

sisted that the facts present a case of equitable estoppel, upon the theory that "when one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, it should be borne by that one of them who, by his conduct, acts, or omissions, has rendered the injury possible." It is a conclusive answer to this contention to say that the respondents are not innocent purchasers within the meaning of the rule, as we have already seen. But I think it proper to add that so far as I know it has never been held that the United States can be estopped by the frauds, not to say crimes, of its public officials; and it is apparent that the consequences of such a doctrine would be ruinous. In my opinion the doctrine of estoppel does not apply.

Upon the whole case my conclusion is that there must be a decree for complainant in accordance with the prayer of the bill, and it is accordingly so ordered.

STONE, Ex'r, etc., v. PARMALEE.¹

Circuit Court, S. D. Georgia, W. D. October 10, 1883.)

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS—NEW PROMISE.

A credit entered upon a note by the holder thereof does not revive a barred note, under the construction of the statute of limitations in Georgia, unless he be authorized in writing to enter such credit by the defendant.

At Law.

Barnes & Cumming, for plaintiff.

R. K. Hines, for defendant.

LOCKE, J., (*charging jury*.) The only defense interposed in this case is the statute of limitations, namely, the law which, after a certain lapse of time, bars the right to recover upon contracts. The time in an action of this kind was six years from the date the notes sued on became due. But this statute of limitations is a matter of remedy, and not affecting the right; and a contract barred by the statute may be revived by a new promise based upon the consideration and validity of the former indebtedness.

A payment entered upon a written evidence of debt by the debtor, either in his own handwriting or by some one authorized by him to make such entry, is equivalent to a new promise to pay. Where the entry is made, not by the debtor, but by the creditor or holder under authority from the debtor, such authority must, under the construction of the statute of limitations by the supreme court of the state of Georgia, be shown to be in writing. Under the local law, the creditor or holder is incompetent to act as the agent of the debtor to enter such credit, unless the authority and agency be in writing.

¹Reported by W. B. Hill, Esq., of the Macon bar.

As to the first note, of \$19,000, it is shown that the plaintiff had telegraphed his bankers or agents on the seventeenth of December, 1879, to pay the deceased \$50. The note shows that an indorsement of that amount was made on the 6th; a few days later, a letter was written giving notice of the telegraphic remittance. The question for you to decide, as regards this note, is whether the language of the letter authorized the holder of the note to make this indorsement upon this particular note. If you find that said letter was intended to authorize the making of the indorsement upon this identical note, the time of the receipt of the money being immaterial, you will find for the plaintiff upon that note.

Upon the second note, of \$11,000, if you find any authority conveyed to the party making the indorsement to make the same, or any recognition or acknowledgment of the note in writing by the defendant as a subsisting liability, you will find for the plaintiff on that note. If you find for the plaintiff on either note, or both, you will compute the interest thereupon, and find in the aggregate of the amounts so found.

CHESAPEAKE GUANO Co. v. SPARKS, Defendant, and another,
Garnishee.¹

(Circuit Court, S. D. Georgia, W. D. October 28, 1883.)

GARNISHMENT OF COLLATERAL SECURITIES.

Where it appears from the answer of a garnishee that he has in hands certain negotiable securities, transferred to him by the defendant as collateral security for a debt before service of the garnishment, and that the securities exceed in amount the debt for which they are collateral, the garnishee is not entitled to an order discharging him absolutely, but he should be directed to hold whatever surplus may remain in his hands after paying his debt, subject to the further order of the court during the pendency of the cause.

The Central Georgia Bank was served with summons of garnishment in this case at the instance of the plaintiff. The bank answered that it was not indebted to defendant, and had no effects of the defendant in its hands except certain negotiable notes of third persons, amounting to \$2,000, which had been deposited by the defendant with it as collateral security for a loan of \$1,500. The bank asked to be discharged as garnishee.

T. B. Gresham, for movant.

Hill & Harris, contra.

Before Hon. JAMES W. LOCKE, D. J., presiding by designation.

LOCKE, J., (orally.) The application for discharge is based upon section 3551 of the Code of Georgia, 1882, which is as follows: "Col-

¹ Reported by W. B. Hill, Esq., of the Macon bar.