimony establishes the fact that when the boat started upon her voyage, after making up her tow at Economy, her destination was Louisville. She was to leave her tow at Cincinnati, go to Louisville, and bring back a tow of empty barges to Pittsburgh. The only change that occurred was that in pursuance of a telegram from Jutta & Co., the owners of the tow, she took her tow of loaded barges with her to Louisville, instead of leaving it at Cincinnati. Her destination being a port in another than an adjoining state, the act of congress applies. Section 4520 of the Revised Statutes provides that a written or printed agreement shall be made by the master with every seaman on board, and section 4521 provides that in the absence of such a contract the master shall pay every such seaman "the highest price or wages which shall have been given at the port or place where such seaman was shipped, for a similar voyage, within three months next before the time of such shipping, if such seaman shall perform such voyage." No written or printed agreement was made with either of the libelants. Capt. Reno testifies, without contradiction, that he was to be paid the highest wages that would be paid on each trip, which is substantially what the act provides. No arrangement was made with Capt. Werling as to wages. It follows, therefore, that under the provisions of the statutes referred to the libelants are entitled to receive the highest wages paid at the port of departure for similar voyages. The testimony shows that \$250 was paid to one pilot for a similar voyage at the same time from Pittsburgh to Louisville and return. In another case \$200 was paid to a pilot for a voyage to Louisville, where he left the boat and returned by rail to Pittsburgh, his expenses back being paid by his employers. The libelants, on the contrary, performed the additional service of piloting the boat back to Pittsburgh. These rates seem to have been paid without compulsion, and, while higher than the wages paid to other pilots at the time, were

paid in pursuance of agreement, and apparently because the employers desired the services of those particular pilots for reasons satisfactory to themselves. It is the duty of the court, therefore, to allow the libelants this rate of wages, and the libelants are each entitled to receive the sum of \$250, as claimed in their libel, with costs to be paid by the respondent.

Something was said about the equities of the case by the proctors for respondent, but equities cannot affect the positive provision of the statute, the benefits of which the libelants are entitled to claim. The intention, however, of the statute, seems to be to make it to the interest of the owner of the boat to make a written or printed agreement with the seamen, in order partly to avoid just such disputes as the present one. As is said by Judge TREAT in *Rollins v. The Standard*, 4 Fed. Rep. 750:

"Mariners are wards of the court, and as such are to be protected, not to the injury of the respondents, but to secure them their just wages. It is very easy for officers of vessels to engage mariners at a fixed rate, and if they do not do so the courts must allow them the highest rates existing at the time of departure."

Therefore, there do not seem to be any equities in favor of the respondent. A decree will be made accordingly.

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## THE KAROO.

### JOHNSON *et al.* v. THE KAROO.

(District Court, D. Washington, W. D. February 15, 1893.)

#### 1. SEAMEN'S WAGES—BRITISH VESSEL—JURISDICTION.

A British vessel was libeled for seamen's wages at a port where there was no British consul. The nearest British consul had declined to interfere. Two of the libelants were American citizens. All but three of the crew were not lawfully bound by any contract of shipment. *Held*, that the court was justified in assuming jurisdiction of the case.

#### 2. SAME—SHIPPING ARTICLES—INFORMALITY—RIGHTS OF SAILORS.

Where seamen on a British ship did not sign articles before the British consul, but were taken aboard the vessel by a boarding-house master, who wrote their names in the shipping articles, after which they served aboard the ship, but did not complete the voyage described in the articles, *held*, that the articles were not binding as to voyage or term or rate of wages; that the men could leave the vessel at any port without becoming deserters, and were entitled to recover on a *quantum meruit* for services performed.

#### 3. SAME—KIDNAPPED SAILORS—RATE OF WAGES.

Where it clearly appeared that sailors were inveigled aboard a ship, and compelled to serve against their will, *held*, that the master could not fix the rate of their wages, but the court would fix it anywhere within reasonable limits; and there being some evidence that \$30 per month was the highest rate at their port of shipment at the time of shipment, and also that their fare aboard ship was bad, *held*, that they should recover at the rate of \$30 per month.

#### 4. SAME—RIGHTS OF SEAMEN—INSUFFICIENT FOOD.

The evidence showing that certain sailors, lawfully shipped, were ill treated aboard the vessel, and were deprived of proper food and lime juice or other antiscorbutics, *held*, that it was a breach of the ship's contract, entitling the men to leave the vessel, though the negligence might not have been that of the master of the ship, but of the ship-chandler who supplied her.