

the cargo under the hatches by saying that they were compelled to retrim the cargo at sea after heavy weather, and in so doing left the sulphur under the hatches in the condition it was in on arrival; and their testimony is sufficient to overcome the not very probable suggestion that the three hatches of the bark were opened during the voyage, and sulphur shoveled out of each hatch to the amount, in all, of 28 tons, and the same placed on board some other vessel supposed to have come along-side the bark for that purpose. Certainly it would be improper to infer that such a transaction had taken place from the mere appearance of the cargo at the time the hatches were opened in New York, in the face of positive testimony that no such thing was done. But little support to the merchant's case is obtained from the testimony that, when the hatches were opened, the mate falsely stated that sulphur had been thrown overboard during the voyage. The mate could speak very little English, and those who conversed with him could not understand Italian, and I am not certain that he was understood. It is quite likely that he was alluding to sulphur that had been cast out by the pumps.

My conclusion, therefore, is that the non-delivery of sulphur charged by the merchant has not been proved. The result is that the libel of the merchant must be dismissed, with costs, and the libel for the gratuity must be sustained.

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THE CALISTA HAWES.\*

(District Court, E. D. New York. December 4, 1882.)

NEGLECT IN HOISTING BARREL—PERSONAL INJURY—LIABILITY.

Where an assistant United States weigher, whose duty it was to keep tally of a vessel's cargo while it was being discharged, was required to be about the main hatch on the main deck of the vessel, and the mate undertook to hoist a barrel from the pier on the opposite side of the vessel from that on which the cargo was being discharged, with the tackle and fall employed to raise the cargo from the hold, which was so arranged that the barrel was swung across the deck in spite of the efforts of two men stationed on the rail to assist in getting the barrel to the deck, and the barrel, while so swinging, struck the weigher, who was standing on the deck with his back turned to the rail, and knocked him over the combings of the hatch into the lower hold, no warning having been given him in time to enable him to move, *held*, that the libellant's injuries arose from a neglect on the part of the owner of the ship to discharge

\*Reported by R. D. & Wyllys Benedict.

a duty arising on navigable water out of the employment of the ship as an instrument of commerce, and owing to the libellant, and that the vessel was liable for the injuries resulting, and there must be a reference to ascertain the amount.

In Admiralty.

*Beebe, Wilcox & Hobbs*, for libellant.

*Butler, Stillman & Hubbard*, for the vessel.

BENEDICT, D. J. The facts of this case are not in doubt:

The libellant, William G. Vance, was an assistant United States weigher, whose duty it was to keep tally of the cargo of the ship *Calista Hawes*, while that vessel was discharging her cargo in this port. The cargo consisted of iron ore, and was discharged into a lighter lying along-side the ship on her starboard side. The libellant, in order to a proper discharge of his duty, was required to be about the main hatch upon the main deck of the vessel. During a short cessation of the discharge of the cargo, the mate of the vessel undertook to raise from the pier on the port side of the vessel to the deck of the vessel a barrel of tar. He used for this purpose the tackle and fall employed to raise the cargo from the hold. This tackle and fall were attached to a span rigged to the masts over the main hatch, the span being fastened by a guy-rope on the starboard side, so that it could not swing to port, but would raise the weight over the center of the hatch. The mate, without loosing the guy by which the span was guyed to starboard, carried the fall over the port side of the ship to the pier, and then attached it to the barrel of tar, and by horse-power raised the barrel above the rail. No guy-rope had been attached to the barrel, but two men were stationed on the rail to assist in getting the barrel to the deck. The result of this method of proceeding was that the barrel, when raised by the horse, as soon as it cleared the rail, and in spite of the efforts of the men on the rail, was pulled by the power of the horse across the deck from the rail to the hatch. At the time the barrel was thus pulled across the deck, the libellant and another man were standing on the deck between the rail and hatch near to the combings, with their backs to the rail and directly in the course taken by the barrel. Both men were struck by the barrel as it passed across the deck. One was not injured, but the libellant was knocked over the combings of the hatch and into the lower hold. No warning was given to the libellant in time to enable him to move from his position.

Upon these facts the liability of the ship is clear. The libellant's injuries arose from a neglect on the part of the owner of the ship to discharge a duty arising on navigable water out of the employment of the ship as an instrument of commerce, and owing to the libellant. The mate was in charge of the ship. His neglect was in law the neglect of the owner. It was the duty of the mate so to hoist the barrel as to prevent it from being pulled by the power of a horse across the deck where the libellant was standing. This duty was neglected

when the barrel was hoisted with the span so guyed that the barrel, when raised by the power of the horse above the rail, would be drawn by the same power out of the hands of the men on the rail and across the deck. The duty thus neglected arose upon navigable water, out of the employment of the vessel as an instrument of commerce. The case is similar in principle to the case of *The Kate Cann*, decided by this court and affirmed by the circuit court, 2 FED. REP. 241; 8 FED. REP. 719.

The libelant was guilty of no negligence. He was standing where he had the right to stand in the discharge of his official duty. If he could be chargeable with knowledge that the barrel was being hoisted from the pier at that place, he had the right to assume that it would not be pulled across the deck where he was, and no notice to the contrary was given him.

There must, therefore, be a decree in favor of the libelant, with an order of reference to ascertain the amount.

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### THE FRANCISCO GARGUILO.\*

(District Court, E. D. New York. December 7, 1882.)

#### PILOTAGE—TENDER OF SERVICES—STATE STATUTE.

A pilot who brought a vessel into the port of New York from sea became entitled under a state statute to pilot her to sea when she next left the port, by himself or one of his boat's company. The master of the vessel arranged with the pilot to meet him at a certain time and place, whence they were to go on board the vessel together. The pilot presented himself at the time and place appointed; the master did not appear, but went on board and to sea without a pilot. *Held*, that this was sufficient tender of his services on the part of the pilot, without his presenting himself on board the vessel, to charge the vessel with liability for the damages resulting from the non-performance of the obligation created by the statute.

In Admiralty.

*Butler, Stillman & Hubbard*, for libelant.

*Goodrich, Deady & Platt*, for claimant.

BENEDICT, D. J. This case comes before the court upon exceptions to the libel. The facts averred in the libel are in substance these: The libelant, John E. Johnson, being a regular licensed pilot, was employed to pilot the bark *Francisco Garguilo* from sea to the port of New York, and in fact did bring that vessel in from sea. When

\*Reported by R. D. & Wyllys Benedict.