nese, without any objection from the mother country. The com plaints there from the conflict of white with Chinese labor had been as great and as strongly expressed as any which ever arose in this state. Legislation by congress excluding or restricting the immigration would never have been so long delayed except from a desire not to offend the Chinese government. It was not deemed necessary to negotiate with other governments with respect to Chinese within their borders. So, when the act of congress was passed, it had a double purpose; it was to exclude laborers coming from China, subject to certain stipulations of the treaty of 1880, and also laborers of the Chinese race coming from any other part of the world. Its framers knew, as we all knew, that the island of Hong Kong would pour such laborers into our country every year in unnumbered thousands, unless they also were covered by the restriction act. So the act declares in its first section that from and after the expiration of ninety days from its passage, and until the expiration of ten years, the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States, without any limitation of the country from which they might come, is suspended, and during such suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese laborer to come, or having come, after the expiration of the ninety days to remain, within the United States.

The second section makes it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both, for the master of a vessel knowingly to bring into the United States on his vessel, and land, or permit to be landed, *any Chinese laborer from any foreign port or place.* The language of these sections is sufficiently broad and comprehensive to embrace all Chinese laborers, without regard to the country of which they may be subjects. And the twelfth section declares that any Chinese person found unlawfully within the United States shall be removed therefrom by direction of the president to the country from whence he came—not necessarily to China.

Our attention has been called to a recent decision of Judges LOWELL and NELSON, of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts,[1] in which they reach a different conclusion. Those judges considered that the act of congress was simply intended to exclude laborers from China within the stipulations of the supplementary treaty. Undoubtedly, as already said, that was one of its objects; but it is very evident, both from the circumstances under which it was passed and from its language, that it had a still further object. The construction which we give renders all its provisions consistent with each other. The whole purpose of the law, which was to exclude from the country laborers of the Chinese race, would be defeated by any other construction.

The release of the petitioner must be denied, and he must be returned to the ship from which he was taken. And it is so ordered.

[1] See 17 FED. REP. 634.

In re WILSON.

(*District Court, E. D. Michigan.* October 8, 1883.)

1. PASSING COUNTERFEITED OBLIGATION OF UNITED STATES—REV. ST. §§ 5430 AND 5431—INFORMATION.

   It seems that a person accused of passing a counterfeited obligation of the United States may be prosecuted by information.

2. SENTENCE OF CONFINEMENT—PENITENTIARY IN ANOTHER STATE.

   In sentencing a prisoner to confinement in a penitentiary outside the limits of the state in which he was tried, it is not necessary that the record of his conviction should show that there was no penitentiary within that state suitable for the confinement of prisoners from the federal courts, or that the attorney general had designated the penitentiary in question for such purpose.

3. HABEAS CORPUS—CERTIFIED COPY OF SENTENCE.

   A certified copy of the sentence of a court of record is sufficient authority for the detention of a convict. No warrant or *mittimus* is necessary.

This was an application for a writ of *habeas corpus* to release a prisoner confined in the Detroit House of Correction, under sentence from the district court for the eastern district of Arkansas. A copy of the record of his conviction was annexed to his petition, from which it appeared that he was found guilty upon an information which contained a count under Rev. St. § 5430, for having in possession, with fraudulent intent, an obligation engraved and printed after the similitude of an interest-bearing coupon bond of the United States. The information also contained a second count, under section 5431, for passing and attempting to pass a counterfeited obligation and security of the United States. A copy of the obligation in question was attached to the information. It purported upon its face to be a gold-bearing bond, in the sum of a thousand dollars, of the United States Silver Mining Company of Denver City, Colorado, signed by the president and secretary of the company, and having a strong resemblance to a genuine interest-bearing coupon bond of the United States. The words "United States" were printed in large and conspicuous capitals, while the words "Silver Mining Co. of Denver City, Col.," appeared in small, indistinct type, at a considerable distance below the others. The bond was numbered and lettered very much like a genuine government bond. It was agreed by counsel that the merits of the case should be disposed of upon the application for a writ without the formality of its issue and return. Petitioner demanded his discharge upon the following grounds:

(1) Because he was convicted upon an information, and not upon an indictment; (2) because sentence was imposed upon him for a crime of which he was not convicted; (3) because it did not appear from the record that the court had power to sentence him to a prison outside the state of Arkansas, and made no finding that there was no jail or penitentiary within the state suitable for the confinement of persons convicted of crime against the United